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ABSTRACT
This study examines the foreign subsidiary performance evaluation and 
control systems in operation in multinational corporations (MNCs), 
with a view to determining the extent and ways in which the influences 
of host country environments are taken into account in the evaluation 
of operations and managers. Additionally, the study attempts to 
determine the profile of the multinationals which employ systems that 
are sensitive to the environment.
In general, the foreign subsidiary performance evaluation and control 
process is known to have an important impact on the international 
allocation of company resources. This fact has relevant implications 
for a number of actors in the multinational scene: for corporations,
since it is through the exercise of control and the close monitoring 
of the subunits* performance that the integration of foreign 
operations is coherently achieved with the overall corporate strategy; 
for managers responsible for the subsidiaries, since the outcome of 
the assessment process normally generates decisions concerning 
promotion and supplemental compensation of the local management; and 
for host nations, since the evaluation process provides indications 
that may lead the multinationals to increase their local investments 
in some countries and to divest from others.
Environmental recognition in the performance assessment of foreign 
operations is considered, in particular, to be a vital element of the 
evaluation and control process in MNCs. This is so due to a number of 
reasons which have to do first with the application of certain 
conditions necessary for the accomplishment of an equitable and 
effective assessment, and second with the internal organization of 
multinationals, their strategy, and the nature of their activities 
which may render them particularly vulnerable to host country 
environmental influences.
From the review of the literature, a predominantly deductive mode was 
chosen, and a set of hypotheses was generated. Data for the research 
were collected with the help of a questionnaire mailed to the 210 
British-based MNCs that form part of the 500 largest industrial 
companies in the United Kingdom. The overall response rate to the 
survey amounted to 82 percent. In total, 101 corporations participated 
in the study which corresponds to a success rate of 48 percent. 
Further to the questionnaire, in-depth interviews with company senior 
executives were conducted.
11
The study Involved a detailed examination of the formal reporting 
channels operated between subsidiaries and headquarters, and of the 
methods and criteria employed in the assessment of foreign operations. 
A major finding of the research is that in the majority of companies 
the formal assessment criteria used for foreign subsidiaries and their 
managers are at least moderately capable of taking host country 
environmental influences into account. A comparison of this finding 
with the scarce evidence available from American studies, suggests 
that the performance evaluation systems used in British MNCs tend to 
be more sensitive to the environment than those in operation in U.S. 
multinationals. Despite this intrinsic capability of the systems 
used, headquarters executives generally believed that formal 
evaluation criteria should reflect environmental influences to an even 
greater extent than they actually do. Considering that headquarters 
executives normally viewed their systems as extensively reflecting the 
environment, it appears that their requirements in this respect are 
extremely high. This may be interpreted as an indication of the 
importance of the environmental issue for those who in practice are 
involved in the evaluation and control of foreign operations.
Multinationals that are largely involved in operating overseas, and 
whose activities can be seriously affected by changes in host country 
conditions were found to use methods of performance assessment that 
take more extensive account of the local environmental situation. In 
effect, firms with a higher commitment to foreign operations, higher 
internationalization levels, and a higher exposure to host country and 
government influences employ evaluation systems that tend to be more 
sensitive to the environment. Also, companies which have an 
environmental scanning activity institutionalized at headquarters, 
tend to employ evaluation systems that are more environmentally 
sensitive.
Besides analysing the formal criteria used in the assessment of 
foreign operations, the study also examines the role of informal 
information in the performance evaluation process. Generally, the 
amount of information retrieved outside the formal communication 
network and used in performance assessment was found to be very 
substantial. Contrary to expectations based on theory, the study 
appears to indicate that information is collected informally mainly to 
complement the formal evaluation systems and to enhance their 
capabilities and strengths, rather than to serve as a substitute for 
them.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
1.1. The Context of the Study
The rapid growth of business activities across national boundaries 
experienced by corporations in recent years has raised interest in a 
number of problems that have become important challenges to the
business and academic communities of today. One such problem area is 
the performance evaluation of subsidiaries and managers acting in an 
international network of operations. This constitutes a critical 
issue in the control function of multinational corporations (MNCs).
In general, the control and evaluation of performance of
organizational subunits is an activity essential to the coordination 
of the geographically dispersed activities of a multinational, which 
further contributes to the achievement of a coherent integration of 
operations with the overall strategy of the company [e.g. Prahalad and 
Doz, 1 9 8 1]. Moreover, the control and evaluation process has a 
relevant impact on the allocation of economic, financial, 
technological, and human resources among the various subsidiaries of a 
firm on a worldwide basis [e.g. Shapiro, 1978]. Decisions such as 
those concerning promotion and supplemental compensation of subsidiary 
managers, and those leading either to additional investment in or 
divestment from countries where companies had chosen to invest are
believed to be strongly influenced by indications provided by the
performance evaluation systems operated in the companies. For these 
reasons, the evaluation and control process in MNCs has implications 
that are relevant not only to the corporations themselves but also to 
the countries which are the recipient of the investments.
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1.1.1. The Importance of Environmental Consideration In Foreign 
Subsidiary Performance Evaluation and Control
Like any organization, the MNC is open to its external environment, 
being subject to the impact of environmental characteristics upon its 
activities, and having to react to such characteristics by adopting 
adequate courses of action. In fact, no organization exists in 
isolation from its external environment. Instead, organizations are 
affected by the impact of a complex sociological - cultural - 
political - legal - economic whole which influences their performance 
and frames their activities.
However, the MNC is distinct from any other type of organization 
insofar as the external environment presents particularly high levels 
of variability. These levels of variability stem from the crossing of 
national borders for, as the name suggests, the distinctive 
characteristic of the MNC is that operations are spread over different 
countries often covering separate geographic areas around the world.
When corporate activities cross home boundaries and become
international, the company no longer faces a relatively uniform set of 
environmental characteristics such as a sole currency, a common 
language, a collective political and legal system, and a similar 
economic and cultural structure. In reality, the company is subject 
to wide ranging environmental frameworks that vary in accordance to 
the number and nature of the host countries operated. Each 
environmental framework poses particular threats and opportunities 
which will eventually affect the performance of the subsidiaries of 
the MNC.
Many are the environmental factors impinging on subsidiaries’
activities, their relative power in influencing subsidiaries’ 
performance varying from host country to host country. Examples of 
such factors are import-export controls imposed over a subsidiary by 
local regulations, rates of inflation, exchange controls, consumer
market mobility, production-factors costs, demands made on companies
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by host country legislation (e.g. equitable pricing policies for 
international and intra-company sales or transfer prices, inclusion of 
research and product development in subsidiaries, retaining of 
earnings for subsidiary growth, realization of subsidiary’s operating 
potential through expansion plans developed in the subsidiary rather 
than in company’s headquarters), tax structures, organization of 
capital markets, political instability, cultural backgrounds, 
educational levels of the nationals, social unrest, and quality of 
labour relations with management. In general, the various external 
environmental factors may be grouped into two major classes: economic, 
and non-economic, the latter including political, legal, and socio­
cultural dimensions [e.g. Farmer and Richman, 1965; Brooke and 
Remmers, 1972; Glueck, 1976].
The recognition of the environmental factors that influence 
subsidiaries’ operations and which are particularly relevant in 
performance determination is critical to the exercise of the control 
function in MNCs, for two main reasons. One proceeds from the 
application of the concept of responsibility accounting, and in 
particular of the principle of authority and controllability to the 
evaluation process. According to this principle, resources employed 
in an organizational subunit (inputs) and results produced (outputs) 
should be under the effective authority and control of the managers 
responsible for the subunits [e.g. Miller, 1982; Horngren, 1982]. 
Considering that each foreign subsidiary of a MNC is subject to a 
particular set of environmental conditions that affect its operations, 
it becomes apparent that in order to achieve a fair and competent 
assessment of the subsidiary management, executives in headquarters 
ought to comprehend the specificity of each host country environment. 
Moreover, the understanding of the particular environmental conditions 
faced locally is believed to contribute to a better appreciation of 
the potential of each subsidiary. This has important implications not 
only for the ongoing control of the subsidiary operating performance 
but also for the future allocation of resources and the implementation 
of corporate strategy.
The other main reason justifying the need for the recognition of the 
environmental impact on foreign operations is related to the
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vulnerability of certain MNCs to unexpected changes in the 
characteristics of the host environments. Such a vulnerability may be 
due to different causes, often arising from the way in which the 
international industrial strategy of the multinational is organized, 
and the type of business in which the company is in. As to the 
former, different sources [e.g. Channon, 1979; Davidson, 1982; 
Stopford and Turner, 1985] note that nowadays MNCs are tending to a
global organization of their activities where coordination of
operations is built around an integrated global strategy which seeks 
to realize fully the synergistic potential of the total multi-national 
system of operations. This type of strategy requires a very close 
control exercised by headquarters, and as a result subsidiaries can no 
longer maintain relatively high levels of independence. On the 
contrary, all main subsidiaries of a corporation interact in a complex 
network of mutual relationships under the logic of an overall plan of 
action superimposed centrally. In this context, the failure of one
single operation has a much more serious impact on the whole of the
company than otherwise would have if the subsidiaries were relatively 
independent of each other. It becomes, therefore, vital that 
headquarters managers responsible for the evaluation and control of 
subsidiaries are capable of understanding the dynamic nature of the 
host country environments and also how the environment may affect 
operations. Only in this way can future changes be anticipated and 
corrective actions be taken in a timely manner.
High vulnerability of a MNC to the environment does not stem solely 
from strategies of global integration. In fact, companies that adopt 
an opposite strategy of nation-for-nation segmentation may also be 
highly vulnerable to the foreign subsidiary environmental situation. 
These are cases of multinationals that, due to the nature of their
business, are subject to high levels of exposure to host country and
government influence. In industries such as telecommunications, 
natural resources, and heavy engineering, which are of particular 
strategic importance to host nations, or whose main clients are either 
governments or state owned enterprises, MNCs tend to be more 
vulnerable to local conditions [Doz, 1980]. In such cases, it is also
essential that the evaluation and control of subsidiaries is able to
understand and follow the peculiarities of the host environments.
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There seems to be an Increasing interest on the part of MNCs in the 
identification of influences exerted by local environmental conditions 
upon overseas activities. An indication of this is the growing spread 
of an environmental assessment activity among multinationals. Recent 
studies reporting on American MNCs revealed that the collection and 
analysis of foreign environmental information is rapidly emerging as a 
new managerial function located in multinationals* headquarters 
[Kobrin et al., I9 8O; Kennedy, 1984]. Although in the vast majority 
of the cases the information generated by this function is almost 
exclusively used in initial investment decisions and strategic 
planning, it is conceivable that companies will eventually employ the 
information in the subsidiary evaluation and control process as well.
The realization of the importance of the environmental impact on 
multinationals has led authors to call for a rethinking of many well 
established conventions in both management theory and practice. For 
example, Ringbakk [1976] argues:
"While corporate planning in the past was market-based and 
concerned with growth and profitability in terms such as 
return on investment or assets, planning in the years ahead 
will have to be much more politically oriented and sensitive 
to societal and national priorities. To live up to these 
challenges, international executives and enterprises will 
have to display increasing corporate flexibility, 
entrepreneurship, contingencies, and above all corporate 
statesmanship. To accomplish this. [...1 we need to assess 
past conventions and practices in the light of the emergent 
forces for change." [p.9, emphasis added]
This new approach should not be applied only to the areas of strategic 
planning and general management, but to all facets of corporate 
activity. In the particular case of foreign subsidiary evaluation and 
control, it seems that no common yardstick is adequate for the 
totality of the international activities of the company. Instead of 
superimposing uniform techniques of assessment, and a companywide 
battery of standards, multinationals should rather implement flexible 
performance evaluation systems that can capture the specificity of 
each subsidiary and take the particular characteristics of the local 
environments into account.
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1.1,2. The Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the ways in and the 
extent to which environmental characteristics - both economic and non­
economic - external to foreign subsidiaries of MNCs are taken into 
account in the evaluation and control systems employed in the 
assessment of subsidiaries and their managers.
The study intends to generate testable hypotheses which will be based 
on an operational model drawn from the literature, being described in 
chapter 7. Briefly, this model establishes that the characteristics 
of the control and evaluation systems used by MNCs for foreign 
operations, and consequently the capability of the systems to take 
environmental influences into account, may vary from company to 
company according to some selected corporate features. Such features 
include, among others, the international strategy of the MNC, its 
exposure to host country and government influence, its main industry 
and size, and its commitment to foreign operations and level of 
internationalization. The investigation of the significance of these 
corporate characteristics in possibly explaining differences in 
companies* practices is considered to be an important object of the 
research.
The study will focus on British-based MNCs for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the U.K. constitutes the most convenient universe of analysis 
due to the geographic positioning of the researcher. Secondly, there 
is a noticeable scarcity of information on the practices of 
multinationals originated from the U.K., especially if compared with 
the amount of information available on American MNCs. Thirdly, and 
most important, Britain has a very prominent role as a country from 
where foreign direct investment is originated. This latter point will 
be further explained.
Historically, the United Kingdom has for more than a century been a 
strong source of multinational enterprises. As Dunning [1985] points 
out, the direct international involvement of British companies can be 
traced back to the nineteenth century, this making the U.K. the nation
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with the largest experience as a foreign direct investor. Nowadays, 
the overseas investments of British companies are only second to those 
of U.S. multinationals, and amount to volumes that are twice as high 
as the total foreign investment of competing economies. In fact, in 
the beginning of the eighties the stock of direct investment abroad 
owned by British MNCs was about 14 percent of the world total, as 
compared with 42 percent for the United States which holds the top 
position, and an individual share in the region of 7 percent for a 
group of countries that immediately follow the U.K.: Netherlands, West 
Germany, Japan, and Switzerland [see Stopford and Dunning, 1983,
ch.1]. Considering that in the past decade British MNCs have been
able to hold reasonably well to their second place position, Stopford 
and Turner [1985] remark that the well publicized problems of 
unemployment, slow growth, and de-industrialization that afflict the 
British economy do not seem to have greatly upset the thrust of the 
U.K. multinational business. As Stopford and Turner [ibid., p.8] 
observe: "British multinationals therefore seem to be rather more
resilient than the underlying health of the parent British econmay 
might have suggested."
Another important characteristic of U.K.-based MNCs, with relevant 
implications for the present study, is related to the geographical 
spread of the businesses. It is a well known fact that the
international expansion of British companies was in the beginning 
closely focused on the so-called "Empire" and later on the
Commonwealth, In the past 25 years, however, British companies 
started expanding more rapidly first in Europe and then in the United 
States, while maintaining their presence already acquired in other 
regions of the globe [Stopford and Turner, 1985]. As a consequence, 
MNCs from the U.K. tend to have a wide geographical spread which 
serves the purpose of the present study. In effect, the environmental 
issue in foreign subsidiary performance evaluation is considered to be 
of particular relevance for multinationals that are subject to a large 
variation in host country environmental influences.
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1.1.3. Previous Research
Consideration of the environment in performance assessment is an issue 
that has not been properly addressed in the literature. In reality, 
the theory has so far generally overlooked the importance of the 
recognition of the environmental impact on operations in the foreign 
subsidiary evaluation and control process. Also, empirical studies on 
the criteria employed by MNCs to assess the performance of foreign 
operations have not undertaken the examination of the environmental 
issue in a satisfactory manner.
A number of studies, all focusing on U.S.-based MNCs [Mauriel, 1969; 
Mclnnes, 1971; Bursk et al., 1971; Robbins and Stobaugh, 1973a and 
1973b; Persen and Van Lessig, 1979; Morsicato, 1980; Choi, Ckechowicz 
and Bavishi, 1982; and Yunker, 1983], have attempted to describe the
techniques employed by corporations in the evaluation of foreign
subsidiaries and managers. However, none of them was specifically
designed to explore the extent to which host country environmental
factors are allowed for in the performance evaluation activity.
From such studies a general picture of the internal evaluation and
control systems employed in multinationals has emerged. In general, 
the studies are consistent in reporting a number of characteristics 
commonly found in practice, namely: 1) the existence of insignificant 
differences both in the design and in the use of evaluation systems 
for foreign and domestic operations; 2) the application of identical 
evaluation criteria to all the foreign subsidiaries of a company; 3) 
the use of the same evaluation techniques in the assessment of
subsidiaries and managers; and 4) a tendency for headquarters to rely 
strongly on profit-based measures mainly on the rate of return on
investment (ROI) as the key indicators of foreign subsidiary
performance.
Given these characteristics, one may wonder how MNCs are able to cope 
with the diversity of conditions present in their network of 
international operations when it comes to evaluate the performance of 
subsidiaries and managers. In effect, from the findings just
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summarized it appears that the consideration of the specificity of 
each subsidiary is extremely difficult to achieve with the systems 
currently in operation. Furthermore, it seems in particular that 
environmental influences peculiar to individual operations are not 
adequately being taken into account by the performance evaluation 
systems. This was the conclusion of one of the studies mentioned 
above, which to some extent addressed the environmental issue 
[Morsicato, 1980]. It was suggested in Morsicato’s study that firms 
were not systematically designing performance evaluation systems that 
recognized environmental differences. In effect it was found that:
"[...] If the geographic area is taken separately, the 
operating environment does not affect either the actual or 
preferred policy towards developing a system of performance 
evaluation Wiidi reflects environmental differences." [ibid.,
p.9 3]
The body of empirical evidence accumulated by the studies on foreign 
subsidiary performance evaluation relates almost exclusively to 
American MNCs. This being so, little is known as to equivalent 
practices of multinationals from Britain and other countries. Indeed, 
there is reason to believe that the techniques and processes employed 
in U.K.-based MNCs differ from those used by their American 
counterparts. If for U.S. MNCs one may suspect, in the light of the 
incomplete evidence available, that the performance evaluation 
criteria in use are generally not sensitive to the varying influences 
of the host country environments, for U.K. multinationals the 
situation may well be different. Endorsing this view is a study by 
Negandhi and Baliga [1979] which suggests that in contrast to the 
typical American multinational's concentration on profits, European 
and Japanese corporations consider other, less tangible, factors such 
as the maintenance of harmonious relations with host government 
officials and other influential people in the countries where the 
subsidiaries operate.
The answer to questions concerning the environmental issue in 
performance evaluation, not only in terms of the actual capability of 
the systems operated by MNCs but also as regards the ways in which the 
environment can conceptually be taken into account, requires 
additional research. It is believed that such research should cover
1 / INTRODUCTION
certain areas and topics which have been absent in past studies. One 
area refers to the formal reporting system operated between 
subsidiaries and headquarters which produces a strong flow of 
information regularly submitted to executives in the parent company. 
This reporting system has been overlooked in most studies on foreign 
subsidiary performance evaluation, and yet the information that it 
generates is bound to play an important role in the assessment process 
(for example, it is evident from Leksell [1981] that the internal 
reporting system in multinationals is a key element in the control of 
international activities).
Another aspect often deficiently addressed in studies is the set of 
measures and standards employed in the evaluation of operations. In 
effect, there has been an unbalanced emphasis on financial, and mainly 
profit-based, indicators of performance, which has led to a scant 
consideration in the analysis of the extent of use of non-financial 
and qualitative indicators. As can be inferred from Kaplan [1983], 
the importance of indicators of a non-financial nature to the
monitoring of organizational performance is paramount.
Another area frequently absent in past research is the informal 
dimension in performance evaluation. Robbins and Stobaugh [1973a] 
pioneered the idea that beyond the formal criteria of performance
evaluation there might well be an informal assessment which may 
compensate for some of the flaws of the formal systems. And they 
referred to a few procedures used in practice to supplement formal 
information, such as personal visits to locations and rules-of-thumb 
employed to differentiate subsidiaries according to their specificity. 
Informal accounting information systems in general were found to
constitute a widespread and well-established practice in business 
[Clancy and Collins, 1979]. However, no one is known to have
attempted to determine the precise role of informal information in the 
multinational performance evaluation process.
Besides all these areas requiring to be covered, it is believed that a 
study addressing the environmental issue in performance evaluation 
should also investigate whether an environmental scanning activity 
exists centrally located in companies. As mentioned earlier in the
10
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chapter, the collection and analysis of foreign environmental 
information was found by a number of studies to be essential in making 
strategic decisions. However, it is expected that this information is 
equally employed in performance evaluation. If this is confirmed, it 
becomes apparent that the determination of the function and locus of 
the environmental scanning activity represents a relevant aspect for 
the study of the environmental issue in foreign subsidiary performance 
evaluation.
In summary, from what has been discussed in this section two points 
stand out as most relevant. One concerns the importance of taking 
into account in the performance evaluation and control process of 
MNCs, the particular host country environmental conditions encountered 
by subsidiaries in each geographic region operated. The other relates 
to the absence of research done in this area so far. Quite 
significantly, in a recent review article by Schoenfeld [1981] where 
the present state of knowledge in the field of international 
accounting is surveyed, these two points are strongly emphasized. As 
the author states:
■[...] results of operations [in MNCs] are influenced by a 
large number of local variables that require individual 
monitoring and interpretation. [...] Existing and increasing 
degrees of decentralization and operational diversity of 
foreign subsidiaries (induced partially by growing 
nationalism), require detailed nonaggregate analysis of 
individual activities. To "environmentalize" performance 
analvsis several approaches can be applied. Unfortunately, 
insufficient conceptual and empirical research is available at 
present; for example, few case descriptions of performance 
measurement exist and the policy differences between 
multinational enterprises from Europe, Japan, and the U.S. 
whi(A suggest the need for different measurgents have not 
been correlated with these actual approaches. [...] To reduce 
dangers of misinterpretation or inefficiencies, sufficient 
background information about local conditions must be 
incorporated explicitly into the information (accounting) 
system. This problem, though well known to MNE managers, has 
been largely neglected bv scholars: r e s e a r o n  cross-cultural 
loss of information or, conversely, additional information 
requirements is lacking in spite of the fact that it should be 
a prime target." [ibid., pp.92-93, emphasis added]
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1.2. Research Questions and Expected Outcomes
Having defined the context of the research, the main empirical 
question that motivates the study asks;
How and to which extent are external environmental influences 
on foreign operations taken into account in the performance 
evaluation and control systems used in MNCs for subsidiaries 
and subsidiaries' managers?
The complexity of this question, derived from its broad scope and the 
nature of the issues involved, requires that a thorou^ analysis 
aiming at the characterization of the performance evaluation and 
control process in British MNCs be undertaken.
A first step which will place the use of foreign environmental 
information in its organizational and managerial context consists of 
studying the organization of the environmental scanning activity in 
MNCs. It is believed that this activity, when existing in companies’ 
headquarters, may have important implications for the environmental 
capability of the evaluation and control systems employed. For this 
reason, the research will explore the ways in which host country 
environmental information is collected and analysed centrally in 
headquarters. It will also determine the extent of use of such an 
information in the foreign subsidiary evaluation process.
As explained earlier, the full understanding of subunit performance 
evaluation cannot be achieved without taking a close look at the 
formal reporting system in operation between subsidiaries and 
headquarters. The information reported via these formal channels of 
communication will be analysed with a view to determine its nature, 
and the way in which it is used in the assessment of subsidiaries and 
managers. After finding out which type of subsidiary information is 
generally at the disposal of headquarters managers, the study will 
concentrate on the characterization of the methods of assessment
12
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employed. Particular attention will be given to the identification of 
certain key features inherent to the performance evaluation systems 
implemented in companies, such as: 1) the nature of the success
indicators and standards used (i.e. whether they are quantitative or 
qualitative, financial or non-financial, and profit-based or non­
profit-based); 2) the relative importance assigned by headquarters 
executives to each indicator employed; 3) the capability of the 
systems to allow for a distinction in the criteria used to evaluate
the performance of operations and to assess that of managers; 4) the
variability of success indicators and standards applied to 
subsidiaries with different characteristics.
From the analysis of features such as these, it is expected to be
possible to construct an instrument that gives an indication of how
sensitive to the host country environments are the performance 
evaluation systems in operation in the MNCs studied. This will 
provide an objective measurement of the actual environmental
sensitivity of evaluation systems. Therefore, the instrument created 
in the study will have the advantage of being independent from the 
subjective perceptions of headquarters executives as to the level of 
environmental sensitivity possessed by the evaluation criteria 
utilized.
Having accomplished the objective defined by the research question 
above, the study will attempt to determine the profile of those MNCs 
that employ evaluation and control systems more sensitive to host
country environmental influences. This leads to another research 
question which can be seen as a corollary of the previous one:
Which major characteristics of the MNCs are related to the 
degree to whidi the performance evaluation and control syst^s 
in operation take the environment into account?
It is hypothesized that evaluation systems showing higher degrees of 
sensitivity to the environment will be encountered in multinationals 
whose operations are particularly vulnerable to environmental
influences as well as in companies whose size, organizational
structure, and experience enable the utilization of more sophisticated
13
1 / INTRODUCTION
assessment practices. As to the vulnerability of MNCs to the
environment, it is anticipated that firms with global integration 
strategies, high levels of exposure to host country influence, tight 
strategic control over subsidiaries, high levels of 
internationalization, and a high commitment to foreign operations will 
tend to employ evaluation and control systems that take more extensive 
account of the host environments.
The outcomes anticipated so far concern formally institutionalized 
evaluation and control practices. However, earlier in the chapter
attention was drawn to the important role played by informal
information in the performance evaluation process. The study will 
attempt to understand and define the extent of intervention of this 
informal dimension on the assessment of subsidiaries and managers of a 
MNC. In particular, it is expected that the less the formal systems 
account for environmental influences on foreign subsidiaries, the 
higher will be the volume of environmental information collected via 
informal methods, and incorporated, although not systematically, in 
subsidiary and managerial evaluation.
It is hoped that the answer to the research questions formulated here 
will contribute to a better knowledge of the problem of environmental 
recognition encountered in the assessment of foreign operations, and 
will generate solutions of value both to theory and practice.
1.3. Research Methodology
Due to the empirical nature of the study, the research employs survey 
methods to collect information about the practices followed in 
companies. The method of survey research, as it is used in the study, 
encompasses the dual task of description of corporate practices and 
exploration of inferential relationships between practices and certain 
independent variables, such as corporate characteristics.
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The basic data on which descriptions and inferences are constructed is 
collected from a number of techniques, namely mail questionnaire, 
personal interview, and to a smaller extent archival search. The 
questionnaire is the pillar of the data collection in the study and 
all possible care was taken in its preparation, testing, and 
administration. The survey population to which the questionnaire was 
mailed was composed of all the U.K.-based multinationals among the 500 
largest British industrial companies, included in the Times 1000 
[1982- 83] list (for a definition of multinational for purposes of 
selection of the survey population see chapter 8, section 8.3.1.). 
The administration of the questionnaire was followed-up by a reduced 
number of personal interviews conducted with questionnaire 
respondents. The interviews are a means to acquire in-depth 
information relating certain aspects of particular interest to the 
research. They are also a mechanism to check further the capability 
of the questionnaire in accurately describing companies’ practices. 
The selection of firms for interview was judgemental, and attempted to 
cover a range of cases employing different practices in key issues of 
the research. Finally, the collection of relevant information for the 
study is complemented with archival search, notably from published 
annual company reports.
Survey research has the distinct advantage of enabling inferences to 
be made with respect to large populations from the selection of 
smaller samples. Such an inferential process is achieved with 
statistical techniques whose utilization is facilitated by the nature 
of the information collected. The present study employs a wide range 
of descriptive and inferential statistics which are hoped to give the 
investigation robust evidence, allowing the generalization of the 
results. Despite these advantages, critics of the survey research 
method built around the questionnaire instrument note that the
information collected merely reflects the perceptions and beliefs of
the respondents and not necessarily the reality. In order to overcome 
this limitation of the methodology, the questionnaire to be used in 
the study emphasized factual instead of opinion questions. In
addition, methods to confirm independently the rigour of the
information provided in the questionnaire were used.
15
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As a final word, it should be noted that the main feature of this work 
is that of an exploratory empirical investigation, and as such it is 
not purposely developed in a normative way. In spite of this, the 
study attempts to generate insights into the process of foreign 
subsidiary performance evaluation and control which, it is hoped, will 
have relevant implications for the development of normative theory.
1.4. Outline of the Study
The study is organized into three major parts. The first reviews the 
literature relevant to the problem under investigation. The second 
part defines the research approach and its design and methodology. 
The third part reports the results of the empirical analysis 
undertaken, comments on the conclusions reached, and finally 
summarizes the main findings. An overview of the study with a brief 
introduction to each individual chapter is given here.
Part I is intended to provide the theoretical foundations of the study 
and to review previous research conducted in the area. It is divided 
into five chapters, as follows:
Chapter 2 provides the general theoretical context of the interaction 
between an enterprise and its external environment. Contributions 
from organization theory and comparative management theory to the
understanding of the impact of the environment on organizational 
patterns and effectiveness are reviewed here. In addition, the
chapter presents a model of environmental interaction which attempts 
to integrate these two bodies of theory.
Chapter 3 brings the conceptualization of the Interaction of
enterprise-environment to a more tangible level, centred upon the
particular case of the MNC. It starts by presenting the multitude of 
environmental frameworks in international business, and then discusses 
the forms used by multinationals to respond to environmental threats
16
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and opportunities while simultaneously matching their internal 
resource capabilities. This is the essence of corporate strategy, 
whose understanding is considered essential for the study of foreign 
subsidiary performance evaluation. The chapter ends with a discussion 
of the environmental scanning activity in MNCs.
Chapter 4 introduces the performance evaluation and control function 
in MNCs. It examines the essence of control in organizations in
general, and discusses the formal performance evaluation process of
foreign susbsidiaries in particular. It also introduces the informal
dimension in performance assessment, analysing the role of informal 
information in the headquarters-subsidiary relationship.
Chapter 5 focuses on the main instruments through which performance 
evaluation and control are normally exercised. Classic measures of
divisional performance are reviewed with a discussion of their
advantages and weaknesses, and special attention is given to the 
budget due to its important role as an integrated instrument of 
subunit performance evaluation. The chapter ends with an examination 
of the rationale for the use of non-financial and qualitative success 
indicators.
Chapter 6 surveys the available empirical evidence as regards the 
performance evaluation and control criteria employed in MNCs. Eight 
major studies spanning over a period of more than a decade are 
analysed, and their findings referred to the context of the present 
research.
Part II, dealing with the research approach and design, has two 
chapters :
Chapter 7 formulates the main problem to be investigated and presents 
a model of foreign subsidiary performance evaluation and control that 
operationalizes the theoretical concepts and issues reviewed in Part 
I. Additionally, the chapter generates the research hypotheses to be 
tested later, and defines the methodology to be adopted.
17
1 / INTRODUCTION
Chapter 8 discusses the data collection Instruments employed. It 
explains the steps taken In the preparation and administration of the 
questionnaire, and in the organization of the follow-up interviews.
Part III, finally, presents the empirical side of the study. It is 
divided into the following six chapters:
Chapter 9 describes the characteristics of the research sample in 
terms of the independent or explanatory variables of the study. The 
concrete definition of these variables and the determination of the 
criteria employed for their measurement are also made here.
Chapter 10 examines the collection and analysis of foreign 
environmental information in the headquarters of MNCs. It reports
first on the environmental scanning practices, and then presents
findings on the relationships between such practices and corporate 
characteristi cs.
Chapter 11 describes the features of the internal reporting systems 
operated between foreign subsidiaries and group headquarters, and 
discusses the company characteristics associated with such features of 
the reporting systems.
Chapter 12 may be considered the central chapter of the empirical side 
of the study. It basically analyses the formal criteria used by 
headquarters in the evaluation and control of foreign subsidiaries and
their managers, and determines the degree of environmental sensitivity
possessed by the evaluation systems in operation. It also defines the
profile of the MNC that is more likely to have host country
environmental influences taken into account in the formal evaluation
process. A by-product of this chapter is also the identification for
each geographic area in the world of the environmental factors that
are perceived in headquarters to have the greatest impact on
subsidiaries' local activities.
Chapter 13 is the last chapter of results. It explores the use of
informal information in foreign subsidiary evaluation and control, and
attempts to discover whether the extent of reliance on informal
18
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information by headquaters executives is associated with the relative 
weaknesses of the internal reporting systems and the evaluation 
criteria in general.
Finally, chapter 14 concludes the study by presenting an overview of 
its background and purpose, and by summarizing its main findings. 
After revealing some of the work’s limitations, the chapter ends with 
a discussion of the major contributions of the study, and suggests 
directions for future research.
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PART I
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND EVIDENCE FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES
CHAPTER 2 - THE INTERACTION BETWEEN HITERPRISE AND ENVIRONMENT - 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1. Introduction
It is generally accepted that no individual or organization can exist 
divorced from the external environment in which it is inserted. 
Despite the self-evident character of this assertion, only relatively 
recently have the influences of the external environment on the 
internal properties of an organization been systematically addressed 
in the literature. Two major streams of thou^t in the study of 
organizations, namely organization theory and cross-cultural 
comparative management, have contributed over the years to a better 
understanding of the impact of external environmental factors on
organizational patterns and effectiveness.
These two bodies of theory are reviewed in the present chapter, as 
regards their contribution to the understanding of the interaction 
between organizations and environment. In addition, a model which 
attempts to reconcile and integrate the two approaches is presented in 
the final part of the chapter.
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2.2. The Contribution frcMB the Organization Theory
2.2.1. The General Systems Approach
In the literature on organization theory, the general systems 
approach, by drawing a distinction between open and closed systems, 
calls the attention for the vital importance of the environment in the 
study of complex entities.
The systems approach derives from the sciences of physics and biology 
and is inspired in the pioneering works of Koehler [1938], Angyal 
[1941], and above all Von Bertalanffy [1950]. Its underlying 
principle is based on the notion of system, which in its simplest form 
may be defined as "a set of elements standing in interrelation among 
themselves and with the environment" [Von Bertalanffy, 1972, p.417]. 
The different components in a given system ("subsystems") are 
conceptualized as interdependent elements whose relationships present 
some degree of stability, and which cannot be separated from the whole 
in a meaningful way [Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972]. The performance of 
the whole is not determined by the performance of each part considered 
independently but rather by the way in which the parts fit and work 
together [Ackoff, 1974, pp.13-15].
Conceived at a high level of abstraction, the general systems approach 
has attempted to establish an hierarchy of system complexity. Miller 
[1955] proposed a classification based on living systems which 
includes the cell, organ, organism, group, organization, society, and 
the supernational system. In a more comprehensive classification, 
suggested by Boulding [1956], nine categories were identified, namely 
frameworks (static structures), clockworks (simple dynamic systems), 
feed-back mechanisms (cybernetic systems), the cell (living systems), 
plants, animals, humans, social organizations (sociotechnical 
systems), and finally transcendental systems. Business enterprises, 
as Boulding observed, are placed at the level eight of complexity. As
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sociotechnlcal systems, enterprises are regarded internally as a 
combination of human and non-human (or technical) resources, which 
transact, externally, with other groups and organizations (e.g. 
suppliers, customers, competitors, government, and public) for 
survival. These groups and organizations are part of a wide milieu 
which surrounds the organization affecting its operations. However, 
the relationships between the firm and the external environment are by 
no means passive. Dill [1958] proposed the concept of "task
environment" to describe the external influences to which the 
organization is subject, and to which it responds through adaptive 
behaviour. In a more precise definition, the task environment 
consists of information inputs from external sources, which represent 
stimuli to which an organization is exposed. In this sense, the task 
environment differs from simple tasks and activities. According to 
Dill, when studying organizations one ought to distinguish between 
"things that the organization does (activities), things that the 
organization sets itself to do (tasks), [and] stimuli that the 
organization mi^t respond to (task environment)" [ibid.,p.411].
The recognition of the existence of an important interface between 
organizations and their environments led to viewing business 
enterprises as open systems. This view holds that firms are non-self- 
sufficient entities which in order to survive have to engage in input- 
output transactions with other entities in their task environment.
This view contrasts with the so-called closed systems approach,
according to which organizations are regarded as self-sufficient, 
independent, closed units where problems are normally studied with 
reference only to the organizations’ internal mechanisms. As Emery 
and Trist [I960] stated, "thinking in terms of a closed system [...] 
allows most of [the] problems [of an organization] to be analysed with 
reference to its internal structure and, without reference to its 
external environment" [p.281]. The closed systems approach 
represents, therefore, an "environment-free" thinking, as opposed to 
the open systems which involve an "environment-full" approach [Ackoff, 
1974, ch.1]. Many organizational studies have adopted the restricted
closed systems approach when they centred on the impact of certain 
internal variables such as size, leadership style and location on 
behaviour patterns, and organizational structure and effectiveness
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[e.g. Caplow, 1957; Indik, 1963; Stogdill, 1965; Likert, 1967].
A characterization of the concept of open system, following the 
original writings of some of the leading theorists in systems thinking 
[Von Bertalanffy, 1950, 1950-51, 1962; Ashby, 1952; Boulding, 1956;
Buckley, 1967; Zadeh and Polak, 1969; Ackoff, 1971; etc.] can be found 
for example in Kast and Rosenzweig [1972; 1985, ch.5] and Amey [1979]. 
In these comprehensive reviews the most important features of open and 
closed systems are first explained in the light of the laws of 
thermodynamics, and then meaningfully interpreted with reference to 
the business enterprise. In general, the distinctive characteristics 
of open systems include an inherent tendency to evolve towards greater 
complexity, the ability to reach a "steady-state” (or a stable dynamic 
equilibrium), and the capability of behaving "equifinally" (or to 
reach the same final state from different starting points via diverse 
pathways). The result is that open systems tend to be highly adaptive 
entities which change in conjunction with changes in the external 
environment. The more complex a system the more open to a wider range 
of environmental interchanges it is likely to be, thus making the 
system more subject to uncertainty, ambiguity and incongruence. 
Firms, as highly complex systems, experience a deep necessity to adapt 
and change, and at the same time to resist the forces which compel 
them into loss of identity and into disintegration. According to Amey 
[1979], it is through the exercise of control that companies are able 
to maintain a certain level of stability crucial to their existence. 
The role of control will be discussed in this context in chapter 4.
Many empirical studies in organization have attempted to incorporate 
the principles of the general systems theory. However, researchers 
have faced great difficulties in making the theory operational. The 
present state of knowledge, together with the difficult understanding 
of concepts which are only described at an abstract level, and on 
whose definition theorists sometimes disagree(l), elII contribute to 
making the theory of very difficult practical application.
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2.2.2. The Contingency Approach
In order to avoid such seemingly insurmountable difficulties, 
researchers/theorists on organizations have tried to develop an 
approach which utilizes some of the more salient attributes of the 
systems thinking, and which at the same time provides a feasible base 
for research applied to business enterprises. This approach led to 
the development of a contingency theory of organization which is a 
"midrange" view [Kast and Rosenzweig, 1972], "scmewbere between 
simplistic, specific principles and complex, vague notions" [p.463]. 
It represents a step towards less abstraction, more explicit patterns 
of relationships, and more applicable theory [ibid.]. The contingency 
theory, term labelled by Lawrence and Lorsch [1967], has as a basic 
underlying assumption that organizational variables are in a complex 
interrelationship with one another and with characteristics of the 
environment [ibid., p.157]. When introducing their approach Lawrence 
and Lorsch wrote:
"Until very recently [...] organization researchers and 
theorists have tended to view the internal functioning of 
effective organizations as if there was one best way to 
organize. No attention was devoted to the problem [•••] that 
different external conditions might require different 
organizational characteristics and behavior patterns within 
the effective organization", [ibid.,p.14]
The roots of the contingency approach can be found in the 
contributions to organization theory by a number of authors with a 
very diverse background. Such contributions span from the empirical 
studies of industrial sociologists such as Burns and Stalker [1959], 
and Woodward [1958, 1965] and the experimental designs of group
communication networks of social psychologists such as Leavitt [1962], 
to the works on pre-industrial civilization of Udy [1959]» a 
sociologist, and the history study of the evolution of large U.S. 
corporations by Chandler [1962]. All these studies culminated with 
the landmark empirical investigations of Lawrence and Lorsch [1967] 
and Lorsch and Allen [1973]» and the conceptual works of Thompson 
[1967]» and Galbraith [1973]» which have greatly inspired a vigorous
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stream of research conducted for more than a decade, reaching the
present day.
Common to all this work is the notion that the pattern of internal
states and processes developed by an effective organization are
contingent upon the particular environmental conditions to which the 
organization is subject. For example. Burns and Stalker [1959] 
explored the relationship between internal management practices and 
two characteristics of the external environment - rate of change in 
technologies and markets. They found that in highly dynamic 
industries (the electronics industry) companies tended to be more 
effective when they placed lower emphasis on formal structure and had 
higher levels of interaction and communication among members around 
decisions (this was termed the "organic" pattern of management 
practice). In contrast, in relatively stable industries (the textile 
machinery industry), the more effective firms tended to use heavily 
formal structures and to adhere strictly to hierarchical positioning 
in decision making and information exchange (this was termed the 
"mechanistic" pattern).
Joan Woodward [1958] reported that effective organizations in 
different industries with different technological complexity could be 
consistently characterized by different organizational structures 
(i.e. different number of levels in the hierarchy, and different ratio 
of managers to hourly employees). Udy [1959] studied the compilation 
of anthropological descriptions of a very large number of non­
industrial societies and found that the technological processes to 
which the organizations in these societies were subject had a distinct 
and persistent influence on the structure (authority, division of 
labour, solidarity, proprietorship) of the organizations. In his 
famous study on strategy and structure. Chandler [1962] after 
analysing the case histories of some of the major American companies 
concluded that new strategic choices made by corporations arose from 
environmental changes. The very development of strategic management 
was seen as a result of the awareness of the opportunities and needs 
to employ resources in a more profitable way in face of the changing 
characteristics of the population, income, and technology. The rate 
of environmental change (in technology, markets, and source of supply)
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was to Chandler the phenomenon which creates the pressure in a company 
for strategic and subsequently structural modification.
Lawrence and Lorsch’s [1967] influential study built on much of this 
previous research and developed a systematic set of concepts for 
understanding the relationships among functional units in large, 
single-product companies. The members of each unit (sales, 
production, and research) in an organization were found to develop a 
particularly strong orientation towards the specific goals, time 
horizons, interpersonal relationships, and formality of practices 
required by the respective sub-set of the organization’s total 
environment (the market, the techno-economic, and the scientific 
environmental segments, or subenvironments). Differences in the three 
subenvironments were measured in terms of their respective degree of 
certainty, the scientific subenvironment being the least certain, and 
the techno-economic the most certain. By finding a consistent pattern 
of behaviour among unit members coping separately with three different 
levels of environmental uncertainty, Lawrence and Lorsch were able to 
conclude that organizational "differentiation" (differences between 
functional units in terms of the characteristics mentioned above) was 
related to the "diversity" in the environment (differences in the
level of certainty in the various subenvironments). The authors 
studied the relationship between organizational differentiation and 
environmental diversity in three industries which presented different 
degrees of heterogeneity across subenvironments, and concluded that
within each industry the more effective organizations tended to
demonstrate a closer fit between their level of differentiation and 
the level of diversity of the environment. In other words, in 
effective companies the functional units tend to accommodate better to 
the demands of the corresponding subenvironments than in ineffective 
companies.
Lorsch and Allen [1973] extended the work of Lawrence and Lorsch
[1967] from single-product organizations to multiproduct, 
multidivisional firms. They examined contingent relationships between 
environmental characteristics and internal practices at both the 
divisional and corporate headquarters level, having achieved findings 
that could be reconciled with those obtained by Lawrence and Lorsch.
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Lorsch and Allen concluded that the degree of differentiation between 
each division and the corporate headquarters is contingent upon the 
demands posed by the division’s industrial environment (characterized 
in terms of rate of change, time span of feedback, and key competitive 
variables), and the demands posed by the portion of the total 
environment that is salient to headquarters. They also concluded that 
higher divisional performance tended to be associated with the
adequate level of differentiation required by the division’s 
environment. Moreover, higher corporate performance was concluded to 
be associated with the adequate levels of corporate-divisional and
interdivisional differentiation required by the company’s total
environment.
Two other studies, of a more theoretical nature, were also decisive in 
the contribution they brou^t to the understanding of the 
relationships between the enterprise and its environment. In one of 
these studies, Thompson [1967], organizations are viewed as open 
systems, permanently faced with uncertainty, but subject to criteria 
of rationality which demand certainty. "Rie critical problem to 
organizations is hence to cope with uncertainty, and according to 
Thompson companies attempt to respond by structuring themselves in the 
most appropriate way to the complexity of the environment. 
Specifically, Thompson argues that organizations are able to create 
certain units (boundary-spanning units) whose purpose is to deal with 
uncertainty, and which create the possibility for other units (core 
technologies) to operate under conditions closer to certainty. In 
general terms, organizational structure, therefore, is seen as a 
response to environmental uncertainty in the sense that the complexity 
of the structure, the variety and number of units, tends to match the 
complexity of the environment.
The other study, Galbraith [1973], emphasizes the role of information 
in the matching process of an organization to its environment. 
Uncertainty is measured by the difference between the amount of 
information necessary to perform a given task and the amount of 
information already possessed. In order to achieve a given level of 
task performance, the organization must acquire a predetermined amount 
of information which is as high as the outputs (number of different
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products and services) and inputs (number of different technical 
requirements on a project, number of different machine centres in a 
factory) required to perform the task are diverse. Accordingly, it is 
not uncertainty per se that is critical to a company, but the need for 
additional information which uncertainty generates. Relationships 
between environmental uncertainty and structure via the information 
flow in the successful organization are hypothesized by Galbraith in 
the following terms: in the presence of high uncertainty, a low degree 
of structuring of activities (flexible, decentralized structures) is 
appropriate since it facilitates the processing of the high volumes of 
information needed during task execution; on the other hand, with low 
uncertainty highly structured activities (rigid, centralized 
structures) are suitable to the low volumes of information likely to 
be needed. In the Galbraith study, as in the others reviewed above, 
the organization’s internal processes are seen as a response to 
environmental requirements.
The major contribution given by the contingency approach to the 
present work is to have demonstrated that corporations are adaptive, 
transient systems responsive to ever-changing phenomena of the outside 
world. A general criticism of the contingency approach, however, is 
that the understanding of the relationships between enterprise and 
environment has been kept restricted to a too narrow characterization 
of the environment [e.g. Negandhi, 1975]. By reducing all the 
environmental complexity to such traits as technology, market, or 
degree of certainty, the contingency approach fails to provide a 
comprehensive basis to study the patterns of environmental influence 
on an enterprise. Such a basis may perhaps be found in another area 
of the study of organizations - cross-cultural comparative management 
- which takes an essentially macro view in the study of external 
environmental impacts on business enterprises.
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2.3. The Contribution from the Comparative Management Theory
The conceptual and methodological approaches employed by the 
comparative management theorists can be divided into four distinct 
groups [Schollhammer, 1969], one of which is of particular interest to 
the present study. This group represents the so-called ecological or 
environmental approach, according to which the business enterprise is 
viewed as part of an ecological system where external factors of the 
environment have a determining impact on managerial effectiveness 
[ibid.; p.85]. On the other hand, managerial effectiveness is seen to 
determine firm efficiency, which in term affects aggregate economic 
efficiency (at region or country level).
The environmental approach to comparative management attempts to 
provide a conceptual model of environmental analysis upon which 
comparisons of management practices and managerial efficiency among 
various countries can be built. At the base of this approach is the 
assumption that external environments vary greatly between countries 
and cultures, and that differences in the environments within which 
firms must function have a crucial impact on the performance of 
enterprise management. Among the most influential authors associated 
with the environmental approach are Farmer and Richman. In their main 
work [Farmer and Richman, 1965], they justify the perspective they 
adopted by calling attention to the fact that:
" most studies of management have taken place in a "black 
box" labelled "management", without much concern for the 
external environment in whicA the firm and its management may 
operate. As long as this external environment is basically 
the same for all firms the approach is valid; however, in 
cases when the environment differs significantly, present 
theory fails to describe, explain, or predict comparative 
differentials in managerial performance", [ibid., p.5]
Farmer and Richman further elaborate this point by providing an 
example which, incidentally, is particularly relevant to the case of a 
multinational company with subsidiaries in various countries:
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"We observe two firm managements in the same sector, and we 
note that in country A managers seem far superior to their 
counterparts in country B; however, we cannot then state 
categorically that managers in A do their internal managing 
job better than those in B, since the nature of the external 
environment facing the two managements may be completely 
different. A may be a country with ample supplies of high 
skill labour, while B may have serious shortages of this 
important factor. A may also have a good, low cost 
transportation system, while B is faced with transport 
shortages, h i ^  cost freight movements, and the need to build 
far larger inventories than A. A may have an excellent 
credit system, whicdi allows a competent firm to obtain 
adequate funds, while B may have no organized capital 
markets. The result could well be that the presumably inept 
managers in B are actually doing better than their 
counterparts in A, given their external constraints", 
[ibid., pp.5-6].
The above quotations generally illustrate the underlying rationale of 
the environmental approach. In order that differing external 
influences on companies’ operations might be understood, authors have 
been led to develop a classification of environmental variables, which 
could provide them with a means to isolate major environmental 
conditions and to examine their relative influence on managerial 
effectiveness and economic achievement. One of the first attempts was 
made by Hall [1959, I960] who concentrated on cultural and
sociological environmental differences and their impact on 
international management. Despite having outlined a classification of 
cross-cultural differences. Hall, however, did not provide a 
comprehensive conceptual model to be used in further comparative 
management studies. Another contribution came from Blough [1966], who 
emphasized that the problems of international business are different 
from those of domestic business, and mainly studied the influences of 
governmental policies on business decisions. This was again a narrow 
model of environmental analysis which paid only scant attention to the 
impact of cultural and economic factors.
The first comprehensive classification of environmental influences on 
an enterprise was provided by Farmer and Richman [1964] in a tentative 
paper that was later developed into a series of articles and books 
[Richman, 1965a, 1965b; Farmer and Richman, 1965, 1966; Farmer, 1967], 
which reach the present day [e.g. Farmer and Richman, 1984]. Such a 
classification of environmental variables includes four major
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categories - educational, sociological-cultural, political-legal, and 
economic - each of which is broken down into a substantial number of 
factors or constraints that may aid or hinder managerial performance 
in a particular country [Farmer and Richman, 196 5, ch.3]. According 
to Farmer and Richman, multinational corporations are still exposed to 
a fifth environmental constraint category, the "international 
constraints" [ibid., ch.14]. In total, 43 different environmental 
factors were identified and explained by the authors(2), Having 
created a comprehensive checklist of environmental influences on an 
enterprise. Farmer and Richman then developed a model which attempts 
to understand how external constraints may influence managerial 
decisions and ultimately enterprise and country efficiency. This 
model is presented in flow-chart form in Exhibit 2.1. It establishes 
that company efficiency, and ultimately system (e.g. country) 
efficiency, are determined by the level of managerial effectiveness, 
which is defined as the "level of efficiency, from society's point of 
view, with which the overall management process is performed in a
given enterprise" [Farmer and Richman, 1965, p.25]. Managerial
effectiveness is seen to be affected directly not only by external 
environmental constraints, but also by the elements of the management 
process, which in turn are equally subject to the direct influence of
the external environment. Such elements of the management process
consist of a number of aspects considered to be critical both to the 
managerial functions (finance, marketing, production, personnel, 
research and development) and to policy decision areas (planning and 
innovation, control, organization, leadership and motivation, public 
and external relations)(3). There are a number of limitations 
inherent to the Farmer and Richman model, particularly a lack of 
precise definitions, and a subjectivism latent in any attempt to 
operationalize the model's relationships. Despite its limitations, 
the model theorizes in a rather original way the consequences of the 
impact of the total environmental setting on an enterprise, and 
presents a very comprehensive inventory of environmental variables 
which when used cautiously can be a tool for identifying those factors 
most critical to the successful operation of an organization in any 
given country. Authors such as Douglass [1975a, 1975b, 1976], and
Wright [1976-77] employed with satisfactory results the Farmer and 
Richman model as a means of describing the environmental context of a
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Exhibit 2.1 - Farmer and Richman's Model of the Impact of External 
Environmental Constraints on Managerial Decisions and 
System Efficiency
AffectAffect
Affect
Determine
Determine
Elements of the
management
process
External
environmental
constraints
Management and
managerial
effectiveness
System
efficiency
Company
efficiency
Source: Farmer and Richman (1965, p . 35]
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CO untry.
In summary, the environmental approach to the comparative management 
theory has explored the impact of external variables affecting the 
operation of complex organizations, and developed an almost exhaustive 
list of environmental factors that are likely to influence the 
critical elements of the management process. However, the 
overemphasis on the external environment led to regarding individual 
organizations as being basically a passive agent of external
constraints. There is a marked tendency for the theory to stress the 
necessity for environmental adaptation and not enough attention is
paid to the fact that organizations may respond to the environment by 
attempting to influence it in order to achieve desired goals 
[Schollhammer, 1969]. Besides, the environmental approach appears to 
be unable to cope with the fact that the impact of external factors on 
business operations is not likely to be uniform. If theoretically it 
is possible to envisage a list of external environmental factors and 
separate them into compartments, empirically it becomes very difficult 
to judge the impact of a given constraint on internal management
practices and effectiveness [ibid,].
Such weaknesses of the comparative management theory were not found in 
the contingency approach to organization theory. As was discussed in 
the previous section the contingency approach assumes a close 
interaction in both directions between organization and environment 
and does not overlook the role of management as a change agent.
Similarly, the contingency approach has gone much further in 
explaining how internal organization processes change with changes in 
the external environment. The major criticism made to the contingency 
approach, that the understanding of the environment per se has been 
kept restricted to a too narrow set of factors, is not applicable, 
however, to the environmental approach. Indeed, the latter has come 
up with a very complete list of external factors likely to influence 
companies' operations in any country. This is regarded as the main 
contribution of the environmental approach. Accordingly, both bodies 
of theory, namely the contingency approach to organization theory and 
the environmental approach to comparative management theory, appear 
therefore to be complementary in some important aspects.
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The next section will attempt to integrate the two approaches by 
presenting a model which accommodates the views of both the 
organization and the comparative management theories.
2.4. An Integrating Model of Environmental Interaction
The views of both the contingency approach (organization theory) and 
the environmental approach (comparative management theory) as regards 
the effect of external variables on the functioning of complex 
organizations can be reconciled in a model proposed by Negandhi 
[1975]. This model incorporates a number of variables of different 
nature which are seen as influencing organizational patterns and 
effectiveness. Such variables are conceptualized to exert their 
influence at three successive boundaries: 1) societal environment; 2)
task environment; and 3) organizational internal domain (see Exhibit 
2,11),
The first level, societal environment, represents the broad and 
intricate macro context within which an organization has to function 
in any country. Comparative management theorists such as Farmer and 
Richman [1965] have made useful contributions to the understanding of 
this environmental level by characterising it in its diverse economic, 
political, legal, sociological, and cultural dimensions.
The task environment, as a particularisation of the macro-societal 
environment, is that part of the total setting which, according to 
such authors as Dill [1958] and Thorelli [1967], directly transacts 
and competes with the organization and is potentially relevant to goal 
setting and goal attainment, A large number of organization theorists 
[e,g, Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1973]» 
have attempted to explain how the task environment impacts on 
organizational patterns and, on the other hand, how these respond to 
the environment.
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Exhibit 2. II - Levels of Environmental Interaction on a Company's 
Internal Patterns and Effectiveness
S O C I E T E N V I R O N M E N T
Economic
T A S K
Distributors
R O N M E N T
Shareholders
EN V
Z A T I  DNAL D O M A I NO R G A N
Company Size
CL
CL
ORGANIZATIONAL
PATTERNS
AND
COEFFECTT/BvESS
CL
Human ard c< pital reî ourceso_
EmployeesCommunity
Cultural
Source: Adapted from Negandhi [1975, p.340]
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Finally, the third level is now situated inside the company’s 
boundaries, in contrast with the two previously discussed which are 
external to the company. This level, which has been termed here as 
the organizational internal domain, was defined by Negandhi as "the 
environment existing within the closed system that marks the 
boundaries of the organization" [1975, p.3%1]. Variables, such as
company size, technology, organizational climate, and human and 
capital resources are among important organizational traits that have 
been demonstrated to have an influence on organizational patterns and 
effectiveness [e.g. Caplow, 1957; Indik, 1963; Stogdill, 1965; and 
generally all the authors associated with a closed systems view of 
organizations]. These variables are very much under the range of 
operation and control of the decision maker.
The model presented here has the advantage of integrating the 
different streams of theory which have been concerned with the study 
of the interaction between organizations and environment. It provides 
the present study with a comprehensive framework which helps 
understanding the efforts made in the literature to demonstrate that a 
company’s organizational patterns and effectiveness are not 
exclusively affected by internal managerial action, but are also 
influenced by the particular external environmental conditions that 
are encountered.
2.5. Si»mnaT»v and Conclusions
This chapter aimed at demonstrating that the environment external to 
an organization does influence its internal functioning. Two major 
bodies of theory which have addressed the problem of the interaction 
between enterprise and environment, namely organization theory and 
comparative management theory, were reviewed here.
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An effort to conceptualize the dynamic relationship between the 
business enterprise and its environment was made by organization 
theorists who were quick in adopting the notion of open system. This 
notion, originally based on certain physical properties found in 
biological systems, led into viewing organizations as entities which 
are not self-sufficient and which, in order to survive, have to engage 
in input-output transactions with other entities in the environment. 
Difficulties in operationalizing the new concepts of the general 
systems approach prompted researchers to develop a more manageable and 
pragmatic perspective which keeps some of the most relevant concepts 
of the systems thinking: the contingency approach. A very large
volume of work associated with this view has been produced over the 
years. Common to it all is the finding that the pattern of internal 
states and processes developed by an effective organization are 
contingent upon the particular environmental conditions (e.g. 
technology, market characteristics, degree of certainty), to which the 
organization is subject. Underlying these findings is the recognition 
that business enterprises are adaptive, transient systems which 
constantly respond to ever-changing phenomena of the outside world. 
Due to the very need of keeping the number of variables in the 
analysis down to a manageable number the contingency approach adopted 
an essentially micro view of the environment, which resulted in a lack 
of comprehensiveness in the understanding of the external factors that 
are likely to influence company internal processes.
In a different avenue of research the comparative management theory 
also explores the influence of the external environment on an 
organization. The so-called ecological or environmental approach 
views the business enterprise as part of a whole where external 
characteristics of the environment produce a determining impact on 
management practices and managerial effectiveness. External 
conditions are assumed to vary substantially across countries and 
cultures. Consequently, any comparison of internal management 
processes in companies operating in different parts of the world must 
be accompanied by an attempt to understand how the local environment 
impacts on companies’ operations. This view generated the need for a 
classification of environmental variables which could provide 
researchers with an appropriate tool to identify major environmental
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conditions in a given setting. In this sense, the ecological approach 
to comparative management theory takes a macro view in the way it 
approaches the environment. Such a macro view is reflected in the 
level of comprehensiveness found in some models of environmental 
analysis that have been developed.
If on one hand, the environmental approach to comparative management 
did succeed in providing an instrument to describe any environmental 
scenario in its multiple facets, it did not produce, on the other 
hand, convincing results as to the particular impact of given 
environmental constraints on internal management practices and company 
efficiency. In this respect, the contingency approach to organization 
theory has probed deeper into the realm of the interrelationships 
between enterprise and environment. However, its analysis has focused 
on a very limited number of environmental features, which is far from 
the comprehensiveness of the models developed by the environmental 
approach.
The chapter concludes with the presentation of a model which attempts 
to integrate the two approaches from the organization and the 
comparative management theories. This model incorporates most of the 
environmental variables whose interaction with companies’ internal 
processes has been studied in the literature. Three levels of 
influence on organizational patterns and effectiveness are 
conceptualized in the model. The first two are external to the 
organization and include the variables developed by the environmental 
approach ( the societal environment level) as well as the variables 
studied by the contingency approach (the task environment level). The 
third level of influence (the organizational domain) is internal to 
the company and includes those variables that are under the direct 
control of the companies’ management. The model is believed to 
provide a global overview of the many differing factors that are 
likely to affect a company’s operations in a given environment.
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Footnotes;
An Illustration to this point can be found in Amey [1979, p.250], 
when he demonstrates the disagreement between two leading system 
theorists (Von Bertalanffy and Ashby) as to the basic definition 
of a cybernetic model.
(2) These environmental factors will be discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter, where several models of environmental analysis 
and assessment will be presented.
(3) A comprehensive list of 76 critical managerial elements is 
provided by Farmer and Richman [1965, pp.20-21]. The list was 
built with the assistance of expert opinions upon which the Delphi 
technique was applied [pp.329-33%].
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CHAPTER 3 - THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND ITS EXTERNAL
ENVIRONMENT
3.1. Introduction
The discussion regarding the relationship between an enterprise and 
its external environment was conducted in the previous chapter at an 
abstract; theoretical level which accommodated any type of 
organization. In the present chapter, the discussion of this 
relationship is brought into a more concrete level which centres upon 
a particular type of organization: the multinational corporation
(MNC).
The MNC is only one of the many forms of doing business across 
national boundaries [Daniels, Ogram and Radebaugh, 1982, ch.1].
Common to all of them are the particular problems and opportunities 
that emerge because an entity is operating in more than one country. 
When the activities of a firm are confined to a sole (domestic)
environment managers face a scenario which is reasonably stable in
geographic terms. The same language, a common currency, relatively 
homogeneous culture, a single tax system, similar interest rates, 
compatible infrastructures, are all normally expected by domestic 
managers to remain constant from one region to another. In 
international business, however, there are few fixed constraints. 
Many environmental characteristics that are largely irrelevant to 
domestic business, such as foreign legal systems, foreign exchange 
markets, intra-national cultural features and political regions, 
suddenly assume a decisive importance once a firm crosses its domestic 
border.
The MNC is generally regarded as the most elaborate form of 
international involvement for a business organization. However, there 
is a considerable amount of disagreement as to what constitutes a MNC.
Many definitions have been proposed in the literature^D. Some of
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them emphasize operational aspects such as number of countries in 
which the company is established, or sales turnover generated outside 
the home country [e.g. Vernon, 1971, ch.1]. Others stress conceptual 
aspects such as the collaboration between headquarters and 
subsidiaries in the establishment of general standards and a ccmmon 
strategy, or the adoption of an attitude of "multinationalism" on the 
part of managers [Perlmutter, 1969; Scott, 1972]. A comprehensive 
definition which serves the purposes of this chapter is provided by 
Priel [197%, p.%6]:
"A multinational company is an industrial or commercial 
enterprise which pursues its business objectives on behalf 
of its owners by actively managing investments in domestic 
and foreign territories."
At the core of this definition lies the capability of the headquarters 
of a MNC to exercise control over its overseas subsidiaries. The 
concept of managerial control over an investment has been extensively 
used in the literature as the distinctive characteristic which enables 
to draw a separation between foreign direct investment, the hallmark
of the MNC, and other forms of overseas investment like foreign
portfolio investment [e.g. Aharoni, 1966; Daniels, Ogram and 
Radebaugh, 1982, ch.7].
As it was demonstrated previously, the relationship between an 
enterprise and its external environment is a dynamic, interactive, 
two-way phenomenon. The present chapter attempts to capture the
nature of this relationship by discussing the impact of the
environment on the operations of a MNC, and also by revealing the 
response of the MNC to the threats and opportunities posed by the 
environment.
The chapter starts by discussing the nature of the external 
environment characteristic to a MNC. A framework in which to 
comprehend the functioning of a multinational is set first, taking a 
systems view. Next, the variability in the external environment which 
international companies have to face is described. Such a variability 
may simultaneously be due to changes in the environmental 
characteristics across geographic location, and to changes in
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atmosphere towards multinationals over time. Both cases are reviewed, 
with the intent of illustrating the differences in the total external 
environment encountered by MNCs as compared to domestic companies.
Faced with an overall external environment with certain 
characteristics and a given makeup of internal strengths and 
weaknesses, the MNC must act in a way as to match its activities to 
both the environment in which it operates and its own resource 
capability. This is the essence of corporate strategy, which the 
chapter discusses in some length. After the nature of strategic 
management being reviewed, the chapter resorts to the discussion of 
multinational strategies in the context of companies* response to the 
forces for fragmentation and unification in the pattern of 
international operations. The factors influencing the choice of a 
particular strategy by a MNC, namely a global integration strategy, a 
segmented nation-for-nation strategy, or a mixture of the two, are 
then presented with a particular focus on "economic" (internal) and 
"political" (environmental) imperatives that prompt company response 
in a given direction.
Finally, the chapter reviews the environmental scanning activity in 
MNCs which by promoting an adequate fit between an organization and 
its external environment, constitutes the foundation of strategic 
management. Practices • adopted by companies to collect and analyse 
information about foreign environments are described, as revealed by a 
number of empirical studies conducted over a period spanning more than 
a decade.
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3.2. The Multitude  Environmental Frameworks In International
Business
3.2.1. The MNC Viewed as a Syst*
A MNC is a system where typically a number of operating units or 
subsidiaries (subsystems) are located in more than one country. The 
MNC system normally commands a common pool of resources and responds 
to a common strategy [Robbins and Stobaugh, 1973a]. It is formed by a 
network of operating units linked to one another by flows of capital, 
goods, services, people, technology, and information, all of which 
cross national frontiers. As a system, the MNC is open to the 
environment. Such an environment, as it will be seen, is subject to a
high degree of variation in its components, and poses special problems 
that are not likely to be encountered by a domestic company.
A model encompassing the complex reality of the MNC system is 
presented in Exhibit 3.1. This model, outlined in Korth [1985], takes 
any two operating units of a same MNC. Each of these units is assumed
to be established in a different country, and, accordingly, is
affected by a unique set of socio-cultural, political, legal and 
economic factors. At the same time, each unit, like any other 
business organization, sends flows of goods, services, salaries, 
taxes, payments, information, pollution, and so forth into the
particular environment in which it operates [ibid., ch.1]. Because
the two units belong to the same company, they are both subject to the 
control of headquarters, and they are tied up by a common strategy and 
common resource allocation criteria. Consequently, the two units are 
linked by international flows of the kind discussed in the preceding 
paragraph.
In an ideal world of free movement of capital, goods, and human 
resources, international flows among two operating units of a same MNC 
would be permitted to occur without any obstacle. The reality.
44
E
<D
4J
CO
> 1
CO
L)
(d
o
(D
T3
O
z
ro
CM
LU
o CVi
SMOjJZ UJ
LU
LULU
LU
LU
%
SMOjJ
Li-
I
CO
a
a
lO
00
m
Xi
4J
M
O
u:
E
O
u
'W
TJ
0)
a
<d
T)
<
■H
XI
•H
X:
X
u
0)
u
M
P
O
CO
45
3 / THE MNC AND ITS EXTERNAL aVIROHMENT
however, is very different. Economic interchange among firms in 
different countries is impaired by a host of controls and regulations 
that are imposed by nations. These controls reside in the
international domain of each domestic environment (see Exhibit 3.1). 
They are made of obstacles such as tariffs and other trade controls, 
which interfere with free movement of goods and services, capital 
controls, which impede money movements, and exchange controls, which 
obstruct the free access to foreign exchange markets. Historically, 
as it will be seen, the nature and degree of these controls, 
regulations, and other obstacles to the activities of the MNC have 
changed according to the volatility of the international environment 
and the atmosphere, especially in host countries, towards
multinational business.
The total environment of a MNC in any given point in time, as 
understood in the model presented in Exhibit 3.1, is therefore
composed of the respective domestic environments whose national 
borders are intersected by the flows generated among the operating 
units of a particular multinational business network. In addition, 
the international environment includes a number of institutions that 
overlap countries and which play an important role as regulators and 
sometimes referees of international economic activity. Such
institutions comprise, among others, the world monetary system, the 
foreign exchange markets, the international financial markets, as well 
as economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank Group(2), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
several regional development banks (e.g. the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank), and a few areas of 
economic integration (e.g. the European Economic Community (EEC), the 
Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance or COMECON).
Set in the above framework, designed to understand the functioning of 
the MNC, the next two sub-sections will discuss in some detail how the 
external environment of a multinational is subject to variability, 
both geographically and in time.
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3.2.2. Changes In Environments Across Geographic Location
One of the most distinctive features of a MNC as apposed to a domestic 
company is the fact that the MNC is subject to a much wider range of 
variation in the characteristics of the environment in which it
operates. In fact, while in a domestic company most environmental
characteristics are likely to vary substantially only along time, in a 
MNC they also vary across geographic location. The degree of
variation due to geographic factors is related not only to the number 
of different countries where the corporation operates, but also to the 
very nature of such countries. For example, it can be argued that 
cultural differences are greater between Europe and the most of Asia 
or Africa, than between Europe and North America. Similarly, legal 
differences are likely to be greater across nations whose legal 
systems derive from separate foundations (e.g. the Napoleonic Code in
France, the Communist legal framework in Yugoslavia, the Koranic law 
in Saudi Arabia), than across countries which share their legal
foundations in the principles of common law (e.g. the United Kingdom 
and Australia). Also, certain economic/financial characteristics of 
countries such as the degree of sophistication of their consumer 
markets or capital markets are bound to be associated with the
countries* respective stage of economic development.
The diversity of environmental conditions existing across countries or 
clusters of countries (e.g. the EEC) poses very special problems to 
MNCs. When a company crosses its national boundaries to become 
multinational it no longer deals with one sole currency, one common 
language, the same political system, one identical set of laws, an 
homogeneous economic structure. In reality, the company has to face 
as many and difficult environmental frameworks as many and different 
are the countries where the company is established. Exhibit 3.II 
presents a list of environmental factors that are likely to diange 
from one country to another. These, naturally, make for special 
complexity in international business. The list is intended to be 
merely illustrative, and covers only some of the problems that are 
most commonly encountered by MNCs in their total environment.
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Exhibit 3.II - Some Environmental Factors That Are Likely to Change 
Across Countries and Which Create Added Complexity in 
International Business
r-
CULTURAL
h-
L.
r*
Different languages 
Diverse customs
Labour - relations, attitudes and organizations 
Management - ethics, outlooks, style and competence 
Expectations and life styles
POLITICAL
Different rules of the game
Defence and foreign policies - impact on industry and trade 
Governments hostile or restrictive towards foreign business 
Home government restrictions on investment abroad 
Red tape and uncertainty in industry-government dealings
LEGAL
Differences in company law, especially concerning foreign firms- 
e.g. remittances 
Differences in general commercial law
Restrictive practices legislation - e.g. monopoly, separation of 
public and private sectors
FISCAL
Different tax systems 
Tax concessions 
Trade barriers
ECONOMIC
Different stages of economic development
Different growth rates - some economies in recession, others in boom 
Different economic policies 
Diverse consumer markets
FINANCIAL
Currency and exchange rates 
Exchange control restrictions 
Different interest rates
Problems of transfer pricing and movements of capital 
Different canital market facilities
Source: Based on Brooke and Remmers [ 1972, ch.9], and Farmer and
Richman [1965, ch.3 and 14]
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3.2.3. Changes Over Time in the Overall Atmosphere Towards 
Multinationals
Besides the variations in environmental conditions in any point in 
time due to geographic location, the MNC is also subject to the 
overall atmosphere towards multinational business. This overall 
atmosphere sets a particular scenario under which MNCs* activities 
evolve. Such a scenario reflects on a world scale attitudes towards 
international companies and conditions forced upon their operations, 
and superimposes on the differences in the environments across 
countries and geographic areas.
Over the years, the overall atmosphere towards multinational business 
has changed in ways which are of great relevance to the development of 
the MNC. Since the Second World War, basically three periods with 
very different characteristics can be found. The first, ranges from 
1945 to the late 1960s. The second period starts in the late sixties 
and spans over the decade of the seventies. Finally, the third period 
corresponds to the fraction of the eighties lived so far. Each of 
these periods will be characterized below.
The period after the war
The period between the end of World War II and the late 1960s is 
associated with the rapid growth of MNCs which became a prominent 
force in the world economy. Although many companies had extensive 
involvement overseas by 1945, the large scale rise of multinationalism 
only took place after the war. This period of the twentieth century 
is seen by authors such as Dunning [1981, ch.15] as the maturation of 
a certain phase in the evolution of international business. Such a 
phase began at the turn of this century, remained dormant in the 
interwar period, and awakened after the Second World War in conditions 
that were ideally suited to the expansion of companies* activities 
across national boundaries, through the medium of equity investment 
[ibid, p.410].
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The overall atmosphere towards multinational business during the two
decades that followed the war is described by Ringbakk [1976] in an 
influential article. In the beginning of this period, Western Europe 
and Japan engaged in a massive effort of reconstruction which created
many business opportunities. World-wide shortages of capital, know­
how, and human skills could only be met by the U.S.A., whose economy 
by 1950 was considerably stronger than any other country, and which 
had a vast technological lead over the rest of the world. This is the 
time of the absolute dominance of the U.S. MNC. Only later in the 
period European and then Japanese firms suceeded in competing on equal 
terms with American corporations [Franko, 1978; Negandhi and Baliga, 
1981, ch.1]. The period after the war is characterized by a general
stability in geopolitics. The U.S. dominance in the political and 
economic areas created zones of influence which constituted "friendly" 
geographic areas for business. The ideology-based cold war produced 
its own stability where areas hostile to American business were 
clearly identified and known. As Ringbakk [1976] remarks, from a 
corporate viewpoint this meant reduced and often predictable political 
risks. National resources were ready to be explored and little 
demands were made by governments in the countries where such resources 
were available. Increasing energy needs produced large-scale 
investments in the exploration and production of oil in the Middle 
East and Latin America, providing the markets of the "North", to where 
most of the value-added creating investment was channelled, with 
plentiful and cheap raw materials.
The growth of the MNC amidst such favourable conditions was further 
spurred by considerable improvements in international transportation 
and communication systems, which facilitated the flows of products, 
services, information, and technology. Also, the development of an 
international institutional framework served the strengths and needs 
of the MNC. In effect, economic integration blocks such as the 
European Free-Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) helped create larger markets where expertise in mass 
production and mass marketing were required. Simultaneously, 
international sources of funds such as Eurodollars, Eurobonds, and 
Eurocurrencies provided the growing MNC with an additional financing 
source [ibid.].
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In summary, the period after the war is marked by an intense growth of 
the MNC under conditions of stability and low political risk. Host 
countries, both in the industrialized and in the developing worlds, 
were eager to attract foreign direct investment, and imposed little or 
no restrictions on MNCs * operations in their territories. As John 
Dunning explains:
"Because [...] of the need for the package of resources which 
the multinational could provide, host countries were willing 
to offer generous incentives to inward investors. Some 
attempted to influence the direction of investment and to 
ensure that it was in conformity with their more pressing 
national goals, for example, improving the balance of 
payments, but most imposed few constraints. The cost/benefit 
ratio was rarely calculated, and the benefits were taken for 
granted. Little attention was paid to obtaining the 
resources provided by multinational enterprises in other 
ways." [1981, p.412].
The late sixties and the seventies
By the end of the 1960s the overall atmosphere towards MNCs had 
dramatically changed. In a relatively short period of time, general 
conditions faced by corporations in their international activities had 
been altered from a world of great opportunity to a world full of 
uncertainty and hostility.
During the period of little more than a decade, until the end of the 
1970s, many changes took place in the international environment. In 
geopolitics, stability gave way to an upsurge in conflicts among 
nations, a breakdown in traditional alliances, the emergence of new 
centres of power such as the Arab world, and an exacerbation of 
nationalistic feelings [Ringbakk, 1976]. Resources became scarce due 
not to physical shortages but to politically motivated actions. The 
emergence of host-country dominated resource cartels, whose most 
notable example is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), made the MNCs and the industrialized countries short of cheap 
raw materials, and made than dependent on resource-rich developing 
countries with different objectives and ideologies. In resource-poor 
developing nations, increased problems of food and population gave 
often rise to a desperate situation of chronic malnutrition and
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widespread poverty which added tensions to the already strained 
geopolitical conjuncture. Simultaneously, the international economic 
order of the period after the war, characterized by growth and 
stability, was replaced in the 1970s by a scenario of high inflation 
rates, widespread currency fluctuation, extensive barriers to trade, 
and increased economic protectionism.
All these sudden changes were accompanied by a shift in the attitudes 
and values of judgement towards the MNC both in home countries, and, 
above all, in host countries. In the words of Ringbakk:
"Fundamental (Aanges of the kind diaracterizing [the period 
following the late 1960s] have not only added uncertainty and 
ccMBplexity to the multinational environment, they have also 
impacted directly on the relationship between the 
multinational corporation and home and host countries alike. 
Attitudes towards foreign direct investments, international 
production, and multinational corporations, have begun to 
reverse and the free investments climate of the past is being 
replaced by suspicion, restrictions, and new constraints and 
regulations. Foreign economic dominance is resisted, 
resented, and no longer tolerated. Host countries are 
scrutinizing existing and new foreign direct investments in 
efforts to align private to public interests. Existing 
contracts are no longer based on terms dictated by the MNC 
but on the principle of maximizing the benefits for the host 
countries by extracting the most favourable terms from the 
foreign investors." [1976, p.7]
In host developing countries, a new mentality was installed motivated 
by the awareness of the value of the resources possessed, and, 
simultaneously, by the acquisition of the knowledge necessary to 
control the exploration and use of these resources. Countries 
frequently developed strong feelings against the MNCs, which were 
considered instruments of new forms of economic imperialism or 
colonialism [Dunning, 1981, ch.15]. A vast and vigorous literature on 
"dependencia" [e.g. Franko, 1967; Cardoso and Faletto, 1970; Boulding 
and Mukerjee, 1972], raising the issue of the dependence of the weak 
nation-state upon the powerful multinational conglomerate, contributed 
to a confrontation between host governments and other publics in host 
countries, and the MNC [La Palombara and Blank, 1977, ch.1].
Provocative titles of books published by respected authors during the 
late 1960s and the 1970s - for example, "The American Challenge" 
[Servan-Schreiber, 196 8], "The Invisible Enpire" [Turner, 1970],
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"Sovereignty at Bay" [Vernon, 1971], "The Sovereign State of ITT" 
[Sampson, 1973], "Global Reach" [Barnet and Mueller, 1975], and "The 
Frightening Angels" [Negandhi and Prasad, 1975] - reflected how much 
the MNC was under attack at the eyes of the public opinion [Negandhi, 
1980]. As La Palombara and Blank observed at the height of the 
resentment against the MNC:
"in a world of political volatility the multinational 
corporation bids fair to become the chief whipping boy for 
all of the ills, failures, frustrations and calamities that 
individuals claim to detect in society." [1977, p.3]
The confrontation between the host nation and the MNC was not
circumscribed to words. In effect, there is a long history of real
interference by host governments in the operations and activities of 
multinationals. Over the years the literature on political risk has 
compiled the cases of friction between these two parties, which now
amount to an impressively extensive list (see, for example, Kobrin 
[1979/80], and Levis [1979]). Conflicts between MNCs and host 
governments, erupted in a virulent manner during the period under 
analysis. Different forms of interference included nationalization, 
intervention/requisition, renegotiation of contract, forced sale 
[Hawkins, Mintz, and Provissiero, 1976], as well as "creeping" 
expropriation and changes in the general regulations governing foreign 
investors* operations [Levis, 1979, ch.4]. The consequences for the 
nations from these actions are diverse. In effect, the host nation 
has not always benefited from interference on the multinational 
business, as it is suggested by Stoever*s [1985] account of the 
disasterous effects for Zambia from the nationalization of its copper 
industry. While nationalization and expropriation of property are the 
forms of interference most visible and noted, of greater overall 
importance, because much more common, are a multitude of smaller 
demands made by host countries - both developing and developed - on 
MNCs [Fayerweather, 1966]. Such demands include the share of capital 
and control a foreign company is allowed to hold in a local venture, 
the reinvestment of earnings, the indigenization of technical and 
managerial positions, the transfer of technologies, and the
subordination to national plans and interests, just to mention a few. 
Of considerable importance are also the pressures on MNCs to disclose
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information, which are often an instrument used by governments and 
other groups to increase their bargaining power towards the 
multinationals. As Gray [1984, p.13] remarks:
"In addition to arguments concerning the right of access to 
information, the demand for greater disclosure from MNCs may 
be viewed as a part of a bargaining process - an effort by 
host countries, and developing countries in particular, to 
improve their bargaining powers."
Exhibit 3.Ill presents a list of demands classified as "good corporate 
behaviour principles" [Negandhi and Baliga, 1981, p.109] established 
by host countries for foreign companies operating in their territory. 
Each of these behaviour principles is related to an alleged 
objectionable practice by the MNC, from the perspective of the host 
country. Although the list presented in the exhibit is based on the 
demands made by Canada on multinationals (especially U.S. companies), 
it is believed that the list typifies the situation encountered in the 
seventies as regards demands made by host countries on MNCs.
It is important to note that the pressure exerted on the 
multinationals during the period under analysis did not come 
exclusively from the host countries. Also at home the MNC was often 
subject to criticism and attack. Accusations of the MNC exporting 
jobs and technology thereby reducing home country comparative
advantages and contributing to domestic unemployment were frequently
heard by trade unionists and other groups at the MNC home (see for
example, Goldfinger [1973]). Simultaneously, the MNC was critized in
its country of origin for exploiting the lower labour costs in other 
countries notably in the Third World, for contributing to domestic 
balance of payment difficulties by increasing imports and reducing 
exports, and for diverting capital away from home to invest abroad 
[Ringbakk, 1976].
In summary, the period of roughly a decade ending in the late 1970s, 
in great contrast with the atmosphere found previously, was
characterized by high turbulence in the international geopolitical and 
economic environment, and by new attitudes both in home and host
countries generally hostile to the multinationals. Besides having to
confront host governments* accusations that they exploited local
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Exhibit 3.Ill - Principles of Good Corporate Behaviour Demanded by Boat 
Conntrles to MICs and Respeotlve Alledged Objectionable 
Foreign Subsidiary Practices
GUIDING PRINCIPLE SUMMARY ALLEDGED (EJECTIONABLE PRACTICES
1. Full realization of the company's 
growth and operating potential in 
the host country.
2 . Make the host country subsidiary 
self-contained, vertically-
integrated entity with total 
responsibility for at least one 
productive function.
3. Maximum development of export 
markets from the host country.
4. Extend processing of host 
country's raw materials through 
maximum number of stages.
5. Equitable pricing policies for 
International and Intracompany 
sales.
6. Develop sources of supply In the 
host country
7. Inclusion of R&D and product 
development.
8. Retain substantial earnings for 
growth.
1. Home-based corporate planners 
Institute expansion and cut­
back plans without regard for 
the host country's plan and 
aspirations.
2. The host country subsidiary Is 
primarily an assembler of 
Imported parts or distributor 
of goods produced elsewhere so 
operations can be easily shut 
down or transferred.
3. Filling export orders to third- 
country markets from the home 
country stock earns credits 
for home country balance of 
payments rather than host 
country's.
4. Have as few materials^ 
processing stages as possible 
In the host country to minimize 
political leverage.
5. Negotiated or spurious prices 
host-home country subsidiaries 
are designed to get around host 
country Income taxes.
6. Preference for home country or
third-country sources for 
purposes of corporate
convenience or political 
leverage.
7. The concentration of R&D and 
product design In the home
country means the host country 
can never develop these 
capabilities.
8. Profits earned In the host
country do not stay to finance
host country expansion.
9. Appointment of host country 9. 
officers and directors.
10. Equity participation by the host 10. 
country Investing public.
11. Publication of financial reports. 11
12 Support of host country cultural 
and charitable Institutions.
12.
Use of home country officers 
and directors to prevent 
development of local outlook in 
planning and execution.
Creation of wholly owned 
subsidiaries denies policy 
determination and earnings to 
the host country public.
Consolidation of host company 
operating results Into parent 
company statement or failure to 
p u b l i s h  any rele v a n t  
Information.
Failure locally to support such 
c a u s e s  w h e r e  parent 
corporations give generously at 
home.
Source: Adapted from Ashton [196 8, p.57]
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labour, used monopolistic power to defeat the local competition, and
charged excessive royalty payments for obsolete technology and patent
rights, the MNC had also to endure real interference in its internal
business by being forced to comply with sudden host country demands,
which sometimes led to traumatic cases of expropriation and 
nationalization.
The eighties
It is difficult to comment on the overall atmosphere towards the MNC 
in the present decade, since the few years already elapsed can only 
provide trends. However, the characteristics of the portion of the 
1980s lived so far are different enough from those of the previous 
decade to justify a separate comment.
The 19 80s started with a deep global recession which was only second 
to the Great Depression of the 1930s [Root, 1984]. Despite the strong 
but uneven recovery of the world economy in 1984 and 1985, the effects 
of the recession, which have not been totally overcome, moulded, and 
will continue to do so, the attitudes of both industrialized and 
developing nations towards the multinationals.
In the developing world, a combination of adverse factors created a 
situation in countries characterized by mounting foreign debt, and the 
inability of governments to meet the interest obligations let alone 
repaying the loans. The amounts involved are phenomenal. In 1984, 
developing countries had an external debt of $800 billion, which 
constituted more than half of the money owed to the world's banking 
community [Dymsza, 1984b]. Difficulties in complying with the 
contractual obligations to the creditor institutions, were mainly due 
to a depressed international demand for the countries' major export 
products (in many cases commodities), the consequent fall in prices in 
these products, and the rising interest rates on the countries' 
foreign debts. As a consequence, nations found themselves short of 
cash, unable to import essential goods, and, sometimes, even impeded 
to exploit their own natural resources.
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This unfavourable conjuncture for developing nations, coupled with the 
realization that relationships of dependence cannot be so simply 
overturned [Gulley and McGill, 1984], led governments to seek more 
eagerly foreign direct investments. Until the debt crisis broke out 
borrowing was preferred to foreign investment as a way of getting 
capital. Loans could be channelled to the investments the country 
wanted, and no foreign interests had to be satisfied. Countries were 
seen in control of their own destinies, and that was hoped to pay 
political and economic dividends locally. With the general inability 
of obtaining new international bank loans, however, countries have had 
no alternative but to liberalize their policies on foreign direct 
investment. Clear signs of change have emerged everywhere. For 
example, India and many African countries which traditionally posed 
firm obstacles to foreign company entry, are now spending a 
considerable amount of effort to attract foreign investment [Kristof, 
1985]. Similarly, in Latin America the mood has changed and is now 
much more welcoming for multinationals. In particular, the Decision 
24 of the Andean Pact countries - Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and Venezuela - promulgated in 1971 with the purpose of 
curtailing the presence of MNCs in the region is rapidly
disintegrating as these countries are entering negotiations with the
U.S.A. with a view to an increase in the flow of inward direct 
investment [ibid.].
Meanwhile, in the industrialized world the widespread recession was to 
leave countries with deep problems of unemployment, balance of 
payments deficits, and sometimes an ageing industrial structure which 
rendered a country uncompetitive. Here, too, many countries have 
played an active role in encouraging foreign direct investment on 
technology agreements that enhance their technological capabilities 
and provide them with new jobs and exports [Dymsza, 1984]. Even
countries seen not so long ago as particularly difficult for the MNC,
like Canada and Australia, now present themselves as keen hosts for 
foreign investment [Kristof, I9 8 5]. Sectoral controls or restrictions 
exercised by a number of OECD countries in areas of economic activity 
such as banking, insurance, air transport, communications, tobacco, 
energy, and natural resources have been gradually opened to foreign 
ownership. Screening procedures on inward foreign investment, and
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performance requirements on foreign enterprises have been relaxed. In 
general, governments are now more than ever willing to offer MNCs wide 
incentives and concessions. Specialized bodies created by governments 
with the purpose of attracting foreign companies promote aggressively 
their countries as recipient of investments. Examples in Europe
include the Scottish Development Agency, the Irish Development 
Authority, and the Portuguese Foreign Investment Institute which have 
been particularly visible in putting their messages across.
The implication of this state of affairs for the MNC is one of
increased opportunities. Multinationals' activities will evolve in a 
scenario marked by an increasing globalization of the markets, and by 
a new world industrial map. The new map will emerge from a migration 
of mature industries in the direction North - South, and from the 
eruption of a new generation of industries in the North [Root, 1984]. 
Markets will expand especially in the newly industrialized countries, 
such as Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea, and the massive market 
potential of the People's Republic of China will present interesting 
opportunities and challenges to the MNC. Simultaneously, competition 
among multinationals will continue to increase as more and more 
corporations from the OECD take the international route and as MNCs 
from the Third World grow in number (for a discussion of the latter,
see Wells [1983], and Rail [1983]).
In summary, the 1980s have seen so far a cautious return to an 
atmosphere more favourable to the MNC. Nations across the globe, 
developing and industrialized alike, appear to be opening their doors 
more widely, and offering an increased number of incentives to foreign 
direct investment in the hope of attracting the capital, jobs, and 
technology that MNCs can provide. Such a more favourable atmosphere 
does not imply that international actors in host countries stopped 
worrying about the impact of MNCs on their economies, cultures, and 
sovereignty [Dymsza, 1984b]. What it simply shows is that governments 
are prepared to adopt a much more pragmatic attitude freed from the 
demagogy so characteristic of the late 1960s and the 1970s. The 
scenario that multinationals will face in the future will offer new 
challenges and opportunities, which in order to be turned in the MNCs' 
advantage will require them to adopt novel management approaches and
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techniques. As Franklin Root remarks:
"The emergence of a new industrial map [•••] challenges to a 
far higher degree than ever before the capability of managers 
to cope with political, economic, tedinological, and 
canpetitive discontinuities in the global environment. We 
can expect mucdi more emphasis on environmental scanning, 
early warning systems, and contingency plans to strengthen 
proactive corporate strategies." [1984, p.23, emphasis 
added].
3.2.4. Summary
Companies whose operations transcend national borders are subject to a 
multitude of environmental frameworks which represent the hallmark of 
international business. The MNC is a particular form of doing 
business across national frontiers and the most elaborate too. Viewed
as a system, the MNC is formed by a network of operating units 
(subsidiaries) located in more than one country and linked to one 
another by flows of capital, goods, services, people, technology and 
information. Such inter-subsidiary flows are a result of the fact 
that the units of a MNC are normally subject to the control of 
headquarters, and tied up by common resource allocation criteria and a 
common strategy. Besides these international flows, the MNC system 
also involves the emission of flows of goods, services, salaries, 
taxes, payments, information, pollution, and others into the 
particular country where each subsidiary operates. In this respect 
subsidiaries behave as any domestic company. However, because the MNC 
by its very definition has operations in more than one country each 
unit of the system is influenced by a unique set of economic, 
political, legal, and socio-cultural factors, whose comprehension by 
managers at the centre of the system is vital. This section presented 
a model of a MNC system which contemplates all these elements. In 
addition, the model incorporates those regulations and controls to a 
free movement of international flows that are imposed by nations and 
which reside in the international sphere of each domestic environment. 
Also, the model contains those institutions that, overlapping 
countries, play an important role as regulators of international 
economic activity.
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After setting a framework for understanding the nature of the 
multinational business, the present section discussed the changes in 
environmental conditions that are likely to occur across the 
geographic location of a MNCs subsidiaries. A review of the external 
environmental conditions faced by a MNC would be incomplete without a 
characterization of the overall atmosphere towards multinational 
business to be found in both home and host countries. Such an
atmosphere reflects on a world scale attitudes towards MNCs and 
conditions forced upon their operations at home and especially abroad.
Over time, the overall atmosphere towards multinational business
changed in ways that are greatly relevant to the development of the 
MNC. The section discussed such changes, identifying three periods 
since the second world war. Basically, the first period ranging from 
1945 to the late 1960s was marked by conditions highly favourable to
the rapid growth of the MNC (mainly U.S.-based). Stability in the
international environment was predominant ; natural resources were 
ready to be explored without great demands being made by host 
governments ; nations were eager to attract foreign direct investment 
and imposed little or no restrictions on the operations of 
multinationals. The second period corresponding to the end of the 
1960s and all the 1970s was characterized, in contrast, by a high 
turbulence and uncertainty in the geopolitical and economic 
environments, and by new attitudes both in host and home countries 
generally hostile to the multinationals. During the period, natural 
resources became scarce due to political reasons; the international 
economic order broke up in high rates of inflation, widespread 
currency fluctuation, and increased economic protectionism; 
confrontations between host countries and MNCs emerged frequently, 
leading sometimes to expropriation; demands on multinationals and 
restrictions to their activities became the norm rather than the 
exception. The third period - 1980s - appears to indicate a return to 
a more favourable international atmosphere towards multinational 
business. Developing countries faced with a huge external debt and 
being unable to obtain new international bank loans turn to foreign 
direct investment as the only alternative to attenuate internal 
problems of shortage of cash and investment. Similarly, in the
60
3 / THE MRC AMD ITS EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
industrialized world foreign direct investment is keenly sought as a 
means of improving countries* technological capabilities and of
providing the jobs and exports that the economies lack. This scenario 
presents increased opportunities to the MNC, whose activities will 
evolve amidst an increading tendency towards globalization of markets, 
a new world industrial map, and a stiffening of competition deriving 
from the entrance of more and more corporations in the international 
scene. The new opportunities offered to the MNC will present
challenges which will require the adoption of novel management
approaches and techniques.
3.3. Strategic Management as a Response to the Multinational 
Environment
3.3.1. The Nature of Strategic Management
According to a large and well established body of normative 
literature, the direction taken by a corporation in the development of 
its activities over time should be conditioned by a pre-established 
decision making framework derived from the application of the 
strategic management concept. In an attempt to mould the future of 
the organization management sets corporate objectives and endeavours 
to put forward courses of action that may enable the achievement of 
such objectives. This principle inspired the development of the 
notion of strategic management which in its simplest form can be
defined as "a stream of decisions and actions which leads to the
development of an effective strategy or strategies to help achieve
corporate objectives" [Glueck and Jauch, 1984, p.5].
The word strategy suggests two fundamental operations. One is the
matching of the activities of an organization to its resource 
capability [Johnson and Scholes, 1984, ch.1]. The other, most
important to the present study, is the matching of an organization's
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activities to the environment in which it operates [ibid.]. Such an 
environment encompasses factors outside the firm which can lead to 
opportunities for or threats to the firm. As it was discussed in the 
previous chapter, the environment external to an organization is 
subject to varying degrees of uncertainty. Strategy can be regarded 
as part of such an activity, since by analysing a given situation with 
a view to act strategically management is attempting to reduce the 
many environmental influences to a pattern which is capable of being 
understood and acted upon [Johnson and Scholes, 1984, ch.3]»
The level of uncertainty contained in a given environment is dependent 
on its degree of dynamism and degree of complexity. The more 
environmental conditions are dynamic or the more they are complex the 
more uncertain the environment is likely to be perceived [Duncan, 
1972]. Companies face varying degrees of environmental dynamism 
depending on the characteristics of their relevant environments. 
Never is an environment absolutely static. In effect, changes occur 
continuously, sometimes in a gradual and smooth way (although at 
different paces), other times in a sudden and troublesome fashion. 
Therefore, if the formulation of strategy is concerned with matching 
the capabilities of a firm to its environment, there is the need for a 
continual process of adjustment and modification of the firm's 
existing strategy as changes in the environment occur. The underlying 
idea that strategy is an adaptive process which leads organizations 
into seeking to respond to changes in their external environments, is 
emphasized in the following quotation:
"First and foremost, strategy has to do principally with 
things external to the company rather than internal to it. 
It is generally because of the external environment and its 
ever-changing nature that we are so concerned with strategy 
formulation. Were it not for these changing conditions, 
their impact upon the company and the presenting of 
opportunities to it, our strategy would be relatively simple 
and unchanging." [Collier, 1968, pp.101-102].
Contrary to what is sometimes believed, strategic changes motivated by 
the necessity of organizations to adapt to the environment in 
transformation do not necessarily take place as one-off major changes. 
In effect, there is increasing evidence to show that, more typically, 
strategy formulation takes shape through a set of decisions which are
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made over time in a piecemeal fashion, and which build up to form the 
strategy of an organization [Johnson and Scholes, 1984, ch.2]. This 
constitutes the so-called incrementalist view of strategy formulation. 
As Mintzberg [1978] and Quinn [1980a, 1980b] demonstrated, strategy
formulation can best be described as a pattern in a chain of 
decisions, rather than one major decision made at a point in time and 
then put into action. Naturally, if the changes in the environment
are gradual and smooth the firm can afford an equally gradual and
smooth change in strategy. Pattern A in Exhibit 3.IV depicts this 
situation, where the firm succeeds to keep itself in line with the 
changing environment.
However, there are certain occasions in which the conditions in the 
environment suffer a sudden and unexpected change. If a firm under 
such circumstances keeps changing its strategy only in gradual shifts 
it may find itself completely unadjusted to its environment. Here, a 
major strategic change over a relatively short period of time may be 
needed in order to reposition the company in face of the new
conditions of the environment. This is represented in Pattern B of
Exhibit 3.IV. A third situation, as Johnson and Scholes [1984, p.29] 
point out, may arise when attempts to keep in line with environmental 
changes through incremental development fail. This failure could be 
due to reasons such as moves in strategy in the wrong direction, moves 
that lagged behind the environmental changes taking place over a long 
period of time, or moves in strategy which did not succeed in catching 
up with changes in the environment happening at a greater pace than 
normal. Whatever the reason causing the discrepancies between the 
environmental posture and the company's strategy, it is likely that a 
major strategic change instead of an incremental one will be required 
to put things right. Pattern C in Exhibit 3.IV refers to this 
particular situation.
As seen before, not only the degree of dynamism in the environment 
contributes to its level of uncertainty. Also the degree of 
complexity does. Complexity is at its highest in MNCs due to the 
sheer diversity of environmental influences faced by these companies. 
The MNC is confronted with a total environment which is the more 
complex the higher is the number of countries where the company
63
Exhibit 3.IV - Three Patterns of Strategic Change to the 
Environment
Pattern A
The environment changes gradually and organization strategy develops
incrementally with it
Environmental change
Time
Incremental
strategic
change
Pattern B
There is sudden environmental change requiring a major strategic 
readjustment
Environmental change
Incremental
strategic
change
Major
strategic
change
Incremental
strategic
change
Time
Pattern C
The environment changes gradually but organization strategy fails to 
develop in line with it until such time as a major reajustment is needed
Major
strategic
change
Environmental change
Incremental
strategic
change
Time
Source : Johnson and Scholes [1984, p.30]
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operates, and the larger are the differences in nature between such
countries. Furthermore, different subsidiaries of a MNC may 
experience varying degrees of dynamism in their local environments.
The combination of high level of complexity and differing degrees of
dynamism in the typical total environment of the MNC, normally makes 
this type of company exposed to extremely high levels of uncertainty. 
Consequently, the strategy of the MNC as regards the matching of its 
activities to the total environment in which it operates is likely to 
be fraught with difficulties and to involve conditions that are not to 
be found in companies that only operate in a domestic setting. The 
next sub-section will discuss the major issues which frame strategic 
management in MNCs, and which are particular to this type of 
companies.
3.3.2. Multinational Strategies
Strategic management in MNCs is conditioned by the pressure of two 
vectors which often operate in opposite directions. One of such 
vectors is of an economic nature and represents the need for a company 
to become and stay competitive and efficient on an transnational 
basis. The other vector is of a political nature and reflects the 
necessity of a company to respond to demands and incentives of 
individual host governments [Doz, 1980]. These two vectors frame the 
development of a corporation in the international scene and shape its 
approach to the overall organization of activities on a world basis. 
In this context, multinational strategic management offers an 
analytical framework that guides companies in the employment of their 
resources - capital, management, personnel, technology, managerial 
know-how - in an efficient way to attain corporate objectives [Dymsza, 
1984a]. Besides helping to explore opportunities presented to 
companies worldwide, multinational strategies are also intended to 
reduce threats, uncertainties, and exposure to risk, as well as to 
contribute to greater competitive efficiency, and higher profitability 
around the world [ibid.].
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Fragmentation versus unification in the pattern of international 
operations
In general terms, the formulation of the strategy of a MNC involves 
the consideration of a multitude of influences which will lead the 
company into either fragmentation or unification in the pattern of 
operations [Fayerweather, 1982, ch.1 and pp.210-213]. Fragmentation 
involves highly decentralized and autonomous foreign units often in 
companies organized in a holding structure. The primary ties between 
central headquarters and individual subsidiaries are mainly financial, 
and the transmission of non-financial resources, such as technology 
and marketing expertise, from parent to affiliates are usually given 
little emphasis [Davidson, 1982, ch.1]. Autonomy and decentralization 
of decision making enable a high level of responsiveness to local 
markets, but do not promote coordination with other organizational 
units to share resources and costs, nor do it foster an integrated 
perspective on the objectives and problems of the organization [ibid].
In contrast, unification of operations involves the transmission not 
only of financial resources but also of technology, brand names and 
marketing skills, information, management expertise, components, final 
products, only to cite a few. Decision making regarding the 
distribution of the resources transmitted is highly centralized in the 
parent company, and the level of control over the use of such 
resources by subsidiaries is equally highO). Costs are shared among 
individual units, and manufacturing as well as other activities such 
as research and development (R&D) are tightly coordinated from the 
centre. Unification of operations does not lend itself to as much 
responsiveness to local markets as fragmentation. However, by 
adopting a global centralized approach to management of the company, 
the MNC is able to capitalize on its potential advantages of size and 
sophistication as compared to purely domestic, smaller firms. 
According to Fayerweather [1982, p.211]:
"[the influences which push a company into unification of 
operations] represent a substantial portion of the basic 
rationale for the existence of the MNC and the source of a 
considerable part of its competitive advantage. [... In 
effect,] the possibilities for economies and the greater 
efficiency available to the multinational lie largely in 
capabilities for specialization of activities in individual
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units with substantial interchange among them and are 
therefore dependent upon a h i ^  degree of uniformity in the 
activities of the units composing the structure.”
Forces influencing fragmentation and unification
The forces leading into fragmentation or unification in the 
organization of the international pattern of operations in a MNC may 
be classified in two distinct categories, according to their economic 
or political nature (see Exhibit 3.V), Yves Doz [1980] has called 
attention to such a distinction and argues that the evolution of the 
MNC in the recent past has been characterized by the need to respond 
to both economic imperatives and political imperatives.
A large number of economic factors condition the organization of the 
activities of a multinational. Some of these factors push a company 
into fragmentation of operations. Others, lead into international 
unification (Exhibit 3.V). Fragmentation is highly motivated by the 
diversity in market conditions found in various countries of operation 
(see for example Doz and Prahalad [1984]). Particular market 
characteristics and consumer needs may require products that differ 
greatly among countries. Similarly, high transportation costs, short 
lead times, and emphasis on distribution, installation and other local 
activities represent an incentive for the MNC to serve each market on 
an independent basis. Fragmentation may also make sense in businesses 
whose structure do not favour economies of scale in manufacturing or a 
centralized R&D activity (Exhibit 3.V).
In contrast to these economic factors influencing fragmentation of 
international operations, other factors, also of an economic nature, 
may take the MNC in the opposite direction. Unification in the 
pattern of worldwide operations is induced by the availability of 
substantial economies of scale, not only in manufacturing process but 
also in material and component sourcing, R&D and, sometimes, 
marketing. Similarly, the existence of multinational customers making 
purchases on a supra-national scale, and of direct competitors whose 
international operations are already organized in a unified manner, 
tend to contribute to a company's unification of operations (Exhibit
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Exhibit 3.V - Forces Contributing to Fragmentation and 
Unification in a Company's Pattern of 
International Operations
Economic Imperatives Political Imperatives
Market particular 
characteristics
Costumer special needs
Business structure and 
manufacturing process
High transportation^costs
Short lead times
Emphasis on distribution, 
installation and other local 
activities
FRAGMENrATlGN
Host government restrictions 
and demands:
. Trade barriers 
. Protectionism of internal 
companies
. Norms of conduct and 
regulations for MNC 
activity
Counterparts to incentives 
offered by host governments: 
Import substitution 
Serving the local market 
with locally produced 
goods
Increased added-value of 
production output
Scale economies:
. in manufacturing _  
. in material and component 
sourcing 
. in R&D 
. in marketing UNIFICATION
Multinational customers
Competitors with operations 
unified on an internationa 
basis
Universal product needs
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3.V). Despite the Importance of these latter factors, economies of 
scale are, however, the most powerful argument in favour of 
unification. For this reason, the different types of scale economies 
and the way they influence unification of international operations 
will be discussed next.
Scale economies in manufacturing arise from the concentration of 
production and provide low unit costs through high volume in capital- 
intensive facilities. Associated with such a set up is a consistently 
high product quality achieved through automation and centralized 
quality control. The studies of the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 
have demonstrated the importance of scale economies in the reduction 
of unit costs. Costs per unit of a product are said by the BCG to be 
influenced by an experience curve which is dependent not only on scale 
of operations, but also on the learning function, and the level of 
specialization [BCG, 1974; Hedley, 1977; Grant and King, 1979]» 
According to the studies carried out by the BCG both in Europe and the
U.S.A., each time experience, measured in terms of cumulative units 
produced in one location, doubles unit costs decline between 20
percent and 30 percent net of inflation [ibid.]. Scale economies in 
manufacturing are maximized in the extreme case when production of a 
final product is concentrated in a single world-scale facility. This 
approach has been frequently utilized by Japanese companies [Davidson, 
1982, ch.5], which from volume-oriented, capital-intensive factories 
at home, manufacture standardized products for shipment to world 
markets.
Scale economies in material and component sourcing arise from 
centralized or coordinated (decentralized) buying which enables high- 
volume purchases. These open the possibility for a company to profit 
from quantity discounts and to use sophisticated information networks 
which are able to scan the world for the best items and the best 
prices. Scale economies in R&D are associated with the existence of 
world products ("high-touch" products in the terminology of Levitt 
[1983]), and derive from the possibility of concentrating the research 
and product development activities of a company in one location. High 
levels of R&D occur in high-technology businesses which, as it has 
been demonstrated in the literature [Vernon, 1966; Keesing, 1967;
69
3 / THE MNC AHD ITS EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
Gruber, Mehta and Vernon, 1967; Severn and Lawrence, 1974], show a 
marked tendency to have high levels of export and foreign investment. 
Therefore, it is likely that in many MNCs R&D is an important activity 
offering scope for substantial economies. Finally, scale economies in 
marketing are also associated with world products, and arise specially 
when the same advertising campaigns are designed to be used in a 
number of countries, instead of the more common situation of having 
campaigns with different characteristics for different countries. 
Clearly, global campaigns must assume that the world, or at least a 
large region, is a sole market with uniform characteristics, and this 
does only make sense in a very limited number of cases. Nevertheless, 
there have been considerable efforts both on the part of academics 
[Levitt, 1983a, 1983b] and on the part of advertising agencies [see
Fisher, 1984] to push for the idea of global marketing. So far, some 
successful cases include the marketing of soft drinks and computers. 
However, a major departure from the so-called "marketing concept" 
[e.g. Kotler, 1984, ch.1] should be regarded with extreme caution.
The forces contributing to fragmentation or unification in the pattern 
of international operations in a MNC are not exclusively economic. 
Also, forces of a political nature may influence the way in which a 
company's network of operations is organized. The political 
imperatives which condition the organization of the activities of a 
MNC generally push the company into fragmentation of operations (see 
Exhibit 3.V). The political forces shaping the evolution of the 
multinational stem from the fact that the world is divided into 
separate units, each claiming sovereignty over its territory and 
imposing a set of rules to which the MNC must abide by. The political 
forces include a large number of specific requests and general demands 
made on international companies by host governments. These have 
largely been discussed in section 3.2. and comprise factors such as 
high import duties and other international trade barriers, internal 
protective and subsidized trade practices, norms of conduct and 
regulations applied to MNC activities. In their response to the 
political imperatives, multinationals do not face only restrictions on 
the part of host governments. In effect, many countries are more than 
eager to attract foreign investment and offer a number of incentives 
(e.g. reduced taxes, capital at low interest rates, land to build
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plants), whose counterparts (e.g. serving the local market, 
substituting imports) sometimes may impede unification of a company's 
operations across national borders.
The incentives for fragmentation and unification vary largely with the 
type of industry. In some businesses, the economic imperatives are 
such that fragmentation of operations is the adequate form of 
organizing international activities. This is the case, for example, 
of the food industry and other consumer nondurable businesses where 
products differ greatly among country markets due to varied national 
tastes, where economies of scale available are insufficient, and where 
products are perishable goods which do not stand long transportation. 
This is also the case of the steel and cement industries where
transportation costs offset any scale economies available, and of 
fashion-oriented industries and many service businesses where lead 
times are short and economies of scale are unavailable (for a 
comprehensive list of industries, see Davidson [1982, pp.6-7]). In 
contrast, in many other industries the economic imperatives require 
companies to unify international activities. These are industries 
generally in high and medium technology fields presenting very
substantial economies of scale to be explored on a transnational 
basis. Examples are automobiles (see, for example, McMullen and Megna 
[1982], for a discussion of the world car concept), computers, 
civilian aerospace, electronic consumer goods, tyres, construction 
machinery [Davidson, ibid.], and chemicals [e.g. Read, 1984].
In the industries whose economic imperatives favour fragmentation, the 
political imperatives can easily be met, and no conflict between the 
two will arise. However, in industries where there is a strong
economic incentive for unification of international operations, the 
political pressures lead MNCs in the opposite direction, and a
conflict between the economic incentive to unify and the political 
pressure to fragment is likely to emerge. Strategic management in 
multinationals evolves around the need for a coordinated response to 
these economic and political stimuli, in order to capture the highest 
possible economic advantages with the minimum political disruption and 
interference. A comment on the strategies of MNCs at the light of 
such stimuli is the object of the discussion that follows.
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Strategic response to the forces for fragmentation and unification
The consideration of the relative importance of the particular 
economic and political imperatives influencing the international 
activities of a company should determine the type of strategy adopted. 
As it was just seen above, there are forces inherent to the very 
nature of the multinational business activity that exert pressure into 
fragmentation or into unification of a company's pattern of 
international operations. Frequently, pressures to unify and to 
fragment co-exist within a MNC. In order to achieve successfully 
corporate objectives, management must, therefore, decide to which 
pressures the company should primarily respond. As Doz and Prahalad 
[1984] point out, very seldom can a clear-cut, exclusive, choice 
between the two modes of international organization be made. They 
argue that such choices are not of the "either-or variety" but involve 
difficult trade-offs in the extent and form of organization to be 
found in the balance between fragmentation and unification [p.56].
Having this in mind, three multinational strategies can be defined. 
They are the segmented nation-for-nation strategy, the global 
integration strategy, and a mixed strategy carefully balancing the 
previous two(*).
The segmented nation-for-nation strategy is consonant with 
fragmentation of international operations. Companies may adopt this 
strategy because it is the only one applicable to the characteristics 
of the industry where they are in. In these cases, the economic 
imperatives have the same impact on the companies as the political 
imperatives, and no incentive for unification exists. On the other 
hand, there may be companies adopting the segmented nation-for-nation 
strategy that are subject to opposite forces for fragmentation and 
unification, as it was discussed above. In such cases, companies 
forgo the main economic benefits of unification and respond mainly to 
the political imperatives. Consequently, the formulation of segmented 
strategies may be dominated by either political imperatives, economic 
imperatives, or both simultaneously. In industries where local
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governments play a key role, as in the case of telecommunications, 
nuclear engineering, and electrical power, political considerations 
are paramount in setting up a segmented strategy (for a discussion of 
strategic response to political imperatives, see Doz [1979]). In 
contrast, in industries where governments do not play an Important 
role, such as food processing and fashion, the formulation of 
segmented strategies responds more closely to economic imperatives 
that call for differentiation in the local markets (for a discussion 
of strategic response to imperatives of economic differentiation, see 
Wiechmann [1974]).
Generally, a segmented nation-for-nation strategy is characterized by 
a high level of decentralization. Foreign subsidiaries are 
strategically independent of one another and have large autonomy from 
central headquarters. This means that the MNC that pursues a 
segmented strategy is composed of a number of foreign units which act 
in the local markets as if they were independent national companies. 
Such units have separate strategies, highly adapted to the local 
markets, and know-how and other resources of the group are called upon 
only when the subsidiary management finds them necessary [Doz, 1980]. 
Subsidiaries are only loosely controlled by the parent, and they tend 
to be regarded as profit centres expected to contribute earnings and 
growth in relation to respective local market opportunities [Hout, 
Porter and Rudden, 1982]. In a segmented strategy, manufacturing is 
usually organized on a nation-for-nation basis, with local plants 
substantially independent of each other, and with low levels of 
intersubsidiary transfers. Sourcing of materials and components is 
decided independently by each subsidiary. Also, often R&D is spread 
over local operations being difficult to avoid duplication of efforts, 
especially when host governments insist upon local research and 
product development on specific projects for which government 
sponsorship is available.
In sharp contrast with the segmented nation-for-nation strategy lies 
the global integration strategy. Global integration is akin to 
unification of international operations. Companies adopting this 
strategy give priority to the economic imperatives that motivate them 
to unify and integrate multinational activities. However, by
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responding first to the economic forces for integration, companies 
have to stand the pressure of the political imperatives that require 
them to be nationally responsive and internationally fragmented.
Behind the global integration strategy lies a view of the MNC as a 
system of well-articulated and multi-dependent parts transcending 
national borders. To satisfy the logic of the global strategy, 
companies have sometimes to take decisions which, regarded 
independently, may seem uneconomic, but which will eventually produce 
major benefits for the corporation as a whole. As Hout, Porter and 
Rudden [1982] point out, managing a business globally demands a number 
of unconventional approaches such as the adoption of investment 
projects with zero or even negative internal rates of return(5), the 
introduction in some markets of product lines deliberately 
overdesigned or underpriced, and the adoption of a view of individual 
market positions as interdependent, rather than independent elements 
of a worldwide portfolio to be increased or decreased in accordance to 
profitability [p.99].
The rationale for an integration strategy resides in the factors that 
compel a MNC into unification of activities on a global scale. As 
discussed above, the availability of unexplored scale economies plays 
a dominant role in leading a company to unify operations. The 
response to the incentives to explore economies of scale on a cross­
national basis requires MNCs to centralize decision making and to have 
a coherent and highly integrated strategy involving the whole network 
of foreign operations. Decisions regarding manufacturing, sourcing of 
materials and components, R&D, and sometimes marketing are made 
centrally by headquarters for the whole of the multinational network. 
Under this set-up, individual country subsidiaries are highly 
interdependent in terms of activities and are all subordinate to one 
company overal strategy. As a result, each subsidiary may specialize 
in producing only part of its product line, exchanging products with 
other subsidiaries in the international network (an analysis of how 
far a MNC can take global rationalization of production is made by Doz 
[1978]). Similarly, subsidiaries may specialize according to 
different stages in the production process in a way in which the 
advantages of different countries in terms of availability and cost of
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production factors - raw materials, labour, energy, technology - is 
explored in full (authors like Kogut [1984] view the activities of a 
MNC as a "value-added chain" and argue that the formulation of 
strategy in these companies consists in the placing of "bets" in the 
links of the chain). A consequence of the high levels of 
interdependence among units in a global integration strategy is the 
existence of a large volume of components, semi finished, and 
finished products being moved across plants located in different 
countries. The management of such a complex system of 
interrelationships requires tight levels of central control and the 
close monitoring of subsidiaries' activities. The evaluation and 
control of foreign operations should rely on key indicators linked to 
the critical functions of each subsidiary, making the assessment 
criteria used by headquarters management particularly varied and less 
dependent on profit-based targets.
Within the global integration strategy different marketing approaches 
to local markets may be taken. Some authors [e.g. Levitt, 1983a, 
ch.2; 1983b] contend that the full benefits of a global strategy can
only be achieved when corporations succeed in standardizing products 
worldwide. Based on the premise that for a certain number of products 
preferences and national tastes are homogeneized across nations (such 
an idea is imbedded in Levitt's "Republic of Technology" concept), 
this approach views the world as one sole standardized market, instead 
of as many customized markets. It should be noted, however, that such 
an approach does not mean that companies should offer a single product 
version worldwide. In effect, in the same way as domestic 
corporations ought to recognize different segments in a market, also 
global MNCs have to be able to identify market segments and provide 
differentiated product lines. Standardization of products occurs, 
therefore, within segments that are viewed as similar across the world 
market. In contrast to this position, a number of authors [e.g. 
Kogut, 1984] argue that a global integration strategy can accommodate 
some differentiation in products across country markets. Rejecting 
the idea of world homogeneization of consumer preferences, this 
approach attempts to demonstrate that substantial economies from 
integration may be possible when the variables of the marketing mix 
are changed to suit local markets. This would be so provided that
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upstream opportunities in the production process are exploited by 
linking shared resources on an international basis.
An important aspect in the definition of a global integration strategy 
is that the degree of unification of a company's International
activities may be determined by considerations of risk originated by 
the vulnerability of the company to disruptions in units of the 
network, and to sudden alteration of the premises on which the
decisions to invest were based. In the extreme case of a MNC which
tries to capture all the scale economies available by concentrating 
sourcing and manufacturing in units for which there is no back-up, one 
single problem in any of the units is likely to have a significant 
impact on the whole of the company. In fact, when a corporation does 
not possess multiple sources for key items it allows itself an extreme 
vulnerability to contingencies such as strikes and other labour 
problems, transportation disruptions, host government import 
restrictions, and even currency appreciation. The level of 
integration in a MNC strategy has, therefore, to equate increases in 
production efficiency available through concentration with increases 
in the vulnerability of the corporation arising from such a 
concentration.
In between the contrasting strategies of nation-for-nation 
segmentation and global integration lies a third strategy that 
carefully combines elements of both. This mixed strategy that Doz 
[1980] terms administrative coordination strategy is characterized by 
the lack of a priority given to pressures to unify or to fragment 
international operations in a MNC. Companies in this situation, being 
subject to conflicting economic and political imperatives are unable 
to make a clear choice as to which set of influences they should 
respond first. As a result, corporations adjust to circumstances in a 
manner that is deemed adequate for each particular situation, without 
attempting to integrate the adjustments into a consistent 
comprehensive strategy. Doz [1980, p.29] describes this approach to 
multinational management in the following terms:
"Instead of taking a stable proactive stance vis-a-vis the 
environment and relying on the cdiosen strategy to provide a 
framework within which to deal with sources of uncertainties 
and to make specific decisions as the need arises, companies
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using administrative coordination absorb uncertainties and 
try to resolve conflicts internally ea<A time new
uncertainties question prior allocations of strategic 
resources. In short, strategy becomes unclear, shifting with 
the perceived importance of changes in the economic or 
political environment, and it may become dissolved into a set 
of incremental decisions with a pattern which may make sense 
only ex post."
A mixed segmented-integrated strategy, although not providing a clear 
and positive strategic direction, enables a fair degree of internal 
flexibility which allows companies to respond to governmental 
requirements in certain cases while maintaining some degree of 
integration in others. Indeed, flexibility appears as the distinctive 
purpose of the mixed strategy which, compared with global integration, 
constantly trades off internal efficiency for external flexibility 
[Doz, 1980]. An important element in subsidiary flexibility is the 
less tight control exercised centrally on the units composing the MNC 
network. This, understandably, facilitates subsidiaries' response to 
host country requests and enables them to participate in projects 
jointly with local partners such as government agencies and state 
owned enterprises [ibid.].
As the discussion so far has suggested, MNCs for which economic 
pressures for integration are significant face a wide choice of 
strategic postures whose extremes would correspond to a complete 
fragmentation of operations, on one side, and to a global worldwide 
unification of operations on the other. The next paragraphs will 
discuss in more detail relevant factors that influence the choice of 
strategy by multinationals subject to economic forces that compel them 
into integration.
Oiooslng a multinational strategy
To start with it should be noted that the choice made by a company of 
a segmented nation-for-nation strategy or of a global integration 
strategy does not necessarily imply that the company has to practise 
the same strategy to the whole of its international operations. What 
it does mean is that there is a dominant strategy being preferred by 
the corporation and which applies to most of its subsidiaries. In
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fact, due to different trade restrictions and regulations for an 
industry among countries, it is practically impossible to avoid the 
existence of subsidiaries whose strategies deviate from the dominant 
company strategy.
Another point to be made is that global integration strategy is 
compatible with unification at the regional level. In other words, 
global integration may be conceived as a system of major geographic 
blocks within which high levels of interdependence are achieved, 
rather than as a universe of operations spread worldwide. Hood and 
Young [1 9 8 2, pp.176-182], for example, report the existence of high 
levels of product or component specialization in U.S. MNCs within 
Europe. The growing homogeneity of the European market, together with 
the gradual breakdown of cultural and legal barriers are said to have 
contributed to U.S. companies viewing Europe, or parts of it (i.e. the 
EEC and the EFTA), as a large geographic block where integration can 
be successfully achieved. Also a case of contained integration is the 
one that exists between the United States and Mexico, here clearly to 
capture the advantages of a close source of low-cost labour [Daniels, 
Ogram and Radebaugh, 1982, p.171].
The choice of strategy by MNCs operating in industries for which 
international integration pressures are high is suggested by Doz 
[1980] to be dependent on certain factors, namely market structure and 
nature of the customers, bargaining power of the corporation, size, 
technology level, and weight of the competition. Market structure is, 
for this matter, defined in terms of barriers to trade for particular 
produts or industries. Trade barriers and other restrictions can be 
either openly dislosed by governments or concealed in practices whose 
real intent is to impede free circulation of goods across borders. 
Such concealed practices include the use of the market power of state 
monopolies such as national telephone and postal companies, and 
electricity and gas companies, as well as the creation of certain 
legislation on product specification and inspection requirements. The 
degree of control in foreign trade by host governments varies with the 
nature of the goods being transacted. Indeed, characteristics of 
products such as large visibility and hi^ price, as well as their 
strategic importance for nation-states often influence governments to
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exercise close control over supplies [Williamson, 1975]. Electrical 
power systems and telecommunications equipment fall under this 
category, and in industries such as these the political imperatives 
are likely to be dominant to the point of preventing global 
integration, making nation-for-nation segmentation the most viable 
strategy. In contrast, there are industries whose products do not 
attract so much desire of control on the part of host governments. An 
example is the motor car industry which is subject to more liberal 
international trade, enabling MNCs to exploit scale economies and,
consequently, adopt strategies of worldwide or regional integration.
A third class of industries is situated in between the two mentioned 
above in terms of government control appetency. As Doz [ibid.] points 
out, there are businesses such as semiconductors and computers whose 
markets are partly internationally competitive and partly government 
controlled. As a result, in these businesses the market accomodates 
both customers who select their suppliers on economic grounds and 
customers who, being state-owned or state-influenced entities, show a 
preference for controlling their suppliers. It is in this class of 
industries that the choice of a strategy is likely to be most 
difficult. Faced with equally critical economic and political
imperatives, MNCs may opt for global integration in order to achieve
international competitiveness, they may opt, alternatively, for
segmentation to better respond to governmental demands and so benefit 
from their support, and thirdly they may opt for not making a clear 
option, in which case they resort to a mixed segmented-integrated 
strategy.
Selecting a strategy in such cases where both economic and political 
imperatives are paramount, is suggested to be determined by the 
bargaining power of the MNC vis-a-vis its host governments [ibid.]. 
Bargaining power is possibly given to a firm by its very size, its 
market share of the industry relative to the shares of competitors, by 
the level of technology of its products and by the quality of its 
relations with host governments. In effect, the larger and powerful a 
MNC, i.e. the more dominant in the market and the more sophisticated 
and leading its technology, the more likely is the corporation to be 
able to bargain with governments and to resist their impositions. In 
such cases, MNCs naturally tend to adopt global integration strategies
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because they are capable of handling the political imperatives without 
having to sacrifice economic efficiency. Moreover, it is in larger 
firms with higher market shares and with more sophisticated 
technologies that usually the potential for economies of scale is 
higher. Therefore, the incentive for integration in such firms is 
even more marked than in smaller companies, and, as a consequence, 
they may feel particularly willing to exercise their bargaining power 
and influence against host governments. Conversely, smaller, less
prominent MNCs which could not capture as many economic benefits from 
integration as the market leaders, find themselves simultaneously in a 
position where their bargaining power with nation-states is limited. 
These firms are, thus, likely to find segmented nation-for-nation, or 
mixed strategies more suitable and will seek host governments* support 
and subsidies to compete against the leading MNCs [ibid.].
The factors equated above were subject to a tentative empirical
observation by Yves Doz [ibid.], whose results are depicted in Exhibit 
3.VI. This corresponds to a study of six industries in Western Europe 
where trade restrictions for each industry are assumed to be 
relatively constant, and in which the economic and political 
imperatives are seen to be in conflict. The exhibit ranks the 
industries in terms of market structure (measured as a percentage of 
sales to government-controlled customers), and plots a number of 
companies in each industry according to their bargaining power 
(measured in terms of market share only). Additionally, the exhibit 
indicates the strategy followed by each company in the region. The 
examination of this data provides very interesting results that
support the relationships discussed above. As a matter of fact, 
global integration strategies are found in industries with the lowest 
exposure to government influence (automobiles and commercial 
vehicles), whereas segmented nation-for-nation strategies are
encountered in the industries that are most exposed (electrical power 
systems and telecommunications equipment). Mixed segmented-integrated 
strategies tend to be found in those industries where the number of 
government-controlled customers is reasonably important but not 
dominant (microelectronics and computers). Also, it is interesting to 
verify in Exhibit 3.VI how the bargaining power of a MNC seems to 
influence its strategy. In microelectronics, for example, the
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companies which have adopted a mixed strategy (Philips and Fairchild) 
are previously those that present the smaller market shares. The 
market leaders in the industry (Texas Instruments and Motorola) follow 
a global integration strategy. Also, in the computer industry IBM is 
the only corporation included in the study that has a global strategy. 
The other two (Honeywell and Sperry), with much lower market shares, 
have to resort to mixed strategies. A similar situation also happens 
in the telecommunications equipment industry, where the only company 
that can resist segmentation is the market leader (LM Ericsson) - see 
Exhibit 3.VI.
Before concluding, a further comment on strategies of global 
integration is required. It should be pointed out that global 
integration can be sometimes compatible with the satisfaction of 
stringent requirements of host governments. In countries where trade 
barriers are prohibitively high, and markets offer great potential for 
growth, like in major newly industrializing countries MNCs may have to
establish a local manufacturing subsidiary if they want to have a 
chance to explore the market. However, instead of creating a self-
contained subsidiary, the MNC may be able to build a specialized 
component manufacturing facility which will be integrated in a global 
sourcing network [Hout, Porter and Rudden, 1982]. By doing this the 
company can achieve scale economies and at the same time sell locally 
its product range, provided that the subsidiary is allowed to 
compensate exports of the component manufactured locally with imports 
of the final products.
An interesting case of two very different global integration 
strategies is provided in the motor car industry by some of the 
Western manufacturers, and by the Japanese producers. Western volume 
manufacturers, notably the two largest U.S. companies - General Motors 
(GM) and Ford - practise strategies of worldwide (or regional) 
integration through a network of production facilities located 
throughout the world, in order to capture the very large scale 
economies available in the industry, and, simultaneously, to respond 
to host government requirements of local production. The cost for 
such corporations in satisfying political imperatives is the creation 
of a system which sacrifices some of the economies of scale available.
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Therefore, the natural move for these companies is the search for even 
higher economic benefits of integration, by using more sophisticated 
global sourcing networks. Indeed, the present strategies of GM and 
Ford point to the exploration of opportunities in East Asia, specially 
in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan (see, for example, Kraar [1984]), in 
the same way as these companies have already started exploring the 
advantages offered in Europe by Portugal and Spain. In contrast to 
Western firms, Japanese manufacturers concentrated all their 
production at home from where they serve the world markets via export. 
This form of organization constitutes an extreme mode of global 
integration, which seeks to maximize efficiency by capturing virtually 
all the available scale economies and by exploring the advantages of 
the highly productive Japanese system. However, by adopting such a 
posture Japanese companies let themselves exposed to host government 
demands, in the sense that they have nothing to trade-off against 
import quotas and other regulations. The need to respond to such 
political imperatives, is forcing these companies to give up of some 
of the economic benefits already achieved, and is taking them into 
investing in production facilities in large markets such as the U.S. 
and Europe. In brief, the situation described presents the case of 
companies which, although operating in the same industry and 
practising global integration strategies, are forced to move in 
different directions for the reason that some have to respond 
primarily to pressing economic imperatives while others must give 
priority to ominous political pressures.
3.3.3. Summary
Strategic management represents an analytical framework for making 
decisions in a way consistent with corporate objectives. Companies 
must employ their resources in an efficient and productive manner and 
for that they need to adapt with foresight to the ever changing 
conditions of the environment. The role of strategy is therefore to 
elicit the most adequate matching of the organization to its 
environment through a chain of decisions which best explore the 
organization's resource capability. The environment external to an
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organization is subject to a certain degree of uncertainty which 
management attempts to reduce via careful analysis of key 
environmental influences. Uncertainty in the environment is defined
as a function of its degree of dynamism and complexity.
It is in MNCs that strategic management is more critical, due to the
fact that corporations have to deal with many varying degrees of
dynamism and a high level of complexity in their total external 
environment. Complexity arises from an extremely heterogeneous 
environment, composed of differing country sub-environments comprising 
the companies' network of operations. The best matching of the 
overall organization to such a varied and complex total environment 
within the most efficient use of resources available internally to 
firms, makes the strategic management process in MNCs particularly 
problematic and crucial to the companies' survival.
Strategic management in MNCs is fundamentally based on the choice of a 
pattern of organization for the companies' overall operations, that 
attempts to conciliate the form in which resources are used most 
efficiently with the best possible fitting to the characteristics of 
the environments operated. Such a choice involves the selection of a 
proper balance between fragmentation and unification of a company's 
international operations, and derives from the nature and weight of 
economic and political imperatives that frame the company's 
activities. Economic imperatives can exert pressure into 
fragmentation or unification of operations. The latter is motivated 
by the availability of unexplored scale economies in areas such as 
manufacturing, material and component sourcing, R&D, and marketing. 
Unification is also motivated by the existence of universal product 
needs, multinational customers, and competitors already unified on an 
international basis. While economic imperatives sometimes attract a 
company into unification, political imperatives such as host 
government restrictions and demands, usually push the company into 
fragmentation. In cases where economic and political imperatives are 
contradictory, there is an open conflict of interests between the MNC 
and the nation-states, and it is the role of strategic management to 
respond to the economic and political stimuli in such a way that the 
highest possible economic advantages may be captured with the minimum
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political disruption and interference.
Multinational strategic management encompasses the choice and 
consistent practice of one of three major strategies, namely a 
segmented nation-for-nation strategy which gives priority to 
international fragmentation of operations, a global integration 
strategy which prefers worldwide or regional (e.g. EEC) unification of 
activities, and a mixed segmented-integrated strategy (or 
administrative coordination strategy) which does not opt first for 
either pressures to fragment or to unify, rather prefering to 
constantly compromise and have no coeherent strategy (it is in this 
sense that administrative coordination is said to be the strategy of 
having no set strategy). In Industries where the pressures for 
international integration are high (e.g. industries with a minimum 
efficient manufacturing scale involving an output larger than the size 
of any of the individual markets served), the selection of a given 
strategy appears to be strongly influenced by the level of control 
exercised by host governments over the industry, and by the bargaining 
power of the MNC. The desire of host countries to control an industry 
in their territory is often reflected in the existence of state owned 
or government controlled institutions that constitute the major, if 
not the only, customers of the multinational in those territories. In 
such cases, companies may have to opt for nation-for-nation 
segmentation and forgo the economic benefits of integration. Yet, in 
some cases the bargaining power of a company vis-a-vis national 
governments may counterweight the political forces for fragmentation 
and enable corporations to put forward global strategies of 
integration, or at least resist flat-out segmentation through a mixed 
strategy.
Whatever the strategy adopted by the MNC, there will always be a need 
for an alternative surveillance of the environment relevant to the 
company's operations. If this is important for a corporation 
practising a segmented strategy, since the premises and conditions on 
which the strategic posture is based may alter, it is absolutely vital 
for a company globally integrated, where the impact of an 
environmental change in one of the units is likely to be felt 
throughout the whole system. The next section of the present chapter
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will discuss such a process of environmental surveillance.
3.4. Enviroimental Scanning
3.4.1. The Practice of Searching and Diagnosing the Environment
An adequate fit between an organization and its external environment, 
a major desideratum of corporate strategy, requires the understanding 
of the scenario in which the organization's activities evolve, and the 
ability to recognize in it threats and opportunities that should 
prompt corporate reaction. Understanding the environment and being 
able to anticipate future changes rather than be a victim of them, 
requires an activity of collecting and analysing information external 
to the firm, which constitutes the essence of the environmental 
scanning process. Scanning, as Aguilar [1967, p.1] defines it, is
"the activity of acquiring information [...] about events and 
relationships in a company's outside environment, the knowledge of 
which would assist top management in its task of charting the 
company's future course of action."
The search of the environment external to a company and the diagnosis 
of the likely impact of significant environmental factors on the 
company's activities are generally considered in the literature to be 
a crucial early stage in the strategic management process [Glueck and 
Jauch, 1984, ch.3]. The normative literature on corporate strategy 
prescribes a systematic search and diagnosis of the environment to 
determine which factors present threats to the company's current 
strategic direction, and also to determine which factors present 
opportunities for a better attainment of objectives through an 
adjustment in the company's strategy. Moreover, it is argued that the 
practice of environmental search and diagnosis helps managers to 
create an early warning system to identify potential threats, and 
gives managers time to anticipate opportunities and to plan optional
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responses to these opportunities [ibid.].
Research in the strategic management area suggests that company 
success, measured ultimately in terms of profitability, is somehow 
influenced by the existence of an environmental scanning activity. 
For example, Grinyer and Norburn [1975] found that the higher were the 
volumes of information collected and used in strategic decision making 
the more effective the performance of a company tended to be. Wolfe 
[1976], using a simulation model discovered that managerial 
effectiveness increased as the knowledge of the environment on the 
part of the decision makers also increased. Similarly, Miller and 
Friesen [1977], by identifying ten types of firms ("archetypes"), 
showed that corporate success was related, among other factors, to the 
appropriate amount of environmental information collected and 
analysed, relative to the characteristics of the environment.
The nature of the environmental scanning activity may vary widely from 
company to company. Research has shown that the quantity of 
environmental information processed by companies and the 
sophistication of the mechanisms used to collect and analyse that 
information vary with the nature of the environment. In environments 
with low levels of uncertainty, particularly in environments that are 
relatively static, the scanning activity tends to rely on a detailed 
analysis of the past, as a basis to forecast the future [Johnson and 
Schoies, 1984, ch.3]. Environmental scanning in this case, tends to 
be more continuous and systematic than in dynamic situations where it 
is likely to be more intermittent and inspirational in nature [ibid.]. 
In fact, when the past can be used as a reasonably reliable prediction 
of the future managers are willing to invest time and resources in 
relatively sophisticated scanning activities based on the formal 
collection and analysis of historical environmental information. In 
contrast, when conditions are particularly dynamic and volatile 
managers do not concentrate so much on formally diagnosing what has 
happened, preferring instead to rely on verbal, more informal 
information which enable them to sense the future.
Research conducted to determine the object of the environmental 
scanning activity has found that companies focus primarily on economic
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factors, specially those concerning the competitor sector [Aguilar,
1967, ch.3; Wall, 1974; Glueck 1980, ch.31. The influence of
competitive forces on the shaping of a company's strategy has been
extensively explored by Porter [1979, 1980, 1985] who has provided a
very complete analytical framework as a structured means of examining 
the competitive environment of an organization. The literature above 
addresses predominantly the scanning activity in a domestic context. 
In the case of multinationals, the sheer variety of environmental 
influences to which companies are subject, and the implications of 
such a variety in the companies' overall strategy, suggest the need 
for the collection and analysis of environmental information of a 
wider ranging nature. In the sub-section that follows, the process of 
environmental scanning will be discussed in the context of the MNC, 
and particular attention will be given to the collection and analysis 
of non-economic information.
3.4.2. The Environmental Assessment Activity in MNCs
Corporations operating at a multinational scale face increased levels 
of uncertainty, which managers attempt to cope with by implementing 
mechanisms of flexibility whose purpose is to elicit the companies' 
adaptability to changing environments. Mascarenhas [1982] describes 
several ways that MNCs can use to increase their flexibility, one of 
them being the implementation of "an intelligence system so as to be 
able to monitor and respond to new environmental developments" [p.89].
The existence of an intelligence system in a MNC implies the presence 
of an organized activity of collection and analysis of information 
about foreign environments. To perform such an activity properly the 
organization must have, first, access to relevant environmental data; 
secondly, it must develop mechanisms for organizing the data and 
procedures for analysing them; thirdly, the organization must 
disseminate the findings to the appropriate decision centres and 
people in the company [Aharoni and Baden, 1977, ch.6]. Before seeking 
access to environmental data, the corporation must know, however, what 
data to look for. This will depend upon the type of decisions in
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which the environmental information is expected to be used.
Nevertheless, if a company wants a reasonably comprehensive 
characterization of a host country environment it may base its
analysis on a systematic model of assessment either developed in-
house, or borrowed from the literature. In the latter, several models
of environmental characterization have been proposed over the years. 
One of them - Farmer and Richman [1965] - was extensively discussed, 
in a different context, in chapter 2 of the present work. The Farmer 
and Richman model provides a comprehensive classification of 
environmental influences on an enterprise in any given country, and 
covers a wide range of variables not only economic, but also 
educational, sociological-cultural, and political-legal. Other 
alternative models that can be of assistance in the characterization 
of host country environments have been proposed, for example, by 
Negandhi and Estafen [1965], Litvak and Banting [1968], Thomas [1974], 
and Glueck [1976, ch.3].
The use of a systematic model of environmental assessment presupposes 
a relatively advanced stage in the scanning activity, which only a few 
corporations are likely to have introduced. Some form of 
environmental scanning is, however, expected to be found in any 
international company. It is difficult to conceive a properly managed 
company in which decisions with a long-range impact on the 
organization are taken without giving consideration to the external 
environment. In fact, academia and practice have long recognized the 
importance of environmental assessment as a support to decision 
making. However, traditionally scanning tended to be made on an 
informal basis and tended to focus on economic aspects of the 
international environment, giving only scant attention to non-economic 
factors (in the literature, for example Vernon and Wells [1976] 
provide a very unbalanced view of the context of international 
business by discussing almost exclusively the economic environment).
Early empirical studies on the environmental scanning activity in 
MNCs, reviewed the collection and analysis of host country information 
in the context of one of its primary uses: the foreign direct
investment decision. These studies noted that the decisions to invest 
in a country were generally based on subjective perceptions on the
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part of the decision makers, rather than on well founded information 
purposely collected [Aharoni, 1966; Root, 1968a, 1968b; National
Industrial Conference Board, 1969]. Considerations of political 
stability and political risk were dominant among those of a non­
economic nature. For instance. Root [1968a], who explored the 
attitudes of executives towards five countries (U.K., France, Brazil, 
Mexico, and India) in a large sample of U.S. MNCs, found that 
attitudes regarding the stability or instability of a given country 
were highly determinant of the attitudes towards the safety and 
profitability of investments in that country. He also concluded 
[196 8b] that such attitudes relative to political stability were based 
on general images of countries "carried by executives in their heads" 
[p.22], and not on a systematic evaluation of the actual conditions 
encountered in the countries.
Other studies followed these pioneering efforts with not very 
different results. Keegan [1974] confirmed how little managers relied 
upon systematic scanning methods, and noted that organized gathering 
of environmental information was hardly significant in the companies 
he analysed. Behrman, Boddewyn and Kapoor [1975] found that generally 
managers did not anticipate environmental changes, rather reacting to 
them a posteriori. La Palombara and Blank [1977] reported the 
important finding that an environmental analysis function, although 
insipid, was already in existence in a number of MNCs. Included in 
their study were not only U.S.-based multinationals but also 
corporations based in the U.K., Continental Europe, and Canada. The 
authors found a relatively well organized system of information 
collection and analysis for economic data on host countries, and, in 
contrast, a "remarkably loose and casual" mechanism for non-economic 
information [ch.5]. Environmental analysis, which was found to be a 
part of the corporate planning process, included non-economic 
information occasionally collected by either affiliates or high-level 
headquarters management. The relatively superficial quality of such 
an information system, could perhaps be attributed to a certain fear 
on the part of companies that a deep involvement in the gathering of 
local non-economic information might be misunderstood by host 
countries. As the authors explain:
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•Multinational firms, particularly the U.S. firms, also have 
deep fear and antipathy about •political involvement^. Given 
past political interventions of some MNCs in the internal 
affairs of host countries, firms want to steer as wide as 
possible from any suspicion of similar behavior. There is a 
tendency to confuse sophisticated analysis of a host 
country's society, its political system and economic 
development aspirations, with covert intelligence activity.• 
[ibid., pp.xlii, xiv]
Recently, two studies provided more up-to-date information on company 
practices as regards the collection and analysis of foreign 
environmental information. They both reached the conclusion that the 
environmental assessment activity in many MNCs, having achieved a 
considerable level of refinement and sophistication, had been 
institutionalized in a formal function. The first of these studies 
corresponds to a major project led by Stephen Kobrin [Kobrin et al., 
1980], which involved the mailing of questionnaires to large U.S.- 
based MNCs (193 usable replies were received) and the conducting of 
extensive interviews (113 managers in 37 firms were interviewed). The 
study focused on the methods used by companies to process host country 
information of a non-economic nature (mainly social and political), 
and found that more than half of the respondents (55 percent) had 
already centralized and institutionalized an environmental assessment 
function. In these companies there were one or more organizational 
units with formal responsibility for collecting and analysing host 
country information. Such units varied widely in complexity from 
company to company, and ranged from one junior staff analyst with 
part-time responsibilities for country studies to a group with five 
analysts charged with developing and implementing a formal assessment 
methodology on a continuous basis [ibid., p.35]. The locus in the 
organization of the groups formally charged with the assessment of 
environmental information were mainly the finance/treasurer 
department, the planning and the legal departments, and the 
international division. In companies that had not institutionalized 
the function, top management tended to bear responsibility for 
environmental assessment. Tests of association indicated that the 
MNCs which had institutionalized the assessment function tended to be 
larger and more international than those which had not. Also, firms 
in industries that were more vulnerable to environmental impacts were 
found to be more likely to possess a formal function. In effect.
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nearly three quarters of the natural resource companies had assessment 
groups, as compared to the average of slightly more than half for all 
the cases studied.
The process of collecting and analysing environmental information was 
described by Kobrin et al. as "reactive rather than active" [ibid., 
p.3 7]. Only about one third of the corporations conducted 
environmental assessment on a routine basis. In the majority of the 
cases the process was made "on demand". As the authors point out, the 
essentially reactive nature of the assessment process explains that 
environmental analyses tended to be utilized in conjunction with 
certain activities which require action. Most analyses were motivated 
by an internal event such as an investment proposal, or the strategic 
planning cycle, or less frequently by an external event such as a 
major change in a given country of interest to the firm. Although the 
authors did not particularly explore the utilization of environmental 
information in the evaluation of foreign subsidiary operating 
performance, there is reason to believe that such an use was not 
widespread, since only a minority of firms (a quarter of the 
respondents) reported to employ environmental information for day-to- 
day operations.
As regards the sources of information used by companies, Kobrin et al. 
reached findings that are consistent with those of previous studies. 
Apparently, there was a distinct preference for executives to obtain 
political and social information through "interpersonnel oommunication 
in the context of veil established networks* [p.38]. The information 
sources considered of most importance by respondents were internal to 
the companies, especially subsidiary and regional managers, and 
headquarters personnel. A number of external sources of information 
were also used (banks, consultants, business periodicals, etc.) but 
they were all generally considered of less importance. A noteworthy 
finding of the study was that the environmental assessment process was 
often conducted in a manner that did not lend itself to an independent 
and objective analysis, because of a heavy reliance on host country 
management. As Kobrin et al. explain, subsidiary and regional 
executives not only prepared the assessment but also usually decided 
which aspects of the local environment merited coverage [p.41]. It is
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in this sense that the authors define the environmental assessment as 
a "bottom up" procedure. The natural implication of this is that 
subsidiary managers, either locals or expatriates, are members of the 
host country elites, and because of this they may not be in the best 
position for an objective and unbiased analysis. Similarly, host 
country managers are rewarded for the results their subsidiaries are 
able to show, thereby they have a vested interest in the environmental 
information they report and in the decisions headquarters senior 
executives may take on the grounds of the information that is 
reported.
It appears, as a general conclusion to the Kobrin et al. study, that 
the environmental assessment function required a more objective and 
systematic approach in its modus onerandi. It also required the 
imposition of some strategic direction from top management which 
enabled comparability between countries or regions. Another important 
conclusion of the study is that despite the rapid emergence of the 
environmental assessment activity as a formal function in MNCs, there 
was a lack of integration of that activity into the decision making 
process.
The second study to provide up-to-date information on company 
practices relative to the collection and analysis of foreign 
environmental information is Kennedy [1984]. Kennedy's research is a 
follow-up of the Kobrin et al. [1980] study. It had as a stated 
objective to determine whether substantial changes in the 
environmental assessment function had occurred in U.S. MNCs since the 
Iranian revolution(6). The overthrow of the Shah in Iran had enormous 
consequences for multinational business, and raised a sharp interest 
on the part of companies on environmental assessment issues in general 
and political risk in particular. Such an interest was also reflected 
in the academic literature, giving rise to what some call "the post- 
Shah surge in political risk studies” [e.g. Glueck and Jauch, 1984, 
ch.3], Examples of this literature are Linnemann and Klein [1979], 
Newgren and Carroll [1979], Ritvo, Salipante and Notz [1979], and 
Fahey, King and Narayanan [1981].
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The Kennedy [1984] study was based on structured interviews (61 in 
total, 10 personal and 51 on the telephone) conducted in very large 
U.S.-based MNCs. Kennedy reports that nearly three quarters (74 
percent) of the companies analysed had formally institutionalized the 
environmental assessment function, which represents a substantial 
increase from the 55 percent figure obtained by Kobrin et al. [1980] 
four or five years earlier. Such an increase would be easily 
justified by an upward trend in the institutionalization of the 
environmental function, already detected in empirical studies spanning 
more than a decade. Also, the "trauma" created in many companies by 
the discontinuities in Iran could provide a logical explanation for 
the increase in importance attached to non-economic host country 
information. However, as Kennedy points out the results of the two 
studies may not be compatible for possible sample bias and definition 
problems in his own study [p.100]. If no safe conclusion can, 
therefore, be drawn as to the increase in the number of firms 
introducing a formal environmental function, nevertheless the study 
appears to demonstrate that a greater qualitative emphasis had been 
placed on environmental assessment by MNCs in the last few years. In 
effect, the collection and analysis of host country information was 
found to be less dispersed within the organization, in those companies 
which had introduced the function since 1978. (In the overwhelming 
majority of the cases the function is located in the planning
department). Similarly, an increase in the number of full-time
analysts as opposed to professionals with part-time assessment 
responsibilities, together with an increase in the reliance placed on 
information supplied by outside sources, appear to suggest a 
significant qualitative change in the U.S. corporate approach to 
environmental assessment. In Kennedy's interpretation, ■this strongly 
implies a more serious, oo-ordinated, and less haphazard approach to 
external environmental analysis” [ibid., p.101].
Another important conclusion of the Kennedy study was that the 
institutionalization of the environmental assessment function was
somehow related to the characteristics of the planning process, namely 
to the existence of business portfolio or strategic business unit 
(SBU) analysis. In all cases, environmental information was 
considered of great importance to companies, even to those which had
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not yet institutionalized the assessment function. This fact suggests 
that a particularly positive and receptive attitude towards the 
external environment assessment activity was present in MNCs. 
Accordingly, further progression and sophistication in the 
organization of the environmental collection and analysis function may 
be expected in the future.
Despite the relatively large pool of knowledge accumulated over the 
years as regards the practices of U.S. multinationals in this area, 
very little is known about U.K.-based MNCs. The study by LaPalombara 
and Blank [1977] previously mentioned, included British multinationals 
together with companies from other countries. Although the 
distinctions in the practices of companies from different origin are 
not very clearly reported in that study, there is reason to believe 
that at the time a formal function of environmental assessment was 
also beginning to emerge in MNCs from Britain.
3.4.3. Summary
The environmental scanning activity lies as the foundation of the 
strategic management process. The setting of corporate objectives and 
the determination of the most appropriate courses of action to achieve 
such objectives encompass a careful consideration of the nature of the 
environment in which companies' operations evolve. Environmental 
scanning involves the activity of collecting and analysing information 
external to the organization in order to detect present and future 
threats and opportunities that should prompt managerial action.
The characteristics of the environmental scanning activity, in terms 
of volume and nature of the information processed, and also in terms 
of sophistication of the techniques used to collect and analyse 
information are suggested in the literature to be influenced by the 
degree of dynamism and complexity encountered by companies in the 
environment. In the case of MNCs, normally the external environment 
presents high levels of uncertainty resulting most of the times from 
the highly complex nature of the overall environment these companies
95
3 / THE MNC AND ITS EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
have to face. Coping with such complex external conditions, appears, 
therefore, to require the use of particularly well developed 
mechanisms of collection and analysis of host country information.
Traditionally, environmental scanning tended to be made on an informal 
basis. It also used to concentrate on economic data, overlooking most 
information of a non-economic nature. Empirical studies conducted 
during the 1960s and the early seventies all agreed in that a 
systematic and well organized gathering of environmental information 
In MNCs was hardly existent. Towards the end of the 1970s, studies 
started reporting that an environmental analysis function was emerging 
in multinationals. Such a function implied an institutionalized 
activity of collecting and analysing environmental information which 
in the beginning appeared to concentrate on economic data, spreading 
afterwards into non-economic information. Larger and more 
international corporations, together with firms in industries that 
were more vulnerable to host country environmental impacts were found 
to be those which tended to have introduced the environmental 
assessment function. Generally, the nature of the function was more 
reactive than active, meaning that only a minority of companies were 
conducting environmental assessment on a routine basis. In fact, most 
analyses were triggered by an occasional event such as a new 
investment, or a major change in a country of interest to the 
company, rather than making part of a continuous and permanent 
surveillance of external environmental conditions. Accordingly, and 
despite the lack of evidence in this respect, it appears that 
environmental information was not being widely used in the evaluation 
and control of foreign subsidiary operating performance. Overall, 
there seems to be a growing number of corporations implementing the 
environmental assessment function. Also, as a recent study suggests, 
there are signs that the quality of the function is increasing, and 
that there is a growing awareness on the part of senior executives of 
the importance of external environmental information.
Nearly all the empirical evidence available as regards the 
environmental scanning activity in MNCs is referred to U.S.-based 
companies. Accordingly, very little is known about how foreign 
environmental information is processed in U.K. MNCs. The present
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study intends to bring a contribution to the knowledge in the area by 
reviewing the practices of British multinationals.
3.5. SunmarY and Gonclosions
The present chapter brought the discussion of the relationships 
between an enterprise and its external environment initiated in the 
previous chapter to a more concrete level. Here, the analysis centred 
on a particular form of organization - the multinational corporation - 
which is focal to the study. In essence, the purpose of the chapter 
was to capture the nature of the dynamic relationship between a MNC 
and its environment by analysing the characteristics of the scenario 
which frames the international operations of a company. Also, the 
chapter intended to reveal the response of a MNC to the threats and 
opportunities posed by such a scenario, in the form of corporate 
strategic management and environmental scanning activities.
After a definition of MNC has been proposed, the chapter turned to a 
discussion of the nature of the environmental frameworks in 
international business. A very distinctive feature of a MNC as 
compared to a domestic company is the degree of variability in the 
external environment to which the MNC is subject. A systems view is 
useful to understand the ways in which a MNC differs from a purely 
domestic firm. The chapter presented a model of a MNC system which 
defines the total environment of a multinational as a composition of 
operating units in different domestic environments. Each unit (or 
subsidiary) acts as any local company by engaging in input-output 
transactions with other entities in the domestic environment. 
However, because a MNC normally involves a certain degree of control 
of subsidiaries by headquarters, and a common strategy and resource 
allocation criteria, there are inevitably flows among subsidiaries 
that cross national frontiers. Such flows are conditioned by controls 
and regulations imposed by countries, which reside in the 
international sphere of each domestic environment, and also by
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International institutions that transcend nations and regulate 
economic activity. All these elements are considered in the model 
presented in the chapter, together with the unique set of economic, 
political, legal, social, and cultural influences on subsidiary
operations associated with each host country. These environmental
influences are likely to change across geographic regions. The degree 
of variation due to location is related not only to the number of 
countries where the MNC operates, but also to the very nature of such 
countries. In spite of this, the chapter presented a list of 
environmental factors that are most likely to change from one country 
to another, and which provides an illustration of how different 
country environments can be.
Adding to the complexity of the environment, MNCs have also to face
particular conditions that result from the fact of them being simply
multinationals. Over the years, the overall atmosphere towards 
multinational business has changed considerably both in home and host 
countries. Three periods since the end of the second world war were 
identified in the chapter. The first (1945 - late sixties) was highly 
favourable to the growth of MNCs and presented great opportunities in 
the way of relatively stable environments. The second period (late 
1960s - late 1970s), presenting a sharp contrast, was marked by 
turbulence and discontinuities helped by hostile attitudes towards 
MNCs. A third period (the 1980s), characterized by slightly steadier 
environmental conditions and more positive attitudes towards 
multinationals, appears to begin to emerge.
In order that an organization be able to reach its objectives in an 
efficient and productive manner it must adapt to the constantly 
changing conditions in the environment. Such a process of adaptation 
requires that decisions are made strategically, that is in a way that
the organization's activities match the characteristics of the
environment and explore to the full the resource capability of the
organization. The external environment with its permanent changes and 
its varied influence on an enterprise is a major source of uncertainty 
for management. An important portion of managerial activity is 
typically spent dealing with uncertainty. Part of the role of
strategy is to assist in this respect. In effect, by analysing a
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given situation in order to make a strategic decision, managers 
attempt to reduce the many influences of the environment to a pattern 
which they can understand and act upon. The level of uncertainty in 
the environment results from its degree of dynamism and complexity. 
In MNCs, environments tend to be particularly uncertain due to varying 
degrees of dynamism and a generally high level of complexity, both 
resulting from the existence of country subenvironments with different 
characteristics. Consequently, strategic management in MNCs presents 
very special problems that must be understood if a perfect match with 
the environment, within an efficient use of internal resources, is to 
be achieved by a company.
Having provided a discussion of the nature of strategic management in 
general, the chapter concentrated on the understanding of 
multinational strategies. Two vectors frame the development of a 
company in the international scene and dictate its approach to the 
overall organization of activities worldwide. One of these vectors is 
mainly economic and represents the pressures for a company to be
competitive and efficient on a transnational basis. The other vector 
is eminently political and reflects the pressures for a company to 
respond to demands and incentives of individual host environments. 
Economic imperatives may influence a company either into fragmentation 
or unification in its pattern of international operations.
Fragmentation is motivated by diversity in local market conditions, 
such as different customer needs and tastes, and by certain
characteristics of industries, like short lead times, emphasis on 
distribution, high transportation costs, and unavailability of scale 
economies. Unification, in contrast, is induced by the existence of
substantial economies of scale in manufacturing, material and
component sourcing, R&D, and marketing, and also by universal product 
needs, and multinational customers and competitors. Political 
Imperatives, on the other hand, normally push a company into
fragmentation. A result of the exercise of the prerogatives of 
sovereign governments, political imperatives consist of a large number 
of specific requests and general demands made on MNCs by host nations.
The choice of strategy by a MNC should give consideration to the
particular economic and political imperatives influencing the
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International activities of the company. Frequently, pressures to 
unify and to fragment operations are co-existent inside a MNC. It is, 
therefore, the role of management to decide to which pressures should 
the corporation respond first, in order that the highest economic 
benefits may be captured with the minimum political disruption and 
interference. Three distinct strategies were defined and discussed in 
the chapter, namely the segmented nation-for-nation strategy, the 
global integration strategy, and the mixed segmented-integrated 
strategy. In industries where the pressures for integration and 
segmentation are simultaneously high, the level of control exercised 
by host governments over the industry on one hand, and the bargaining 
power of the MNC on the other, appear to have a decisive influence on 
a company’s choice of strategic posture. As it was extensively 
discussed in the chapter, each of the three main strategy stereotypes 
results in different organizational structures, practices, and levels 
of control by headquarters over subsidiaries. Therefore, the choice 
of strategy by a MNC has far reaching implications for the present 
study.
At the foundation of the strategic management process lies an activity 
which is instrumental in the creation of an adequate interaction of an 
enterprise with its external environment. Such an activity consists 
of the scanning of the conditions which frame companies’ operations 
with the objective of recognizing threats and opportunities that 
should prompt managerial reaction. TTie environmental scanning 
activity involves searching and diagnosing practices, whose 
characteristics and degree of sophistication are believed to be 
dependent on the level of dynamism and complexity found in the 
environment itself. Accordingly, it appears that in MNCs, where such 
levels of dynamism and complxity are at its highest, the scanning 
activity would require particularly elaborate techniques to process 
environmental information. Extensive empirical evidence focusing on 
U.S. multinationals is available, and was reviewed in the chapter. By 
judging the results of research over a number of years, it appears 
that there is a growing number of MNCs institutionalizing in 
headquarters an environmental assessment function. Equally, the 
Quality of the scanning activity appears to be steadily increasing. 
From the available evidence it is not clear how the environmental
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information retrieved is used in the decision making process, 
particularly in the evaluation process of foreign subsidiary operating 
performance. The present study proposes to shed some light into such 
an aspect and simultaneously to contribute to the scarce knowledge of 
the environmental scanning activities in British multinationals.
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(1) For a compilation of definitions of MNC see McGreevy [1978], where 
more than a dozen of different criteria used in the literature to 
describe a MNC are presented.
This includes the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development together with its two associated agencies, namely the 
International Finance Corporation and the International 
Development Association.
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
For a comprehensive discussion of the control exercised by 
headquarters of MNCs over the strategic resources made available 
to subsidiaries, see the two-part series article by Prahalad and 
Doz [1981], and Doz and Prahalad [1981].
Multinational strategies, defined in accordance to similar 
criteria as the ones used here, have been termed differently by 
distinct authors. For example, Doz [1980] calls the three 
strategies presented here, respectively national responsiveness 
strategy, worldwide integration strategy, and administrative 
coordination strategy. Hout, Porter and Rudden [1982] distinguish 
between multidomestic and global strategies. Davidson [1982] talks 
about local and global management strategies. Fayerweather [1982] 
makes a separation between a strategy of fragmentation and a 
strategy of unification.
The application of models of investment appraisal in practice is 
most likely to leave absent from the calculation of future cash 
flows important strategic, market, and competitor considerations 
that are not directly reflected in the investment per se. but 
which affect the company as a whole. If investment appraisal 
techniques are used in such a deficient way it is not surprising 
that Hout, Porter and Rudden [1982] suggest the occasional 
selection of a project that shows an insufficient internal rate of 
return or net present value. An example of a situation in which 
the decision to invest is motivated by consequences that transcend 
the investment itself is a project whose main purpose is to drain 
the cash flow of a major competitor in the market where it is 
traditionally generated (the case described by Hout, Porter and 
Rudden of Caterpillar’s investment in Japan to block the position 
of its main world competitor, Komatsu, is an illustration to this 
point). Another example is the case of an oil company deciding to 
invest in a new oil field yielding large potential, just because
major competitors are exploring it. As Robbins and Stobaugh
[1973b] point out, no company would risk being left out of such a 
new field even if the (deficient) application of investment 
appraisal techniques produces unattractive results. As they point
out [p.81], the risk of a rival finding a large, low cost oil
field, and thereby acquiring a long term strategic advantage is 
too high for the company to take.
The Kobrin et al. [1980] study was, in effect, conducted before 
the Iranian revolution, since the questionnaires on which part of 
the research is based were completed by respondents in 1978.
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chapter 4 - INTERNAL CONTROL AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
4.1. Introduction
Before initiating a discussion on the internal control and performance 
evaluation processes in MNCs, a brief examination of the nature of the 
control activity in an organization is required.
In a restricted sense, control may be defined as an essential 
management function whose purpose is to direct the employment of 
organizational resources in an efficient and effective manner. 
According to this definition, control follows the function of 
acquiring and organizing the human, technical and capital resources 
necessary to implement plans and goals previously devised in the 
organization [Steiner, 1969, ch.2]. This view presents a classic and 
elementary approach to the management of organizations which sees
managerial activity composed of three major functions: planning,
organizing, and controlling [e.g. Miller, 1982, ch.2; Horngren, 1982, 
ch.1]. Despite the need for distinguishing in theory between planning 
and control most authors agree in that the two functions are 
inextricably interwoven not only in practice but also conceptually. 
Steiner [ibid, p.4l] explains that "although the basic distinction 
between planning and control is sharp the two are inseparable; they 
are inseparable because planning is necessary before controlling can 
be meaningful, and each must be done in light of the other".
Therefore, although the focus of this chapter will be on ex post
monitoring of sub-organizational activities, i.e. on control, planning 
will always be implicit.
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In a much broader sense, and at a purely conceptual level, control may 
be seen as the process by which an organizational system adapts itself 
to the environment in which it operates. In chapter 2, business 
organizations were defined as open systems in constant interaction 
with their surrounding environment. The distinctive characteristics 
of open systems were said to be a tendency to evolve towards greater 
complexity, the ability to reach a "steady-state", and the capability 
of behaving "equafinally". Such characteristics mean that business 
organizations are capable of constantly adapting their behaviour to 
the ever-changing characteristics of the environment, and so preserve 
their integrity and identity. The capability of achieving adaptation 
through a certain level of stability which maintains the organization 
in existence is provided by internal control mechanisms. Control is 
therefore vital to the organization’s survival. This idea is 
expressed by Amey [1979, p.250] in the following terms: "Business
enterprises are open to a vide range of environmental and internal 
disturbances, and without the conscious exercise of control would be 
highly unstable systems".
Internal control in an organization is concerned with both strategic 
issues (the search for an adequate match between the organization and 
the environment), and operational issues (the search for an effective 
allocation of resources guided by the achievement of goals) - see, for 
example, Emmanuel and Otley [1985, ch.1] for a discussion along these 
lines. Strategic issues were amply discussed in chapter 3 of the 
present study in the context of the MNC, which is the type of 
organization where the problems of interaction with the environment 
are likely to be experienced more acutely. In the present chapter, 
operational issues will be emphasized, and internal control will be 
discussed in the framework of the process guiding the monitoring of 
performance of organizational subunits (i.e. divisions, subsidiaries).
The chapter opens with a discussion of the essence of control in 
organizations and starts by equating control with the ultimate 
organizational purposes of achieving certain minimum necessary 
requirements of internal stability and adaptability to the external 
environment. Next, the chapter places control in the context of the
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continuous internal monitoring process of organizational unit
performance and draws attention to the fact that the evaluation of 
unit performance ought to distinguish, at least at a theoretical 
level, between output (i.e. the performance of the unit as such), and 
behaviour (i.e. the performance of the management responsible for the 
unit). Established such a distinction, different types of control 
modes are presented. These modes apply equally to the monitoring of 
organizational output and management behaviour of foreign subsidiaries 
in MNCs and are basically characterized by differing levels of
formalization of control mechanisms, such as targets, measures, rules 
of conduct, and interpersonal relationships. The factors influencing 
the choice of particular control mechanisms and of the general 
characteristics of the MNC's internal control process are, then, 
reviewed on the basis of the evidence available in the literature. 
Such a review will, hopefully, provide a sound basis for the
ascertainment of major explanatory variables relevant to the present 
study.
Having introduced the formal and the informal dimensions of
performance evaluation, the chapter explores each in detail. The 
formal performance evaluation process in MNCs is based on information 
provided by communication channels formally institutionalized between 
headquarters and subsidiaries. These channels constitute a firm's 
management information system whose meaning is defined in the chapter. 
The design of the information system as far as the flow of information 
between headquarters and foreign subsidiaries is concerned, is then 
discussed at the light of the empirical evidence available. Next, the 
use of the information provided by the internal reporting system in 
MNCs is analysed, and major problems and difficulties arising in 
subsidiary performance evaluation from the use of such information are 
highlighted.
As to the use of informal information in performance evaluation, the 
chapter attempts to explain the reasons why information that is not 
collected through formal channels of communication is utilized in the 
monitoring of subsidiary performance. Intrinsic weaknesses of the 
management information system, attributed to be a major cause for the
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use of informal information, are reviewed and extended to the case of 
companies subjected to highly diverse and dynamic environments. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the role of informal information in 
the headquarters-subsidiary relationship. The circumstances in which 
informal information is called upon to use are subject to scrutiny. 
Also, the ways in which informal information is integrated in the 
formal evaluation process are carefully analysed.
4.2. The Essence of Control in Organizations
4.2.1. The Ultimate Purpose of Organizational Control
As it has often been suggested previously, organizational survival 
demands a constant fit of the organization to its environment. 
Moreover, organizational success can be viewed as a result of how well 
organizations react to, and also anticipate, threats and opportunities 
in the environment.
Survival and success of an organization can only be achieved through 
the use of control mechanisms^) which ensure that organizations 
attain a desired degree of flexibility subject to the necessary levels 
of stability. Organizations,as any other complex open systems, ought 
in the first place to achieve internally a stable dynamic equilibrium 
(a steady-state, according to Von Bertalanffy [1950, 1972]).
Stability, once obtained, can be maintained by ensuring that any 
deviations from the desired (equilibrium) values are kept within 
certain prescribed boundaries. However, as Amey [1979] reminds, the 
control exercised to keep an organization stable may restrict its 
ability to adapt and change in relation to the environment. In the 
pursuit of stability, resources are deployed in the maintenance of a 
desired state of equilibrium. Some of these resources could perhaps 
be more usefully employed in testing the environment, and in
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proactively making anticipatory moves. Therefore, besides being 
stable, organizations also ought to be flexible and adaptive, and this 
has to be elicited by the control mechanisms. In sum, the activities 
of sociotechnical systems (remind Boulding [1956]) should be 
conditioned by the simultaneous attainment of internal stability and 
flexibility. In this sense, Buckley [1967] argues that the most far 
reaching objective of an organization is a joint optimization of 
stability and flexibility. A similar position is defended by Amey 
[1979] who, nevertheless, gives priority to flexibility over 
stability. In his proposition, business enterprises should be guided 
by an objective of maximizing adaptability (flexibility being a 
prerequisite to successful adaptation) subject to a minimum necessary 
degree of stability. As Amey [ibid, p.255] explains:
"The organization must be thoroughly ccMnmitted to 
impermanence. [...] To remain viable and adaptive, business 
enterprises need to maintain great flexibilitv in their 
structure and organization. At the same time a certain
degree of stabilitv is necessarv in at least some of the 
relationships between systan (xmponents, in all of their 
dimensions - technical, managerial, and social (interpersonal 
relationships) as well as financial - otherwise the 
organization might fly apart and cease to exist.” [emphasis 
added]
Having equated control in organizations with the ultimate purposes of 
maintaining flexibility and stability, the discussion will now take a 
more pragmatic view, and will deal with control as a process by which 
desired performance of an organizational unit is monitored.
4.2.2. Monitoring the Performance of an Organization - Object and 
Types of Control
In a general sense, organizational performance results from a relation 
between controlled variables and uncontrolled variables [Ackoff, 1974, 
P‘233]. The latter can be presented to an organization as both 
constraints which the organization must face (for a meaningful period 
of time they are fixed conditions to which the organization has to
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adapt), and contingencies which the organization must meet [Thompson, 
1967, ch.2].
Performance should, therefore, be monitored in a way which recognizes 
that organizational success in the attainment of goals is only 
partially dependent on managerial competence. For this reason, two 
different phenomena are required to be monitored when assessing the 
performance of an organization, namely output and behaviour [Ouchi, 
1977]. Each will give indications of different dimensions of 
performance. In effect, while output is concerned with the 
performance of the organization as such, behaviour deals rather with 
the performance of the management responsible for the organization. 
Monitoring output focuses on "ends", and relies heavily on readily 
available output measures. In contrast, monitoring behaviour 
emphasizes the "means" to the ends, and looks at actions and decisions 
instead of shortcut measures. A similar distinction has also been 
made by Levinson [1976], who drew attention to the fact that the 
monitoring of performance should accommodate the "what" (i.e. the 
outcome, or output) as well as the "how" (i.e. the behaviour) in 
performance.
Monitoring the performance of an organization, either its output or 
the behaviour of its managers, involves the use of practices and 
instruments that may widely vary in character. Child [1972, 1973]
introduced a distinction between two major types of control - personal 
and bureaucratic - to which Edstrom and Galbraith [1977] added a third 
type - control by socialization. As Baliga and Jaeger [1984] note, in 
the context of the MNC the personal type of control consists of 
placing trustworthy executives from headquarters in key positions in 
subsidiaries to supervise their functioning, and to report information 
and results to the centre. On the other hand, the bureaucratic mode 
constitutes a more indirect and impersonal kind of control vrtiich 
relies on an extensive set of rules, regulations and procedures. 
These create a fair degree of formalization in the control process. 
The third type of control - control by socialization - is close to the 
personal type and is characterized by a large proportion of people on 
whom the company has absolute trust, placed in upper and middle
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management positions, exchanging information with headquarters on a 
permanent basis. An important characteristic of this type of control 
is the de-emphasis placed on formalization. Because of the affinity 
between the personal type of control and control by socialization, 
Baliga and Jaeger [ibid.] proposed a merger of the two under the name 
of cultural control. Consequently, one may distinguish between two 
dominant forms of control that managers in MNCs can employ to monitor 
the performance of their subsidiaries; bureaucratic control, and 
cultural control.
Both types of control - bureaucratic and cultural - are likely to 
coexist whithin companies, though one of them will always prevail. In 
their pure, ideal form bureaucratic and cultural controls are viewed 
as opposite approaches to organizational control. The bureaucratic 
model is the prototype of formalized control. It is based on te 
utilization of an explicit set of codified measures and rules which 
define desired performance in terms of output and/or behaviour [Child, 
1973]. The instruments used in the monitoring of output are 
widespread and include formal performance reports submitted by 
subunits to the parent through the internal reporting system, 
performance measures reflecting ex post output, and targets 
representing desired performance determined ex ante. On the other 
hand, the monitoring of behaviour is helped by instruments such as 
company manuals, formal internal rules of conduct, and management by 
objectives (MBO) techniques (for a discussion of the latter, see 
Humble [1970], and Odiorne [1979]). In general, monitoring 
performance in a bureaucratic mode involves the comparison of 
organization's output and individuals' behaviour to standards 
predetermined in measures and rules, and applying the appropriate 
rewards or penalties that follow. These rewards and penalties may be 
of an organizational nature when they involve decisions dealing with 
the allocation of company resources among subunits (subsidiaries), and 
of a personal nature when individuals' performance determines 
supplemental compensation, as well as other incentives such as esteem, 
job satisfaction, promotion, and status symbols.
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The cultural model of control, on its turn, does not rely on codified 
formal procedures, preferring instead informal and implicit control 
mechanisms. The natural habitat of such a control mode are companies 
with a strong corporate culture (for a discussion of organizational 
culture see Deal and Kennedy [1982], and Schwartz and Davis [1981], 
among others). Japanese companies are said to favour the cultural 
model of control [Hatvany and Pucik, 1981; Wilkinson, 1983], and 
authors such as Ouchi [1981] have adapted the approaches used by those 
companies to Western organizations. Monitoring of performance in a 
typical cultural control model occurs through interpersonal 
interaction, and although explicit formal control mechanisms are 
present, monitoring is drawn essentially from a general company-wide 
culture [Baliga and Jaeger, 1984]. Organization's output and 
individuals' behaviour are monitored during the course of 
interpersonal interactions. Feedback, which can be of a subtle 
nature, is given to organizational participants on a personal basis.
Exhibit 4.1 summarizes the differences in the control mechanisms 
associated with the bureaucratic and the cultural types of control. 
Elements of the cultural model of control are likely to be found in 
any company, to a larger or lesser extent. Even corporations which 
heavily rely on formal bureaucratic control will use informal control 
mechanisms as a complement to the institutionalized explicit control 
procedures. Informal control of performance will be further discussed 
later in the chapter.
4.2.3. Factors Influencing the Characteristics of the Control 
Process
The degree of bureaucratization and informality found in a company's 
control system are thought to be influenced by the very 
characteristics of the company which operates the syston. As Baliga 
and Jaeger [1984] remind, the age, size and industry of a company have 
been found to impact significantly on the emphasis placed by the 
company on bureaucratic control. In particular, it appears that the
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older the firm, the larger its size, and the older the industry in 
which it functions, the more bureaucratic and formalized the company 
tends to be [e.g. Khandwalla, 1977; Reimann, 19731. On the other 
hand, studies in organization which focused on the interaction between 
the enterprise and its environment have suggested that firms choose a 
certain level of formalization and adopt determined internal processes 
as a response to environmental characteristics. This was discussed in 
some detail in chapter 2 of the present study.
Control in multinationals is affected by the factors just mentioned 
and also by a number of variables that are characteristic to MNCs. 
The strategy adopted by the organization for its international network 
of operations is just one of these variables. In chapter 3» a 
typology of multinational strategies was defined, which essentially 
opposed global integration strategies to segmented nation-for-nation
strategies. Such strategies can be interpreted at the light of 
Thompson's [1967] classic model of internal interdependence, in order 
to put in context certain assertions made by Baliga and Jaeger [1984]. 
According to these authors, sequential and reciprocal interdependence, 
which are believed here best to reflect integration strategies, 
typically generate a greater need for monitoring and coordination
leading to the bureaucratic mode of control. On the other hand,
pooled interdependence, which is akin to segmented strategies, by not 
requiring such high levels of control coordination, would facilitate 
the use of more informal approaches to control.
Another factor that is thought to influence the nature of the control 
process is organizational structure. Management's choice of structure 
for a company's international operations (i.e. organization by
international division, by product, geography, matrix, etc.) would 
affect its control and monitoring system [e.g. Daniels, Ograra, and 
Radebaugh, 1982, ch.18]. Also, at a more fundamental level structural 
issues such as decentralization and divisionalization were suggested 
to play an important role in explaining the degree of formality 
encountered in a control system [see, for example, Emmanuel and Otley, 
1985, ch.2]. Similarly, organization theorists such as Mintzberg 
[1979] have proposed a classification of control mechanisms linked to
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organizational forms characterized by different structural patterns.
Finally, an important factor in determining the characteristics of the 
control process in MNCs could also be the management philosophy 
prevalent in companies headquarters. In a well known model of 
multinational organizational policy first presented by Perlmutter 
[1969] and later developed by Rutenberg [1982], the managerial 
attitudes in MNCs are viewed to follow a typical evolution that 
includes three stages: ethnocentricity (or home country orientation),
polycentricity (or host country orientation), and geocentricity (or 
world orientation). As Perlmutter explains, these are essentially 
states of mind among international executives which have a strong 
implication in the functioning of MNCs. As far as control mechanisms 
are concerned, an ethnocentric multinational would be characterized by 
tight controls imposed by headquarters, a high flow of orders, 
commands, and advice from headquarters to subsidiaries, and the 
application of home measures and standards to all the components of 
the MNC. A polycentric company, in contrast, would exercise a loose 
control on subsidiaries, the level of communication between 
headquarters and subsidiaries would be low, and the performance 
measures and standards would be determined on an individual 
subsidiary-related basis. On the other hand, a geocentric MNC would 
aim for a collaborative approach between headquarters and subsidiaries 
in its internal decision making, would have an intense flow of 
information going both upwards and downwards the headquarters- 
subsidiary communication channels, and would employ measures and 
standards that are simultaneously global and local.
In conclusion, the discussion here has suggested that management's 
choice of control systems is influenced by a number of organizational 
characteristics. Consideration of such characteristics should not be 
overlooked in a study that proposes not only to offer empirical 
evidence on the practice employed by companies to monitor foreign 
operations, but also to explain why certain practices are in use 
preferably to others. Later in chapter 7, the independent variables 
of the study will be made explicit.
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4.3. The Formal Performance Evaluation Process of Foreign Sabsldlarles
4.3.1. Ite Flow of Information Reported Internally by Subsidiaries 
to Headquarters
The exercise of formal control in an organization is essentially based 
on information flowing through institutionalized internal reporting 
channels. The internal information system in a company is made up of 
such communication channels and constitutes a primary support, of 
vital importance, to managerial decision making. Moreover, the 
information system generates data relevant to the monitoring of the 
organization and of its elements, thus facilitating the internal 
control process. In this sense, the information system can be viewed 
as the "connective tissue" [Shapiro, 1982, p.553] that links all the 
parts of an organization helping it to preserve its integrity and 
identity. The close interaction between the control process and the 
information system is explained by Arpan and Radebaugh [1981, p.292] 
as follows;
"There is [...] a necessary link between the information 
system and the control systan. A control system must insure 
that there is goal congruence among all the elements of the 
organization and that operations are in harmorqr and 
consistent with goals. It also must be able to assess the 
results of operations, in terms of plans as well as of 
changes in the environment. Yet a control system is no 
better or worse than the information and decision making 
systems on which it relies. Hence the symbiotic 
relationship."
In the typical business organization the management information system 
(MIS) represents the totality of the formal communication channels. 
The information that circulates in such channels is used for several 
purposes in the company (e.g. finance, marketing, production, 
personnel), and is an integral part of the communication, measurement, 
evaluation, and decision making activities. At the centre of the MIS
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lies the financial information system (FIS) in whose core is 
accounting information [Miller, 1979, ch.11]. Generally, the FIS 
dominates the total information system in an enterprise [e.g. Leksell, 
1981; Machin, 1983], to the point that in most firms non-financial 
Information is not reported via particular channels, but included 
instead in the FIS. The reasons for this are varied and range from 
the fact that historically accounting has represented business 
information with almost exclusivity becoming known as "the language of 
business" [Miller, 19 82, ch.2], to the fact that the main overall 
control system seems invariably to be the budget [Machin, 1983]. Due 
to this dominating characteristic of the FIS within the general MIS, 
in the present study the term financial information system will be 
used interchangeably with internal information (or reporting) system.
For purposes of the study, and paraphrasing a definition presented by 
Leksell [1981], the financial information system is defined as the set 
of formal and standardized reports which in a MNC are submitted by 
foreign subsidiaries to headquarters. These reports are primarily 
(but not exclusively) generated from and based on the accounting 
system, and may contain not only quantitative but also qualitative 
information. As integral parts of an institutionalized information 
system, reports are usually standardized and formalized in terms of 
content, structure, and reporting frequency.
The next sub-section will attempt to provide an insight into the 
surprisingly scarce empirical evidence available as regards the design 
of the internal reporting system in MNCs.
4.3.2, The Design of the International Reporting System
The variety and sheer volume of information reported by subsidiaries 
to headquarters is illustrated in Watt, Hammer, and Burge [1977, 
ch.17], when they describe the different reports that are typically 
forwarded by the subsidiaries of a given U.S. MNC. Such reports cover 
a wide range of issues from accounts receivable ageing and cash
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forecasts for month to non-accounting information such as data dealing 
with industrial relations, legal issues, and data processing. All 
these amount to more than 100 reports of different nature. In another 
U.S. multinational. Watt, Hammer and Burge found that each subsidiary 
was normally requested to send to the headquarters more than 500 
reports during the period of one year. The reporting frequency of the 
items varied from once every month for certain kinds of reports to 
once a year for other types.
More recently, Laurent Leksell [1981] produced evidence on the design 
of multinational internal reporting systems, based on a systematic 
study conducted in six Swedish MNCs. As regards the content and 
reporting frequency of the items included in the companies' 
information systems, Leksell [ibid, pp.212-215] found that financial 
items such as the balance sheet, income statement, specification of 
cash and credit, and inventories were forwarded by subsidiaries either 
monthly or every quarter in all the companies studied. Non-financial 
reports such as production output, and market share in host country in 
some companies were either requested on a less frequent basis or not 
requested at all. A very noteworthy finding is that in four of the 
six corporations analysed the reporting system included formal reports 
on the economic and political conditions encountered in the host 
countries submitted on a very frequent basis (either monthly or 
quarterly). In the other two corporations such environmental reports 
were also part of the information system, however on a non-systematic 
occasional basis only. Leksell points out that the companies in which 
local conditions in the host countries were regularly reported 
presented a higher degree of host country dependence (defined as the 
level of exposure of a MNCs operations to host government influence), 
and a high intra-organizational interdependence (close to Thompson's 
[1967] definition of reciprocal internal interdependence).
As far as the standardization of the reporting system is concerned, 
the degree of uniformity of the international reporting system in 
relation to format and content was found by Leksell [ibid, pp.215-218] 
to be high in all the MNCs studied. The companies had formalized and 
standardized their international reporting documents on a corporate-
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wide (or divisional) basis as to layout, measurement principles, and 
accounting definitions. Consequently, the reporting requirements from 
subsidiaries were generally found to differ little within each 
corporation. Notwithstanding, in some of the companies reporting
requirements changed slightly in accordance with the size and the 
financial performance to the subsidiary. Larger subsidiaries were 
required to report more than small ones; also, subsidiaries performing 
unsatisfactorily were imposed new reporting requirements to strengthen 
control and increase information. A substantial change in reporting 
requirements was found, although, to exist between wholly owned and 
partly owned subsidiaries (especially joint ventures). The degree of 
integration in the standardized reporting system of documents 
emanating from joint ventures was in general lower than that from 
wholly owned subsidiaries. Such an integration appeared, however, to 
be dependent on the integration of the operations of the joint venture 
into the overall operations of the MNC. Besides, pressures on the 
joint ventures to adopt the standardized corporate reporting standards 
tended to increase if the joint venture was consolidated into group 
accounts.
Another aspect regarding system standardization is the extent to which 
international reporting between foreign subsidiaries and headquarters 
differs from domestic reporting between home country divisions or 
subsidiaries and headquarters. In the sample of companies studied by 
Leksell the international reporting system was observed to be fairly 
similar to the domestic systems in use.
The relationships suggested by Leksell between companies' 
characteristics and the features of the international information 
systems cannot be generalized due to the excessively short sample base 
of his study. However, Leksell's research reached far in the 
generation of valuable hypotheses that can be tested in a study which 
Is designed to use inferential statistics.
Having discussed the design of the internal information systems in 
MNCs, the use of the data provided by these systems in subsidiary 
performance evaluation will be analysed next.
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4.3.3. Evaluation and Control of Foreign Subsidiaries Using the 
Formal Reporting System
Purposes and functions of formal reporting systems
The formal Internal reporting system in a company performs a number of 
different functions, namely communication, evaluation, motivation, and 
direct action [Bursk et al., 1971, ch.2]. Communication represents
the very essence of the information system, which is made up of data 
flowing through the channels formally established across the several 
segments of the organization. On the other hand, evaluation
presuposes the intelligent use of the information communicated, with a 
view to assess the effectiveness and the efficiency of an
organizational unit or of the management responsible for the 
operations of that unit.
As to motivation and action, they are a result of the evaluation
function. Implicit to performance evaluation is the idea that the 
assessments made at the top will act as the major criticism on which 
rewards are based. It is known that a manager will tend to optimize 
those criteria on which his promotion and compensation are dependent 
upon [e.g. Levinson, 1976]. Therefore, by applying right criteria and 
accurate judgement the evaluation function should ideally achieve a 
congruence of goals between the corporation as a whole and its 
managers, in particular. The discussion of the behavioural 
implications of performance evaluation are beyond the scope of this 
study. However, it should always be kept in mind that the
sophistication and eventual success or failure of performance 
evaluation ultimately depend on the people that apply the system and 
on which the system is applied.
Direct action, the last of the functions of the internal information 
system, is triggered by evaluation of performance. In the particular 
and obvious case of unsatisfactory results corrective action must be 
taken by management at the top. In any case, however, decision making
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and action naturally follow the process of evaluation. As Shapiro
[1978] indicates, the evaluation system aims at granting a rational 
basis for overall resource allocation, and provides an early warning 
of any problem likely to occur with the operations. These two 
characteristics of reporting systems are inextricably linked to 
decision making and action.
Evaluation, the central function of the internal reporting system, is 
by no means an easy task. In any corporate situation, and especially 
in a MNC, the performance evaluation and control of an organizational 
subunit is likely to be surrounded by difficulties. Some of the 
difficulties with particular relevance to the present study will be 
reviewed next.
Problems in performance evaluation and control
As Brooke and Remmers [1977, ch.10] noted, the international 
reportings system is largely a measurement device that provides a 
basis for comparing the performance of the several organizational 
subunits of a same company. In order to be able to measure, the 
reporting system has to use quantifiable information which is mainly 
provided by accounting data. Therefore, any weaknesses bore by 
accounting information will be necessarily reflected on the 
performance evaluation process.
Hopwood [197 2] points out that data based on accounting systems pose a 
series of major problems when they are used in the evaluation of 
performance. In the first place, accounting-based measures and 
standards are not comprehensive enough to reflect all the relevant 
dimensions of performance. Secondly, even if accounting information 
is used only to assess the economic aspects of performance, accounting 
can rarely approximate the complexity of an organization's economic 
cost function, which is hardly possible to know with rigour. Thirdly, 
accounting data cannot properly reflect managerial performance, since 
the data are primarily concerned with representing the outcome of the 
operations performed by the unit (i.e. the "what" in performance).
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The process giving rise to the final outcome which reflects the 
efforts of managers (i.e. the "how" in performance), are not 
adequately captured by accounting. Fourthly, accounting reports 
emphasize short-term performance while the concern of performance 
evaluation may be more with long-term results. Lastly, as Hopwood 
[ibid, p.158] remarks, accounting systems try simultaneously to serve 
a number of purposes by producing general reports, instead of custom- 
built information. As a result, "in trying to satisfy a series of 
purposes, the reports may fail to perfectly satisfy the requirements 
for any single purpose", performance evaluation included.
So far, general level problems in performance evaluation that lie at 
the root of the information that is normally used as the basis of 
assessment have been introduced. The discussion will now proceed by 
exploring some of the more pertinent issues that create difficulties 
to the subsidiary evaluation process in MNCs.
Performance evaluation and control in divisionalized companies is 
traditionally based on the concept of responsibility accounting. In 
its simplest form, responsibility accounting recognizes various 
decision centres throughout an organization (i.e. cost centres, profit 
centres, and investment centres) and traces performance (measured in 
costs, profits, assets, and liabilities) to the individual managers 
who are responsible for making decisions about the activities of the 
centres [Horngren, 1982, ch.5]. The concept of responsibility 
accounting is constructed upon a framework of premises that should 
always be present if a fair evaluation is to be achieved. Such 
premises assume that: 1) resources employed (inputs) and results
produced (outputs) are measurable; 2) inputs and outputs are traceable 
to specific activities; 3) inputs and outputs are within a certain 
time span, under the effective authority and control of given managers 
responsible for the specific activities; and 4) meaningful standards 
can be developed in order to compare and assess actual with desired 
performance [Miller, 1982, ch.31.
Problems frequently arise in performance evaluation because superiors 
insist in using the concept of responsibility accounting even when one
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or more of the premises mentioned above are not present. In 
particular, the principle of authority and controllability is most of 
the times violated due to interdependencies created within companies 
which "act to nullify the logic of responsibility accounting and 
usually result in illusory evaluations of managers and segments" 
[ibid, p.35]. The problems arising from interdependencies among 
subunits of an organization are amplified by transfer pricing and 
other related techniques of cost allocation [e.g. Farag, 1974]. In 
MNCs such techniques are widely used due to the need of integrating 
and coordinating largely scattered operations [e.g. Arpan and 
Radebaugh, 1981, ch.10]. Common to all is the fact that the 
headquarters make decisions that have a direct impact on the 
performance of each subsidiary individually, leaving no room for the 
discretion of the subsidiary managers to be exercised. Examples of 
such decisions include, besides transfer prices, charges for the 
parent technology and the parent services, valuation of fixed assets 
transferred from one subsidiary to another, internal borrowing from 
the parent, and leading and lagging practices. Robbins and Stobaugh 
[1973b] discussed the effects to performance evaluation resulting from 
the use of some of these practices, showing that companies invariably 
used the principles of responsibility accounting in performance 
evaluation even when subsidiary managers could not be held responsible 
for the results their operations demonstrated. Decisions such as 
these, taken by headquarters and having a direct impact on the results 
of subsidiaries were left out of the scope of this study for reasons 
of size manageability.
The principle of authority and controllability is also often 
misapplied due to another sort of factors, which are related to the 
different nature of the environments where foreign subsidiaries 
operate. As it was extensively discussed in chapters 2 and 3, each 
host environment where a MNC is established is likely to present a 
different set of features which have a particular impact on the 
subsidiaries’ activities. Local conditions of an economic nature 
(such as inflation and exchange rates, market size, and cost of 
production inputs), and also political conditions (e.g. political 
stability, political risk), legal conditions (e.g. taxes, import-
121
4 / INTERNAL CONTROL AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN MNCs
export controls, labour law, exchange controls), and social/cultural 
conditions (e.g. language, religion, attitudes towards achievement and 
work, labour strikes) all contribute to a subsidiary’s performance, 
and only to a very limited extent can be influenced and altered by the 
subsidiary’s managements^). Hence, if the concept of responsibility 
accounting is applied without top management making an effort to 
comprehend the peculiarities of each environment misjudgements as to 
the performance of subsidiary managers are likely to occur. For this 
reason, and also as a means of anticipating future changes that will 
have a strong impact on subsidiaries’ activities, internal information 
systems should take into account the external environment 
characteristic to each operation.
Such a requirement appears to be difficult to fulfil as long as 
companies use the same criteria to evaluate and control foreign 
subsidiaries, and domestic operations. Hawkins [1965] enumerates four 
basic reasons why MNCs feel an incentive to export their control 
systems, namely the fact that: 1) performance evaluation and control
usually only become a major problem once subsidiaries are fully 
operational and an integral part of the multinational network; control 
issues are "seldom a critical problem in getting started initially 
overseas" [p.26]; 2) the utilization abroad of the domestic reporting 
system and the domestic evaluation criteria is less costly than the 
creation of a new purpose-built system for the international 
organization; 3) due to the need to consolidate the accounts of all 
subsidiaries, domestic and foreign, there is a pressure for all the 
operations in a company to report the same information in the same 
format; and 4) the once domestic (now international) executives feel 
more comfortable in their new roles if they continue to use the 
control system with which they are familiar. Uniformity in the 
information reported and the control procedures used often lead 
companies to fail to distinguish in the evaluation of performance the 
characteristics that are peculiar to each subsidiary. A reflection of 
such an uniformity is, according to Hawkins [ibid.], the application 
of the budgetary system to all subsidiaries in exactly the same 
moulds, and the imposition upon overseas operations of standards 
identical to those applied to domestic operations. As a result.
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performance evaluation practices used for overseas units are seldom 
effective and successful. Due to the diversity of environmental 
conditions encountered across the spectrum of host nations it seems 
that not only a distinction in performance evaluation criteria is 
necessary between foreign and domestic operations, but also a 
distinction among the several overseas subsidiaries is required.
There have been attempts in the literature to "environmentalize" 
performance evaluation systems. The purpose is to introduce in the 
evaluation criteria used for foreign subsidiaries methods that enable 
the identification of the effect of environmental factors on 
subsidiary performance. Morsicato and Diamond [1980] proposed the 
utilization of the model developed by Farmer and Richman [1965] in 
which external environmental constraints are directly related to 
internal management functions (see chapter 2 of the present study). 
The method suggested by Morsicato and Diamond involves the 
quantification of the impact of dominant environmental constraints on 
the efficiency of various management functions, which at best appears 
to be extremely difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, the Farmer and 
Richman model, if used in a less elaborate manner, provides a useful 
tool to comprehend the nature of a particular environment. 
Consequently, its use in performance evaluation may help in accounting 
for the effects of the environment on the performance of a subsidiary. 
Another study to attempt a method of "environmentalization" of 
evaluation systems was conducted by Jacque and Lorange [1984]. 
Centred on the case of subsidiaries operating in "hyperinflationary" 
environments, this study developed a methodology which achieves over a 
strategic horizon the smoothing of highly erratic, environment- 
influenced, subsidiary yearly results. Also of somewhat difficult 
application this method, like the one previously described, 
nevertheless reflects the concern by members of the academic community 
about the need to render performance evaluation systems in MNCs 
sensitive to the characteristics of the local subsidiary environments.
In sum, the consideration of the environmental specifity of each 
subsidiary is vital for the achievement of a competent and effective 
performance evaluation and control system in a MNC. Channon and
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Jalland [1979, ch.19] observe that Increasingly sophisticated 
oornrauni cation and data processing technology have made possible the 
use of more environmental information in the control and evaluation of 
foreign subsidiaries. No conclusive evidence has, however, been 
provided in the empirical literature as to the extent to which the 
overseas environments are taken into consideration in the evaluation 
of foreign subsidiary and managerial performance(3). The production 
of such an evidence, and the ascertainment of the factors that explain 
the degree of environmental sensitivity on the part of evaluation 
criteria are major aims of the present study.
4.4. Informal Information In the Performance Evaluation Process
4.4.1. The Rationale for the Use of Informal Information
Parallel to the formal information system in organizations there is 
information which is not collected through the Institutionalized 
channels but which is used for the same purposes as the official data. 
Such an information is called informal.
The use of informal information appears to be widespread in 
organizations. Authors such as Davis [1953], Simon et al. [1954], 
Aguilar [1967], Hopwood [1973], Mintzberg [1973], and Clancy and 
Collins [1979] have found that managers frequently rely for their 
decisions on data retrieved and reported outside the formal 
communication network. Specifically, there is evidence that senior 
executives favour verbal channels (either face-to-face contact or the 
telephone), and direct observation as means of supplementing, and even 
replacing, formal sources of information.
Mintzberg [ 1975] attributes the use of informal information to the 
limitations of the formal information system. According to him, the 
typical MIS has four basic weaknesses, namely: 1) the formal system is 
too limited in scope; 2) the formal system tends to aggregate data.
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this resulting in that much of the information produced is too general 
for the manager; 3) the formal system produces information too late; 
and 4) the formal system generates information which is sometimes 
unreliable.
The problem of limitation in scope stems from the fact that formal 
information systems, as Porter and Lawler [1968] point out, have 
difficulty in coping with data regarding intangible and non­
standardized subjects. By relying on documents and on written 
information, the MIS does not capture some significant facts that 
verbal communication is able to provide. Moreover, verbal channels 
allow for a prompt interaction and feedback apparently so important to 
managers [Mintzberg, 1973]. Limitation in the information provided 
is, in particular, due to the circumstance that the formal system 
often ignores important non-economic and non-quantitative data 
[Mintzberg, 1975]. Also, as emphasized by Mintzberg [1973, 1975], the 
formal system is usually weak in providing external environmental 
information, leading managers to develop theirown information systems: 
"networks of contact men, informers, customers, trade organizations 
and other personal sources who feed them external information on an 
informal, ad hoc basis" [1975, p.4].
As regards the second weakness of the MIS, that of excessive 
aggregation of data, it must be noted that information reported has 
necessarily to be aggregated to suit the limited time of managers. 
However, in the aggregation process, information may become so general 
and bland that it is of little practical use. On the other hand, it 
is known that decision makers need specific detail instead of general 
aggregation [Mintzberg, 1975]. The way of reconciling these 
apparently opposite requirements is to provide the detailed 
information relevant to a given decision only when that decision is 
being pondered by the user of the information. This brings the issue 
of the filtering process. The appropriate selection of the 
information relevant to a manager in each point in time requires a 
filtering process more intelligent and flexible than the one offered 
by the typical MIS which uses standard clerical and automated 
procedures.
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The timeliness of information may constitute another important issue 
for data users, since decisions are often required to be made 
immediately after (and sometimes even before) the occurrence of the 
events that give rise to the decisions. The information reported via 
the formal system is usually tardy due to a number of reasons. First, 
the nature of the formal reporting is such that information is 
normally communicated in regular intervals, even if that means that a 
certain very relevant piece of information must await until the 
scheduled time of reporting. Second, the data aggregation process, 
characteristic to formal systems, takes time impeding a prompt 
disclosure of information. Third, by giving preference to 
quantitative data the MIS retards the communication of information. 
As Mintzberg [1975] explains, a considerable amount of time must 
elapse between the occurrence of an event and its translation into a 
figure ready to be reported through the formal channel. Events may be 
known first as rumors and gossip, later as isolated and confirmed 
facts, and only after this they are quantified and reported. In sum, 
"although data can be machine-processed quickly, the nature of the MIS 
is such that these data are delayed as they become measurable fact, as 
they get aggregated with other data, and as they are reported to the 
managers on schedule" [ibid., p.6].
The fourth and last weakness of the formal system mentioned above, 
that of unreliability of the information, is associated with the 
adoption of surrogate measures that do not describe events in the most 
appropriate manner. The preference for quantitative data by the MIS, 
is for Mintzberg [ibid.] again the main responsible for the 
unreliability of some data reported hrough the formal channels. 
According to him, something is likely to be lost in the quantifying 
process to the extent of distorting reality. It should be noted, 
however, that errors in the measurement and processing of data are 
natural to the human nature, and therefore, are likely to occur with 
all forms of information, not only formal but also informal. Related 
to the problem of data reliability is the problem of trust on the part 
of the users of the formal information. Sometimes, information 
although being reliable is not trustworthy. In this case, the 
weakness lies not in the information system itself but somewhere else
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in the organization. As Clancy and Collins [1979] suggest, executives 
may not trust sources of information over which they have no control, 
even when such sources produce accurate information. As a result, 
parallel, non-official information systems may emerge. Similarly, 
Porter and Lawler [1968] reported that results upon which rewards to 
managers are made, are frequently cast in doubt by those people to 
whom the rewards are to be given. This may give rise to the creation 
of personal, informal records.
The weaknesses encountered in the MIS leading to the use of informal 
information are perhaps amplified when companies are subject to 
particularly diverse and dynamic environments. Galbraith [1973] 
argued that the amount of information that must be processed by an 
organization in order to ensure a given level of performance varies 
directly in proportion with the degree of environmental change and 
uncertainty. Based on this premise, Leksell [1981] hypothesized that 
informal information accrues to the formal system whenever a higher 
than normal volume of information is required to respond to 
particularly difficult characteristics of the environment. Companies 
would strive to standardize routine information flows in order to 
avoid information overload, leaving non-routine information needs to 
be processed on an ad-hoc basis and via informal channels [ibid. 
p.217]. Such a view perhaps suggests that MNCs which tend not to 
include environmental information in their formal systems process high 
levels of environmental information on an informal basis.
The present study, besides attempting to ascertain the main reasons 
for the use of informal information in subsidiary performance 
evaluation and control, will also explore the relationship between the 
characteristics of the formal information systems and the use of 
informal information. In particular, information relating to the 
subsidiaries’ external environments collected through informal 
channels of communication will be subject to analysis.
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4.4.2. The Role of Informai Information in the Headquarters- 
Subsidiary Relationship
Empirical evidence helping to explain how and when informal 
information is used in decision making is marked by its paucity. In 
the particular case of the MNC, it appears that the frequency with 
which informal information is used is substantially lower than in the 
general case of domestic corporations. Mauriel [1969, pp.38-39] in a 
study involving 15 very large U.S. multinationals, suggested that 
informal communication between foreign subsidiary managers and 
headquarters executives was less frequent than between home country 
divisions and headquarters. This fact has as a consequence that a 
greater reliance is made on the data from the formal system that is 
operated between foreign subsidiaries and the parent company. 
Similarly, Daniels, Ogram, and Radebaugh [1982, p.480] argue that in 
an international setting, subsidiary managers have much less personal 
and oral contact with corporate headquarters. Based on these sources, 
it would appear that the flow of informal information in MNCs is low, 
or at least lower than in a purely domestic setting. However, this 
could be a characteristic of only some multinationals, for the extent 
of informal information used in MNCs was found by Robbins and Stobaugh 
[1973a, ch.8] to vary according to the size of the corporation’s 
international business. In effect, in small companies relationships 
between foreign operations and headquarters relied very heavily on 
personal visits, and much of the decision making in the parent company 
with a direct impact on subsidiaries was based on information 
collected through informal channels. In contrast, in large 
corporations exchange of information was rigid and relied upon highly 
visible formal channels of communication. Decisions in headquarters 
concerning foreign subsidiaries were "built around procedures, 
directives, and rule-of-thumb standards" which reflected the 
impersonality with which executives in the parent company approached 
subsidiaries. This condition was also found to exist in domestic 
subsidiaries of large corporations. However, it was thought to be 
aggravated in the international context where distance usually
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provides serious obstacles to direct exchanges [ibid., pp.148-153].
Another factor to consider in the understanding of the level of use of 
informal information is the corporation origin. All the findings 
above concern U.S.-based MNCs, and there are reasons to believe that 
in non-U.S. companies there is a smaller emphasis on formality. If 
this is so due to cultural differences or simply due to differences in 
size - the average non-U.S. MNC is arguably smaller than the average 
U.S. MNC - has not been ascertained. In the particular case of 
European multinationals, authors such as Lombard [1969], and more 
recently Egelhoff [1984] have observed a strong tendency for 
enterprises to develop informal communications on their international 
network of operations. As Lombard pointed out, European MNCs are 
characterized by a high informality of communications and 
responsibility, and an emphasis on personal relationships and contacts 
among management. Similarly, Egelhoff defended that MNCs from Europe 
give more attention to personal contacts and monitor more closely 
behaviour than their U.S. counterparts. American multinationals, in 
contrast, were said to monitor more closely subsidiary output and to 
rely more extensively upon formal reports.
These opinions appear to be confirmed by Leksell [1981] in his study 
of six Swedish MNCs. The reliance by senior headquarters executives 
on reports forwarded by subsidiaries via the formal system was found 
to be very low. To extract information about subsidiary operations 
informal communication channels such as telephone conversations and 
personal visits were preferred to the formal reports forwarded by 
subsidiaries. Consequently, the MIS emerged as more of a confirmation 
of information already known. Also, the role of the formal reports 
became limited to consolidation purposes and the mere historical 
analyses of subsidiary operations [ibid., pp.223-224]. Based on these 
findings, Leksell concludes that the standardized information of the 
type contained in the formal system does not satisfy the information 
needs of headquarters executives in MNCs. Headquarters staff and line 
managers are said to be compelled to create personal and informal 
links to satisfy their information needs, because the formal system 
fails to provide the adequate Information in the right timing.
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Besides, as Leksell acknowledges, there is an inherent problem with 
standardized information systems as regards their capability of 
satisfying the diverse and constantly changing information needs that 
normally arise in corporations as complex and varied as the MNCs 
[ibid., p.2 2 3 ].
From the evidence just described it appears that the informal 
information often acts as a substitute for the information provided by 
the institutionalized system. For example, Leksell [1981] observes 
that "the limited use of subsidiary reports among senior executives 
raises the question of how valuable [the formal] systems are for other 
than routine control purposes" [p.223]. Also, it is generally 
accepted that the use of informal information is an "evil" only 
necessary because of the imperfections of the formal system. Hawkins 
[1 9 6 5], on his observation of U.S. MNCs, found the widespread use of 
personal visits to subsidiaries as a means of overcoming the 
limitations of the MIS, and concluded that such ways of gathering
information are a rather poor use of top management time. He asserts 
that :
"[Frequent plant visits arise] because the management control 
system utilized by the home office is unable to overcome the 
distance and cultural gap between the home office and its 
overseas field operations. When the uncertainty builds up to 
a sufficiently high level, the executive involved usually 
resolves the situation by a personal visit to the foreign 
area involved. Unfortunately, at best, such exertions of 
personal control result only in temporary solutions and 
not correct the basic problem, the defective control system." 
[ibid.,p.28, emphasis added]
The argument that the use of informal information can be dysfunctional 
Inside the organization is illustrated by Leksell [1981] when he 
describes the consequences of the increase in the flow of informal 
information utilized by MNCs in the evaluation of subsidiary 
performance. The emphasis on informal information for performance 
evaluation purposes is said to give rise to the emergence of a number 
of sub-goals regarding subsidiary performance, which usually have 
dysfunctional effects. As Leksell explains:
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"The pattern observed was that different headquarters* staff 
or line executives emphasized different operating cureas in 
their communication with the subsidiaries. For example a 
divisional product manager may ask about sales levels, a 
financial manager about increases in inventory levels, and a 
corporate production manager about waste and material flows. 
The subsidiaries sometimes interpret these comments and 
questions as signals about headquarters goals and 
expectations, i.e. as those items against which subsidiary 
performance is measured. As the number of "goals" increases, 
the likelihood of goal conflicts increases too [...]. As a 
consequence, the subsidiaries easily become confused about 
headquarters expectations." [ibid., p.224]
The established idea that informal information acts as a substitute 
for the information provided by the formal system, and that the use of 
informal information is dysfunctional for the decision making process 
can be questioned in face of a study conducted by Clancy and Collins
[1979]. In their analysis of the attitudes of 148 executives, Clancy 
and Collins reached some interesting and controversial findings. One 
of such findings was that those managers with both formal and informal 
accounting systems had independent attitudes towards the systems 
[p.28]. Formal and informal accounting systems were equally perceived 
positively both being considered moderately efficient and effective. 
This result contradicts the hypothesis that informal systems would 
compete with, and partially supplant, formal systems. As a 
consequence, Clancy and Collins conclude that informal information 
should perhaps be considered "a useful and necessary adjunct to the 
formal system rather than an unnecessary dissipation of resources" 
[p.2 9]. This being so, informal information should be regarded as a 
supplement instead of a replacement for the formal information. The 
implications of these tentative conclusions are far reaching. As 
Clancy and Collins argue:
"If the conclusions are subsequently supported, then the 
direction of systems design and improvement should be 
changed. No longer would the elimination of informal systems 
be an important objective. Rather, improving compatibility 
between formal and informal systems should be stressed."
[ibid., pp.2 9 -3 0 ]
The results from Clancy and Collins’ study are difficult to reconcile 
with the empirical evidence concerning the use of informal information
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in MNCs. This is mainly due to the fact that the Clancy and Collins 
study addresses the problem of the utilization of informal information 
in the context of middle-level management in domestic corporations, 
and not in a headquarters-foreign subsidiary type of setting. Its 
findings are, however, very relevant and the present study will 
attempt to ascertain whether informal information used in a MNC for 
performance evaluation purposes is regarded mainly as a substitute for 
or a complement to the formal information system.
4.5. SiMimarv and Conclusions
The present chapter introduced the concept of organizational control 
and discussed the essence and nature of the performance evaluation 
process in the multinational context. Different objects and types of 
control were reviewed together with the factors believed to determine 
managements’ choice for particular features in the subsidiary 
performance evaluation process. Due to the fact that performance 
evaluation makes use of information retrieved and communicated outside 
the formal reporting channels, as well as of data reported via the 
institutionalized information system, an examination of these two 
types of information was considered necessary.
Organizational control may be viewed at an abstract level as a means 
of maintaining a particular type of open system - the business 
organization - in a constant internal stable condition subject to a 
simultaneous permanent state of adaptation to the ever changing 
conditions of the external environment. In this sense, internal 
control is a determining factor of organizational success and 
survival.
The operationalization of this concept of organizational control 
requires that the control activity in an enterprise be placed at two 
essentially different levels: the strategic, and the operational
132
4 / INTERNAL CONTROL AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN MNCs
level. The former was addressed in the previous chapter when the MNC 
was approached not as an isolated phenomenon but as an entity in 
constant interaction with its particularly complex environment. The 
operational level, in turn, was explored in the present chapter. 
Here, the control activity was viewed as a continuous on-going search 
for an effective allocation of organizational resources guided by the 
achievement of goals or targets. This process is consubstantiated in 
an activity encompassing the monitoring of the performance of 
organizational subunits.
The consequences of the monitoring of performance within organizations 
are far reaching, since the rewards or penalties that follow have a 
strong impact on the future development of the organizations. Such 
rewards and penalties may be of two different natures, i.e. of an 
organizational nature, when they involve decisions regarding the 
allocation of physical resources across subunits, and of a personal 
nature when they involve the allocation of tangible and untangible 
resources among the managers responsible for the subunits. In order 
to be able to distinguish between these two types of rewards and 
penalties the performance monitoring process should allow, at a 
theoretical level, a differentiation between the performance of the 
organization as such, and the performance of the management in the 
organization. At the root of this distinction lies the fact that 
organizational performance is a consequence of factors not all of them 
under the influence and control of management. Therefore, the process 
of performance monitoring should be capable of recognizing that 
success in the attainment of organizational goals is only in part 
dependent on managerial competence. For this reason, the chapter 
emphasized the existence of two objects of assessment, namely output 
which focuses on "ends" or on the "what" in performance, and behaviour 
which concentrates on the "means" to the ends or on the "how" in 
performance.
Regardless of the object of assessment, the approach to the monitoring 
of performance can be highly diverse. Different instruments, 
p rac tices , rules and so forth may be employed by companies to assess 
the performance of their subunits or their managers. Basically, two
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major types of control were described in the chapter. One, 
bureaucratic control, is characterized by the utilization of an 
explicit set of codified measures and rules which define desired 
performance. The instruments employed in the monitoring of output are 
essentially based on the internal reporting system, and include 
measures and targets formally set up in the organization. In turn, 
monitoring of behaviour tends to be helped by Instruments such as 
company manuals, institutionalized internal rules of conduct, and MBO 
techniques. In contrast, the other major type of control - cultural 
control - privileges informal and implicit control mechanisms. 
Monitoring of performance is built around a web of interpersonal 
interactions, whose complexity and sophistication may range from a 
relatively casual network of contacts and relationships (the personal 
type of control) to a very complex and well articulated social 
structure drawn from a strong company-wide culture.
These two stereotypes of organizational control epitomize the 
differentiation between the formal and informal approaches to the 
monitoring of subunits, which necessarily coexist in any organization 
in differing degrees. Many factors have been suggested in the 
literature to influence the degree of bureaucratization and 
informality of a company’s control system. Such factors were reviewed 
in the chapter with the purpose of identifying relevant variables that 
may explain in the study why certain performance evaluation practices 
found in MNCs are used in preference to others.
After introducing the formal and informal dimensions of performance 
evaluation, the chapter turned to each separately. The formal 
subsidiary performance evaluation process in MNCs cannot be understood 
without a careful analysis of the reporting channels set up between 
headquarters and foreign subsidiaries and through which information 
flows. The formal communication channels were viewed in the chapter 
as a "connective tissue" linking all the parts of an organization, and 
providing the data required for the monitoring of the organization’s 
subunits. In this context, the concept of MIS was introduced and its 
bias towards information of a financial nature explained.
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The chapter proceeded by revealing how the international reporting 
system is designed in MNCs. Despite the scarce evidence available, it 
was possible to provide some insights into the characteristics and 
nature of the information contained in multinationals’ reporting 
systems, as well as into the content, reporting frequency, and 
standardization of the items forming the reporting system. Worth 
mentioning here is a study reported in the chapter which revealed the 
existence in some corporations’ systems of formal reports on the 
economic and political conditions encountered by subsidiaries in the 
host countries. Such reports were submitted to headquarters 
periodically and in some instances on a very frequent basis. This 
appears to demonstrate the concern in certain companies for the local 
environmental conditions faced by foreign subsidiaries.
The information provided by the formal internal reporting system is 
naturally used for performance evaluation purposes. However, this is 
not the sole application of such an information, for other functions 
are performed by the MIS, namely communication, motivation, and direct 
action. Evaluation is, notwithstanding, the central function of the 
reporting system, and its exercise is generally surrounded by 
difficulties of different nature. Such difficulties, in particular 
those associated with the MNC, were discussed in the chapter in some 
length. A basic problem in the evaluation of organizational subunits 
is related to the inherent shortcomings of accounting information, 
which lies at the root of the measurement process. Additionally, most 
of the problems arising in performance evaluation derive from the 
application of the principle of responsibility accounting in 
circumstances where one or more premises on which this principle is 
based are not fulfilled. Especially, the premise of authority and 
controllability of subunit managers is often violated when transfer 
prices and other techniques of cost allocation are imposed by the 
centre leaving no room for subunit managers to exercise their 
discretion.
Another situation in which the principle of authority and 
controllability is misapplied arises when the performance evaluation 
process of a MNC fails to take into account the different nature of
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the environments faced by foreign subsidiaries in their host 
countries. As a consequence, in such cases misjudgements as to the 
performance of subsidiary managers are likely to occur. Also, the 
capability of anticipating changes in the environments that will have 
an impact on subsidiaries' activities is likely to be virtually non­
existent. The consideration of the environmental specificity of each 
subsidiary is, therefore, vital for the achievement of a competent and 
effective performance evaluation and control system. Modern 
communication and data processing technology makes feasible the use of 
environmental information in the monitoring of foreign subsidiaries. 
However, there is no conclusive evidence as to the extent to which the 
overseas environments are taken into consideration in the performance 
evaluation process of subsidiaries and managers. The production of 
such an evidence is a major aim of the present study.
Having explored the theory and the practice of formal subsidiary 
performance evaluation, the chapter turned to the informal dimension 
of performance assessment. Such a dimension was identified with the 
use of informal information in the evaluation and control of 
subsidiaries, i.e. with information not collected through the 
institutionalized channels of communication set up between the 
subsidiaries and the headquarters of a company. The reasons for the 
use of informal information were reviewed, which the empirical side of 
the present study will try to confirm and expand.
In order to understand the circumstances in which informal information 
is called upon in the monitoring process, the role of informal 
Information in the headquarters- subsidiary relationship was analysed. 
The extent of use of informal information was discussed in the light 
of the corporation internationalization, size, and geographic origin. 
Also, the way in which informal information interacts with the formal 
system was studied. Here, the theses defended by authors are 
contradictory. In effect, there has been a tendency to regard 
informal information as a substitute for the information provided by 
the institutionalized system. In addition, it has been generally 
accepted that the use of informal information is a necessary evil, 
sometimes even dysfunctional for the organization. However, recent
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studies have suggested the possibility of informal information being 
acting as a useful and necessary supplement to the formal system. The 
implication is that informal information should not be seen as a waste 
of resources, and that efforts should be made in improving the 
compatibility between formal and informal systems, rather than in 
eliminating the informal side of information collection and analysis. 
The contradiction found in the studies reviewed in the chapter cannot 
be resolved, because their findings are difficult to reconcile. In 
the present study the extent of use of informal information in foreign 
subsidiary performance evaluation will be analysed. Also, an attempt 
will be made to determine whether informal information in MNCs is 
regarded essentially as a substitute for or a complement to the formal 
information system.
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Phntnotes
(1) A vast literature In organization has suggested, on the basis of 
empirical research, that the use of control mechanisms leads to 
organizational effectiveness. Examples are Bell [1965], Lawrence 
and Lorsch [1967], Tannenbaum [1968], Farris and Butterfield 
[1972], McMahon and Perritt [19731, Khandwalla [1973], Turcotte 
[1974].
The extent of environmental control exercised by people in 
organizations has been studied by Thompson [1967], Galbraith
[1977], and Lowe [1981], among others.
(3) Later in chapter 6 this point will be demonstrated when the major 
empirical studies on subsidiary performance evaluation in MNCs 
will be reviewed.
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chapter 5 - SUCCESS INDICATORS OF DIVISIONAL OPERATING PERFORMANCE
5.1. Jntrodactlon
Having reviewed the nature of the processes of internal control and 
subunit performance evaluation in organizations, the present chapter 
will turn to the discussion of the main instruments of assessment of 
division operating performance used in the internal control and 
evaluation activity.
The measurement of the actual performance of an organizational subunit 
so that it may be compared with what is desired or expected, requires 
the utilization of indicators which gauge success in achieving 
standards previously set. The specification of such indicators 
represents a major difficulty in subunit performance evaluation and 
control [Kaplan, 1982, ch.13]. In reality, the selection of 
performance indicators should fulfil certain criteria which are in 
themselves difficult to accomplish. In the first place, success 
indicators should represent top management goals which provide a 
conceptual structure to the performance evaluation process [Horngren, 
1982, ch.20; also AAA, 1971]. Goals and objectives are usually 
multiple, dynamic, and partly conflicting, and therefore, the 
respective performance indicators will have similar characteristics. 
On the other hand, to perform their role appropriately success 
indicators should be complete, accurate and neutral. As Emmanuel and 
Otley [1985, ch.8] demonstrate these are attributes which in practice 
sre almost impossible to realize. Despite the difficulties 
encountered, performance evaluation and control rely on measures of 
success which encapsulate organizational activity and provide a 
summary indication of output or behaviour.
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The chapter examines the measures of divisional performance most 
commonly found in the literature. It starts by discussing the two 
classic measures of subunit performance: return on investment (ROI)
and residual income (RI). These measures represent a development from 
the use of profit as an indicator of success, and are intimately 
associated with the profit notion in performance evaluation. A brief 
history of the prescription and use of ROI is presented, together with 
a discussion of the rationale for the RI concept, which is sometimes 
seen as a substitute for ROI. The conceptual validity of RI raised a 
debate which involved a considerable number of academics. This debate 
is reviewed in the chapter, and an attempt to structure areas of 
convergence and disagreement between authors is made. The examination 
of the two classic measures ends with a discussion of their advantages 
and limitations of practical nature.
An ubiquitous tool of performance evaluation is the budget. The 
chapter analises the various roles of the budget and concentrates on 
its utilization as an integrated instrument of performance assessment. 
In particular, the managerial use of budgeting information is studied 
with reference to the attitudes of managers towards the budgetary 
standards and the emphasis placed on budgetary deviations.
Finally, the chapter focuses on a different category of performance 
indicators: those based on non-financial data and on qualitative
information. It is argued that these indicators should supplement, 
rather than replace, financial measures in general and profit-based 
indicators in particular. The justification for the use of non- 
financial measures of divisional performance is presented in the 
chapter. Also, the main criteria that should assist in the selection 
of a battery of non-financial indicators to be employed in a given 
subunit are discussed both in the light of the basic characteristics 
the measures should possess and the key management dimensions the 
measures should monitor.
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5.2. The Classic Measures of Divisional Performance; the Rate of 
Return on Investment and the Residual Income Methods
The use of the rate of return on investment (ROI) and residual income 
(RI) as measures of divisional operating performance emerged as a 
development of the application of the simple notion of profit. They 
are traditionally regarded as the measures of performance "by 
excellence".
5.2,1. Developments in the Use of ROI
The gradual adoption of a measure such as ROI that relates profit to 
the resources employed in its generation, was associated with the 
diffusion of the concept of investment centre among companies which 
had adopted decentralized profit responsibility. The history of ROI 
is, therefore, to a certain extent, also the history of corporate 
divisionalization.
A ratio relating profit to total assets is reported to have been used 
systematically for the first time in an internal managerial context in 
about 1919 by the E.I, Dupont de Nemours Co. [Korrigan, 196 8]. This 
company developed a model of analysis consisting of a chain of 
performance indicators whose starting point was ROI. Such a model was 
popularized as the "Dupont formula", which started as a triangular 
ratio system consisting of ROI at the top, and a profit margin ratio 
(net income/sales) and a capital turnover ratio (sales/total assets) 
the base. The Dupont formula was gradually refined in the 1920s 
and subsequently through the breakdown of the profit margin and the 
capital turnover ratios. In this way, the operating results in terms 
of revenue, expense and investment (both in fixed and current assets) 
could, in every company division, be related to the respective ROI
[G ore lik , 1971] .
141
5 / SUCCESS INDICATORS OF DIVISIONAL OPERATING PERFORMANCE
The concept behind the Dupont formula was quickly adopted by very 
large corporations. For example, General Motors developed a complex 
ratio model which was "used to measure the effectiveness of each 
division's operation", according to the description of Alfred Sloan 
[1964, p.141]. Despite the prompt acceptance of the ROI concept by 
the largest corporations, its widespread diffusion among the bulk of 
the Industry in the U.S.A. was remarkably slow, as noted by Korrigan 
[1968] in his concise history of financial ratio analysis. The 
occasional efforts made in the literature, such as in Bliss [1923], to 
publicize the possibility of ROI to serve as a basis in the 
development of an integrated ratio analysis system for internal 
decision making purposes went largely unnoticed until the 195 0s, when 
a sudden interest emerged. As a result, many companies began using 
ROI on a regular basis for the purpose of subunit performance 
evaluation.
The shift from absolute profit to ROI as the fundamental tool used in 
Internal performance evaluation was the result of the implementation 
In companies’ structure of the investment centre concept, and the 
consequent abandon of the profit centre concept. This association 
between ROI and investment centres has been shown by a number of 
studies. Mauriel and Anthony [1966] in a survey in vdiich 2658 large 
U.S. corporations participated found that most divisionalized 
companies had already adopted the investment centre concept and were 
using ROI as the basic measure of divisional performance. In effect, 
74 percent of the 2169 companies that were decentralized reported to 
have introduced investment centres by the time of the Mauriel and 
Anthony study. The timing of the introduction of the investment 
centre concept and of ROI shows a rapid growth during the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. Of the 851 respondents to a second phase in the 
Mauriel and Anthony study, only 21 percent had used ROI consistently 
before 1950. In contrast, in the short period of ten years that 
preceded the study as many as 59 percent of the companies surveyed had 
actually introduced investment centres and ROI [ibid., pp.99-101].
Another study conducted by Reece and Cool [197 8], offered more up-to- 
date evidence on the use of the investment centre concept. The study 
involved a survey in which 620 of the largest U.S. companies
142
5 / SUCCESS INDICATORS OF DIVISIONAL OPERATING PERFORMANCE
participated. The findings show some progression in the diffusion of 
Investment centres as opposed to profit centres in the twelve years 
since the Mauriel and Anthony study. This time, 77 percent of the 594 
firms that were decentralized reported to have introduced the 
investment centre concept. Nearly all these corporations (93 percent) 
employed ROI as the main divisional performance measure. A noteworthy 
finding of the Reece and Cool study is that the incidence of the use 
of investment centres tended to increase with the size of companies. 
In fact, only 4 8 percent of the small decentralized firms (sales under 
US$100m) had investment centres, whereas 86 percent of the large 
companies (sales over US$1000m) had this type of responsibility centre 
[ibid., pp.29-30]. The growing widespread use of the investment 
centre concept was again confirmed by Vancil [1979] who, based on 
responses given in his survey by 291 U.S. firms, found that 86 percent 
of all the divisionalized companies included in this sample, had 
investment centres instead of profit centres.
In the U.K., the interest in the use of ROI, and in ratio analysis in 
general, was generated by the British Institute of Management as a 
device for making inter-firm comparisons in order to help managers in 
th e ir  control and planning functions [Horrigan, 196 8]. A pioneer 
study was conducted by a group set up by this institute and published 
in  1956, which adopted the premise that ROI was the primary ratio to 
vrfiich all other ratios would be related [ibid.]. As a consequence, 
elaborate listings of performance indicators were devised, always 
fo llow ing  the principle of the "return on Investment ratio pyramid 
notion" [ibid., p.293]. A similar idea was defended by Nelson [I960] 
who suggested the utilization of a system involving secondary ratios 
grouped into three classes - operating ratios, expense ratios, and 
fin a n c ia l ratios - which derived from the primary ratio : ROI. Such a 
battery of indicators was to be used "to check the activities of 
individual departments, divisions or profit centres" [ibid., p. 189], 
which reflects the internal management orientation of the approach. 
The advantages from the use of an integrated system of ratios were 
emphasized by Nelson [ibid], this reflecting the very "raison d'etre" 
of h is  or any other similar model of ratio analysis based on ROI. As 
Nelson explains, the advantages are two-fold. First, secondary ratios 
®ey be used to explain differences from the forecasted amount in ROI,
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since they enable the identification of the reasons for such 
differences. Second, ratio analysis may act as an early warning 
device, whenever one of the secondary ratios differs from the 
forecasted amount, this meaning that unless a compensating variation 
is produced, the expected ROI will not be achieved.
Evidence on the extent of the use of the investment centre concept and 
ROI among U.K. companies, was first provided by Tomkins [1973, ch.8]. 
In a survey which obtained the participation of 65 firms, Tomkins
found that the use of ROI as a divisional performance criterion was
widespread. In addition, the study reported that the measure was
generally used both to evaluate the performance of divisions and to 
assess the performance of managers. In effect, 91 percent of the 44 
companies that responded reported that they were using ROI in the 
evaluation of divisions, and ranked this measure as the most important 
of all the performance indicators utilized. Similarly, 83 percent of 
a total of 46 firms said that they were employing ROI to assess the 
divisions' heads, having attached to the measure a high level of 
importance [ibid. pp.158-166]. Despite the narrow sample base of the
Tomkins study, which requires the generalization of the survey results 
to be made with some caution, it appears safe to conclude that by the 
early 1970s the notion of investment centre and the consequent
application of ROI were already dominant in British divisionalized 
companies. A similar • situation would indeed be encountered across 
Europe, as it can be concluded from Franko [1974].
More recently, a survey conducted simultaneously in the U.K. and in 
the U.S.A. by Scapens and Sale [1981] managed to provide comparable 
evidence on the practices of divisionalized companies from both sides 
of the Atlantic. An identical questionnaire was administered in both
countries, having the results of the survey been based on 211
divisionalized companies in the U.K. and 205 divisionalized 
corporations in the U.S. The findings obtained revealed a slightly 
higher preference for ROI in American than in British firms. While in 
the U.S. ROI was the performance measure most commonly used, in 
Britain this measure was second to another one (profit before interest
and taxes). Nevertheless, the incidence of the use of ROI in both
countries was found to be far less than the one reported in previous
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studies. Only about half of the participants in the survey (45
percent in the U.K., and 52 percent in the U.S.) did report the 
regular use of ROI as a measure of divisional performance [ibid., 
p .395]. This result is surprising insofar as the overwhelming support 
for ROI revealed in previous surveys appears not to be confirmed here.
The reasons explaining this contradiction were not provided by the
Scapens and Sale study. As it will be discussed later in the chapter,
the most severe criticisms have been made to ROI by many authors. As 
a consequence, a strong interest in finding alternative criteria for 
the assessment of subunit performance was generated. This fact could 
provide an hypothetical explanation for the drop in popularity of a 
measure such as ROI. Other criteria would perhaps be being employed 
in place of ROI. These would include RI, the budget as an integrated 
evaluation instrument, and a number of non-financial and qualitative 
indicators. All these success criteria will be reviewed in the
chapter.
Opponents of ROI have proposed a new criterion, generally known as
residual income, vdiich, due to the attention received in the
literature and the emphasis given in management accounting texts, 
became a classic measure of divisional performance. This measure is 
discussed next.
5.2.2. RI as an Alternative Measure
RI has in common with ROI the fact that both relate profit to the 
investment base. However, instead of having the form of a ratio, RI 
is an absolute figure which, when applied to divisional performance 
measurement, represents the remaining net income of a division after 
meeting an interest charge based on the value of the division's 
capital assets.
"^ e development of the RI criterion is attributed to the General 
E le c tr ic  Company in the U.S.A. [Miller, 19 82, ch.3 ] ,  and its use has 
heen extensively advocated in the literature. One of the earlier
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reports was made by Lewis [1955] in an extensive case study of General 
Electric. Later, a number of academics took an interest in the 
method, and started introducing it in their writings. Among the first 
were Solomons [1965], and Anthony, Dearden and Vancil [1965] who,
noting the use of RI by General Electric, advocated its application to
divisionalized companies.
Surveys of corporate divisional performance practice have revealed 
that the use of RI is circumscribed both in the U.S. and in the U.K. 
to a relatively small number of companies. This measure does not 
enjoy in practice, therefore, the widespread acceptance and success 
known by ROI. Mauriel and Anthony [1966] found that less than one
third of the companies studied used RI on a regular basis. They
report that only 7 percent of the 851 divisionalized companies(l) in 
their survey were employing RI as the sole basic measure of subunit 
performance. And jointly with other indicators RI was employed in 
another 23 percent of the total cases. The introduction of the 
measure had occurred not very long ago. For 44 percent of the 
companies using RI at the time of the study, the measure had only been 
introduced in the 196 0s. And for another quarter, RI had started 
being used between 1955 and 1959. In another study, Reece and Cool
[1978] demonstrated that in the period of twelve years that followed 
the Mauriel and Anthony survey, the diffusion of RI among companies 
did not progress. In fact, the extent of use of this measure in the 
late seventies was found to be as limited as in the mid-sixties : only 
30 percent of the firms with investment centres analysed by Reece and 
Cool had adopted RI as a sole or joint measure of divisional 
performance.
Ihe results obtained by Tomkins [1973] in his survey of the U.K. 
practice suggested that British firms favour RI slightly more than 
American companies. In effect, 48 percent of the respondents 
acknowledged the regular use of RI when evaluating the performance of 
divisions. The use of the measure in the assessment of the divisions’ 
managers was found to be lower, however : 39 percent of the
respondents. The importance attached to RI by those firms that 
employed the measure was only fair, since other indicators such as 
net profit, and controllable operating income were generally
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considered more important.
As to  the survey conducted by Scapens and Sale [1981], two main 
conc lus ions can be drawn. One is that the use of RI did not advance 
since the 1960s and 1970s, The other is that RI is more frequently 
encountered in British than in American corporations. RI was found to 
be r e g u la r ly  in use in 37 percent of the cases in the U.K. and in 29
percent in the U.S. These results are remarkably close to those
obta ined by the previous studies described above. The acceptance of 
RI by the industry is, therefore, relatively low in both countries,
e s p e c ia lly  when compared with other indicators of performance. In 
r e a l i t y ,  Scapens and Sale found that RI lies at the bottom of
p o p u la r i ty ,  even in Britain where its use is more widespread
[ i b id . ,  p.395].
In apparent contrast with this lack of enthusiasm towards RI on the 
part of the practice, lie a number of academics who have endeavoured 
to demonstrate the virtues of the measure. To these authors, RI is 
seen as a criterion that minimizes certain weaknesses of profit used 
as an absolute figure and ROI. The motivation to develop a measure 
such as RI was, in fact, founded in the belief that the continuing use 
of absolute profit and ROI as divisional success indicators would 
Inevitably lead to meaningless appraisal. The argument against these 
two measures is based on the following reasoning: On one hand, if
absolute profit is the sole indicator of the success of a division and 
of its management, then a manager with access to unlimited capital at 
a low rate of interest or at no charge at all, may increase the 
absolute profit of his division by using more and more capital as long 
as he can obtain any positive return (if he gets the capital free), or 
a return in excess of the cost of capital. On the other hand, if ROI 
is used it becomes extremely difficult to compare ratios based on 
different amounts of capital. As Solomons [1965, p.61] asks : "is a 
rate of return on a small capital better or worse than a lower 
but still satisfactory return on a larger capital?". The answer is, 
of course, impossible if the rate of return is not linked to the cost 
of capital, and other factors like capital rationing are not pondered 
P^on. Moreover, when managers are required to maximize their 
divisions’ ROI they may prefer not to expand investment when they are
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that reflects the opportunity costs derived from the assignment of a 
given amount of capital to a particular unit. In other words, if RI 
Is to be applied to the assessment of divisional management the 
division investment base must be under the control of the managers in 
the division and not of those in the head office.
The question of the degree of controllability exercised by the 
division management over the investment base generated a long debate 
which divided academics in the support for RI.
5.2.3. The Debate Over the Conceptual Validity of RI
The validity of the argument for charging interest to divisions in
assessing performance was strongly contested by Amey [1969a, ch.7; 
1969b; 1975] who maintained that the use of the RI concept in
divisional performance evaluation was either useless or adversely 
misleading, depending on the objective set to a division. As he
points out:
"i) If the objective whicdi divisions are set is to maximise 
the rate of return on capital, imputing a (Aarge for interest 
is unnecessary and adiieves nothing.
ii) If, on the other hand, the objective is to maximise 
profits before charging interest, the levying of a charge for 
the use of capital, however this diarge is defined, will in 
general frustrate this purpose. In this case, it will not be 
in the overall interests of the firm to instruct divisional 
managers to maximise residual income because this is likely 
to lead to their using the resources at their disposal 
suboptimally (less fully than they should).
iii) Where a (substantially autonomous) division is set a 
residual income [...] target - Professor Solomons' preferred 
measure in sucdi a case - whether it is the result of an 
optimisation or not, the last r»ark also applies: this goal 
may induce suboptimal behaviour in the division compared with 
that whicdi would result if interest were ignored." [Amey,
1969b, p.5]
Despite this opposition to RI, a partial agreement between Amey and 
Solomons can be found for the situations where the capital base of a 
division is not under the control or influence of the division 
management. Both authors appear to agree that, in such cases, RI is
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obtaining relatively high returns, if the new investments have the
effect of lowering the divisions’ average rate of return. This is
likely to occur even when the incremental revenue would be still far 
in excess of cost and would enhance the corporation overall rate of 
return.
To achieve a fair evaluation of the success of a division it would be
necessary, therefore, to take the cost of capital into account. RI
does just that, reason why it has been favoured in the literature. 
Ihe implementation of the RI method is not, however, free from 
problem s. A common difficulty is the determination of the cost of 
c a p ita l to be charged to a division. Such an amount is calculated as 
the  product of two elements: the volume of capital employed by the
division, and the rate (or rates) of interest charged on that capital.
Conceptually, the rate of interest on the capital employed by a 
division is determined in different ways, according to the company’s 
capital structure. In the simplest case of a company which is wholly 
financed by equity capital, the rate of interest is "the rate at which 
the market capitalizes the company's expected earnings" [Solomons, 
1965, p.157]. This means that, if expansion of a division is assumed, 
any new investment must be expected to earn a rate of return equal or 
lower than the estimated rate of return, prior to the investment, on 
the company’s current market price of shares. Accordingly, the cost 
of capital is understood as an opportunity cost, representing the 
sacrifice demanded for not getting the benefits derived from an 
alternative application of resources. In the more complex case of a 
company with different sources of capital, the determination of the 
rate of interest to be charged on the capital employed should be 
based, according to Solomons [ibid., ch.5], on the weighted average 
cost of raising money from all the sources of capital utilized by the 
company.
The use of Ri has been advocated for both subunit output performance 
and managerial behaviour performance, provided that controllable costs 
and revenues are identified in the assessment of the latter [ibid., 
°h.3]. The concept of controllability in a RI context has, besides, 
to be extended beyond operating costs and revenues to the component
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an Irrelevant measure of subunit performance. However, when 
suggesting a solution, they propose different indicators, Solomons 
supporting the use of ROI [1965, e.g. pp.64, 151, 154], and Amey
rejecting the validity of such a ratio and advocating instead that the
efficiency of a division is best gauged in terms of "profits in
relation to optimal budgets" [1969a, p. 146]. It is for the cases 
where the division management has considerable influence on the 
investment level that Amey is in contradiction with Solomons.
According to Amey, charging interest of existing divisional assets may 
lead to suboptimal decision making because it can make divisional 
management to restrict output below the level which would be attained 
if no charge was imputed. In other words, if an interest charge on 
the capital of the division is levied the resulting profit maximizing 
output (i.e. the point where the difference between the total revenue 
and the total costs is at its highest) is inferior to the profit 
maximizing output before imputing interest, as it was demonstrated by 
Amey [1969b, p.5; 1975, p.62].
A reconciliation of Solomons’ and Amey’s approaches was attempted by 
Samuels [1969] who argues that when Amey criticizes RI he "only shows 
that the charging of interest to divisions would lead to sub-optimal 
company behaviour by the divisions, within a comnanv where central 
Management are responsible for the level of capital used bv the 
divisions" [ibid., p.3, emphasis added]. For this reason, Samuels 
concludes that the two authors were not really defending opposite 
views because they were dealing with two different business 
situations. While Solomons defended the use of the RI concept for 
divisions where managers had ample discretion upon the volume of 
capital employed, Amey argued against the use of such a concept but 
only demonstrated its alleged dysfunctional effects for those cases 
where the investment decision making authority of the division was
restricted.
None of these views is shared, however, by Tomkins [1975a, 1975b] who 
alternatively believes that RI is a valid performance measure for 
divisions that have no influence on the volume and value of the fixed 
assets at their disposal. In contrast, RI is believed not to be valid 
o^r those divisions where managers are free to select their own
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capital assets. As regards the latter situation, Tomkins argues that 
RI is a superfluous measure of performance and recommends the use of a 
cash flow comparison basis instead. As he explains, if the appraisal 
of the performance of an investment is based on the comparison of
actual with budgeted RI, the interest and depreciation charges would
have to be kept as budgeted. In this case, "the residual inocme 
variance [would] always be equal to the difference between the 
budgeted and actual cash flow for the period and so, [...], it is
apparent that residual income is only an elaborate mecdianism for
adiieving irtiat [can] be attained far more simply" [1975a, p.50]. 
Behind this reasoning is the view that the performance of a division 
is identified with the ex post appraisal of the capital investment
dec is ion (2 ).
When rejecting RI as an appropriate performance measure for divisions 
responsible for their investments, Tomkins does not obviously support 
Solomons. But he does not support Amey either, since he believes that 
RI is a valid subunit performance measure when divisional managers are 
not formally responsible for the investments. Tomkins' arguments are 
based on the premise that managers of such divisions, even not having 
any power over the level of fixed assets have, nevertheless, some 
control upon the divisional total investment. In effect, divisional 
managers are expected to decide at what output volume their divisions 
should produce, and in this way they indeed influence the level of 
working capital employed which is a function of the output volume. 
Following this thought, and considering that Amey acknowledges in his 
took that working capital is a function of the output level, Tomkins 
states that it is extremely difficult to understand how can Amey 
I'eject the notion of an interest charge on capital [Tomkins, 1975a, 
pp.40-43, p.45; 1975b, pp. 163-166].
An answer to this question can partially be found in Bromwich [1973] 
who interprets Amey's position by stating that the total costs curve 
Amey’s model "already incorporates all the costs associated with 
additional output" [p. 128]. This assertion is based in that the 
marginal costs scheduled to be equated with marginal revenue are 
considered to include an interest charge on working capital which 
represents a cash outlay cost as the payment to a contracting factor.
151
5 / SUCCESS INDICATORS OF DIVISIONAL OPERATING PERFORMANCE
This, of course, holds the assumption that the funds necessary to the 
m arginal investment in working capital are obtained by borrowing.
In a later paper, Amey [1975] corroborates this interpretation of his 
own thought, and adds that "both businessmen and economists treat [the 
funds required for an additional investment in working capital] as a 
oost, and ri^tly so" [p.62]. If a classification of Amey’s argument 
along these lines is accepted, then all his criticism of Solomons 
would be reduced to a mere matter of differences in the definition of 
total costs, as Tomkins remarks [1975a, p.45; 1975b, p.163].
Furthermore, Tomkins argues that Amey’s view of corporate practice as 
regards the inclusion of a cost component derived from divisional 
operating capital needs is removed from the reality. Mentioning two 
empirical studies [Baumes, 1961, and Tomkins, 1973], Tomkins reveals 
that most divisions do not seek financing from sources outside the 
company group. In fact, when divisions need cash to meet their 
responsibilities, they turn to centralized corporate bank accounts or 
their own local bank accounts that are refilled by the company 
headquarters. It follows from here that "unless the company head 
office orders an imputed charge to be made in the division's profit 
and loss account, the division will bear no interest cdiarge at all" 
[1975b, pp.163/4].
The review of the debate on the validity of RI as a measure of 
divisional performance conducted in this section sought to uncover and 
stress the major assumptions adopted in the authors’ argument. Indeed 
in certain crucial points of the controversy the impartial reader 
feels the necessity for empirical data to consubstantiate claims made 
^  thG authors. This is the case of a central assumption in Amey’s 
argument that divisions normally include in their profit and loss 
accounts a cost component derived from the interest charges on funds 
for working capital requirements, obtained by divisions through 
external borrowing. Evidence from the practice is provided by the 
I'ecent study of Scapens and Sale [1981; 1985], which reviewed firms
both in the U.K. and U.S.A. This study found, generally, that in few 
companies divisions had authority to raise finance externally. In 
ccly 14 percent of the cases in the U.K. and 12 percent in the U.S. 
divisions were allowed by the head office to use finance sources
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ex te rna l to the group. In the limited number of companies that had 
such an authority divisions were only permitted to use short-term 
sources - suitable primarily for financing working capital demands 
[1981; p . 396 and 400]. It would seem, therefore, that the assumption 
on which Amey’s position is based only holds for a minority of cases.
Another aspect with relevance to the RI debate, which also requires 
empirical evidence is the extent of division management autonomy in 
decisions involving the investment in capital assets. Here again the 
Scapens and Sale [19 81] study provides useful information. In 
general, division managers of British and American companies were 
found to retain very limited capital investment autonomy. Formal 
authorization mechanisms were largely widespread: in 88 percent of the 
corporations in the U.K. and 93 percent in the U.S. the head office 
had to give permission to divisions for all capital expenditure or for 
projects above a certain amount [ibid., p.398]. In the latter case, 
the limits above which authorizations were required for divisions to 
be allowed to make investments were quite low. The comparison of the 
average ceilings with the average annual capital expenditures of the 
corporations led Scapens and Sale to conclude that only very minor 
items of capital investment could be acquired by divisions without the 
head office formal approval [p.396].
The evidence offered by Scapens and Sale as to the degree of 
divisional autonomy in the capital investment decision is based on the 
features of the formal procedures in operation in the companies 
surveyed. However, some literature has suggested that the divisional 
involvement in the capital investment decision is much deeper than one 
could be led to infer from the formal procedures administered in 
practice. Implied in this assertion is the existence of an informal 
mechanism which is supposed to be present in the process leading to 
the capital budgeting approval [e.g. Bower, 1972; King, 1975]. In 
effect, it is argued that headquarters managers are limited in their 
Capacity to assess divisional proposals thoroughly, and as a 
consequence they do no more than proposing minor changes. Reflecting 
on this point, Emmanuel and Otley [1976, p.45] stated that:
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"Perhaps of greatest Importance in deciding 1^0 makes the 
expenditure decision is an acknowledgment of limited human 
information processing capacity which forms the rationale of 
setting up divisionalised companies. The ultimate decision 
to accept or reject a capital project rests with corporate 
management, but their awareness of the possible multitude of 
sub-decisions which have taken place and f r m  which the final 
data is derived is limited. In practice, one would suspect 
that investment decisions may be effectively taken at a level 
close to where the project originates, whi<A is typically 
within the division."
Information on the informal aspects of capital budgeting selection and 
approval is not abundant. Studies by Morgan and Luck [1973] and 
Scapens and Sale [1981] suggest, however, that once a project reaches 
the stage of formal application for approval by the head office the 
likelihood of rejection is very small. Furthermore, these studies 
observed that in the few cases in which the proposed projects were not 
authorized, the reason was that insufficient information had been 
submitted. However, the proposals were generally referred back to the 
respective divisions, rather than immediately rejected.
These findings regarding the informal aspects of the capital 
investment process in divisionalized companies appear to demonstrate 
that, in general, division executives are able to exert influence upon 
capital expenditure. The implications of this conclusion for the RI 
debate are very significant, since much of the controversy was 
originated from differing interpretations about the degree of control 
exercised by divisional managers over the divisions capital base. 
Indeed Solomons [1965], whose advocating of RI as a measure of 
divisional performance generated such a debate, had based the logic of 
bis argument precisely in this capability of division managers to 
influence a division's capital base. In fact, Solomons' theory 
implied a situation where the head of a division had the actual power 
to make investment decisions. Besides, in the particular case where a 
division manager did not have the right to give formal approval to 
capital expenditure above a certain limit, it was assumed that the 
managers would have, at least, the power to persuade top management to 
Eive the approval.
According to  Solomons [ibid., p.155]:
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■Full division autonomy implies, among other things, the 
right to exercise substantial influence on the scale of the 
division's operations. It also implies the right to
determine the optimum scale of operations, and to be provided
with the capital necessary to achieve that scale so long as
the cost of the capital can be met.”
For this reason, it is assumed throughout Solomons' analysis that:
■[The division general manager] has the power to determine 
the amount of capital to be invested in his venture. In 
practice, in divisionalized campanies, a division general 
manager has only limited power to expand investment since 
approval of higher authority is needed for capital 
expenditures above a given limit. But the important thing is 
that the division general manager has the power to ask for 
capital.■ [ibid., p.64]
Had this assumption in Solomons* argument been noted much of the 
controversy originated would have been avoided.
In summary, the discussion in the present section demonstrated a 
remarkable lack of agreement in the academic literature as to the 
conceptual validity of RI as a measure of divisional performance. 
Attempts to reconcile the conflicting perspectives were made by a 
number of authors. Such attempts were successful in showing that the 
Rl controversy was circumscribed to those situations in which division 
managers had some degree of freedom in determining the amount of 
investment (either in current or fixed assets) at their disposal. On 
the other hand, a general agreement in the literature was found for 
the cases where the investment base was fixed at corporate level, 
without any intervention from the divisions. In these cases, the 
Interest element was generally considered irrelevant. Beyond the 
recognition of these areas of convergence, the effort made by authors 
in reconciling the different approaches was largely unfruitful. The 
reason for this stems from the fact that divergent basic assumptions 
were made by the authors when developing their arguments. These 
assumptions were generally related to two aspects, namely the 
capability of divisions to use external sources of finance for their 
working capital requirements, and the degree of divisional autonomy in 
determining the divisions* capital asset base. Empirical evidence
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provided on companies* practices regarding these two aspects were to 
put the debate on the validity of RI in context, insofar as it offered 
a positivist dimension to a highly normative approach, and rendered 
some of the arguments put forward by authors redundant.
Having discussed so far the major features of ROI and RI at a 
conceptua l level, the advantages and limitations of both measures as 
experienced  in practice will be reviewed next.
5.2.4. Practical Advantages and Limitations of ROI and RI
Despite the controversy over the conceptual validity of RI this 
indicator of divisional performance gained acceptance among the 
accounting academic community and as a result has been included in 
most management accounting textbooks. It was seen earlier, however, 
that RI has not been well accepted in practice, judging by the limited 
proportion of companies that have adopted the measure. In contrast,
ROI although perhaps not so popular among academics has enjoyed the 
most widespread use among corporations. At this point of the
discussion it seems pertinent to enquire about the reasons for such a 
discrepancy, for which the comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
pragmatic nature of both methods will be pondered.
The advantages of ROI as a method of assessment of divisional
operating performance are many, giving the method a special appeal 
when used in practice. Besides being a straightforward concept, ROI 
provides information that makes possible an immediate comparison with 
the return of alternative uses of capital in the market. Other
advantages of using the rate of return measure can be found in the 
literature. For example, ROI is said to be a single comprehensive 
figure which reflects all the events influencing the financial
position of an organizational unit [Dearden, 1969]. I t  is also seen 
to provide a common denominator that can be used to make comparisons 
with organizational units (e.g. comparisons among division of a same 
firm, comparisons between a particular division of a corporation and 
another company, etc.) [ibid.]. In addition, ROI is viewed as an
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adequate method to be set as a goal of corporate performance,
providing a dual base for planning and control of divisional
operations [Gorelik, 1971]. Finally, by giving an indication of the 
efficiency with which capital is being utilized by unit management, 
ROI is said to motivate management to focus on the particular 
relationships between profit and capital [ibid.].
Despite its strengths, ROI presents serious weaknesses. A vast
literature has focused on the practical limitations of ROI,
emphasizing the potential dysfunctional consequences that can arise 
from its indiscriminate application to divisional performance 
evaluation. Henderson and Dearden [1966, p.144], taking a very 
radical view against ROI pointed out:
"... we want to challenge the prevailing view. It is our 
conviction that ROI for divisional performance evaluation can 
be so misleading that it is destructive. It provides 
information that logically leads to incorrect decisions. It 
motivates division managers to take actions contrary to the 
best interests of the OMpany. And it provides top 
management with misleading information about divisional 
performance."
The discussion of the limitations of ROI can be approached from two 
distinct perspectives that are closely interrelated. One concerns the 
motivational aspects of ROI. The other relates to the technical 
characteristics of the method.
The problem of misdirected motivation of division managers caused by 
subunit performance evaluation systems based on ROI arises in those 
situations where the judgement on the competence of managers is 
directly influenced by the results obtained by their divisions. In
essence, as long as the success of a division's manager is identified
with a certain ROI figure, the manager will be motivated to take 
actions that in spite of optimizing the return on the capital of his 
division may be harmful for the company as a whole. Many of the
dysfunctional decisions taken by divisional management are only 
possible due to the high management turnover in posts of top
responsibility in divisions. To obtain promotion, managers are 
encouraged to improve their divisions' short term rates of return at 
the expense of long term profitability. If they have a certain degree
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of independence and authority they can easily produce a better ROI by 
such actions as reducing inventories, failing to replace ageing 
equipment, lowering advertising expenditures, reducing research and 
developm ent, and cutting down on training programmes. This represents 
a major shortcoming of ROI, generally referred to as "cultivation of 
short-range thinking" [Steiner, 1969, p.382].
In addition to these difficulties, ROI also has drawbacks of a 
technical nature which under certain circumstances may produce 
misleading information. A major technical problem of ROI is related 
to the measuranent of the amount of capital employed in a division. 
If in the computation of ROI fixed assets are valuated at gross book 
value there will be a very strong incentive to scrap equipment as long 
as the contribution made by an asset divided by its gross book value 
gives a rate of return lower than the ROI currently earned by the 
whole division. Also in the cases where equipment is idle the 
incentive to scrap is high, even when the equipment still maintains 
its full productive capabilities and the need for its use is foreseen 
at a medium or long term. In cases such as these, an immediate 
improvement in the ROI figure is produced, although with possible 
harmful effects for the company as a whole or for the division itself. 
In effect, when scrapped equipment is not replaced, prospective sales 
growth and future scale economies are impeded. On the other hand, 
when productive, though .old, assets are scrapped and replaced by brand 
new and slightly more efficient equipment this may cause an 
unnecessary dissipation of scarce financial resources that could be 
alternatively employed elsewhere in the company, and yield a better 
marginal return.
Tf in the computation of ROI fixed assets are alternatively valuated 
at net book value problems may arise when assets accumulate high 
levels of depreciation. The smaller the value of the capital employed 
in a division the higher is the division's ROI for the same amount of 
profit. Thus, when the division's fixed assets are fully, or near 
fully, depreciated there exists a strong incentive for postponing the 
replacement of equipment even when the equipment is obsolete. In 
these cases, divisions would simply accept stagnation observing their 
rates of return improving automatically with time [Dearden, I960].
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Most of the problems just described result from the fact that there is 
often very little relation between accounting values, on which ROI 
assets are based, and current economic values. In effect, in 
determining ROI fixed assets should reflect the true economic 
usefulness of the assets, and this depends on the market and the 
technology, among other factors, and not on the original purchase 
prices [Dearden, 1969]. An approximation, however rough, to such 
economic values can be provided by replacement costs when these are 
used to determine the value of the divisional fixed assets.
The determination of the amount of capital employed in a division is 
not limited to the valuation of fixed assets. Also the divisions' 
current assets make part of their total asset base for purposes of ROI 
performance evaluation(3). Dysfunctional consequences may arise by 
ignoring liabilities in the investment base as Dearden [1961] explains 
in detail. Additionally, difficulties are likely to be created by the 
fact that the current asset items are generally included in the 
investment base at end of period static values [ibid.].
Like the calculation of the amount of capital (both fixed and current) 
employed in a division, also the determination of net income - the 
other main element of ROI - may cause difficulties to divisional 
performance evaluation. The examination of the theory and practice 
behind income determination is not within the scope of this study. It 
must be emphasized, however, that some of the faults attributed to ROI 
stem from the way in which profit is measured [e.g. Henderson and 
Dearden, 1966; Horngren, 1982, ch.20]. The profit notion is 
inevitably linked to a period of one year, and this is often not long 
enough to allow a meaningful assessment. Consequently, the literature 
has proposed longer evaluation cycles that are in the base of the 
concept of time-span evaluation [Dearden, 1968]. Problems such as 
these which derive from the way in which income is determined are not 
exclusive of ROI, rather being present in all the profit-based 
measures employed in divisional performance evaluation.
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Having discussed many of the practical consequences arising from the 
use of HOI in performance evaluation, a comparison with the other 
classic measure of divisional performance is now pertinent. On the 
advantages side, ROI avoids the problems normally created when a
division presents a high return on the capital employed. When
divisional managers seek to maximize RI, they are willing to invest 
even in those projects whose expected return is lower than the ROI 
earned by the division. In fact, RI will be increased as long as the 
profit yielded by any additional investment is higher than the cost of 
capital charged to the division. Another advantage of RI is its 
flexibility, which enables the capital rates to be changed from period 
to period in accordance with the corporate capital investment 
policies. RI also facilitates the utilization in practice of
different capital charges for different types of assets [Dearden, 
1969; Gee, 1973].
As regards the limitations of the RI method, one major difficulty
arises with the determination of the cost of capital as it was seen 
earlier in the chapter. This element of the RI measure represents an 
opportunity cost and as such the computation of its value in practice 
is rather problematic. Another weakness is that RI does not provide a 
common basis on which comparisons among different subunits can be 
made. Finally, RI also presents some of the shortcomings attributed 
to ROI. Fixed and current assets, as well as net income must still be 
determined before RI can be calculated. And the determination of such 
values still pose problems and difficulties, as explained when 
discussing ROI.
In general, RI avoids some of the dysfunctional consequences that are 
incurred with the use of ROI. However, its application in practice is 
not without difficulties. Perhaps this is the reason why its 
acceptance among companies has not been as widespread as one could be 
led to infer from the support for the measure found in the literature. 
Authors such as Gee [1973] and Reece and Cool [1978], recognising the 
practical shortcomings of RI but not denying its conceptual strengths, 
stressed that until a better measure of performance is discovered ROI 
"is still best". They advocate that to avoid many of the ROI 
dysfunctional consequences, both divisional divisional and head office
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managers should be familiar with the potential ROI pitfalls. As Gee 
[1973, p. 15] notes:
■The widespread use of return on capital employed reflects 
not so much inertia as a feeling that it will be until 
something better turns up. This has not yet happened. The 
search for improved performance measures must continue; but 
in the meantime a knowledge of the limitations of i^at we now 
have can prevent many wrong decisions and a great deal of 
needless friction."
The limitations of the two classic measures of divisional performance 
- ROI and RI - render any evaluation process solely based on either of 
the measures highly likely to be unsuccessful. In order to overcome 
this problem other methods of divisional performance evaluation may be 
used by corporations. Indeed, the assessment of divisions and their 
managers is best conducted if based on a battery of different 
indicators of performance, instead of concentrating on one sole 
measure. The following sections will introduce a number of such 
indicators, that can successfully complement ROI and RI.
5.3. The Budget as an Integrated Instranent of Divisional Performance 
Evaluation
5.3.1. The Multiple Roles of the Budget
Budgeting systems can be found in virtually every company of any size. 
However, organizations can use budgets for different purposes and in 
only a proportion of cases are budgets systematically employed in 
divisional performance evaluation. Surveys of company practices have 
revealed that the use of budgets as a method of assessment of 
managerial and subunit performance is widespread. For example, 
Scapens and Sale [1981, 1985] found in their recent survey that nearly 
a^lf of the companies studied (44 percent in the U.K., and 49 percent 
io the U.S.) were using the budget as an integrated instrument of
161
5 / SUCCESS INDICATORS OF DIVISIONAL OPERATING PERFORMANCE
divisional performance evaluation. The budget was found to be the 
second measure most widely used in the U.S. (ROI being the first), and 
the third in the U.K. (after profit before interest and taxes, and
ROI).
Different ways of understanding the budgeting system in organizations 
are found in the literature. The traditional approach views the 
budget as a device in which the superiors can exercise their planning 
and control activities over the subordinates. Alternatively, more 
modern approaches view the budget as serving a complex of multiple 
functions, namely: 1) a formal authorization procedure; 2) a means of 
forecasting and planning; 3) a channel of communication and co­
ordination; 4) a motivational device; and 5) an instrument of 
performance evaluation and control [Emmanuel and Otley, 1985, p.110]. 
Frequently, authors recognize the multi-functional role of the budget
but emphasize only one of the functions. For example, Ronen [1975]
stresses "motivation" as a main role to be performed by the superior
via budget use. Lowe and Shaw [1968] and Livingstone [1975] favour 
the resource allocation process inside the organization and view the
budget as an internal market by which resources are committed within 
the firm, and as a device in which overall goal statements of broad 
nature are converted into operational and more specific subgoals. For 
Cyert and March [1963, ch.3], the budget is a dominant "natural- 
control system" used by organizational members to enforce their 
agreements through which conflicting views are accommodated. Via the 
budget, a set of fixed commitments and fixed expectations are 
explicitly defined in advance by the members of coalitions. According 
to this view the budget is an important stabilizing and integrative 
device since it provides a mechanism for enforcing the agreements 
reached within the coalition, so reducing the potential for conflict.
The performance evaluation and control function of the budget will be 
the focus of the present section. A major advantage of the budgeting 
system as an integrated instrument of performance evaluation and 
control is that it enables a comparison at a detailed level of
disaggregation between actual and forecasted components of the final
Profit figure. This characteristic facilitates the use of the budget 
ic the assessment not only of output performance (the "what" in
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performance), but also of behaviour performance (the "how"). 
Consequently, the budget can be appropriately utilized as an indicator 
of both subunit performance and managerial performance, provided the 
necessary adjustments are made. In effect, the use of budget 
Information leads far beyond the bottom line figure and provides 
Information that can adequately be employed in assessing how good 
managers were in administering corporate resources.
Furthermore, budgeting data are endowed with intrinsic characteristics 
that allow to distinguish between effectiveness and efficiency when 
setting standards of performance. As Otley [1978, p.124] points out:
■[The budget] represents a standard of effectiveness insofar 
as it specifies a set of desired outputs and a standard of 
efficiency to the extent that it details the inputs deemed 
necessary to produce the specified outputs.”
5.3.2. Managerial Uses of Budgeting Information for Performance 
Evaluation
The way in which top management makes use of budgetary information in 
the assessment of divisional performance has strong implications for 
the success of the budget as a performance evaluation criterion. Two 
aspects will be considered next. One has to do with the attitudes 
taken by superiors towards the budgetary standards, which also 
includes the degree of enforcement placed on the achievement of such 
standards. The other aspect concerns the emphasis put by head office 
management on the deviations between actual and budgeted results 
obtained by divisions. Just how top managers enforce the standards 
assigned to divisions and how they react to under-achievement of 
objectives may be reflected by the severity of the decisions resulting 
from the appraisal.
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Attitudes towards the budgetary standards
Generally, there are two opposite attitudes towards the budgeted 
results set as performance standards [Bursk et al., 1971, ch.2]. One 
consists in regarding the budget as a forecast, which in the strictest 
sense is simply a prediction of what is expected to happen, being 
assumed that the forecaster has no influence over the results. The 
other attitude consists in looking at the budget as a management 
commitment in which it is assumed that division managers have the 
ability to make the predictions to materialize. Forecast and 
commitment co-exist in different relative degrees in the budgeting 
systems found across companies.
Difficulties arising in the performance evaluation process from the 
use of the budget appear to be due to the failure in recognizing the 
differences between forecasts and commitments [ibid.]. If budgets are 
used by headquarters as simple forecasts an accurate anticipation of 
future events is sought, and the forecaster (i.e. the division 
manager) should be evaluated on how close his prediction came to 
actual. On the other hand, if budgets are understood as a divisional 
management commitment, the estimated values agreed upon are regarded 
as satisfactory levels of performance that divisions are expected to 
attain or exceed. In .this case, the more the division managers can 
show actual values in excess of the forecasted ones, the better their 
performance is likely to be considered by superiors. There can be, 
therefore, a direct conflict between two of the basic functions 
attributed to the budget, i.e. planning and control, since these 
functions involve respectively, forecasts of future activity and 
measurements of actual performance (commitments). Accordingly, in 
those cases where the same budgeting system is utilized simultaneously 
for both planning and evaluation purposes, and where the budget 
standards are enforced and predominantly understood as divisional 
management commitments, the estimates of future activity relevant to 
planning will tend to stay behind the results the divisions can really 
achieve. As the distribution of rewards is usually related to the 
results of the evaluation process, divisional management behaviour 
tends to be oriented in a way in which those rewards that are
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considered desirable by the division manager can be reached. This 
will lead the manager deliberately to underestimate future activity 
[Hopwood, 1972], and to consciously build organizational slack into 
the budget(^) [Schiff and Lewin, 196 8]. Hence, no satisfactory data 
for planning purposes are likely to be obtained in such cases.
On their turn, top executives being aware of these reactions on the 
part of division managers will try to counteract the sub-optimization 
built into the predictions made for divisions. This constitutes, in 
essence, the rationale for the negotiation and bargaining that often 
take place before a budget is approved. The process of preparation of 
proposals, their acceptance or rejection, and the subsequent revision 
of the proposals is widely known and well documented in the literature 
[e.g. Hofstede, 1 96 8; Shillinglaw, 1 972]. Also, behavioural 
scientists following the pioneering works in the fifties of Argyris 
[1952] and Stedry [1959] have studied the nature of the bargaining 
process originated by the budgeting system, and have attempted to
understand the changes induced in the organizational participants' 
attitudes and behaviour by the necessity to comply with budget
standards [Mattessich, 1980]. (For a comprehensive review of the 
literature with important insights into the psychological field, see 
Tosi [1 975]).
In general, whatever agreement is reached between top and divisional 
management on the setting of budgetary standards of performance, the 
budgeted figures will reflect the bargaining expertise of the 
participants and most likely will differ from the predictions that 
would be made if no commitment was attached to the forecasts. In this 
sense, Hofstede [1968, ch.2] distinguishes between "budgets for 
measuring performance” (i.e. budgets used as standards for managerial 
performance evaluation), and "budgets for planning or coordinating 
performance" (i.e. budgets employed as devices for coordinating 
resources and anticipating managerial performance). Hofstede calls 
for a clear separation in practice of these two concepts and advocates 
the creation of two distinct types of budgets.
E xhib it 5.1 illustrates the differences between standard, planned, and 
actual performance which are on the basis of a system where the two
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Exhibit 5 . 1 -  Variances Between Bu d g e t e d  Performance
and Actual Performance
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types of budgets are kept separate. According to this system, planned 
performance must correspond to actual expectations and is intended to 
show as close to actual performance as possible. Plans include not 
only forecasted elements upon which the corporation has little or no 
control (e.g. general economic level, inflation rates), but also a 
guided coordination of actions and decisions to allocate resources 
with the purpose of fulfilling pre-set general business strategies and 
particular policies. Any deviation between what was planned and what 
came to be the actual - A in exhibit 5.1 - should only be due to 
unforecasted and uncontrolled factors. On the other hand, standard 
performance (see exhibit 5.1) is the outcome of a political and 
bargaining process where the contending parts exercise their 
negotiation skills and personal influence and power. The deviation 
between this and the planned budgeted performance - B in exhibit 5.1 - 
Involves a forecasted underattainment of targets, which contrasts with 
the unforecasted variance A. By distinguishing these two levels of 
budgeted performance it is then possible to separate between a 
deviation that concerns only planning (C in the exhibit), and a 
deviation that relates exclusively to performance evaluation (D in the 
exhibit). According to Hofstede [ibid] the difference between 
standard and planned performance can sometimes be forecasted. It is 
assumed in his model that an underattainment of the performance 
standards is to be expected. And it is ascertained that in some cases 
It Is possible to forecast a "risk percentage" which, when applied to 
standard performance, gives a closer estimate to actual performance. 
From this results a new estimate that can be used for planning 
purposes in those companies where standard performance and planned 
performance are not differentiated. As Hofstede [ibid., p.24] 
explains:
"Budgets serving as standards for performance will obviously 
not always be attained. Not only a lack of effort of the 
person measured, but also external disturbances may lead to 
an under attainment of goals. The average risk of such an 
underattainment can sometimes be forecasted, so that the 
performance that is actually expected differs from standard 
performance. Planning, however, must be based on actual 
expectations. Therefore, when an underattainment of goals 
ean be expected, the same budget cannot be used for measuring 
and planning purposes. The difference must be resolved by 
adding a risk percentage to the standard performance."
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The Hofstede model can be extended to a wider range of situations if 
the premise of underattainment of standard performance vis-a-vis 
planned performance is dropped. In reality, the positioning of the 
estimates for performance measuring (standard performance) in relation 
to the estimates for planning (planned performance) can vary widely, 
both in theory and in practice, and include also situations where an 
overattainment of performance standards is expected. In fact, the 
setting of budgets as performance standards is mainly a behavioural 
phenomenon, and as such a difference, either in excess or by defect, 
is bound to exist in relation to the budgets that would be set for 
sole purposes of planning and coordination.
Exhibit 5.II depicts three possible situations. In situation I the 
standard performance for a division of a particular firm was set at a 
higher level of results than the planned performance. From this it 
follows that the required targets for performance evaluation are 
expected to be underattained. In addition, and because planned 
performance will be underachieved (the exhibit shows for the three 
situations actual performance coming to be lower than planned 
performance) an unfavourable deviation relating to performance 
evaluation will be encountered. On the other hand, in situation II 
standard performance is set lower than planned performance, which 
means that the results demanded for the division are less than the 
results really expected to be obtained. Here, the required targets 
for performance evaluation are anticipated to be overattained. 
However, due to the underachievement of planned performance an 
unfavourable deviation relating to performance evaluation will be 
obtained. Finally, in situation III standard performance is also set 
at a lower level than planned performance. However, the difference 
between the two is so high here that a favourable deviation relating 
to performance evaluation will be obtained, even having planned 
performance been actually underachieved (see exhibit 5.II).
If no distinction was made between budgets for measuring performance 
and budgets for planning and coordinating performance - the latter 
being simply assumed to be the same as the former - the planned 
performance would not be set at the same level in situations I, II and 
1^1. Rather, planned performance would accompany the fluctuations in
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standard performance in accordance with the outcomes of the 
negotiations that take place in the setting of standards for 
performance evaluation. As a consequence, the budget would not 
provide an adequate basis for corporate planning and, more important 
for the present study, the budget would not be appropriate for 
divisional performance evaluation, as situation III in exhibit 5.II 
clearly demonstrates. The lesson from this appears to be that for 
those companies which use only one budget for planning and control 
purposes, the standards employed for the evaluation of performance 
should always be as close as possible to the targets that would have 
been set, had a budget been built as a forecast instrument without any 
commitment attached to it.
Emphasis placed on budgetary deviations
Differing emphases put by superiors on deviations between actual and 
budgeted results obtained by organizational subunits have been 
suggested to impact differently on the divisional performance 
evaluation process. In a study conducted by Hopwood [1972] important 
facets of human behaviour were explored in a performance evaluation 
context where budgetary deviations were the dominant managerial 
assessment criterion. Distinct ways of using accounting data in the 
evaluation of performance were defined, and three styles of evaluation 
were identified: 1) the budget-constrained style, where a heavy 
emphasis is attached to meeting or exceeding the budget; 2) the 
profit-conscious style, where the meeting of the budget is not so 
crucial and where the superior, being aware of the shortcomings of 
budgetary information, supplements deviations with other performance 
indicators; and 3) the nonaccounting style, where the evaluation of 
performance is not primarily based on accounting data.
The effects of each of these styles of evaluation on the division 
managers' attitudes towards their job (i.e. relations with superiors 
and peers, job related tension, engagement in dysfunctional decision 
making) were then studied. Hopwood's results revealed that the 
budget-cons trained style was associated with the subordinate's belief 
that the evaluation was unjust, and with higher levels of tension on
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the job than the two other styles. Also, the budget-constrained style 
was found to result in feelings of distrust towards the superior, in 
less favourable relations of the subordinate with peers, and in a 
higher likelihood of division managers to manipulate accounting data 
with the purpose of improving their reported performance [ibid., 
pp.166-172]. From such results one would conclude that when the 
assessment of an organizational subunit is exclusively based on the 
budgetary deviations, more dysfunctional behaviour on the part of 
subunit managers is likely to occur, compared with assessments that 
complement deviations with other performance indicators.
Using a similar approach and methodology, Otley [1978] extended 
Hopwood’s [1972] hypotheses and designed a study in which factors 
influencing participants’ behaviour that were not related to the use 
of budgetary deviations could be controlled. The study attempted to 
focus on subunits with identical products and similar physical and 
environmental characteristics, in order that it could isolate as far 
as possible the effects on behaviour of alternative styles of 
budgetary use.
The results of the Otley study did not give support to the previous 
Hopwood’s findings, for, contrary to what had been hypothesized by 
Otley, the style of budget use was not found to affect job-related or 
budget-related tension, nor a budget-oriented style of evaluation was 
found to decrease job ambiguity or ambiguity of evaluation. The 
evidence gathered suggested that job-related tension was inversely 
associated with the degree of agreement a unit manager had with the 
way in which budgets were set or his performance was evaluated by 
superiors, rather than being invariably associated with any specific 
style [ibid., pp.130-132]. A noteworthy finding in Otley’s study was 
that budgets tended to be more closely met when a heavy emphasis was 
placed by superiors on budgetary measures of performance. However, 
Otley asks whether the apparent improvement of performance under the 
budget-cons trained style of evaluation is real or whether it is caused 
by manipulation of the budgetary standards, or even by 
manipulation of the results reported. The analysis tended to show 
that when evaluation stressed budget deviations actual performance 
came closer to the budget not so much because performance improved but
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because the budgetary standards were set at more realistic levels 
[ibid., pp.138-139].
In this and subsequent articles, Otley [1978, 1979, and 1 9 8O]
introduced a new dimension to the relationship between the use style 
of budgetary information and budget accuracy (i.e. how close actual 
performance comes to the budget). Such a new dimension involved the 
consideration of the nature of the environment surrounding the 
organizational subunits being evaluated. Basically, the environment 
external to a subunit was characterized as either liberal, when 
favourable business conditions lead to expected actual performance 
being higher than the minimum acceptable performance, or tough, when 
unfavourable conditions lead to expected performance falling below the 
minimum acceptable performance. A model involving type of 
environment, style of evaluation, and budget accuracy is presented in 
exhibit 5.III. Here, when the environment is liberal it is assumed, 
following the findings of Lowe and Shaw [1968], that slack is 
introduced in the budget estimates. On the other hand, when the 
environment is tough it is assumed that budget estimates are 
optimistic. Furthermore, it is assumed that a rigid style of 
evaluation (mainly budget-constrained) leads to budget estimates to be 
set at lower levels of performance than a more flexible style of 
evaluation (mainly prof it-conscious). As it is observed in exhibit 
5,III, while in a liberal environment the most accurate budget 
estimate takes place under a flexible style of evaluation, in a tough 
environment the most accurate estimate occurs under a rigid style. As 
Otley [1978, p.145] concludes, if budget accuracy is considered to be 
a desirable feature of the budgetary systems implemented, "a different 
style of budget use is called for, contingent upon the nature of the 
operating environment."
A wider perspective of the effects on the divisional evaluation 
process from a differing emphasis placed on the budget and other 
accounting-based measures was sought by Hirst [1981]. He argues that 
in situations of low task uncertainty, where the means of achieving 
required performance are well understood, a relatively high emphasis 
on accounting performance measures tends to reduce dysfunctional 
behaviour. In contrast, when task uncertainty is high the reduction
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of dysfunctional behaviour tends to be achieved with a relatively low 
emphasis on accounting measures.
In summary, it is suggested from the evidence available that the 
degree of emphasis placed by superiors on budgetary deviations, 
together with the nature of the information used, have an impact on 
the subordinates’ behaviour as regards their approach towards the 
budget in particular, and the overall performance evaluation process 
in general. The links between style of evaluation and subordinate 
behaviour are difficult to comprehend in all their magnitude, and the 
studies reviewed managed only to scratch the surface. However, as 
Emmanuel and Otley [1985, ch.6] remark such studies clearly 
demonstrated that the motivational impact of budgeting information is 
somehow critically influenced by the way in which the budget is used 
by superiors and the extrinsic rewards that are made dependent on 
budget achievement.
5.4. NoiHFinancial and Qualitative Measures of Divisional Performance
So far the discussion about the success indicators of divisional 
operating performance has centred solely on financial measures of 
performance. In this section non-financial indicators, both of a 
quantitative and qualitative nature, will be analysed.
5.4.1. Why Using Non-Financial and Qualitative Success Indicators?
The implications of the use of financial measures of performance, and 
especially profit-based indicators such as ROI and RI, for the 
divisional performance evaluation process have been extensively 
discussed in the previous sections of the present chapter. It was 
emphasized there that a narrowly focused attention on periodic profit
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reports from divisions would most likely lead to dysfunctional 
behaviour on the part of divisional management who would give 
preference to short term profits at the expense of long term results.
A number of actions w h i c h  w o u l d  p r o duc e such an effect w e r e  described. 
These i n c l u d e  t h e  l o w e r i n g  o f c a p i t a l  i n v e s t m e n t ,  as w e l l  as t h e  
reduction of i n t a n g i b l e  i n v e s t m e n t s  in a r e a s  s u c h  as R&D, e m p l o y e e  
training, m a i n t e n a n c e ,  q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l ,  a n d  c u s t o m e r  s e r v i c e .  
Moreover, in c h a p t e r  4 w h e n  p r o b l e m s  in p e r f o r m a n c e  e v a l u a t i o n  a nd  
control were dis cussed (see s e c t i o n  4.3.3.) m a j o r  w e a k n e s s e s  in her ent  
to a c c o u n t i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  w e r e  d e m o n s t r a t e d  to  c a u s e  s e r i o u s  
limitations to an e ffe cti ve p e r f o r m a n c e  appraisal.
Emphasis on profit and other financial measures of performance 
probably derives from the ultimate purpose of the business enterprise 
of maximization of the shareholders’ wealth. However, the monitoring 
of an organizational subunit in order to achieve that ultimate 
objective should encompasse the regular assessment of a number of 
indicators, many of which, not being directly related to financial 
performance, will measure attributes that have a significant impact on 
the bottom line. Likert [1967, ch.8] calls attention for the 
importance of non-financial indicators of performance, and reasons 
that these should always co-exist with the traditional profit 
measures, constituting important current sub-goals which will 
influence future long run profits. Similar positions are defended by 
authors such as Caplan [1971], Scott [1972], Fantl [1975], Rappaport 
[1978], Parker [1979], and Kaplan [1982, 1983], just to mention a few.
An explanation for the management concentration on the short term 
rather than on the more important long term, on which the survival of 
a company will be decided, was attempted by Rappaport [1978]. 
According to him, the way in which executive compensation is awarded 
is the main responsible for such a focus on the short term and on 
profits. Executive compensation is observed to be directly linked 
^ith the results normally disclosed to external investors, notably 
absolute profit, ROI, and earnings per share [ibid., p.83]. It is 
known that the stock market favours the maintenance of quarter-to- 
quarter or annual earnings growth, and this leads managers to 
concentrate on short term results, and sometimes overlook the long
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term. It could be argued that short term results are strongly 
influenced by long term thinking in the sense that today's performance 
is partly the result of decisions made in the past and that only now 
bear their fruits. This being so, managers would not be allowed to 
overlook the long term since they would be jeopardizing future 
performance. Despite the logic of this argument, the fact is that in 
practice managers usually stay in a given position for a period of 
time that is not long enough for the consequences of their long term 
decisions to be felt while they still hold that position. As a 
consequence, they will tend to privilege those decisions that will 
enhance their subunits' performance on the short term even when such 
decisions are not beneficial on the long term. As Rappaport 
[ibid., p.83] explains:
"In light of [the given] Incentives and the fact that the 
division executive usually remains in his or her position for 
only three to five years, he is compelled to concentrate on 
short-run results and adopt policies that may discourage 
growth and acceptance of reasonable risk. The ambitious 
person expecting a promotion in the next two or three years 
nay abide by two guidelines for decisions concerning 
discretionary outlays of development funds: the risk must be 
low, and the project should yield a significant portion of 
its return in the next two or three years."
One way of assuring that managerial decisions safeguard the company's 
best interests in the long term involves the implementation of a 
performance evaluation system which encompasses three main approaches 
[ibid., p.85]. First, executive incentives should be closely tied to 
long range plans. This would require the utilization of performance 
indicators to periodically gauge the achievement of strategic, non- 
financial goals such as market share, product quality, product 
development, productivity and personnel development. Second, 
management compensation should be related to extended time periods, 
involving several years rather than just one year. Finally, if 
financial measures are to be used, the performance evaluation system 
should utilize indicators that do not penalize managers for taking 
decisions that favour long term profitability at the expense of short 
term results.
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As Kaplan [1983, p.699] points out, a serious objection to a 
performance evaluation system such as this is that the short term 
financial performance of the firm will appear more erratic and 
unpredictable, to the disliking of many investors and securities 
analysts. However, at the end of the day it is the stock market price 
that will reflect the success of management. Different beliefs as to 
how such price is determined may influence management behaviour and 
their choice of a performance evaluation system, as Rappaport [1978, 
p.84] notes. In effect, if top executives believe that stock prices 
are based mainly on profit and earnings per share, they are likely to 
demand from subordinates the achievement of targets measured in profit 
terms and covering short periods. On the other hand, if top managers 
believe that stock prices reflect not only the company's currently 
reported earnings but also the expected future returns of R&D and 
capital expenditures, and indeed all publicly available information 
relevant to the company's future activities, in line with the concept 
of "market efficiency" [e.g. Van Horne, 1983, oh.3], then they are 
more likely to emphasize long term performance evaluation and to use 
strategic, non-financial, success indicators.
Another justification for complementing financial measures with non- 
f Inanci al indicators in divisional performance evaluation stems from 
the problems that arise with the concentration on a scarce number of 
success indicators. Caplan [1971, pp.103-108] warns that single 
criterion measures such as ROI overemphasize that sole factor and 
exclude other factors important to the overall success of the 
organization. Besides, it is argued that focusing on a single or a 
limited number of indicators leads to undue pressure on the divisional 
managers to concentrate upon an index instead of upon decisions that 
benefit the whole organization. Therefore, a battery of performance 
indicators covering a wide range of company facets, some of them 
having inevitably to be expressed in non-financial terms, is 
preferable to the over-reliance on a single measure. However, the use 
of an excessively large number of indicators may be counterproductive. 
As Leksell [1981] adverts, as the number of goals and their respective 
indicators increases, the likelihood of goal conflicts also increases 
(for example, demands for a high customer service involving speedy 
deliveries and repairs may conflict with requirements for low stock
177
5 / SUCCESS INDICATORS OF DIVISIONAL OPERATING PERFORMANCE
le v e ls ) .  It is easy to conceive the divisions of a company becoming 
con fused  about the head office expectations and preferences [ibid., 
p.224] if the performance evaluation criteria applied are not 
c a re fu l ly  balanced and their number reasonable.
Finally, the use of non-f inanci al measures of performance becomes even 
more crucial in a MNC context. Previously, in section 4.3.3. a 
conclusion was reached that the achievement of a competent and 
effective performance evaluation and control system in a MNC 
encompasses the consideration of the environmental specificity of each 
individual subsidiary. The taking into account of such a specificity 
in the evaluation process, a necessary condition for the proper 
application of the principle of authority and controllability, is 
facilitated by the use of non-f inanci al and qualitative performance 
indicators. In effect, non-financial measures in general, and 
qualitative information in particular, are local, situation-specific 
in nature [AAA, 1971], and so offer the potential for an adequate 
assessment to be made of each subsidiary individually, free from much 
of the influences of subsidiaries on one another that so readily show 
on profit measures. The inclusion of non-financial indicators in the 
performance evaluation process in MNCs appears to be a step towards a 
more capable evaluation system. Scott [1972], among others, defended 
the creation of a multidimensional performance evaluation system for 
foreign subsidiaries and their managers. As he pointed out:
"It seems clear that, unlike predecessor profit center 
systems which were largely uni dimensional in that performance 
was evaluated primarily in terms of profit and return on 
investment, these new systems can be expected to be 
multidimensional." [ibid., p.65].
The extent of non-f inanci al information used by MNCs in their internal 
©valuation systems will be reviewed next in chapter 6, on face of the 
empirical evidence available.
To summarize, there are many relevant reasons for the use of non- 
f Inanci al measures in performance evaluation. They arise primarily 
fnom the inherent weaknesses of accounting information which cannot 
capture the whole complexities of a business, let alone the MNC, and 
from the characteristics of the performance evaluation systems in
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operation in companies. Non-financial success indicators like market 
share, productivity, success and level of R&D, personnel development 
and so forth are believed to give an indication of the long term 
health of a business. The continuous monitoring of these indicators 
gives managers a more thorough understanding of the units being 
evaluated and provides them with early warnings of potential problems 
which will reflect on future profits.
5.4.2. Wbi(A Non-Financial and Qualitative Success Indicators?
Having demonstrated the rationale for the use of non-financial success 
indicators in performance evaluation, the present sub-section will 
discuss which measures are appropriate for the achievement of an 
effective assessment of organizational subunits, and which basic 
characteristics these measures should possess.
In discussing the role to be fulfilled by non-financial and 
qualitative indicators of performance, it should be reminded again 
that performance measures are only surrogates for organizational 
objectives previously set. In effect, a measure of effectiveness is 
normally a gauge indicating the degree to which an objective is 
accomplished by a given alternative [AAA, 1971, p.169]. This being 
so, the adequacy of any given indicator included in a performance 
evaluation system is often the reflection of the adequacy of the 
organizational objective the indicator is attempting to measure.
Brennan [1976] defined three major requirements for a successful 
performance criterion by specifying the desirable characteristics of 
any organizational objective. These characteristics are relevance, 
reward, and measurability. According to Brennan [ibid., p.116] the 
objectives set to a business must be relevant to it, since a primary 
responsibility of an organization is "to make contributions in areas 
where it is organized and competent to do so." In addition, 
objectives must be linked directly to the reward system by which 
managers are compensated, in order that organizational effectiveness 
may be built around managerial accomplishment. Finally, objectives
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must be measurable. However, measurability does not necessarily imply 
the property of being quantifiable, but only the capacity of being set 
finite targets and deadlines and progress being evaluated against 
these predetermined criteria [ibid.].
Taking a wider approach, Brinkerhoff and Kanter [1980] defined the 
success of a performance criterion as being linked to the existence of 
a number of conditions concerning both organizational objectives and 
the tasks necessary to perform in order to achieve those objectives. 
Such conditions are: 1) the purpose of the appraisal must be clear; 2) 
the objectives to attain must also be clear; 3) the outcomes should be 
predictable; 4) the tasks should be simple and relatively independent; 
and 5) the task performance should be observable [ibid., p.13].
Keeping in mind these general considerations about the requirements of 
a performance evaluation criterion, the list from which to choose non- 
financial indicators is almost endless. All possible dimensions of a
business can be covered by such indicators. For purposes of 
convenience performance measures are usually associated with one of
several major areas of performance. A classical classification 
considers six main domains of organizational effectiveness [AAA, 1971] 
namely productivity (or production effectiveness), marketing 
effectiveness, personnel and organizational effectiveness, financial 
effectiveness, effectiveness of internal communication, and the 
effectiveness of fulfilling the firm’s social role. Many studies have 
covered one or several of these areas, having proposed a number of 
measures which on the whole amount to a hugely extensive and 
meaningless list of performance criteria^5),
A more fruitful approach is the one which relates the instruments of 
evaluation with the varying key management aspects of each 
corporation. According to this approach non-financial measures of 
performance should be selected in function of the critical managerial 
tasks that arise in each point in time in any given business. As an 
illustration to this principle the particular case of the assessment 
of manufacturing performance will be discussed.
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In the common instance of manufacturing organizations in which 
production plays an important overall strategic role (see for example 
Skinner [1969] for a demonstration of the importance of manufacturing 
to corporate strategy), the evaluation of the performance of this 
Important area of corporate activity is critical. Hayes and 
Wheelwright [1979a, 1979b] showed that the manufacturing process of a 
product changes as the product progresses in its life cycle. Based on 
this observation Hayes and Wheelwright developed the notion of a 
process life cycle which parallels the well known model of the product 
life cycle. Typically, manufacturing in the introductory stage of a 
product is said to be a "fluid" process, characterized by a high 
flexibility and a low cost efficiency. As the product moves into the 
next stages of growth and eventually maturity, manufacturing becomes 
increasingly standardized, mechanized and automated, until it reaches 
a point where it is very efficient and interrelated. In this phase 
manufacturing is much less flexible than the initial fluid process 
[Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979a].
The changing characteristics of the manufacturing process along the 
product life cycle led Richardson and Gordon [1980] to propose 
different performance measures for manufacturing in each stage. As 
they point out, in the introductory stage where frequent design 
changes occur measures that relate to innovation, flexibility and 
responsiveness to customer needs are appropriate. In the growth 
stage, where sales increase rapidly and the product design becomes 
stable, indicators that relate to the ability to deliver sufficient 
product turn out to be the most important. These include capacity 
growth, capacity utilization rates, stockouts, order backlogs, and 
lost sales. Next, in the maturity stage, where sales still grow but 
at a declining rate until reaching a plateau, the critical measures of 
performance are those which gauge the ability to minimize costs and 
maximize capital and labour productivity. Examples of such measures 
are cost per unit of output, value added per employee, capital 
utilized per employee, and output per man-hour [ibid., pp.48-49]* 
Finally, in the decline stage, where sales drop as the product is 
substituted by improved or new products, price becomes of paramount 
Importance and so cost minimization and productivity become even more 
crucial. It is conceivable that companies will be dealing here
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simultaneously with the declining product and a new replacement just 
being introduced. As a consequence, the company will find two 
products in different stages of their life cycle, and specific 
measures of manufacturing performance for each product will be called 
for.
In face of the above, the use of success indicators appropriate for a 
given stage of the product life cycle for products that are in a 
different stage will lead to the wrong decisions on the part of 
managers. For example, if a subsidiary is evaluated on the basis of 
cost minimization and productivity when its main products are in the 
introductory stage, as Richardson and Gordon [1980] indeed found to be 
the case in some instances in their field study of Canadian companies, 
many dysfunctional consequences are likely to arise. Such 
consequences will, most commonly, include lack of responsiveness to 
customer needs, premature freezing of product design in order to 
standardize production as early as possible, and process 
inflexibility. All these will certainly lead to higher rates of 
product failure than might otherwise be anticipated [ibid., p.49].
Reflecting on these observations, Kaplan [ 1983] extended the 
Richardson and Gordon [1980] approach to the measurement of 
manufacturing performance, and attributed the problems presently faced 
by the U.S. industry to a general incapacity to comprehend the 
strategic importance of manufacturing in a world of intense 
competition from countries such as Japan which have a clear 
superiority in this area. The U.S. are not the only to experience 
such difficulties, for many other countries, many of them in Europe, 
feel hopeless in competing with high-quality, low-cost economies.
Kaplan [1983] advocates a departure from the traditional methods of 
assessment of manufacturing performance which privilege productivity, 
to a more comprehensive system which closely monitors in companies 
those facets in which competitors have an edge. In the common case of 
a corporation producing a mature product with relatively stable 
characteristics, the evaluation of manufacturing performance should 
centre on three major dimensions: quality, inventory and productivity 
[ibid., pp.689-694].
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Product quality is said to be emerging as the most important 
manufacturing performance area. Traditionally, quality has been seen 
as a statistical problem linked to the definition of an acceptable 
quality level (AQL). However, as Kaplan [ibid., p.690] remarks in 
certain countries, and notably in Japan, quality is a state of mind 
that leads to the philosophy that all defects can be eliminated. 
Authors [e.g. Crosby, 1979] demonstrated that the zero defect approach 
does not involve a trade-off between cost and quality since long-term 
manufacturing costs are inversely proportional to the percentage of 
defects. Thus, measures of quality are highly desirable in a 
performance evaluation system. As to the second dimension, inventory, 
Kaplan argues that the use of the classical inventory models such as 
the economic order quantity (EOQ) model do not provide companies with 
the most effective inventory systems. Again the example comes from 
Japan where the Kanban system [Monden, 1981] and other methods have 
enabled factories to run with very little or even no raw material 
inventory, work-in-process, and finished goods inventory. It is said 
that if set-up costs could be brought to zero, and uncertainties with 
the delivery of raw materials and the demand for finished products 
reduced production could be matched closely with demand. In this 
event companies would not feel the need to hold the same high levels 
of inventories. Consequently, instead of devising complicated 
mathematical models to optimize with respect to uncertain lead times 
and uncertain demand [Kaplan, ibid., p.693], managers should 
incorporate in their evaluation systems measures of performance which 
provide an incentive to keep uncertainty in production and in demand 
low, in order to minimize inventories. Finally, productivity, though 
the most basic dimension of manufacturing performance requires in 
Kaplan's opinion a better understanding and the use of more 
sophisticated measures. Ideally, productivity measurements should 
supplement traditional financial indicators of manufacturing 
performance [ibid., p.693], since they should help to identify 
improvements from physical operations without the confusing influence 
of the changes in the prices of input factors.
In summary, the choice of non-financial and qualitative success 
indicators to complement the financial measures in a performance 
evaluation system should be guided by those key management dimensions
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whose monitoring i s  critical for a corporation. In a world of intense 
c o m p e t i t io n  on a global international scale corporate success will 
depend on how competently management information systems are able to 
handle the relevant data. As Kaplan [1983, pp.6 88-6 8 9] observes:
"Traditional cost accounting systems based on an assumption 
of long production runs of a standard product, with 
unchanging characteristics and specifications, will not be 
relevant in this new environment. The (Aallenge is to devise 
new internal accounting systems that will be supportive of 
the firm's new manufacturing strategy. Improved measures of 
quality, inventory performance, productivity, flexibility, 
and innovation will be required. Managerial performance 
measures based on achieving these manufacturing goals should 
be developed to replace the current emphasis on short-term 
financial performance measures.”
5.5. Smmarv and Conclusions
The chapter focused on the main instrument of assessment of subunit 
operating activity : the measure of performance. Different types of 
measures were reviewed and particular attention was given to those 
Indicators most commonly encountered in the literature. For each 
indicator discussed, its nature was carefully analysed and its 
strengths and weaknesses examined. Also, the major consequences 
arising from the use of each indicator were identified, with the 
purpose of gaining an understanding of the conditions in which its use 
Is more adequate.
The concept most frequently found at the root of the measures employed 
in the assessment of divisional performance is the one of profit. The 
development of the profit concept in performance evaluation is 
reflected in two assessment criteria which, due to their relatively 
long history and widespread diffusion, are generally considered the 
classic profit-based measures of subunit performance.
One of these measures is ROI. This indicator is not only a measure 
that compares profit with the capital resources employed in its
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generation, but is also the centre of an integrated ratio analysis 
system comprising a battery of indicators that successively unfold 
from the ROI measure. The history of ROI is directly linked with the 
spread of corporate decentralization and in particular with the growth 
of the investment centre concept. Although used for the first time in 
the beginning of this century, the ROI concept only became generalized 
in the past three decades. Recent empirical studies suggest that ROI 
receives a slightly higher preference from U.S. corporations than from 
companies in the U.K. In both countries, however, it appears that the 
once predominance of ROI is now waning due to the introduction of 
other indicators of divisional operating performance.
The other classic profit-based measure is RI. Defended in large 
academic circles as an indicator preferable to ROI, the RI concept 
does not enjoy, however, the same kind of acceptance from the 
practice. Surveys of company practices have shown that in both sides 
of the Atlantic the use of RI is limited to a relatively small number 
of firms and that the diffusion of the measure has not progressed in 
the past two decades. It appears, nevertheless, that RI is encountered 
with more frequency in British than in American companies. No reasons 
explaining this apparent lack of success have been ascertained with 
rigour. Perhaps, one major factor deterring the acceptance of RI is 
the difficulty of its implementation. In effect, despite its 
theoretical elegance, RI is of complex application due to the problems 
found in the determination of a correct cost of capital charge.
Although prevalent in accounting textbooks, RI was subject to an 
intense debate among academics which involved contrasting views about 
its conceptual validity as a measure of divisional performance. The 
chapter followed the arguments presented by the authors with a view 
to bring some clarification to the debate. Particular attention was 
paid in uncovering the major assumptions behind the authors* 
reasoning, and in relating these assumptions with available empirical 
evidence provided independently. The assumptions were, in general, 
related to the capability of division managers to use external sources 
ef finance for their working capital requirements and to the degree of 
divisional managerial autonomy in determining the subunits* capital 
ssset base. The empirical dimension brought to the discussion of the
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debate had the effect of placing many of the authors* arguments into 
perspective, and offering a positivist side to an eminently normative 
approach.
In order that a full appreciation of the character of ROI and RI might 
emerge, the discussion of the conceptual nature of the measures was 
supplemented by a review of their main practical strengths and 
weaknesses. To a great extent, the advantages and limitations of 
these two measures are also the advantages and limitations, as 
experienced in practice, of profit as an indicator of divisional 
performance. Besides the problems generally encountered in the 
calculation of net income, difficulties also arise, however, for both 
ROI and RI in the determination of the amount of capital (fixed and 
current) employed in a division. Such obstacles to a problem-free 
computation are related to the technical characteristics of the 
methods. In addition to this, difficulties emerge in the application 
of ROI and RI that concern the motivational impact of the criteria 
among divisional management. The problems of misdirected motivation 
of division managers, and the technical drawbacks of the measures 
which may produce misleading information were reviewed in the chapter. 
In general, the RI method avoids some of the dysfunctional 
consequences that arise with ROI. Nevertheless, RI does not enable 
comparisons of efficiency to be made among different subunits, and, 
in addition, its practical application is marred with difficulties of 
technical nature. A point that clearly emerged in the chapter was, 
therefore, that no sole isolated measure of divisional performance is 
satisfactory. In fact, the assessment of subunits and their managers 
is best conducted if based on a number of indicators which complement 
one another and provide a disaggregate pattern of analysis.
Ibe budget is just one of the criteria that can be used in performance 
©valuation in addition to the classic indicators of divisional 
performance. The budget is an organizational mechanism of enormous 
potential, which performs a number of important roles. One of such 
roles involves the continual monitoring of subunit operations and 
Provides an instrument of analysis which probes into the numerous 
components of the final profit figure. In this sense, the budget is 
analytical measure very different in nature from the synthetic
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in d ic a to r s  of ROI and R I. Another important advantage of the budget 
is  t h a t  it may be adequately used as a measure of both output and 
b e h a v io u r . Furthermore, the budget facilitates the distinction 
between the notion of effectiveness and efficiency when performance 
ta rg e ts  are set for a subunit.
Despite its obvious advantages the budget, like any other performance 
evaluation criterion, also poses problems in its application. The 
essence of budget use as a success indicator is contained in the 
comparison of actual performance with estimated performance (the 
budget standard). As it was explained in the chapter, this latter 
figure is set up as the outcome of a bargaining process between 
superior and subordinate, where the subordinate's behaviour appears to 
be influenced in a significant manner by the way in which the superior 
makes use of budgetary information (enforcement of standards, and use 
of deviations) in the evaluation of performance. As a consequence, 
the budget standard agreed upon only very rarely approximates the 
level of performance that reflects the true capabilities of the 
subunit. Therefore, the application of budgetary deviations to the 
assessment of performance should be done with caution since according 
to the style of evaluation and indeed the characteristics of the 
operating environment, a given level of budgetary slack or optimism 
may be incorporated in the budget estimates, making the standards of 
performance to diverge from the performance that could truly be 
achieved, A model of the variances between budgeted and actual 
performance was presented in the chapter with the purpose of 
clarifying the distinction between deviations pertaining to planning 
(budgets as forecasts) and deviations relating to performance 
©valuation (budgets as commitments). This model was expanded for a 
range of situations involving either the forecasted underattainment or 
the overattainment of targets. This provided a useful instrument for 
correctly interpreting budget deviations and consequently achieving a 
sound application of the budget as a criterion for the evaluation of 
divisional performance.
Although there is a marked tendency in the literature to restrict the 
discussion of the major success indicators of divisional performance 
to measures of a financial nature, non-financial indicators, both
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q u a n t i ta t iv e  and qualitative should also be perceived as vital for the 
p e r fo rm a n c e  evaluation and control processes. The chapter reviewed 
such Indicators and presented the rationale for their use.
The justification for non-financial performance criteria stems 
primarily from the weaknesses of financial information which 
traditionally focuses on short term results rather than on the long 
term. It is known that the way in which executive compensation is 
awarded favours yearly or even quarterly profits, and that such a 
preference for immediate results leads almost inevitably to 
dysfunctional behaviour on the part of divisional management. In 
order that managerial decisions may safeguard the company's interests 
in the long term executive incentives should be closely tied to long 
range plans and this would involve the utilization of indicators that 
periodically gauge the achievement of non-financial goals like market 
share, level and success of R&D, product quality, productivity, and 
personnel development. Naturally, all these facets of business 
activity will sooner or later reflect on financial performance. 
Therefore, their permanent monitoring will provide managers with early 
warnings of current problems that will show on future profits. 
Another advantage from the use of non-financial indicators in 
performance evaluation resides in the fact that they contribute to a 
more thorough understanding of the specificity of each orgnizational 
subunit by those conducting the appraisal. If an adequate application 
of the principle of authority and controllability is sought, and 
indeed if the consideration of environmental influences is desired for 
the evaluation of foreign subsidiaries in a MNC, local situation- 
specific success indicators are to be used. Non-financial measures in 
general and qualitative information in particular have exactly these 
characteristics offering, therefore, the potential for the 
individuality of each division or subsidiary to be accounted for in 
the evaluation process.
Having ascertained the need for non-financial indicators in divisional 
performance evaluation and control, the chapter moved into a 
discussion of the criteria that can justify the selection of certain 
measures instead of others. The number of non-financial indicators 
From which to choose is almost endless, and clearly management
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requires a framework on which to draw for the choice of the relevant 
information. Such a framework is provided by the identification of 
those key management dimensions whose monitoring is critical for a 
given business. This principle was illustrated in the chapter for the 
case of corporations with an Important manufacturing activity. As it 
was demonstrated, the changing characteristics of the production 
process along the product life cycle require the use of different 
types of measures for each stage. In sum, corporations must recognize 
which functions are of strategic importance to them and reflect this 
in the choice of instruments utilized to monitor subunit performance. 
If a company wants to stay competitive in domestic and foreign markets 
it should closely follow those facets in which its strengths lie, and 
also those in which competitors have an edge.
The present chapter gave an overview of the success indicators of 
divisional operating performance most commonly found in the literature 
and discussed their nature and application from a conceptual 
standpoint. In the next chapter, the use of such indicators in the 
context of the MNC will be revealed on the basis of the empirical 
evidence currently available.
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f9otiiote[3;
(1) Only the results of the second phase of the Mauriel and Anthony 
study are reported here because the data concerning the use of RI 
collected in the first phase are believed to be largely 
overstated. This was probably due to design faults of the survey 
and is ackowledged by the authors [1966, p.104].
(2) A large body of literature, alternatively, believes that the ex 
Dost appraisal of the capital investment decision should be made 
independently of the evaluation process of divisional operating 
performance, and should take the form, for example, of post 
completion audits. According to this view, it is generally 
assumed that once an investment decision is made and the 
respective project implemented, the costs involved become "bygone 
costs" or "sunk costs" [e.g. Henderson and Dearden, 1966]. This 
being so, the evaluation of divisional operating performance 
should concentrate on the assessment of how efficient the 
divisions were in employing the operating resources allocated to 
them and in implementing the strategic directions provided by the 
head office. This view is shared in the present work.
Reece and Cool [1978] found that 95 percent of the companies using 
the investment centre concept included inventories in their 
divisions' asset base. Accounts receivable were included in 94 
percent of the cases; cash in 63 percent; and other current assets 
in 76 percent.
Alternatively, Cyert and March [1963] argue that organizational 
slack arises unintentionally as a result of the bargaining 
process, and its crucial role is to act as a mechanism of 
performance stabilization. Basically, slack would rise when 
business conditions are favourable, offering a pool of emergency 
resources thay could be utilized when conditions are unfavourable. 
A similar pattern is suggested by Williamson [1964] who provides 
some evidence that slack is accumulated in good years and 
converted into reported results in poor years.
A detailed review of such studies is found in AAA[1971]. Also 
authors such as Ferrara [1964], Solomons [1965, ch.8], Hulbert and 
Toy [1977], and Parker [1978] proposed batteries of non-financial 
indicators of performance.
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CHAPTER 6 - PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN
SUBSIDIARIES - THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
6.1. Introdactlon
This chapter surveys the empirical evidence available in the 
literature as regards the criteria used in MNCs to control and 
evaluate the performance of foreign subsidiaries and their managers. 
This contrasts with the previous chapters which constructed a 
theoretical framework by reviewing the distinctive character of the 
multinational and by discussing the essence and nature of the subunit 
performance evaluation and control processes. In this sense the 
present chapter gives empirical substance to what has been discussed 
so far throughout the study, and is intended to reveal major gaps and 
inadequacies from the available evidence.
Over a period of more than a decade a number of empirical studies have 
focused on the assessment practices employed by international 
corporations for their foreign subsidiaries. They all concentrate on 
U.S.-based MNCs, and no study is known to have specifically addressed 
the problem to U.K.-based multinationals^
The review of the empirical literature undertaken in the chapter 
follows a common pattern for each study surveyed. First, a brief 
introduction to the investigation is presented together with the 
description of the methodology employed and the nature of the 
population and sample. Next, a detailed account of the major findings 
reached is offered with some pertinent comments. Finally, a summary 
of conclusions is provided, placing particular emphasis on the 
discussion of the implications of the study for the present research 
project.
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6.2. Malor Baplrlcal StPdleg
6.2.1. The Mauriel Study
An early study dealing with the performance evaluation systems used by 
MNCs for their foreign subsidiaries was conducted by John Mauriel in 
the mid 1960s, and published in 1969. This study followed a previous 
work with Richard Anthony [Mauriel and Anthony, 1966] where an 
extensive survey of the practices of divisional performance evaluation 
was conducted for domestic operations. Although formulated in not so 
rigorous and comprehensive terms as the previous work, the 1969 study 
was, nevertheless, a valid attempt to understand the methods used by 
some MNCs in assessing their foreign subsidiaries, and to detect 
relevant differences, if any, between the multinational and the 
domestic unit control systems in operation. The study surveyed the 
practices of 15 giant American companies whose overseas operations had 
sales of over US$ 5 billion. Interviews were conducted at the 
headquarters level.
The results showed that the use of the profit and investment centre 
concepts was widespread, and that an increasing emphasis was being 
placed on ROI as a performance measure, these results being similar to 
those obtained by Mauriel and Anthony [1966] for domestic operations. 
Twelve of the 15 corporations interviewed were evaluating their 
subsidiaries mainly on the basis of ROI, or a form of RI. Absolute 
profit and profit-as-percentage of sales were also frequently used 
[Mauriel, 1969, pp.36-3?]. When controlling foreign operations, 
parent companies were found to place a heavy emphasis on budgeting 
techniques. Standard budgeting and other financial planning 
techniques used for overseas operations were similar to those employed 
domestically. The author does not provide much evidence as to whether 
such techniques were also used as criteria for managerial performance 
assessment. However, from the detailed description of a particular 
control system (the one Implemented in the 3-M Company) given in 
appendix as an illustration of the nature of the systems encountered 
in the study, it can be inferred that the annual review process of 
overseas operations for planning and control purposes did provide 
information that was used by parent company officials to judge the
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performance and the capabilities of overseas managements [ibid., 
p p .39-52]. Another important observation of this study was that the 
flow of information between headquarters and foreign subsidiaries 
tended to put a heavy emphasis on data of a financial nature [p.3?]. 
Non-financial information which could aid to understand the 
peculiarities of each operation was usually omitted in the internal 
reporting systems, leaving the performance evaluation to rely greatly 
on financial data. Even the most basic information relating to the 
overall economic situation in each country operated was found, most of 
the times, not to be included in the reporting systems, therefore 
making both the budgetary goal-setting and the performance evaluation 
process very problematic [p.38].
In sum, this study observed a certain number of similarities between 
domestic and transnational performance evaluation and control systems, 
namely: 1) the reliance on profit-based measures which summarize the
performance of the organizational subunits; 2) the widespread use of 
standard domestic budgeting and financial planning techniques, and; 
3) a heavy emphasis on financial data in the contents of the 
informational flow between parent and affiliate companies. By 
applying to their foreign operations the same internal reporting 
systems as used domestically, the companies appear not to be allowing 
for the peculiarities of the external environment faced by each 
subsidiary to be taken into account in the evaluation of unit 
performance.
6.2.2. The Mclnnes Study
Another study to provide empirical evidence on the methods actually 
employed by MNCs in the assessment of their foreign subsidiaries' 
performance is Mclnnes [1971]. This research included a survey of the 
financial reporting and control procedures used by 30 American MNCs of 
moderate size (sales between US$ 100-300 million). All the companies 
manufactured industrial products and had a substantial involvement in 
overseas business (at least 20 percent of the sales and assets 
abroad), with subsidiaries in six or more foreign countries. Data
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were collected by a mailed questionnaire and by direct interviews The 
study focused on the characteristics of the financial reporting 
systems implemented between corporate headquarters and affiliates, and 
on the use made by parent companies of the reported data for 
performance evaluation purposes. A comparison of the procedures 
employed for foreign and domestic operations was incorporated in the 
research design, in order that similarities and differences might be 
detected.
The characterization of the reporting systems showed that there were 
no important differences between the foreign and domestic systems 
implemented. In many cases, the volume of information requested to 
the overseas subsidiaries tended to be lower than the one asked to the 
domestic units. In fact, in nine companies (i.e. 30 percent of the
total sample) the reporting systems were the same for foreign and 
domestic operations, and among the others, the principal difference 
noted was that fewer reports were required from foreign than from 
domestic affiliates [ibid., p.17] The table below (Table 6.1) gives 
an idea of the range of reports requested by headquarters on a regular
basis. The content of each of these reports was found to be different
for foreign operations and for domestic operations: in 13 companies
(i.e. 44 percent) the reports of foreign affiliates contained
substantially less detail than the reports of domestic units; in 16 
companies (i.e 53 percent) the detail was approximately the same, and 
in only one company the detail contained in foreign reporting was
substantially higher than in domestic reporting [p.17].
With respect to the use of the information contained in the financial 
repo rting  systems in performance evaluation, Mclnnes observed a strong 
s im i la r i ty  between the range of techniques used for evaluating foreign 
su bs id ia ries  and domestic units. Nineteen responses (i.e 63 percent) 
were identical, and the ones which differed were cases where a higher 
number of indicators was being used for domestic than for foreign
operations [p. 19]. In order that the relative importance of each 
In d ica to r for performance evaluation might be detected, Mclnnes asked 
firm s to  name and rank in order of importance the three control
techniques which they found to be most useful. Table 6.II shows the
nesults obtained. Return on investment appears as the indicator
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Table 6.1 - Number of Companies Having Reports Requested Regularly by 
Headquarters from Subsidiaries, According to Mclnnes[1971]
(total number of cases studied = 30)
Foreign
Operations
(A)
Domestic
Operations
(B)
Difference
(B-A)
Balance sheet 28 30 +2
Balance sheet supporting 
data 16 22 +6
Inventory analysis 14 22 +8
Receivables analysis 12 19 7
Income statement 30 30 -
Income statement supporting 
detail 22 26 +4
Product line income 
statements 14 21 +7
Cash flow 10 18 +8
Sales analysis 14 20 +6
Order backlog analysis 18 23 +5
Local borrowing position 21 19 -2
Others ( frequency less 
than 10 ) 20 21 +1
Total 219 271 +52
____________
Average number of reports 
per company 7 9
Source: Adapted from Mclnnes [1971, p.17]
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Table 6.II - Most Important Success Indicators Used in Evaluating 
Operations, According to Mclnnes [1971]
Foreign Operations Domestic Operations
Frequency Weighted 
of 1 frequency 
mention i  (1)
Frequency
of
mention
Weighted
frequency
(1)
Return on investment 21 50 19 48
Comparison with plan 
Comparison with
17 42 19 48
history
Analysis of income
11 20 10 17
statement 
Analysis of balance
9 16 7 13
sheet
Other criteria men­
tioned by firms 
(e.g. market share, 
comparison of costs
5 6
with a budget,etc.) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
NOTES: (1) The weights assigned to each item were 3» 2, or 1, 
according to them being positioned in first, second, or 
third places, respectively.
n.a. Data not available from the published results.
Source: Mclnnes [1971, p.21]
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most frequently mentioned by the respondents For controlling overseas 
operations, ROI happens to be the dominant criterion, whereas for 
domestic operations a comparison of actual results with plan is as 
important as ROI (see table) Twenty-three companies (i.e 77 percent) 
gave basically the same answers for foreign affiliates and domestic 
operating units; the differences noted tended towards a greater 
emphasis on "purely financial techniques of analysis" in the case of 
overseas operations [p.21]. Mclnnes also reports that from 
interviews he was able to conclude that headquarters tended to 
accord less importance to budgetary cost control and to measures of 
manufacturing efficiency when evaluating foreign operations than when 
assessing domestic operations. The basic reason may be related to a 
less involvement of headquarters in the management of their businesses 
abroad [p.20].
In brief, the main findings of this study support the view that there 
are very little important differences both in the design and in the 
use of financial reporting systems for foreign and domestic 
operations. Further, it was found a tendency for the parent companies 
to rely almost exclusively on financial indicators of performance, 
mainly ROI, when assessing the operations of their subsidiaries 
abroad. When drawing conclusions from his study, Mclnnes stated that :
"[...] the similarity [ of financial reporting systems for 
foreign operations and domestic operations ] does not appear 
to be the result of an oversight, but instead results fram a 
conscious (Aoice on the part of the managements." [p.26]
And he justifies such an assertion declaring that the data obtained 
seems to demonstrate that top managers in headquarters of MNCs have as 
one of their aims the design and implementation of financial reporting 
and control systems which are uniformly applicable to all units of the 
company regardless of their geographic location [p.26]. No sufficient 
evidence is provided in the study to assert the validity of this 
statement. Neither the exact reasons for top managers to prefer 
uniformity and rigidity in the reporting systems instead of more 
flexible ways of reporting, which could account for the peculiarities 
of overseas operations, are given by Mclnnes. However, at a certain 
point of his paper [p.16], he suggests that the similarities between
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domestic and foreign control systems could be mainly due to the 
urgency of getting information about newly implemented operations and 
to the familiarity with the systems being used domestically. As he 
points out:
"In practice, there tends to be a lag between the development 
of Information systems and the development of the 
organization and its operations. As a consequence, manager's 
needs for information are usually pressing. Faced by such a 
situation [...] a corporate controller will install a 
management reporting system abroad idiicdi has been used and 
found effective domestically, and is, at the same time, 
familiar to corporate operating management." [p.16]
Data were not collected in the study to either confirm or reject this 
hypothetical explanation for the similarity between domestic and 
foreign reporting and control systems. An important question remains, 
then, unanswered: Is this similarity the result of a conscious and
well-pondered decision by the managers involved in the control and 
evaluation of foreign subsidiaries? And in the affirmative case, has 
such a decision included consideration of the difficulties that may 
arise in the performance evaluation process from the existence of 
specific problems faced by units operating in environments very 
different from home?
6.2.3. The Bursk et al. Study
By the time Mclnnes [1971] reported the findings of his work, the 
results of another study, sponsored by the research foundation of the 
American Financial Executives Institut were also published. This 
study, conducted by Bursk, Dearden, Hawkins, and Longstreet was 
designed to codify the methods of financial control actually in use by 
MNCs and to evaluate the success of these control systems. Rather 
comprehensive questionnaires and interviews were used to gather the 
data However, like the precedent studies, a small sample of companies 
was surveyed. As the authors acknowledge [Bursk et al., 1971» p.3],
this fact reflects the exploratory nature of the study and the attempt 
to understand each case to its every possible detail. A 36-page 
questionnaire was mailed to MNCs having at least one top financial
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officer as a member of the Institute, and regularly publishing 
separate figures for some aspects of their foreign operations in their 
annual reports. A companion 21-page questionnaire was also sent to 
each of these firms with the request that the head office forwarded 
the questionnaire to two of its subsidiaries. Usable responses were 
received from 34 corporations (2).
The data on current practices that were obtained, demonstrate a heavy 
emphasis placed by headquarters on profit as the basic indicator of 
performance for their subsidiaries abroad. In fact, as many as 94
percent (3) of the companies surveyed held their foreign units
responsible for profit performance. The principal measure of 
profitability used was absolute profit as compared to an annual 
objective (56 percent of the cases), followed by ROI (29 percent of 
the total); RI was employed in only one percent of the companies
[ibid., p.25]. One indication of the importance attributed by parent 
companies to the profit results obtained by subsidiaries, when 
evaluating managerial performance, is the influence that such results 
have on the determination of the supplemental compensation of 
subsidiary managers As such, a question was included to determine the 
extent to which supplemental compensation in the foreign affiliate was 
tied to its profitability. The results show that in nearly 40 percent 
of the cases, bonuses were based directly on profit performance; in 35 
percent, bonuses were influenced by profit performance but the amount 
was determined by top management judgement rather than formula, and in 
only 8 percent of the total were bonuses unaffected by profit 
performance [ibid., p.29].
As regards the method used for setting up the profit objective for a 
given year, in over one-half of the respondents such method was based 
on the budget approved for each unit; in a quarter of the respondents 
the profit objective of the subsidiaries was established in accordance 
to the profit objective of the company, and in almost another quarter 
it was based on management judgement [p.27] With the information that 
is provided by the study it is very difficult to ascertain the extent 
to which the environmental peculiarities of each subsidiary were taken 
into account when the profit objective was set up. It appears, 
however, that in most cases environmental considerations were not
199
6 / PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES
being given much thought. This conclusion is drawn from the answers 
to a question in which the authors asked the companies which 
techniques they were using to confirm whether each subsidiary had a 
reasonable profit objective. Improvement over the previous time 
period, comparison with other company businesses, and comparison with 
competitive businesses accounted for nearly 75 percent of the answers; 
only the rest stated that the profit objectives were based on a 
forecast of the economic conditions faced by each foreign affiliate
[p.28].
Another important conclusion of this study was that the overwhelming 
majority of the companies used the same or very similar systems to 
control foreign subsidiaries and domestic divisions, what is 
consistent with the findings of the previous works reviewed. As many 
as 78 percent of the firms participating in the survey indicated that 
the control systems for foreign units were the same as those used for 
domestic operations, 13 percent indicated that they were little
different, and only 9 percent considered that they were significantly 
or entirely different (6 and 3 percent, respectively) [p.29].
With respect to the accounting procedures adopted by the firms for 
calculating the indicators used in the evaluation of their foreign 
subsidiaries' performance, the Bursk et al. study inquired into the 
methods actually employed in the calculation of overseas units' 
investment base, and drew a parallel with the Mauriel and Anthony 
[1966] survey for domestic operations The findings indicated that the 
fixed assets were included in the investment base at net book value in 
two-thirds of the cases, and at gross book value in one-third, what 
was quite close to the results obtained by Mauriel and Anthony for 
domestic divisions; as regards the calculation of the subsidiaries' 
current investment, liabilities were deducted from current assets in 
nearly 80 percent of the companies, this percentage being twice as 
much as the one found for domestic units (vide chapter on the 
practical advantages and limitations of ROI and RI, where these 
results from the Mauriel and Anthony [1966] survey have been 
reviewed). The organizational characteristics of foreign subsidiaries 
vis-a-vis domestic divisions, present a plausible explanation for this 
particular difference As Bursk et al observe, in domestic operations
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payments are often made centrally and many current liabilities are not 
assigned to particular divisions, as it is the case, for example, of 
income taxes payable. By contrast, foreign affiliates are independent 
companies which have to report separately in order to submit 
themselves to the regulations of the jurisdictions under which they
operate; besides, the managers of foreign affiliates tend to have more
freedom in the operating management of their units.
Recognizing the conceptual need for some environmental aspects of 
overseas operations to be taken into account in the performance 
evaluation of foreign subsidiaries, Bursk et al. attempted to 
ascertain to which extent the actual corporate control systems were
responsive to the particular overseas environmental factors. The
information gathered by the study does not enable, nevertheless, the 
drawing of any safe conclusions in this regard, a consequence perhaps 
of an insufficient development of the subject in the questionnaire 
(questions 1 to 7 in Part III, Section A of both questionnaires) When 
communicating the results, the authors report that headquarters 
executives tended by a small margin to believe that their companies' 
control system was "adequately" taking care of environmental factors, 
and foreign subsidiary executives tended to consider their companies' 
treatment of environmental peculiarities as "not entirely adequate, 
but acceptable" [p.39]. Therefore, in strict accordance to such 
results it could be concluded that the environmental peculiarities
although not being ideally accounted for by the control systems used 
for overseas operations, were generally present in the control process 
in a satisfactory way. This was not, however, the interpretation made 
by the authors. In effect, where the most relevant findings of the 
research are summarized, one notices that Bursk et al. opted for 
concluding that "those responsible for designing and administering
financial control systems often do not fully appreciate the relevance 
of the peculiar characteristics of the diverse international 
environment to their task" [p.6]. No sufficient evidence is provided 
for supporting this interpretation. It is true that such a view is in 
consonance with the basic characteristics of the evaluation and 
control process in use by the firms investigated (i.e. high
concentration on profits as indicators of performance, similarity in 
the methods employed for the appraisal of foreign and domestic
201
6 / PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES
operations, and environmental peculiarities of foreign operations not 
being given much thought in the setting of profit objectives for the 
subsidiaries). However, the study fails to determine whether, as the 
authors appear to conclude, the opinion held by executives about the 
adequacy of the performance systems operated in their firms, was due 
to a lack of appreciation by such executives of the relevance of the 
environment for the subsidiary evaluation process, or whether it was 
dictated, for example, by the existence of informal information in the 
evaluation process, in a successful effort to overcome the 
deficiencies of the formal system The omission of this latter aspect, 
constitutes a shortcoming of the study findings as far as the 
investigation of the degree of environmental representation in 
performance evaluation is concerned.
In conclusion, the Bursk et al. study demonstrates the wide use and 
emphasis put on profit by headquarters of American MNCs in the control 
and assessment of their foreign subsidiaries' performance; from here 
it can be inferred that non-profit-based indicators of performance 
have a virtually negligible role in the evaluation and control 
processes. Moreover, very strong similarities between the 
characteristics of the systems used to control foreign subsidiaries 
and domestic divisions have been found in the great majority of the 
cases. A tentative explanation for this, put forward by the authors
[p.40], is based on the supposition that a number of reasons such as
expedience, ease of design and application, less sophistication of 
subsidiaries abroad, and initial overseas operations in stable, low- 
risk, domestic-like environments, led companies to implement control 
systems for their overseas businesses very much alike to the systems 
used for their domestic operations. Despite this similarity, the 
consideration of some environmental conditions peculiar to each
subsidiary appears not to be completely absent in the evaluation
process.
innovation of the Bursk et al. study was that not only
headquarters executives, but also subsidiary managers, were 
questionned about the evaluation and control process operated in the 
Firms, in the hope that the views of the latter might differ from 
those of the former. It was thought, that a better understanding of
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the issues investigated would emerge in this way Contrary to what had 
been expected by the authors, the results do not show important 
differences in the views of the two sides involved in the evaluation 
process, since the managers of overseas units strongly endorsed the 
methods used by parent companies in the assessment of foreign units' 
performance. Such results are, however, of little value because, as 
the authors acknowledge [p.30], the study has a design weakness whose 
consequences have probably led to response bias: first, the
subsidiaries participating in the study were not selected by the 
researchers but by the parent companies instead; thereby the units 
selected could have been those where the internal control system was 
operating better than average; second, because it has not been made 
very explicit that the responses were not to be seen by parent company 
executives, there may have been some reluctance on the part of the 
subsidiaries managers to criticize headquarters systems.
The interesting feature of the Bursk et al. study is that it raises 
the important problem of the inclusion of environmental peculiarities 
in the assessment of overseas operations. The results obtained, 
however, do not provide a clear understanding of the companies' 
practice. The determination of the extent to which environmental 
characteristics specific to foreign host countries are accounted for 
by the control systems in operation in MNCs, and, more important, of 
how they are accounted- for, are questions that Bursk et al.'s study 
leaves unanswered.
6.2.4. The Robbins and Stobau^ Study
As part of the "Harvard Business School's Multinational Enterprise 
Study", Sidney Robbins and Robert Stobaugh conducted research on MNCs' 
f in a n c ia l practices, achieving some quite interesting findings as far 
evaluation of subsidiary performance is concerned [Robbins and 
Stobaugh, 1973a, and 1973b] The authors extensively interviewed and 
analised the unpublished records of 39 companies. Additionally, they 
slso studied the published records of a vast number of corporations. 
These two groups of firms represented all major U.S. industries with
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investments abroad; the smallest company studied had total sales of 
US$ 100 million and foreign sales of US$ 20 million, whereas the 
largest company had several billions of dollars in foreign sales 
[1973b, p.81].
The findings of this study corroborate the basic conclusions drawn by 
the previous surveys. In fact, very strong similarities in the 
performance evaluation processes used for domestic and foreign units, 
were also found here. Furthermore, emphasis on a profit-based 
indicator of subsidiary performance, allegedly expressive and 
comprehensive, was found to be a common characteristic to most 
evaluation criteria adopted by parent companies As much as 95 percent 
of the headquarters financial managers interviewed said that foreign 
subsidiaries were judged on "precisely the same basis" as domestic 
subsidiaries [1973b, p.82]. Almost without exception, these officers 
used ROI as the basic measure of performance. Only in those few 
companies engaged in rapidly expanding fields and thus firmly 
orientated towards growth, was ROI not the main performance indicator, 
return on sales being preferred instead [1973a, p.143] The investment 
base in ROI calculation tended to equal the amount of equity or the 
amount of total assets after depreciation; only in a small number of 
firms the investment base was total assets before depreciation Though 
being generally regarded as the basic measure of subsidiary 
performance, ROI was not found alone in the evaluation process, for 
other supplementary indicators of performance were also in use.
The authors also found that the use of the budget in performance 
evaluation is widespread and that "multinational enterprises almost 
universally follow the same budgetary procedures in their foreign and 
domestic operations" [1973b, p.83] All the subsidiaries were usually 
required to report at the same time substantially the same information 
in the same format. The budget procedures, as reported in the study, 
typically culminated in two sets of documents: a capital budget,
prepared on a yearly basis, where individual projects were listed and 
analysed; and an operating budget, prepared on a monthly or quarterly 
basis for the forthcoming fiscal year, which contained cash flow 
projections, income statements and balance sheets A long term plan in 
budget form (five years or more) was also required in 74 percent of
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the companies in the sample [1973b, p.83]. The final approval of the 
subsidiaries' budgets was generally done at the highest levels in the 
organization, frequently by the president or by the board of directors 
[1973a, p.14%]. The use of the budget was regarded by the companies 
participating in the study as a means of taking Into account the 
specificity of each operation in the evaluation process. The 
differences among foreign units were considered throu^ the setting of 
different standards of performance, adapted to the realities of local 
conditions. However, it was found that the overemphasis placed by 
headquarters on ROI had as a consequence the offsetting of any serious 
consideration of subsidiaries' peculiarities. In fact, top 
management's final judgements were almost invariably made in ROI 
terms. As the authors put it:
"In theory. MNEs use the budget to take into account the 
circunstances peculiar to each subsidieu*y. But, in fact, 
executives in these companies are so caught up in the 
extensiveness of their international empires that they return 
again and again to a tangible and simple measure of 
performance - ROI. Thus even multinational enterprises that 
use the budget as a supplementary measurement of subsidiary 
performance still select ROI as the kev item in the 
budget.T  1971bf p.8 3, emphasis added]
Behind this general picture of how multinationals evaluate 
performance, Robbins and Stobaugh found that clear variations in the 
characteristics of the control systems and subsidiary evaluation 
processes actually in operation, occurred according to the size of 
each MNC's foreign businesses. They clustered the companies in their 
sample in the three following groups: 1) small MNCs, with total annual 
sales of the foreign units amounting to a maximum of US$ 100 million; 
2) medium MNCs, with foreign sales ranging from US$ 100 to 500 
million; 3) large MNCs, with foreign sales of over US$ 500 million 
 ^1973a, chapter3]. For each of these three groups the authors were 
able to identify some common features inherent to the evaluation 
processes in use for foreign subsidiaries.
In the small enterprises the distinctive characteristic was the 
informality of the appraisal. It was found that headquarters' 
managers were reluctant to implement extensive and burdensome internal 
reporting systems to be forwarded by subsidiaries, and that their
205
6 / PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES
evaluation of foreign operations tended to rely heavily on personal 
visits. Budget procedures for the affiliates abroad were usually much 
less sophisticated than they were domestically, and in some cases the 
budget was not even used as an Instrument of evaluation because 
headquarters simply did not consider themselves capable of making 
independent judgements. The sole formal indicator of subsidiary 
performance was ROI, this measure being calculated on an individual 
basis in which each unit was taken as a separate entity. There was no 
reference to benefits received or costs incurred elsewhere in the 
company, even when they significantly affected the unit's performance 
[1973a, ch.8]. In the medium corporations, on the contrary, the 
budget was already extensively used as a performance indicator 
supporting and supplementing the principal measure - ROI. Budgetary 
policies were relatively relaxed, and, as the authors remark, firms 
had not yet developed the extensive formal adjustments and rules-of- 
thumb that large companies, with more experience, tended to use in 
comparing one subsidiary with another. Interestingly enough, it was
among medium companies, and not in large firms, that Robbins and 
Stobaugh discovered the highest proportion of cases taking into
account, for unit evaluation purposes, the income and assets of the 
total company on an integrated manner rather than the income and 
assets of each subsidiary as an independent entity. Finally, in the 
large multinationals the evaluation process was mainly characterized 
by a very marked rigidity and impersonality. All signs of informality 
encountered in different degrees in the two other groups were non­
existent here. The budget tended to assume a vital importance in the 
control of subsidiaries' operations, and the budgetary process was a 
"compulsive ritual" in which all organizational participants were 
involved. Apart from ROI, always present, performance evaluation in 
large firms was found to be built around a host of procedures, 
directives and institutionalized rules-of-thumb standards. Ihis was 
certainly a consequence of the importance assumed by the manual of 
procedures or the "rule-book" in such companies, as the major guide to 
the relations between parent company and affiliates [1973a, oh.2]. As 
a result, there tended to be an impersonal evaluation at headquarters 
lavel, aggravated in those cases where long distance and communication 
difficulties created obstacles to direct exchanges [1973a, ch.8].
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In summary, this study basically found the same criteria for the 
evaluation of domestic and foreign organizational units, and stressed
the complete reliance put by headquarters of MNCs on profit-based
measures, particularly on ROI, as the key indicator of subsidiary 
performance. The role of the budget as a supplementary criterion for 
performance evaluation was extensively examined by the authors. 
Although the budget was generally regarded by the people interviewed 
as a tool enabling peculiarities of each operation to be taken into 
account in the evaluation and control process, Robbins and Stobaugh 
found that important differences among foreign units were usually 
overlooked. It should be noted that the focus of the study as far as 
such differences are concerned, was mainly on those factors affecting 
units’ operations that are internal to the enterprise, i.e decisions 
taken centrally regarding, for instance, transfer prices, charges for 
the parent’s technology and services rendered, and investments in 
subsidiaries that are subject to strategic considerations sometimes 
having little to do with immediate economic benefits. The influences 
of external environmental factors on foreign units and their impact on 
the unit performance evaluation process was a problem only marginally 
addressed in the study. One of the main thrusts of Robbins and
Stobaugh's research is the relationship they were able to identify
between size of MNCs and characteristics of the evaluation methods 
used to assess performance of their foreign subsidiaries. In the 
description of such methods, some insights into informal aspects of 
the evaluation process, such as personal visits and supplementary 
information used in practice to differentiate subsidiaries, were given 
by the authors The recognition, even implicit, that beyond the formal 
criteria of performance evaluation there may be an informal assessment 
which may compensate for some of the flaws of the formal systems, is a 
roajor step forward towards the understanding of subsidiary performance 
evaluation in multinationals. Robbins and Stobaugh's study has the 
®erit of raising the issue, though in a somewhat vague manner. The 
I'eal importance, role and implications of an informal evaluation of 
performance made by headquarters managers of MNCs, have, nevertheless, 
still to be determined.
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6.2.5. The Persen and Van Lesslg Study
In 1979, the research foundation of the American Financial Executives 
Institute commissioned Business International to undertake a survey on 
the techniques employed by MNCs for measuring the financial 
performance of overseas operations. The study, conducted by William 
Persen and Van Lessig, is a follow-up of the survey carried out eight 
years earlier by Bursk et al [1971] under the sponsorship of the same 
research foundation.
Persen and Van Lessig's [1979] study is based on data collected from a 
questionnaire and personal interviews. The questionnaire was mailed 
to "approximately 400 top international companies, all based in the 
D.S."(^ ). A total of 125 filled-in questionnaires were received. A 
characterization of the response sample according to size of 
companies' international sales (excluding exports), degree of 
companies' international sales compared with their total sales, and 
industry classification was provided by the authors [ibid., pp.8-9]. 
The interviews were conducted both in companies' headquarters in the 
U.S. (20 corporations), and in subsidiaries in Europe (two or more 
field locations for each of 8 corporations). The way in which results 
are reported tend to emphasize information gathered in the interviews. 
Companies' practices are described mainly through the voice of 
executives, rather than through the analytical eye of the researchers. 
In fact, the whole book is packed with quotations of managers 
collected in interviews, and comparatively little information from 
questionnaires is reported in aggregate form. This approach, while 
certainly adding colour to the text, results in that a general view of 
the practices followed by companies is very difficult to achieve by 
the reader.
A major objective of the study was, according to the authors, "to 
identify and analyze [•••] the te (A niques companies use to eliminate 
or neutralize the distorting effects of widely varying national 
■fagjpess envlromiiftni-.a - including fluctuating ezdiange rates - in 
Order to secure a common ground against whi(A to measure the financial 
performance of their individual operations overseas" [p.5, emphasis
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added]. Given this objective, it would be natural to expect that the 
study addressed the case of companies operating in a wide spectrum of 
national environments, spread over different geographic areas in the 
world. Behind this idea lies the assumption that the differences in 
environmental characteristics across countries in distinct large 
geographic zones, such as continents, are generally higher than the 
differences across countries located in a same zone. In other words, 
two countries in Europe, for example, are likely to have more
similarities between themselves than one country in Europe, and 
another, say, in Africa, or the Middle East. Therefore, if a study 
proposes to analyse the effects of "widely varying national business 
environments", it should not restrict itself to one sole geographic
area. Persen and Van Lessig’s study focus on the practices of American 
MNCs towards operations in Europe only (5), which is, besides, the 
continent presenting perhaps the least amount of environmental 
differences in relation to the U.S. This design weakness of the study 
leads to some results having to be carefully interpreted.
Before describing the principle evaluation techniques employed in
MNCs, the Persen and Van Lessig study examines the companies’ 
financial reporting systems, emphasizing the type and frequency of 
information submitted by operations to the head office. This 
constitutes a major strength of the study, and is based on the premise 
that a firm cannot effectively evaluate the performance of its foreign 
operations, without having previously developed an adequate means to 
obtain the information upon which analysis is based [p.29]. Table 
6,III presents the frequency with which some common financial reports 
are submitted by foreign operations. Balance sheet and income 
statement are included in every company’s financial reporting system, 
and in most cases they are submitted on a monthly basis. Receivables 
analysis, report on foreign exchange gains or losses, and funds flow 
analysis are also present in almost every system. It is noteworthy 
that an item - order backlog report - which is included in only 
slightly more than half of the companies, has the highest reporting 
frequency of all the items listed (92 percent of the companies which 
include order backlog reports in their reporting systems have the item 
submitted by affiliates every week or every month).
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The authors report only minor differences among the various categories 
of respondents as regards type and frequency of reports submitted 
[p.3%]. It appears that not only here but throughout the whole study 
no statistical inferential techniques were used to determine 
significant differences in companies’ practices across firms 
classified according to different criteria.
Persen and Van Lessig’s study examines in considerable detail the 
techniques which companies use to measure the performance of their 
overseas affiliates. Two basic criteria are employed by firms; 
variance analysis, and ratio analysis. The former implies the use of 
budgeting comparisons, whereas the latter involves the application of 
indicators of performance based on historical data. Respondents to 
the questionnaire were asked to compare the importance of each 
performance critérium at the time of the study with the importance the 
same critérium had five years earlier, and it was expected to have 
five years later. Despite the difficulties inherent to such a 
question, which the authors acknowledge [p.64], some indication of the 
relative importance of the various instruments over time is provided. 
Table 6.IV lists the percentage of companies which attributed to each 
assessment criteria the rating 1 on a scale of 1 to 3 (where 1 means 
the highest importance). Operating budget comparisons was the only 
technique given a top rating by the majority of companies at the time 
of the study. Highly international corporations were found to have a 
higher preference for the budget as a performance assessment technique 
than corporations with low international involvement [p.65]. The 
primary responsibility for the initial generation of budgets was found 
to lie usually with the subsidiaries, this being a result of high 
levels of decentralization in companies. However, the authors noted a 
trend towards increased parent company involvement in setting up 
subsidiaries’ budgets, as a consequence of the charges taking place in 
the international business environment [pp.49-53]. As Persen and Van 
Lessig point out: "Growing competition, increasingly complex 
environmental constraints and higher demands on limited corporate 
resources seem to be effecting ever-increasing involvement by 
corporate headquarters in all phases of the budgeting process" 
[p.53].
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Table 6.IV - Assessment Techniques Used for Overseas Operations, 
According to Persen and Van Lessig [1979]
{% of total number of respondents)
At
of
the
the
time
study Past Future
Operating budget comparisons 62 50 59
Contribution to earnings
per share 44 45 42
Return on investment 40 32 54
Contribution to corporate
cash flow 35 14 55
Return on sales 34 32 34
Return on assets 34 21 41
Asset/liability management 30 9 50
Non-accounting data 16 13 22
Long term plan comparisons 12 6 23
NOTE: Percentages refer to companies which attributed to each item
the top rating in a scale of 1 to 3.
Source: Persen and Van Lessig [1979, p.68]
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After budget comparisons, the most important evaluation techniques 
Indicated by companies were contribution to earnings per share and ROI 
(see Table 6.IV), both of which emphasize profit. The most highly 
rated non-profit-based measure was contribution to corporate cash flow 
(rated top by 35 percent of the total), followed by asset/liability 
management (rated top by 30 percent). Comparing the importance 
attributed to each assessment technique at the time of the study with 
the importance foreseen five years into the future non-profit-based 
measures came out better. The two single items which registered the 
highest increase in emphasis were contribution to corporate cash flow 
and asset/liability management, both with an increase of 20 percentual 
points (Table 6.IV). Also showing a rise in emphasis were long-term 
plan comparisons and non-accounting data (e.g. market share, quality 
controls, labour turnover etc.). The only profit-based measure 
pointing to a progress in emphasis over the future was ROI (and its 
equivalent return on assets), with an increase of 14 percent (Table 
6.IV).
The accounting procedures adopted by companies in the computation of 
the major return indicators were explored by Persen and Van Lessig 
[pp.73-80]. Findings revealed that the overwhelming majority of 
companies (83 percent) included fixed assets in the investment base 
net of depreciation, whereas only a small minority (17 percent) 
employed a gross basis. As regards the calculation of operations’ 
current investment, the study is not very clear as to the extent of 
cases where current liabilities were deducted from current assets. 
The measurement of profits was also found to be subject to a large 
variation.
In what concerns a comparison between the evaluation practices used 
for foreign and domestic operations, the Persen and Van Lessig study 
confirms the findings of previous surveys insofar as many important 
similarities were generally found between the systems used for both 
types of operations. In particular, 83 percent of the sample 
companies said that they received from overseas affiliates and from 
domestic operations exactly the same reports, with the same frequency
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[p.34]. Besides, the operating budget system, already described as 
the single most important evaluation technique used by companies, was 
found to be the same for operations at home and abroad in 90 percent 
of the cases [p.46]. Also, for the use of ratios in the monitoring of 
subsidiary performance no important difference was encountered between 
the practices followed for foreign and domestic operations in the 
majority of the cases (69 percent) [p.80].
Methods employed for setting up affiliates' return criteria were also 
the object of analysis in the study being reviewed [pp.82-86]. The 
operating budget was considered to be the most commonly used basis of 
comparison for actual results. Other methods included historic
results and values obtained by comparable units. As Persen and Van 
Lessig report, some companies adopted a rather inflexible approach 
consisting of "a fairly standard rate of return expectation 
oorporatewide for all their operations" [p.82]. In other cases,
efforts have been made to introduce more flexible criteria in
assigning targets to subsidiaries. However, the authors conclude that 
"few ompanies have developed formalized procedures for establishing
individual standards for affiliates based on the particular
circumstances relevant to each" [p.84].
Given that small differences were generally found between evaluation 
practices for overseas and domestic operations, and that targets
assigned to foreign affiliates do not seem to be particularly tailored 
to the specificity of each operation, one is led to think that 
environmental differences among subsidiaries are not being given 
enough consideration in performance assessment. The Persen and Van 
Lessig study made an attempt to clarify how headquarters managers 
overcome the complicating aspects posed by differing environmental 
host country influences in the evaluation of foreign subsidiary 
performance [ch.9]. Results show that environmental factors were not 
taken into particular consideration when evaluating the performance of 
foreign operations. Inflation, for example, was not being taken into 
account in the evaluation process in 70 percent of the companies; in 
addition, in more than 90 percent of the total, inflation was not 
treated differently when evaluating overseas and domestic operations 
[pp. 110-111]. This evidence seems to confirm the idea that
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environmental differences among subsidiaries were not being accounted 
for in the performance evaluation process. Such a conclusion cannot 
be made, however, due to the design weakness reported in the beginning 
of the present sub-section. In fact, by investigating companies' 
evaluation practices used only for European operations, the Persen and 
Van Lessig study compromised the reach of its findings. The 
implications of having addressed the study to operations in Europe 
exclusively, can be illustrated by the results obtained from a 
question that asked which of ten non-financial factors might be 
considered as obstacles to evaluation in the companies' three most 
important European subsidiaries. As the authors acknowledge, "the 
most noteworthy finding from the responses to this question was the 
fact that a large portion of the 125 respondents did not answer at 
all, indicating that there were no non-financial factors that they 
considered as obstacles to their evaluation of European operations" 
[p. 113]. Despite this, the executives surveyed demonstrated to 
perceive important differences in the evaluation of the performance of 
domestic and overseas operations, when the latter are not restricted 
to Europe. The differences most commonly pointed out referred to the 
variety of currencies and inflation rates, as well as to the variation 
in financial and economic conditions, and to the multiplicity of 
government regulations and controls [p.114].
To summarize, the Persen and Van Lessig study covers a wide range of 
topics in foreign subsidiary performance evaluation and provides some 
interesting evidence as to companies' practices. It is perhaps to
I'egret the fact that the authors have not opted for a thorough
exploration of the questionnaire data they had available, in order to
extend the analysis beyond the simple descriptive stage into areas
where sets of relationships among variables could be investigated.
Comparing with the results obtained by previous studies, Persen and 
Van Lessig's survey revealed a smaller concentration on profit when 
companies headquarters evaluate the performance of foreign 
subsidiaries. While profit was still a fundamental element in 
performance assessment, projections to the future pointed into the 
direction that its dominance would tend to decline with the emergence 
a number of non-profit-based indicators such as cash flow.
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asset/liability management, and non-accounting data. As regards 
differences between evaluation criteria used for foreign and domestic 
operations, the study simply confirms the findings of others, in that 
many similarities exist between the criteria used for the two sets of 
operations. Also targets for overseas subsidiaries were not found to 
reasonably recognize the different nature of each operation. As it 
was extensively discussed above, these findings lack the evidence that 
would otherwise be provided had the study collected information about 
evaluation criteria employed in the whole spectrum of overseas 
operations in a company, instead of restricting itself to affiliates 
operating in Europe. Notwithstanding, the Persen and Van Lessig study 
brings a major contribution to the available body of existing 
empirical evidence, by examining in considerable detail MNCs* internal 
reporting systems.
6.2.6. The Morsicato Study
An important study by Helen Gernon Morsicato carefully surveyed the 
Internal performance evaluation practices used in some American MNCs, 
having identified a few significant relationships between the features 
of the systems and the characteristics of the firms in which they are 
operated. This study was presented in 1978 as the author's doctoral 
thesis and was published in book form in 1980. A summarized 
description of the research design and conclusions, can also be found 
in two complementary articles: Morsicato and Radebaugh [1979], and 
Morsicato and Diamond [1980]. The emphasis of the study is on the use 
of U.S. dollar and local currency information by headquarters of 
multinationals in evaluating the performance of their foreign 
subsidiaries and managers. Differences in firm size, company 
organizational structure, and operating environment faced by foreign 
subsidiaries, were related to the particular U.S. dollar / local 
currency methods used by the corporations.
The main survey instrument used in the research was a questionnaire 
mailed to 293 U.S.-based companies producing basic chemicals or 
manufacturing products by predominantly chemical processes and having
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at least one manufacturing subsidiary abroad. The decision of 
selecting a sample from a population which included one single 
Industry, was taken, as the author explains, to ensure a common 
characteristic among all the firms studied [Morsicato, 1980, p.71]. 
Usable responses were received from 70 companies, and from the answers 
given to key questions in the questionnaire, 33 firms were chosen for 
follow-up interviews (17 were visited personally, and 16 interviewed 
by telephone). The selection of such firms for interview purposes was 
such that they were equally distributed among three groups with 
different commitment to foreign operations. These three groups were 
defined in terms of annual sales of each firm's foreign operations, 
and correspond to the MNCs size categories defined by Robbins and 
Stobaugh in their 1973 study.
The results of the survey on the foreign subsidiary evaluation methods 
employed by the companies showed that, similarly to other previous 
studies, the most common financial measures used as indicators of 
performance were absolute profit, ROI, and the budget (either compared 
to actual profits or compared to actual sales). The use of RI was 
found to be very limited (only nearly 20 percent of the firms). The 
use of such measures was found to be higher after translation in U.S. 
dollars than in local currency (i.e before translation) For example, 
whereas 80 percent of all the respondents reported the use of ROI 
after translation, only about 53 percent of the companies employed ROI 
before translation. Only for the budget was the number of firms using 
this measure after translation (79 percent) approximate to those using 
it before translation (73 percent).
The study also found that 90 percent of the MNCs surveyed used the 
same basic techniques to evaluate subsidiary performance as they used 
to evaluate managerial performance. Likewise, 90 percent of the 
corporations reported that they were applying the same performance 
evaluation methods domestically as they were abroad. For the seven 
firms (i.e. 10 percent) which used different systems at home and
ebrod, differences in the external environment and the organizational 
structure were the basic reasons preventing the use of identical 
^valuation techniques for all subsidiaries (ibid., pp.86-?87).
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In  evaluating the performance of foreign operations, MNCs used some 
s tandards "as a basis for oomparison against the subsidiaries actual 
balance sheet and income statement". The results obtained show that 
the most used standards for comparison were, by order of importance: 
1) historical data of the subsidiary (i.e. previous periods balance 
sheets and income statements); 2) other similar manufacturing units of 
the firm in the U.S.; 3) other similar manufacturing units of the firm 
in different countries; and 4) other similar manufacturing units of 
the firm in the same country.
The analysis of the data by firm size showed that the small companies 
(annual sales of foreign operations of less than US$ 100 million) had 
a preference for ROI and profit after translation as indicators of 
internal performance, profit and budget being the indicators most 
frequently used before translation. The medium-sized firms (foreign 
sales ranging from US$ 100 to 500 million) tended to prefer a mixture 
of budget, ROI, and profit information after translation, also using 
cash flow from operations as an important indicator of performance. 
As to the large firms (foreign sales of over US$ 500 million), it was 
found that they emphasized budgeting both after and before translation 
more than either the small and medium corporations; for the large 
firms, ROI seemed not to be as important a performance measure as for 
the other companies. A more detailed breakdown of these results is 
presented in Table 6.V. From the data collected, no statistically 
significant difference was found between the preference for the after- 
or before-translation measures, with perhaps the exception of the 
medium-sized firms which showed some preference for after-translation 
measures [p.89]. This contradicts Morsicato's hypotheses, according 
to which large MNCs would be local currency oriented and small 
corporations U.S. dollar oriented, with medium firms in between and 
showing no real preference for either one or the other type of 
information [p.6].
Also in this study, Morsicato sought to explore some possible 
Interactions between the operating external environment and the 
performance evaluation methods employed by the companies. For this 
purpose three questions specifically dealing with environmental issues 
were included in the questionnaire but the information generated was
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too limited in scope and depth to allow a well founded picture to 
emerge. In order to determine "whether or not a firm's system of 
Internal performance evaluation is designed to reflect environmental 
differences, that may be of greater concern in one geographic area 
than another" [p.92], Morsicato introduced one single question in the 
questionnaire and collected the responses in a five-point scale. From 
all the respondents, 41 firms (i.e. 59 percent) reported that their
internal systems had been designed to include environmental 
differences less than moderately. However, headquarters managers in 
45 companies (i.e. 64 percent) stated that in their opinion a system
of internal performance evaluation should at least moderately reflect 
environmental differences. A further analysis of the data concluded 
that neither the size of the firm (large, medium, small firm) nor the 
specific geographic location of the subsidiary (namely Europe, the 
Middle East, Africa, Asia, Australia, Latin America and Canada) had 
influence on the design of the performance evaluation system, and its 
capabilities to reflect the peculiarities of the environment. These 
results are contrary to what had been anticipated by Morsicato in the 
outset of the study. When firms were asked whether the internal 
performance evaluation methods had been modified during the last ten 
years because of changes which had occurred in a specific environment, 
only 23 cases (i.e. 33 percent) gave an affirmative response. The
changes occurred included general cultural, legal, political, and 
economic mutations in the subsidiaries' external environment, currency 
fluctuations, and inflation. The modifications introduced in the 
evaluation systems included an increase in the use of budgets, the 
incorporation of environmental changes in the budget, the addition of 
supplemental information to basic evaluation measures, and the use of 
subjective evaluations of managers and subsidiaries' operations 
[pp.92-95]. It is noteworthy that, overall, there was no significant 
relationship between the operating environment and the U.S. 
dollar/local currency orientation of the companies [p.144].
Another purpose of the study was to explore the relationship between 
the organizational structure of the MNCs and the performance 
evaluation indicators used [see, for example, ibid pp.6 and 85]. The 
organizational structure variable, as it was defined by the author, 
included the following five categories: functional organization.
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product line, geographic division, international division, and global 
matrix. The characterization of the internal systems employed by the 
companies in subsidiary performance evaluation was restricted to only 
one feature of the systems in operation: the preference for U.S. 
dollar or local currency information.
The scope of the conclusions reached in this respect are, therefore, 
very limited. As it had been hypothesized, companies employing the 
innovative global matrix structure showed a preference for local 
currency financial information (i.e. a more innovative evaluation 
technique). On the other hand, firms organized by product line showed 
a strong preference for U.S. dollar information. Corporations 
organized by international division and by geographic location also 
showed a preference for after translation information, although not in 
a manner as pronounced as the firms organized by product line [pp.96- 
97]. This was as far as Morsicato went in the investigation of the 
possible relationships between organizational structure of MNCs and 
internal performance evaluation techniques. A full characterization 
of the evaluation systems operated in the companies in the light of 
the different organizational structures, and indeed of other company 
characteristics, was not undertaken.
In the second phase of the data collection, i.e the interview phase, 
an explanation as to why particular evaluation methods had been 
adopted instead of alternative methods was attempted by Morsicato. 
The information gathered is highly interesting because it led to 
conclusions that are inconsistent with the findings obtained from the 
questionnaire. Unfortunately, no serious attempt is made in the study 
to reconcile the findings or explain the reasons for the 
discrepancies. Besides, the interviews revealed a few significant 
aspects present in the internal evaluation process which were not 
adequately explored in the research.
Contrary to what had been determined in the data gathered through the 
questionna ires, the interviews revealed that environmental factors 
p e c u l i a r  to subsidiaries seemed to be highly present in the 
perform ance evaluation process. Apparently, the environmental 
P e c u l i a r i t i e s  were taken into accbunt by allowing a considerable
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degree of subjective evaluation to operate within the performance 
evaluation system. Almost 96 percent of the headquarters managers 
Interviewed admitted that "hard-core quantitative information" was 
employed to assess the operations of the subsidiaries, whereas 
subsidiaries' managers evaluation tended to rely more on qualitative 
information. Furthermore, in the majority of the cases the interviews 
disclosed an explicit effort on the part of headquarters for not 
holding subsidiary managers responsible or accountable for factors 
which they could not control. Such factors included the following: 
host government intervention in regard to wage and price controls, 
unstable currencies resulting in translation gains or losses, tax 
rates, interest rates, and transfer prices. According to this, the 
MNCs seemed to be clearly separating the evaluation of the subsidiary 
from that of the manager. It was also found from the interviews that 
a considerable number of companies were employing different criteria 
to assess the performance of their foreign and domestic operations. 
In fact, Morsicato reports that when evaluating foreign subsidiaries 
many firms tended to incorporate in the evaluation system a number of 
non-financial indicators of performance which they did not use for 
domestic subsidiaries. Comparison of similar foreign units was also 
found to involve non-financial measures, such as efficiency and 
productivity indicators, and growth ratios [pp.98-100; Morsicato and 
Radebaugh, 1979, pp.89-92].
In summary, although the Morsicato study has adopted a more systematic 
and rigorous research design than the previous studies here reviewed, 
the results it achieved as to the characterization of the performance 
evaluation systems operated in MNCs are, nevertheless, limited and to 
some extent contradictory. In fact, the analysis of the study 
findings requires that the results obtained from the mailed 
questionnaire be distinguished from those drawn from the personal and 
telephone interviews. From the mailed survey it was concluded that 
MNCs assessed subsidiaries operations mainly on the basis of a few 
financial measures, such as absolute profit, ROI, budget, and cash 
How potential. The criteria employed for evaluation not only by the 
small firms (as it had been firstly hypothesized) but also by the 
Medium and large companies, were found basically to be the same for 
domestic and foreign units. It was also found that no significant
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distinction between subsidiary and manager evaluation methods was made 
either by the small, medium, or large corporations In the part of the 
study dealing with the influence of the subsidiary external 
environment on the design of the internal evaluation system, the 
author concludes that:
■in general, the firms [were] not designing performance 
evaluation systems that recognized environmental 
differences. Neither the size of the firms nor the
particular geographic operating environment affected the 
firm's policy of designing the system of performance 
evaluation to reflect environmental differences."
[Morsicato, 1980, p. 143]
As to the Interview survey, two different approaches to performance 
evaluation were, in general, identified. One, was an inflexible 
attitude with well defined assessment policies to be used worldwide 
without exception. The other, was a flexible attitude established by 
subjectively taking into account the important characteristics of each 
geographic area As Morsicato recognizes, both approaches tended to be 
present in MNCs, with different combinations of the two incorporated 
into the operations [Morsicato and Diamond, 1980, p.254] The presence 
of such subjective aspects in performance evaluation was overlooked in 
the questionnaire study and only came into light in the interview 
phase Also, other conclusions drawn from the interviews were found to 
be incongruous with those reached from the questionnaire survey. The 
reasons for this were not explained by the author, and are difficult 
to ascertain. They may be due to interview selection criteria bias. 
Questionnaire rigidity, or some other reason.
Two im p o r ta n t  aspects, at least, seem to be suggested by the study, 
f i rs t ,  any attempt to understand how subsidiaries and managers of MNCs 
are evaluated, should not be limited to the description of the main 
f inanc ia l measures used by headquarters in the evaluation process. 
Instead, a wider characterization of the flow of information, both 
f inancia l and non-financial, circulated between subsidiaries and 
parent company, and of the ways in which such information is 
ncorporated in the assessment process should be undertaken. Second, 
^abind the apparent objectivity of any particular performance 
a luation  system, there is most likely a subjective and informal
223
6 / PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES
component in the evaluation process which attempts to overcome many 
of the limitations and difficulties raised by formal criteria of 
performance evaluation.
6.2.7. The Choi, Cfcechowicz and Bavishi Study
Recently, a survey conducted by Business International provided 
additional evidence on the success indicators used in performance 
evaluation and control of foreign subsidiaries. The results of this 
survey were published in Choi, Czechowicz and Bavishi [1982], and in 
Qioi and Czechowicz [1983], the latter being an article where the main 
findings of the survey are summarized.
The study differs from previous ones, in that it covers MNCs based in 
the U.S. and Europe, namely in Sweden, U.K., Switzerland and other 
non-disclosed countries. The data were gathered from a questionnaire 
and from personal and telephone interviews. The questionnaire was 
mailed to 300 corporations, having 88 replies been received, a 
response rate of 29 percent. Of the companies participating 64 were 
U,S.-based and 24 European.
The main criticism to this study lies in the fact that the results 
presented are merely descriptive, and no attempt was made to determine 
statistically whether there were differences in practices between U.S. 
and non-U.S. MNCs. Similarly, no efforts were spent to interpret 
companies' practices in the light of independent variables reflecting 
major corporate characteristics such as size, or degree of 
multi nationality.
®^sults of the survey with relevance to the present study include the 
description of the performance criteria used by headquarters in the 
assessment of foreign units and managers. In contrast to most 
Previous studies which concentrated on assessment criteria of a 
ioancial nature, the Business International survey explicitly 
considered both financial and non-financi al criteria. The most 
mportant financial indicators used to evaluate the performance of
224
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foreign units in U.S.-based MNCs were found to be budget compared to 
actual profit, and ROI (see Table 6 .VI). In European MNCs the most 
Important financial indicators were budget compared to actual profit, 
budget compared to actual sales, and return on sales. ROI only comes 
fourth in the list of importance, which points to a smaller emphasis 
on the measure in European than in American corporations. As regards 
the assessment of overseas subsidiary managers, the financial criteria 
considered most important by both categories of MNCs were budget 
compared to  actual profit, budget compared to actual sales, and return 
on sa le s . As the results appear to indicate (see Table 6 .VI), ROI 
plays a less important role in the assessment of managers than in the 
evaluation of units. Despite this difference, the authors concluded 
th a t m ost firms use essentially the same financial measures to 
eva lua te  both unit and managerial performance (Choi, Czechowicz and 
Bavishi, 19 82, ch.3). This finding confirms the results encountered 
in the s tu d ie s  previously reviewed.
In what concerns the use of non-financial criteria. Table 6.VI shows 
that these measures are consistently considered more important for
managers than for units. It is noteworthy, however, that even for the 
evaluation of units non-financial measures were accorded high levels 
of importance. The most relevant indicators for both American and 
European MNCs were market share, productivity, relationship with host 
country government, and quality control.
Like other studies, the Business International survey also concluded 
that in the overwhelming majority of cases the financial and non- 
financi al criteria used to evaluate foreign operations did not differ 
in an important way from those used to evaluate domestic operations, 
bere, as in previous studies, it was concluded that, apparently, 
hasle domestic measures of performance were extended for use 
internationally, although there will be modifications for handling 
uniquely international factors such as exchange gains and losses" 
[Qioi, Czechowicz, and Bavishi, 19 82, p.24].
I^ter determining which measures of performance are employed by 
headquarters, the study turned to an analysis of how standards of 
Performance are set. The most commonly used standard was by far the
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Table 6.VI - Performance Criteria Used in U.S. and European MNCs, 
According to Choi, Czechowicz and Bavishi [1982]
(Averages * )
ITEMS American 
N =
MNCs
64
European 
N =
MNCs
24
Evaluation of the: 
Unit Manager
Evaluation of the: 
Unit Manager
FINANCIAL:
ROI 1.8 2.2 2.1 2.2
Return on sales 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.1
Contribution to earnings 
per share 2.8 3.2 3.5 3.4
Operating cash flow to 
subsidiary 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.5
Operating cash flow to 
parent/(reraittances) 2.3 2.8 2.5 2.6
RI 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.2
Budget compared to 
actual sales 2.0 1.6 1.9 1.8
Budget compared to 
actual profit 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3
Budget compared to 
actual ROI 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5
NON-FINANCIAL: 
Market share 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.6
Quality control 2.2 1.9 2.4 2.0
Relationship with host 
country government 2.1 1.8 2.4 1.9
Employee development 2.4 2.0 2.4 2.2
R&D in foreign unit 3.1 3.2 2.8 2.7
Productivity 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.6
Employee safety 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.3
Community service 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.5
NOTE: • Averages were based on the scores given in accordance to the
following scale: 1(most important), 2(important), 3(less
important), and 4(not used).
Source: Adapted from Choi, Czechowicz and Bavishi [1982, pp.161-162]
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subsidiary budget or plan, followed by historical performance of the 
unit [ibid., ch.8]. This result applies both to U.S. and non-U.S. 
firms, and equally to the evaluation of subsidiaries and managers. 
The authors tried to ascertain whether certain environmental 
characteristics of the host countries were taken into account in the 
setting of performance standards. The characteristics chosen were 
political risk and inflation. As regards the former, only a minority 
(approximately 40 percent of U.S. and European companies) either 
required a higher rate of return for high risk countries, or 
incorporated the level of political risk into budget projections 
[p.75]. The majority of firms, in reality, did not consider the 
degree of country risk in performance evaluation. As far as inflation 
is concerned, a very important difference was found between U.S. and 
European MNCs. Whereas only 16 percent of the American firms 
indicated that they made adjustments for inflation in their foreign 
subsidiaries' targets, the majority of European companies (54 percent) 
revealed that they normally did such adjustments [p.51].
The analysis of the environmental differences encountered across the 
companies foreign operations was taken further by an attempt to 
identify which local problems associated with overseas performance 
evaluation were considered more significant by managers in 
headquarters. Responses from both U.S. and non-U.S. multinationals 
were very similar. In general, environmental factors were considered 
More problematic in less-developed than in developed countries. 
Government regulations (such as price control and minimum 
capitalization ratios), as well as local business customs (personnel 
policies, collection periods) were considered the most difficult 
environmental elements in the developed nations. In the developing 
world, factors like time delays in information generation, lack of 
local accounting expertise, and different concepts of control were 
viewed as the most troublesome in addition to those indicated for the 
developed countries [p.66].
Faced with the identification of these relevant environmental 
Problems, the respondents were then asked whether their firms' 
eternal evaluation systems took into account various social, 
economic, legal, and political differences that characterize foreign
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operations. The great majority of companies (64 percent of U.S. and 
58 p e rc e n t of European MNCs) conceded that relevant environmental 
d iffe rences were not considered when evaluating overseas subsidiaries. 
Although of undeniable interest, this result does not provide, 
however, safe conclusions as to the degree of environmental 
s e n s it iv i ty  of the performnce evaluation systems in operation in MNCs. 
In e f f e c t ,  what this result shows is the opinion of questionnaire 
respondents reflecting their perceptions relative to the ability of 
the systems to consider environmental factors, and not an independent 
assessment made on the basis of the intrinsic characteristics of the 
systems themselves.
In summary, the Business International study confirmed many of the 
findings reported in previous surveys, namely the tendency for 
companies to utilize essentially the same measures to evaluate both 
subsidiary and managerial performance, the tendency to export overseas 
the assessment criteria used domestically, and the generalized opinion 
among executives that the evaluation systems operated do not take into 
account environmental differences. An innovation of the study was 
that multinationals of different origin were subject to analysis. In
fact, not only MNCs from the U.S but also companies originating from
Europe were included in the survey. However, the full potential from 
such a design was not realized due to the fact that the authors failed 
to use statistical techniques to infer significant differences between 
the two types of MNCs. Another criticism is that no attempt was made 
to associate companies' practices with explanatory variables deriving 
fi'om major corporate characteristics. In reality, the study is of a 
mere descriptive nature and so no inferences from the data collected 
were provided.
An interesting result calling for statistical confirmation was that 
Many more European than American MNCs appeared to account for local 
inflation in setting subsidiary targets. This finding is not
sufficient to infer the extent to which companies both in the U.S and
Europe take into account relevant environmental characteristics in 
ibeir internal evaluation systems. In effect, the reactions of the 
evaluation systems in operation would have to be tested against a 
wider range of environmental factors for a better understanding of the
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issue to emerge. Although not providing answers for questions of 
major interest to the present research work, the Choi, Czechowicz and 
B a v is h i study, nevertheless, supplemented the knowledge of 
multinationals' practices domiciled in the U.S. with those of MNCs 
from Europe. Besides, the study appears vaguely to suggest that non- 
U.S. companies would perhaps be more predisposed to account for 
environmental differences in foreign subsidiary performance evaluation 
than American MNCs.
6.2.8. The Tunker Study
By the time Choi, Czechowicz and Bavishi were carrying out their 
survey, another study reviewing the performance evaluation practices 
in U.S.-based MNCs was conducted by Penelope Yunker as part of her 
doctoral work. A book [Yunker, 1982], and an article [Yunker, 1983] 
were published out of this research. The study is not concerned with 
foreign subsidiary performance evaluation as such, but with the 
relationships between performance evaluation and transfer pricing 
policies. In this context, performance evaluation practices were 
investigated only to the extent that they would be relevant to better 
understanding of transfer pricing. Given this, Yunker's study is not 
entirely comparable with the studies reviewed previously (6), but even 
so it has been included here since it brings some relevant findings to 
the existing body of empirical evidence on foreign subsidiary 
performance evaluation.
Yunker's research was based on data collected from a questionnaire 
administered to the 358 corporations on the "Fortune 500" list which 
bave international operations. Response rate was a disappointing 14.5 
percent, for a total of 52 usable questionnaires received. Follow-up 
personal Interviews were not conducted. The questionnaire, which was 
relatively small in size and very schematic in presentation, covered 
three main policy areas: transfer pricing, performance evaluation, and 
®^ hsidiary autonomy (decentralization). A large number of company 
characteristics was also included in the questionnaire; these 
represent the study's independent or explanatory variables, and cover
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a wide range of features such as sales (total and foreign), number of 
employees, number of subsidiaries, number of countries, business 
objectives (e .g . profit, growth in sales, employment stability, new 
product development), and, most important, perception of environmental 
in fluence on subsidiaries results [19 82, pp.68-78].
The analysis of data from the survey made an extensive use of 
inferential statistical techniques. However, the selection of the 
specific instruments employed does not seem to have been the most 
adequate. In fact, Yunker appears to have disreguarded the levels of 
measurement at which the variables of the study were placed, and as a 
consequence parametric statistics (like regression analysis) were 
employed throughout the study to variables which were, at best, at the 
ordinal level. In addition, the study findings widely emphasize 
causal relationships between company characteristics and company 
policies in the three areas under investigation. The difficulties 
associated with the demonstration of causality in studies of this type 
are well known [e.g. Kidder, 1981, ch.4], and considerable caution 
must be taken when interpreting results. Let alone the distortions 
that may have been introduced by applying parametic statistics to 
variables at a low level of measurement, the study fails to draw 
sufficient attention of the reader to the extreme caire required in the 
interpretation of causal links in the findings.
The report on some of the practices adopted by companies in the 
evaluation of their operations was done in the study by enuciating 
first the general principles put forward by firms in their evaluation 
systems, and by describing next the specific performance measures 
employed in the assessment process [ 1982, pp. 104-111 ]. Table 6.VII 
presents the perceptions of respondents as to the degree of importance 
of each principle and each measure. As regards the generad principles 
of evaluation adopted by companies, the study found a preference for 
financial indicators expressed in U.S. dollars as opposed to those 
expressed in local currency. Both types of indicators were regarded 
highly important, but one was, however, rated considerably higher 
h^an the other. The study also found that the tailoring of standards 
0^ specific circumstances in subsidiaries was considered more 
“portant than any other method used in setting subsidiary performance
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Table 6.VII - General Principles and Specific Measures Used in 
Performance Evaluation, According to Yunker [1982]
{% of total number of respondents: 52)
Degree of importance Mean
Very Some Minor None
fianpral Principles:
Financial measures expressed 
in U.S. dollars 67 21 10 2 2.538
Financial measures expressed 
in local currency 40 35 17 8 2.077
Standards tailored to 
specific circumstances 27 44 21 8 1.904
Standards set by company- 
wide performance 31 38 15 15 1.846
Standards set by economy- 
wide performance 6 44 38 12 1.442
Standards set by industry­
wide performance 4 50 25 21 1.365
Specific Measures: 
General -
Meeting plan goals 63 33 4 0 2.596
Adherence to budgets 62 29 8 2 2.500
Profit based - 
Net income (profits) 58 29 6 8 2.365
Ratio of profits to total 
assets 52 31 12 6 2.288
Ratio of profits to sales 44 40 13 2 2.269
Ratio of profits to equity 33 27 23 17 1.750
Residual income (profits 
after capital charge) 19 27 25 29 1.365
Remittances to parent 
company 12 27 40 21 1.288
Non profit based - 
Sales growth 54 35 8 4 2.385
Cost reduction 46 44 10 0 2.365
Market share 44 42 8 6 ! 2.250
Production/technological
innovation 27 44 21
i
8 I 1.904
New product innovation 25 50 17 8 1 1.923
Source: Adapted from Yunker [1982, p. 105]
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standards. As far as the specific performance measures are concerned, 
it is noteworthy that while profit-based indicators were generally 
rated as important, non-profit-based criteria were considered at least 
as im p o r ta n t .  The most highly rated indicators were the meeting of 
plan goa ls , adherence to budgets, and sales growth; other non-profit 
measures like cost reduction and market share were also rated high. 
Among the profit-based indicators net income, HOI and return on sales 
were attributed the highest importance (see Table 6.VII),
The fact that companies valued more highly standards tailored to 
specific circumstances than other company-wide criteria of standard 
setting seems to indicate that an attempt was being made to account 
for the environmental factors that are likely to vary considerably 
among subsidiaries. The study collected information concerning the 
perceptions of managers as regards the effects of unforeseen changes 
in a number of environmental factors on subsidiaries* results. The 
factors thought generally to produce the highest impact on results 
were by descending order overall demand, government regulations, raw 
materials and labour costs, level of competition, and inflation and 
exchange rates [ibid., p.77]- Perception of environmental impact was 
found to be significantly associated with some performance evaluation 
criteria. This association was positive in all cases and shows that 
respondents who generally perceived the impact of foreign varying 
environments on subsidiaries* results as high, tended simultaneously 
to perceive high levels of importance for the measures used in the 
evaluation of such results, whatever their nature might be: profit- or
non-profit-based [p .  107 ].
As mentioned before, the Yunker study also collected information on 
the level of subsidiary autonomy by measuring the degree of 
independence of subsidiary managers with respect to a number of policy 
decisions, such as amount of physical output, pricing, capital 
investment, borrowing, and R&D expenditure. It was hypothesized that 
3s more automony was granted to the subsidiaries, the tighter the 
Performance evaluation standards would be in order to maintain control 
[1983, p.121 ]. Analysis of the data did not suggest this
Relationship, however. The study shows, nevertheless, a significant 
association between degree of subsidiary autonomy and emphasis on cost
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reduction in the evaluation of subsidiary performance by headquarters. 
Such an association was found to be negative, suggesting that 
concentra tion  on costs as a measure of performance tended to happen in 
those companies where subsidiaries were highly dependent on parent 
decision making (i.e. subsidiaries with low levels of autonomy). Hie 
i n t e r p r e t a t io n  of this result is difficult due to the lack of 
appropria te  information. However, it could be argued that companies 
where p o l i c y  decisions are fairly centralized in headquarters would 
tend to  adopt a more global view of their international operations, 
which would result in a smaller emphasis on evaluation criteria based 
on p r o f i t ,  and, simultaneously, in a greater stress on cost-reduction 
c r ite r ia .
In conclusion, the Yunker study, although having only superficially 
collected information on evaluation practices in MNCs, achieved some 
interesting findings which add to the available body of empirical 
evidence. At a descriptive level, the study confirmed the extreme
importance attributed to planned goals and the budget in assessing 
subsidiary performance. Non-profit-based measures of performance like 
sales growth and cost reduction were considered at least as important 
as the more familiar indicators of net income and ROI. As regards the 
standards set for subsidiaries, the study revealed a preference for 
targets which were tailored to specific circumstances in subsidiaries, 
as opposed to targets set according to some company- or industry-wide 
fule. The logic implication is that many MNCs were making an effort 
to take environmental influences that vary among foreign subsidiaries 
into account in the setting of performance standards.
Conclusions reached in Yunker’s study concerning relationships among 
variables require careful interpretation due to a less rigorous 
statistical approach that was employed throughout the work. Some 
noteworthy findings reported above include a direct relationship 
encountered between the level of impact perceived by respondents to be 
exerted by varying foreign environments on subsidiaries and the level 
of Importance attributed to the measures of performance used in the 
control of those subsidiaries. Another finding consisted in that 
sophasis on cost in performance evaluation seemed to be associated 
companies whose subsidiaries had little automony from
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headquarters, policy decision making (i.e. decisions regarding 
production output, sales prices, capital investments, marketing 
expenditures, R&D, etc). This is a major contribution of Yunker*s 
study to the present research since it suggests that the level of 
strategic control exercised by headquarters over subsidiaries has some 
implication in the criteria utilized in the evaluation and control of 
subsidiary performance.
6.3. SmimarY and Conclusions
The review of the empirical evidence on the practices followed by MNCs 
in the evaluation and control of foreign subsidiary performance was 
the object of the present chapter.
All the studies analysed examine in considerable detail the assessment 
techniques used by parent companies in the monitoring of their 
overseas operations. They all emphasize the importance given to 
financial measures, mainly profit-based, which seem to be in most 
cases the only type of indicators of performance used by companies. 
Multiple performance evaluation criteria with a diversified number of 
indicators are generally employed, and ROI appears to be the clear 
leader in the preferences of companies for a comprehensive measure 
which encapsulates the performance of an operation. Some of the more 
recent studies, however, reported that non-profit-based financial 
“easures, as well as non-financial indicators are also extremely 
important for most companies. Cash flow, asset/liability management, 
sales growth, cost control, and also market share, quality controls, 
product innovation, etc. were usually found to be at least as 
important for subsidiary performance evaluation as the more 
traditional financial measures. Whether or not such findings are due 
to an emergence of non-profit-based techniques in recent years cannot 
te ascertained, since most previous studies have simply Ignored non- 
financial methods of performance appraisal in their design. What 
seems clear from this recent evidence is that any study which proposes
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to investigate in a reasonably comprehensive manner the criteria used 
in the evaluation of subsidiary performance, can no longer overlook 
those assessment techniques that are of a non-financial nature.
A result on which all studies agree is the crucial role played by the 
budget in subsidiary performance evaluation. The budget, which is 
perhaps the most versatile technique used in the evaluation process, 
lies usually in the origin of the assignment of performance targets to 
subsidiaries. Such targets become a basis of comparison for actual 
results, and represent in turn a major object of assessment.
Another important finding obtained in studies which investigated both 
the performance of subsidiary operations and the performance of 
subsidiary managers was that in most of the cases no relevant 
differences were found between the evaluation practices used for 
subsidiaries and for managers. The review process of overseas 
operations for control purposes provides information which is normally 
used by headquarters executives to judge the performance and the 
capabilities of overseas managements. Likewise, the same or very 
similar practices tend to be found in the control and evaluation of 
foreign and domestic operations, despite the differences that clearly 
exist between operating at home and abroad.
These findings raise the question of how are MNCs being able to cope 
with the diversity of conditions present in their international 
spectrum of operations for purposes of subsidiary control and 
evaluation. Some studies have addressed this problem, although not as 
the main purpose of the investigation. Evidence collected is 
generally superficial, and findings are in some cases puzzling. 
Nevertheless, they provide the only information that is available on 
the issue and represent a valuable starting point for the 
understanding of the ways in which environmental differences across 
subsidiaries are accommodated in the performance evaluation process. 
I^'om an objective analysis of the assessment criteria employed in 
companies, it appears that systems of internal performance evaluation 
not designed to reflect environmental differences that vary from 
geographic region to another. Consonant with this finding, as 
Reported by two of the studies, are the opinions of headquarters
235
6 / PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES
executives who tended to consider that the internal systems in 
operation in their firms had been designed to include environmental 
differences less than moderately. However, the same executives tended 
to feel the need for the systems to reflect such environmental 
differences in a moderate to high degree. In effect, the apparent 
unsensitivity of evaluation systems to environmental differences does 
not appear to be the result of an unawareness on the part of 
headquarters executives of the necessity of influences exerted by 
local environments on subsidiaries being taken into account in the 
assessment of subsidiary results. Several studies report that 
executives in parent companies perceive the impact of local 
environments on operations as a relevant factor to be taken into 
consideration. Factors regarded as producing the highest influences 
on results include government regulations and controls, local demand, 
level of competition, materials and labour costs, currency 
fluctuations, and inflation rates.
The situation just described suggests the existence of a gap between 
the objective characteristics found for the performance evaluation 
systems operated in practice and the characteristics that such systems 
should ideally possess, in the opinion of executives involved in the 
subsidiary evaluation process. Some dimensions of performance 
evaluation, which the studies above only marginally explored, could 
provide a vital contribution to the filling of such a gap. One aspect 
worth of mention is the process followed by companies in the setting 
up of subsidiary standards. Differences among subsidiaries operating 
in various environments can be considered through the setting of 
different standards of performance, adapted to the realities of local 
conditions. The budgeting process, for example, has the capability of 
taking the specificity of each operation into account if the setting 
of targets to be achieved by subsidiaries enables such specificity to 
be incorporated in the budget. Another aspect whose contribution can 
be vital to the bridging of the gap described above is the existence 
an informal dimension of assessment. One study discovered that 
contrary to what had been concluded from the analysis of the objective 
(Criteria employed, environmental influences seemed to be adequately 
baken into account by allowing a considerable degree of subjective 
V^aluation to operate within the formal performance evaluation system.
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This study also reported that subsidiary and managerial performance 
assessment seemed to be based on different subjective criteria. Also 
different informal criteria appeared to be used in the control of 
foreign and domestic operations. This demonstrates how important for 
the understanding of subsidiary performance evaluation are dimensions 
usually insufficiently explored by studies in the area, notably the 
mechanisms employed in setting-up subsidiary standards, and the 
informal information used in the assessment of operations and 
managers.
Some of the studies reviewed in the chapter analysed practices of 
performance evaluation in the light of a number of corporate 
characteristics, which were expected somehow to explain differences in 
practices encountered across companies. A number of such independent 
variables were suggested to have some influence in the criteria 
actually employed by firms in the evaluation of foreign subsidiaries. 
These variables, namely company size (measured in terms of overseas 
sales), organizational structure, perception of environmental impact 
on subsidiaries, and level of subsidiary autonomy in business policy 
decisions, together with others suggested by the literature, and 
reviewed in previous chapters, are important explanatory elements 
which should be included in any study of subsidiary performance 
evaluation proposing to use inferential statistical techniques.
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j?99tnotes:
(1) Although Tomkins [1973], and Soapens and Sale [1981, 1985] have 
reported on the performance evaluation practices of British 
divisionalized companies, they were not concerned with the 
specific case of the MNC. Consequently, the findings of these 
studies do not account for possible differences between the 
evaluation criteria employed by the corporations for their 
domestic and foreign units.
These are among an universe of 98 companies having members in the 
Financial Executives Institute, all of which were circularized. 
Nothing is said in the study about the demographic 
characteristics of such a population, neither how they compare 
with the demographic characteristics of the set constituted by 
all American multinationals.
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
The results of the study are communicated only in percentage 
form. No absolute figures are provided by the authors, which is 
the reason why a tabulation of the responses cannot be presented 
here.
Persen and Van Lessig do not reveal in the study the exact number 
of companies circularized. They also fail to describe the data 
base from which the sample companies were selected, as well as 
the selection criteria adopted.
As the authors report, companies were asked to provide 
information ■on their approach in terms of their European 
operations" [p.6].
Two other factors may add to the difficulties in comparing the 
findings of this study with the previous research efforts. One, 
is that the questionnaire collects information only about the 
criteria used in the performance evaluation of subsidiary 
jnanagers. The other, is that questions relate to practices 
followed not only for overseas subsidiaries, but also for 
^m^çtjc subsidiaries engaged in international transfers.
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PART II
RESEARCH APPROACT AHD DESICM
CBâPTER 7 - the RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
7.1. TntroduGtlon
The present Part II Is intended to act as a hinge between two 
fundamental blocks of the study. One, that was built throughout
Part I, introduced the theoretical foundations of the research. The 
other, the forthcoming Part III, will offer the empirical results and 
conclusions. This chapter will formulate the main problem to be 
investigated and will present a model of foreign subsidiary 
performance evaluation and control that operationalizes the 
theoretical concepts and issues previously reviewed. Also, the main 
hypotheses of the study will be formulated with particular reference 
to the theoretical background. Such hypotheses will be empirically 
tested later, with the application of a certain methodological 
approach that will be defined in the chapter.
T*2. The Research Problem
The present research addresses the environmental issue in the 
subsidiary performance evaluation and control process that takes p ace 
in MNCs. Earlier in chapter 4 (section 4.3.3.) it was demo 
that the consideration of the environmental specificity o eac
subsidiary is vital for the achievement of a competent and 
assessment of subsidiaries and their managers.
Two main reasons justify the need for the environment to be 
account in the evaluation of overseas operations. One, 
the application of the concept of responsibility accounting  ^
any process of subunit performance appraisal is based.
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premise of the responsibility accounting principle is that inputs and
outputs to and from subunits are, for a given time span, under the
effective authority and control of the managers responsible for the
subunits. Such a principle of authority and controllability is
misapplied if the consequences of the impact of the foreign host
environments on subsidiaries* operations are overlooked. Chapters 2
and 3 of the theoretical foundations of the study demonstrated that
each host environment where a MNC conducts activities is likely to
possess a particular set of characteristics which directly affect
subsidiaries* operations. A vrtiole host of local conditions of an
economic nature (for example, market size, inflation and exchange
rates, and cost of production inputs), legal nature (such as the
labour law, exchange controls, taxes, and import-export controls), and
social/cultural nature (e.g. language, attitudes relative to work and
personal achievement, religion, and quality of labour relations) exert
an influence on a subsidiary*s performance, and only to a very reduced
extent can be modified by the subsidiary*s management. Therefore, in
order that a fair evaluation of the managers responsible for a
subsidiary may be achieved, and also in order that the full potential
of the subsidiary may be comprehended, the criteria used in
headquarters to judge the performance of the foreign operation should
be able to recognize those environmental features that are particular
to the host location and that impact on the subsidiary in a relevant 
way.
The other main reason justifying environmental consideration in the 
performance evaluation and control of foreign subsidiaries, stems from 
bhe vulnerability of certain MNCs to sudden changes in the
characteristics of the environments. As extensively discussed in 
chapter 3 (section 3.3.2.) companies that operate at an international 
scale are subject to often conflicting economic and political 
imperatives that influence the organization of the overall pattern of 
corporate activities via the implementation of a strategy particularly 
Assigned to cope with such pressures. Strategies that favour a global 
integration of international activities give priority to the economic 
pressures for unification of operations at a multi-country level. Such 
global strategies involve the centralization of decision making and 
b® setting up of a coherent and highly integrated network of mutual
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relationships across subsidiaries. Indeed, it was argued in chapter 3 
that behind the global integration strategy lies a view of the M N C  as 
a system of well-articulated and multi-dependent parts that largely 
transcend national borders. In such a close tight matrix of 
relationships the failure of a single subsidiary of a multinational is 
enough to seriously jeopardize the whole company. This being so, the 
understanding of the dynamic characteristics of the host environments 
operated and of how they impinge on the performance of the 
subsidiaries becomes vital as a means of anticipating future changes 
that may seriously affect operations.
On the other hand, there may be companies for which the political 
imperatives are so paramount that they override any possibility of 
responding to economic pressures that would enable the exploration of 
scale economies, for example. Such companies will probably respond to 
these political forces for fragmentation with segmented nation-for- 
nation strategies. This is the case of multinationals in industries 
where local governments play a key role such as telecommunications, 
heavy engineering, mining, and agriculture. In fact, MNCs whose 
products are of strategic importance to host countries or whose major 
International customers are national governments or state owned 
enterprises are subject to high levels of exposure to local influence. 
In these cases, the evaluation and control of subsidiaries also 
especially require that the conditions in host environments are 
monitored and understood.
Having presented the rationale for the consideration of the 
environment in subsidiary performance evaluation, the study now asks 
its major empirical question:
How and to which extent are external environmental influences 
on foreign operations taken into account in the performance 
oval nation and control systems used in MNCs for subsidiaries 
and subsidiaries' managers?
connection with this enquiry, another important research question 
is suggested:
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Vbich major characteristics of the MNCs are related to the 
degree to which the performance evaluation and control 
systems in operation take the environment into account?
The empirical evidence available relative to the subsidiary 
performance evaluation criteria used in multinationals does not give 
satisfactory answers to these questions. In fact, the studies reviewed 
in chapter 6 only marginally addressed the environmental issue, no 
conclusive evidence having been provided as to the way in which 
overseas host environments are taken into consideration in the 
evaluation of subsidiary and managerial performance. Besides, such 
studies have all dealt with U.S.-based MNCs and there is reason to 
believe that European multinationals, and in particular U.K.-based 
MNCs, employ methods and practices that are different from those used 
by American companies.
An operational model of the research articulating the main issues that 
will be object of analysis is presented next. There, a definition of 
the descriptive information to be collected in the study will be made. 
It is hoped that such information together with the conclusions 
reached in the testing of hypotheses will represent a relevant 
contribution to the knowledge in the area, and provide valuable 
directions for the practice.
T*3. Operational Model
The formulation of the research problem above raised a number of 
Issues that the present study proposes to examine. Exhibit 7.1 
presents a comprehensive model of foreign subsidiary performance 
evaluation and control, which attempts to equate such issues with the 
object of the study. The model is intended to provide an 
operational approach that is expected to guide the formulation of 
hypotheses and the overall design of the research.
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Basically, the model reflects a major concern in subunit performance 
evaluation which consists in determining the extent and the way in 
which uncontrollable factors are taken into account by MNCs in the 
assessment and control of subsidiaries operating abroad. In fact, as 
it was seen, a crucial issue in performance evaluation is whether the 
principle of authority and controllability is correctly applied. As 
discussed in chapter 4, two very different sets of factors normally 
beyond the direct control of subsidiary management affect the results 
of organizational subunits. One is the subsidiary external
environment, with its particular economic, political, legal, social, 
and cultural characteristics. The other is what may be termed the
subsidiary central managerial context, comprising all the decisions 
imposed by headquarters on subunits, and likely to influence their 
performance. Examples include transfer prices, charges for the parent 
technology and services, valuation of fixed assets, internal 
borrowing, and leading and lagging practices in accounts receivable 
and payable. The present study only focuses on the former, since it 
would be impractical to include in the research both sets of factors. 
Since the two issues represent facets of the same problem that are, 
however, Inherently distinct, it is believed that the concentration on 
one with the exclusion of the other is conceptually acceptable.
In order to answer the major research questions raised in the previous 
section the study will have to examine in detail the characteristics 
of the evaluation criteria in operation in multinationals. Indeed, in 
the centre of the model presented in Exhibit 7.1 lies the performance 
and control system that is used in MNCs for foreign subsidiaries and 
managers. Such a system is seen, for the purposes of the study, as 
involving a number of aspects which will be analysed separately in the 
empirical stage of the research.
The aspect to examine first, is the way in which the collection and
analysis of foreign environmental information is organized in
companies’ headquarters. This outer shell in the exhibit, although not 
necessarily linked in a direct way to the criteria of performance 
assessment, is believed to be important to the understanding of the 
environmental issue in subsidiary evaluation and control. As seen in 
chapter 3 (section 3.4.), environmental scanning is regarded as vital
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Exhibit 7.1 - An O p e r ational Model of Foreign Subsidiary 
Performance Evaluation and Control
SUBSIDIARY EXTERNAL 
ENVIRONMENT
Influences exerted by environmental 
factors:
.Economic ( e.g. inflation and 
exchange rates, market size, cost 
of production inputs)
.Political (e.g. political stability, 
political risk)
.Legal (e.g. taxes, import-export 
controls, labour law, exchange 
controls)
.Social/Cultural (e.g. language, 
religion, attitudes towards achieve­
ment and work, labour strikes)
SUBSIDIARY CENTRAL 
MANAGERIAL CONTEXT
.Transfer prices
.Charges for the parent technology 
and services 
.Internal borrowing 
.Leading and lagging practices
CAPABIUTYTO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ?
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for an adequate fit between an organization and its external 
environment, from which the long term success of the organization will 
depend. In MNCs where the degree of environmental variation is high, 
the scanning of host environments generally constitutes an activity of 
critical relevance, with possible implications in the subsidiary 
evaluation process.
Another aspect to examine is the formal reporting system internally 
set up between foreign subsidiaries and headquarters. Chapter 4 
(section 4.3.), emphasized the fact that the exercise of formal 
control in an organization is essentially based on information 
provided by the channels of communication institutionalized within 
corporations. It was noted there that the internal reporting system 
was a "connective tissue" linking all parts of an organization and 
enabling the exercise of evaluation and control over such parts. The 
design of a reporting system can be described in terms of content, 
frequency of reporting, and degree of standardization. These 
characteristics will be analysed for the internal reporting system in
operation in each of the companies to be included in the study.
The third aspect to examine, as suggested in the model, encompasses 
the review of the formal criteria used in the assessment of 
subsidiaries and managers. These criteria are seen to be based on the 
data that are provided by the internal reporting system, and comprise 
the items of information regularly forwarded by subsidiaries, 
performance success indicators, and standards. Chapter 5 presented a 
conceptual discussion of the most common measures and standards of 
performance, which was complemented by a review in chapter 6 of the 
empirical evidence available from previous studies. It is expected 
that the descriptive data collected in the present research may be
compared with the evidence so far available, and conclusions may be
drawn as to the practices of U.K.-based multinationals.
Finally, an aspect that should not be overlooked is related to the 
informal evaluation and control process. In effect, a thorough 
understanding of subsidiary performance evaluation requires that 
informal criteria of assessment are examined. Such criteria are based 
information that is gathered through non-official channels of
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communication, and so constitute a framework of analysis that is 
parallel to the evaluation process generated from the formal internal 
reporting system.
After achieving a comprehension of the characteristics of the control 
and evaluation systems through the description of companies' 
practices, reasons will be explored that may justify the use of 
certain methods and criteria adopted instead of others. The model in 
Exhibit 7.1. suggests the existence of a relationship between the 
characteristics of the systems in operation, and consequently their 
capability to take the subsidiary host environments into account, and 
a number of corporate features. These, have been suggested throughout 
Part I of the study to be able to act as explanatory variables for the 
present research. Such corporate chsu'act eristics include the 
strategic organization of the international industrial operations of a 
company (i.e. global integration, segmented nation-for-nation, and 
mixed strategies), the level of strategic control exercised by 
headquarters, the level of exposure to host country and government 
influence, the industry and size of the company, its organizational 
structure, its commitment to foreign operations, level of 
internationalization, and international experience. The concrete 
definition of these variables, and the criteria employed for their 
measurement will be presented later in chapter 9.
An aspect contemplated in the model which may create certain problems
in the design of the research consists in that the features inherent
to subsidiaries are seen possibly to affect the characteristics of the 
control and evaluation systems (see Exhibit 7.1). In reality, features 
such as the size of a subsidiary, its strategic importance for the 
multinational as a whole, the type of responsibility assigned (e.g. 
profit centre, cost centre), the ownership share in the subsidiary, 
its dominant managerial function (e.g. marketing, production), the 
unsatisfactory performance level of the subsidiary, and the particular 
characteristics of the host environments posing special threats and/or 
opportunities to the subsidiary, all may contribute to the choice of 
evaluation criteria for a particular subsidiary that may differ from 
h^e criteria used for other subsidiaries of a same company. This
Problem will be resolved by focusing on the practices employed by
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corporations for their typical (i.e. most common) subsidiary.
Nevertheless, a measure of the extent of variability of the
performance evaluation criteria employed across the international
operations of each MNC will be attempted to be determined in the
study.
Raving presented a model that operationalizes the issues
conceptualized in this research, the next section will explore the
relationships among them and formulate the main hypotheses of the
study.
7.4. The Research Hypotheses
Besides the contribution to knowledge expected from the descriptive 
side of the study, also relationships between companies' practices and 
major corporate characteristics will be explored in order to ascertain 
the profile of companies that employ certain methods and criteria in 
the evaluation of foreign subsidiary performance. In this section, 
hypotheses stated in the form of anticipated results will be 
formulated, having as their foundation the literature reviewed in Part 
I of the study.
Before examining which criteria are employed in MNCs to assess foreign 
operations, and how such criteria take into account differing 
environmental influences across host countries, the study will address 
the issue of the environmental assessment activity conducted in the 
companies’ headquarters. This, in fact, reflects the sequence of 
analysis proposed in the operational model presented in the previous
section.
Ibe way in which the environmental scanning activity is centrally 
organized in companies may vary widely in terms of formality and 
sophistication. A number of surveys, all based on U.S. multinationals, 
s*'® known to have studied the organization of the environmental
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assessment activity (chapter 3). The findings of such surveys appear 
to suggest that over the years there has been an increasing number of 
companies institutionalizing the activity in a formal function, and 
introducing methods that have achieved considerable levels of 
refinement. Recent studies by Kobrin et al. [1980], and Kennedy 
[1984], discovered that multinationals that were larger in size, more 
international, and more vulnerable to environmental impacts were more 
likely to have a formal environmental assessment function.
It is hypothesized, in the present study that a formal function of 
environmental assessment will be encountered in organizations for 
which the monitoring of the environment is especially vital (e.g. 
companies with global integration strategies, high levels of exposure 
to host countries, a high commitment to foreign operations, and a 
tight strategic control over subsidiaries), or which are subject to 
higher degrees of variation in the subsidiary environments (e.g. 
companies with high levels of internationalization), or still whose 
size, structure or experience favour the utilization of sophisticated 
organizational techniques, as a formalized function of environmental 
assessment appears to be. In other words, the study anticipates that
MNCs where the collection and analysis of foreign environmental
information is formally institutionalized, and, to a smaller extent, 
companies where the environmental assessment activity is conducted in 
an informal way, will tend 1) to operate in industries that are more 
vulnerable to changes in the host environments, such as agriculture,
mining, and oil; 2) to be larger in size; 3) to have higher levels
of commitment to foreign operations; 4) to be more 
internationalized; 5) to possess larger international experience;
to have more internationally oriented organizational structures, 
such as a structure by international division, or by geographic areas 
in overseas markets; 7) to be more exposed to host country and 
government influences; 8) to exercise higher levels of strategic 
control over subsidiaries; and, finally, 9) to practise strategies 
cF global integration of industrial activities.
F^ter exploring the organizational context of the environmental 
assessment activity, the study will concentrate on the evaluation and 
cntrol process of foreign subsidiaries. A thorough examination of
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the performance evaluation process should encompass an analysis made 
in advance of the characteristics of the internal reporting systems 
operated between subsidiaries and headquarters. The scarce empirical 
evidence available as regards the design of the internal reporting 
system in MNCs shows that the magnitude of reporting and the nature of 
the information submitted vary extensively across companies (chapter 
4). In the present study an explanation for such a variation will be 
attempted, by determining which factors are associated with differing 
volumes and characteristics of the information regularly reported.
It is hypothesized that companies of larger size, internationalization 
and experience, together with corporations with more elaborate 
organizational and managerial processes (firms with, for example, more 
complex organizational structures such as the matrix structure, 
tighter strategic control over foreign subsidiaries, and global 
integration strategies) will require higher volumes of information 
reported by foreign subsidiaries, and will be more selective in the 
nature of the information requested. Operational hypotheses will be 
formulated by relating the magnitude and nature of reporting to the 
nine major corporate characteristics that were selected for the 
independent variables of the study.
Included in the internal reporting systems of multinationals, as 
revealed by Leksell [1981], are formal reports on economic and non­
economic environmental conditions encountered in host countries. It 
was also found by Leksell that the companies which had local 
environmental information regularly reported from subsidiaries 
presented high degrees of host country dependence, and a high intra- 
organizational interdependence (see chapter 4). Assuming that in the 
descriptive stage of the present study, a sufficient number of 
companies formally reporting environmental information is found, an 
attempt will be made to determine which kind of corporation has 
environmental information included in the formal reporting system.
is anticipated that those companies which have economic, and non­
economic (i.e. political, legal, and social) environmental information 
frequently reported in the formal communication system will present 
levels of exposure to host country influences, and a global
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integration of international activities (this being consistent with 
Leksell's findings). It is also expected that companies which 
frequently include environmental information in internal reporting
will be operating in industries that are more vulnerable to the
environment, will exercise a tighter control over strategic variables 
in foreign subsidiaries, will be more internationalized and committed 
to foreign operations, and will be more experienced and larger in size 
(this latter factor assuming that large corporations have an 
organizational infra-structure capable of supporting more 
sophisticated techniques than small companies).
In order to complete the examination of the reporting practices of 
multinationals, certain characteristics of the internal systems will 
be analysed in the light of the organization of the environmental 
assessment activity in headquarters. The purpose of this is to 
discover whether internal reporting features such as the volume and 
nature of the information regularly reported, and the incidence and 
frequency of items on economic and non-economic environmental 
conditions are related to the way in which the environmental 
assessment activity is organized in headquarters.
It is  hypo thes ized  th a t  m u lt in a t io n a ls  w h ich  have fo rm a lly  
in s t itu t io n a liz e d  a c e n t ra l e n v iro n m e n ta l assessment fu n c t io n  w i l l  1) 
require h ighe r volumes o f  in fo r m a t io n  from  fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s ,  and 
so have a la rg e r  f lo w  o f  d a ta  fo r m a lly  re p o r te d  v ia  th e  in te r n a l  
system; 2) p re fe r  the  re p o r t in g  o f  in fo rm a t io n  whose n a tu re  enab les a 
better re f le c t io n  o f  the  p a r t i c u la r  e n v iro n m e n ta l c o n d it io n s  faced by
subsidiaries; and 3) have econom ic, p o l i t i c a l ,  le g a l ,  and s o c ia l
environmental in fo rm a tio n  f r e q u e n t ly  fo rw a rded  by s u b s id ia r ie s  v ia  the  
Internal re p o r t in g  system .
Having reached an u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  c o n te x tu a l background in  w hich 
the contro l and e v a lu a t io n  o f  fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  i s  conducted , the  
study w i l l  be in  a p o s i t io n  to  address one o f  i t s  main re se a rch  
Questions, th a t is  w h ich  fa c to r s  a re  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  the  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  
 ^ company’ s perform ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  to  ta ke  account o f  
environmental in f lu e n c e s  in  fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s .  As e x p la in e d  e a r l i e r  
chapter 6 , the  e m p ir ic a l ev idence  a v a i la b le  as re g a rd s  the  ways in
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which environmental differences across subsidiaries are accommodated
In the performance evaluation process, is rather scarce and
superficial. Therefore, no sound empirical basis is available here 
to support the formulation of hypotheses. However, the knowledge 
acquired in Part I of this study led to the creation of a framework
which can be used in the generation of anticipated results. In 
particular, it is hoped that the theoretical background of the study 
will provide the necessary understanding of the performance evaluation 
process in MNCs, thus enabling to judge how sensitive to the 
environment are the performance evauation and control practices of
each of the companies surveyed. Such practices will be analysed and 
then aggregated into a measure which will reflect the degree of
sensitivity of a formal performance evaluation system to environmental 
influences specific to foreign operations.
It is anticipated that those companies whose formal criteria of
subsidiary evaluation and control are capable of recognizing to a
greater extent relevant environmental influences that differ across 
host locations will be more vulnerable to environmental 
discontinuities (i.e. will operate in industries such as mining,
agriculture and oil, will have high degrees of exposure to host
country and government influence, and will practice some form of 
global integration of industrial activities on a cross-country basis). 
It is equally expected that companies with such evaluation systems
will be more subject to variation in the host environments (high
levels of internationalization due to operating in a large number of 
countries in different geographic areas), will be more internationally 
oriented either in operational terms (high levels of commitment to
overseas activities), or in organizational terms (structures that
emphasize international operations, and companies with tight strategic 
control over foreign subsidiaries), and, finally, will be larger in
®Ize and more experienced, hence, more inclined to use elaborate 
control techniques.
The degree of sensitivity to the environment of the formal performance 
svaluation and control practices employed in companies is also
expected to be associated with the way in which the environmental
assessment activity is organized in headquarters. In effect, companies
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to which the influences of the environment on operations are 
sufficiently important to warrant the creation of a formal function of 
environmental assessment are expected to employ subsidiary evaluation 
techniques that recognize environmental impacts to a greater extent.
Parallel to the creation of a measure that independently assesses the 
degree to which the performance evaluation system in operation in a 
company takes environmental differences into account, the study also 
intends to ask participants how effective, in their opinion, are
systems in taking account of the environment. Studies on American MNCs 
reviewed in chapter 6, namely Morsicato [1980], and Choi, Czechowicz 
and Bavishi [1982], attempted to determine the opinions of managers as 
regards the capability of systems to recognize environmental 
influences on foreign subsidiary operations. Results of these studies 
suggested that performance evaluation criteria generally did not
adequately recognize the environment. Such findings were not
confirmed, however, by the independent observation of the researchers. 
In the present study the perceptions of respondents are hoped to be 
validated by the independent measure of environmental sensitivity that 
is intended to be created. If a direct statistical association is 
found between respondents' perceptions and the scores of that measure, 
then it may be concluded that the opinions of managers as to the
effectiveness of performance evaluation criteria in recognizing the
environment are a good indicator of the actual capability of the
criteria.
In order that such a link may be established, it is expected, 
therefore, that the perceptions of headquarters executives as to the 
effectiveness with which formal performance evaluation criteria
recognize environmental influences will coincide with the intrinsic 
actual capabilities of the criteria to take the environment into 
account.
Another aspect that the study intends to explore is whether the
environmental attributes of evaluation systems are in agreement with 
h^e requirements of their users. Such requirements sought for 
performance evaluation systems regarding the recognition of
^vironmental influences on subsidiaries are hoped to be determined by
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the perceptions of the systems’ users of the variability of the 
environmental characteristics that impact on foreign subsidiaries. 
This, in turn, is expected to be associated with the extent to which 
evaluation systems should, in the executives’ opinion, ideally be able 
to take the environment into account.
The perception of environmental variability on the part of executives 
who in headquarters assess the performance of subsidiaries may play an 
important role in the design of subsidiary performance evaluation and 
control systems. Studies previously reviewed such as Persen and Van 
Lessig [1979]» Morsicato [1980], Choi, Czechowicz and Bavishi [1982], 
and Yunker [1982], revealed that executives in the headquarters of 
MNCs usually view the influence of external environments on
subsidiaries as varying across location. These studies also suggested 
that such executives’ views would most likely represent an important 
factor in the choice of the criteria employed in the evaluation and 
control of overseas operations.
In this study, the views of headquarters executives as to how
environmental influences vary across different geographic areas
operated by companies will be collected. Such views are likely to be 
substantially different from company to company according to the
number and nature of countries and regions in the world where a MNC 
has established subsidiaries. In order that an independent measure of 
the perceptions of environmental variability may be obtained, the 
study will attempt to devise a method that will enable each
executive’s perceptions to be positioned in a consistent scale that 
reflects the extent to which the characteristics of the host 
environment are seen to change across foreign operations.
Given a measure such as t h i s  the  s tu d y  w i l l  be in  a p o s i t io n  to  t e s t  
First the r e la t io n s h ip  between th e  degree o f  e n v iro n m e n ta l v a r i a b i l i t y  
perceived by managers and th e  e x te n t  to  w h ich  the y  th in k  perform ance 
evaluation systems shou ld  be capab le  o f  re c o g n iz in g  th e  env ironm en t.
is expected that executives who perceive the influences of the
®*^ vironment on foreign subsidiaries to vary more widely across 
operations will wish formal performance evaluation criteria to take 
extensive account of the environment. The test of this
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hypothesis is hoped to confirm that the way in which the environment 
is seen to differ among host nations is directly associated with the
requirements sought for the evaluation criteria as far as
environmental recognition is concerned.
After establishing such a relationship, the perceptions of
environmental variability of headquarters executives will then be 
tested against the actual sensitivity to the environment of the
performance evaluation criteria operated by companies. It is
hypothesized that multinationals whose executives perceive a great 
variation in the foreign environments will have formal criteria of 
subsidiary evaluation and control which extensively recognize 
environmental influences that differ across host locations. If this is 
so, it may be concluded that the intrinsic characteristics of the
evaluation systems respond in an adequate way to the requirements of 
their users, as regards the extent to which the environment is taken 
into account.
So far, the hypotheses raised dealing with the performance evaluation 
process have all concerned the formal assessment criteria 
institutionalized in companies. However, as it was emphasized in the 
previous section, a complete understanding of the foreign subsidiary 
evaluation process cannot be achieved without considering the informal 
aspects of assessment. The literature reviewed in chapter 4 (section 
suggests that the use of informal information in internal 
decision making is motivated by the limitations and weaknesses of the 
MIS. In particular, it appears that informal information on the 
performance of subsidiaries is normally used as a substitute for the 
information provided by the official reporting channels.
role of informal information as a replacement for the data 
collected through institutionalized channels is generally accepted in 
ihe literature even without the existence of a large empirical 
knowledge on which to base such a conclusion. The present study will 
attempt to determine how the reliance placed on informal information 
foreign subsidiary performance evaluation varies with the degree 
sophistication of the reporting systems operated between 
bsidiaries and headquarters.
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In general, it is anticipated that informal information is used in 
practice with the purpose of overcoming the differences of formal 
Information. This being so, sophisticated performance evaluation 
systems will require less informal information than unsophisticated 
systems. Based on this principle, the study hypothesizes that 
multinationals whose internal reporting systems present higher volumes 
of information being reported from subsidiaries and information of a 
more elaborate and wide nature, will show lower levels of reliance on 
information collected informally when evaluating the performance of 
foreign subsidiaries.
Particular attention is to be given in the study to foreign 
environmental information collected through informal channels of 
communication. Based on the same principle that an extensive use of 
informal information is related to the lack of sophistication of the 
evaluation systems, the study hypothesizes that MNCs whose formal 
performance evaluation criteria are less sensitive to environmental 
influences will collect more environmental information through 
Informal channels. Similarly, it is expected that companies which do 
not have information on foreign environments regularly reported in the 
internal system or which have such an information reported 
infrequently will rely more extensively on informal environmental 
information for the evaluation and control of subsidiaries.
An overview of the main hypotheses of the study was presented here. 
Later in Part III such hypotheses will be operationalized and tested, 
and results will be related to the relevant literature. In the next 
section, the research methodology adopted in the study will be 
discussed.
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7.5. Research Methodology
The research strategy adopted in the study is survey research. As 
Kidder [1981, ch.4] notes, survey research involves the collection of 
data from all or part of a population to assess the relative 
Incidence, distribution and relationships of naturally occurring 
phenomena. Embodied in this definition are two essential components of 
the empirical data to be generated. Such components derive from the 
formulation of the research problem and can be categorized as 
descriptive evidence of companies* practices, and inferential 
relationships between practices and corporate characteristics.
Due to the fact that hypotheses were generated on the basis of the 
currently available body of literature, and that such hypotheses will 
be later subject to testing, it can be said that the study is
primarily of a deductive nature. However, as frequently remarked (for
example, Kidder [1981, ch.1], Buckley, Buckley and Chiang [1976,
ch.1.]), deductive and inductive elements are often simultaneously 
present in a research effort. In the particular case under 
investigation here, although the emphasis is on the deductive mode, an 
inductive, theory generating approach, will also be used whenever the 
evidence resulting from the data collected suggests further
exploration and testing.
The survey research approach adopted in the study presents n^erous
:  :
ability to draw large samples which enable inference to la 
populations, and the opportunity to analyse data via a wide 
powerful statistical techniques. These characteristics are P
lend the study robust evidence that will allow generaliza 
results to the research population. As to the defici 
approach, they are related to the data collection l-trumen s 
which are normally the questionnaire and the interview. * 
instruments based on opinion, it is frequently though
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cannot reveal reality but only impressions and beliefs of the 
respondents. It can be argued, however, that when the instruments 
emphasize factual rather than opinion questions, this problem becomes 
virtually non-existent provided that there are means to check the 
truthfulness of the answers. In addition, other weaknesses commonly 
mentioned include biases related to the design of the data collection 
Instruments, deriving mainly from the prior selection of questions and 
response sets, as well as biases related to the administration of the 
Instruments, such as sampling errors and the interviewer's role.
The data collection techniques to be employed in the study are mainly 
questionnaire and personal interview, and to a smaller extent archival 
search. Such techniques will be reviewed in the next chapter, and
particular attention will be given to the decisions taken to enhance
the validity of the information retrieved in order to overcome as much
as possible the weaknesses just described.
7.6. SoBimarv
This chapter placed the theoretical background previously reviewed in 
context and presented the framework in which the research is defined 
and operationalized. It started with the demarcation of the research 
problem and its justification in the light of the theory and the 
available empirical evidence. Basically, the research addresses the 
environmental issue in the foreign subsidiary and control process of 
MNCs and attempts to ascertain whether and how external environmental 
influences on overseas operations are taken into account in the 
Performance evaluation and control systems used in practice. It also 
Intends to discover the profile of the MNCs which employ systems that 
sne more sensitive to the environment.
articulation of the research problem into consistent steps in the 
investigation path required the formulation of a comprehensive model 
that operationalizes the issues conceptualized in the research. From
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the construction of the model it became clear that the study would 
have to involve both a level of description where the practices of 
companies would be examined and a level of explanation where
relationships among vital variables would be tested. The former
includes not only the formal criteria used in the assessment of 
subsidiaries and managers but also other aspects that are considered 
necessary for an adequate examination of the research problem. These 
comprise the organization of the environmental assessment activity in 
the companies' headquarters, the internal reporting system operated 
internationally between headquarters and subsidiaries, and the role 
played by informal information in the performance evaluation and
control process.
As to the latter aspect, the level of explanation involving 
relationships among variables, it was the object of a separate section 
in the chapter which presented the main research hypotheses of the 
study. A number of explanatory variables were anticipated to be 
associated with the way in which the environmental assessment activity 
is organized in headquarters, the magnitude and type of the 
information forwarded through the internal reporting system, and the 
capability of formal evaluation criteria extensively recognizing
environmental influences that vary across host locations. Also, 
relationships between the intrinsic characteristics of the evaluation 
criteria employed and the perceptions of managers in headquarters of 
the actual and desired level of sensitivity to the environment 
possessed by such methods were hypothesized. Finally, hypotheses were 
formulated to determine the role played by informal information in
foreign subsidiary and managerial performance evaluation. In 
particular, it was expected that companies whose systems are less 
sensitive to the environment would compensate for that by a higher 
reliance on informal information.
"^ e chapter ended with the definition of the research methodology 
edopted. The particular strategy selected for the study is survey
research which was considered the most adequate to the nature and 
characteristics of the empirical investigation to be conducted. The 
application of such a strategy requires the use of certain data 
collection instruments, which in the case of the present research will
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te «alnly the questionnaire and the personal interview Th. . .
that follows Will present the design of the research and will LZ Z
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chapter 8 - the RESEARCH DESIGN
8.1. Introduction
The present study, being of an empirical nature, resorted to survey
methods to collect information about practices followed in companies.
Two instruments, very different in nature, were used to collect data: 
the mailing questionnaire, and the personal interview. The former 
is the pillar of the data collection in the study, whereas the 
interviews are mainly seen as a means of acquiring in-depth
information in order to complement and sometimes clarify data from the 
questionnaire.
The process followed in the preparation and administration of the 
questionnaire will be described in the chapter. Questionnaire 
preparation is a time consuming task which involves the two major 
stages of planning and testing. Each stage can only be overcome when 
a certain number of phases are covered and an amount of problems 
solved, all of which will be discussed in the chapter. The
administration of the questionnaire deals essentially with the 
definition of the study's survey population, and with the steps taken 
with the mailing of the questionnaire and the pursuit of a high 
response rate.
The chapter will also describe the follow-up interviews conducted, and 
will discuss the criteria adopted in the selection of companies, as 
well as the topics that were systematically covered during the 
interviews.
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5 2. T|ie Preparation of the Questionnaire
■There are few places In social research where time- 
consuming, painstaking effort is more rewarding than in the 
preparation of questions." [Kidder, 1981, p.162]
The above quotation expresses how important a careful and rigorous 
approach to questionnaire design is to the eventual quality of the 
results to be achieved by any survey research. Following this 
principle, a very substantial amount of time and effort was allocated 
to the construction of the data collection instruments in the present 
study.
The preparation of the questionnaire, which is the major source of 
empirical information in the study, followed two main stages. The 
first, consisted in the development of a plan where the information 
needed for the investigation was specified to the highest possible 
detail; the way in which such information would be presented in 
question form, and the most adequate sequence for the questions were 
also planned in this initial stage. The second phase involved the 
preparation of an early version of the questionnaire and its test in a 
varied number of situations; this stage culminated with the 
administration of the questionnaire to a small group of companies, and 
with the conducting of personal interviews with the respondents in 
order to improve questionnaire content and presentation.
®*2.1. Questionnaire Plan
Planning of the questionnaire in the mode adopted in the study was 
suggested by writings scattered over a number of sources, notably 
s^lltiz et al. [1965, Appendix C], Oppenheim [1966, chs.2 and 31» and 
o^ser and Kalton [1971, ch.13]. The questionnaire plan involves the 
sking of several decisions prior to starting writing-up the 
Questions. Such decisions regard the precise definition of the 
astionnaire content, and the determination of the sequence to be
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followed in the presentation of topics of different nature. In this 
study four steps were taken before a drafted version of the
questionnaire was ready to be tested. Such steps involved: 1) the
definition of the main parts of the questionnaire; 2) the breakdown of 
these main parts into precise items of information; 3) the
organization of such information in a natural sequence to be followed 
In the questionnaire; and H) the writing of the questionnaire.
The definition of the major parts of the questionnaire was directly 
dictated by the areas that are pivotal to the study. These areas were
defined in the preceding chapter (chapter 7), and follow from the
research problem and the main research hypotheses formulated there. 
In this context, five main parts were identified for the questionnaire 
each seeking the characterization of a relevant dimension to the
study. These consist of:
I) Definition of the extent of formal environmental analysis 
undertaken by headquarters, and of its role in the subsidiary 
performance evaluation and control process.
II) Characterization of the internal reporting system in operation 
(source of formal information for the evaluation of subsidiary 
performance).
III) Characterization of the subsidiary performance evaluation and 
control process in use (how headquarters executives use the 
information provided by the internal reporting system).
IV) Definition of the role played by informal information in the 
performance evaluation and control process.
V) Characterization of the company - demographics.
The next step in the questionnaire plan involved the definition of 
®V6ny item of information to be collected, within each major part. 
Exhibit 8.1 presents a list with all the items for which information 
collected via the measuring instrument was considered necessary. This 
p^resents the questionnaire specifications, and reflects its content
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Bxhlblt 8.1 - Questionnaire Content Specifications
I.DEFINITION OF THE EXTENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS UNDERTAKEN 
’by headquarters, and of its role in THE SUBSIDIARY PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION AND CONTROL PROCESS
1,1, .Environmental assessment function:
determination of the existence in the company of an 
institutionalized function for the collection and 
analysis of foreign environments (economic and non­
economic) .
determination of how the environmental assessment 
process is organized in the company, namely:
- main object of assessment, i.e. economic or non­
economic factors
- sources of environmental information
- number of people, and their commitment (i.e. whether 
part-time or full-time), involved in the formal 
environmental assessment function
- locus of the environmental assessment function 
institutionalized in the company (i.e. whether the 
function is part of the controller/financial 
department, planning department, international 
division, board of directors, etc.)
1.2. .Uses made of the environmental assessment information:
determination of the activities and decisions where 
environmental analysis is systematically used
determination of how formal environmental information 
is incorporated in the subsidiary performance 
evaluation and control process
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE INTERNAL REPORTING SYSTEM IN
OPERATION (SOURCE OF FORMAL INFORMATION FOR THE EVALUATION OF 
SUBSIDIARY PERFORMANCE)
.Content of the internal reporting system: 
determination of the elements included in the
internal reporting system operated between foreign 
subsidiaries and headquarters
•Magnitude of internal reporting:
determination of the amplitude of the information 
included in the internal reporting system operated
.Frequency of internal reporting:
determination of the time interval between
consecutive submission of the elements included in 
the internal reporting system
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.Degree of standardization of the reporting system:
determination of the variation in reporting 
requirements with regard to content, magnitude, 
frequency, and format, within each company. 
Distinguish two different cases:
- variation in reporting requirements between the 
system used domestically and that used for 
international operations
- variation in reporting requirements among 
international operations
d e te r m in a t io n  o f  th e  f a c t o r s  w h ic h  in f lu e n c e  th e  
v a r ia t io n  in  th e  r e p o r t in g  re q u ire m e n ts  f o r  fo r e ig n  
o p e ra tio n s . C ons ide r the  fo l lo w in g :
- size of subsidiary
- strategic importance of subsidiary to the company 
as a whole
- unsatisfactory performance level of subsidiary
- ownership share in subsidiary (i.e. wholly owned 
vs. partly owned subsidiaries or joint ventures)
- geographic location of subsidiary
- special difficulties encountered in host 
environment
- consolidation practice for subsidiary
- type of responsibility assigned to subsidiary 
(i.e. subsidiary as a profit-centre vs. subsidiary 
as a cost-centre)
- dominant managerial function in subsidiary (e.g.
marketing oriented vs. production oriented 
subsidiary)
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SUBSIDIARY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
AND CONTROL PROCESS IN USE (HOW HEADQUARTERS EXECUTIVES USE 
THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE INTERNAL REPORTING SYSTEM)
.Criteria used to measure foreign subsidiary operating 
performance:
determination of what information contained in the 
subsidiaries internal reports is most used in 
performance evaluation
- which success indicators are used?
- what is the relative importance assigned by 
headquarters executives to each indicator?
determination of the nature of the information most 
used in the evaluation of foreign subsidiaries' 
performance (i.e. whether the information is mainly 
profit-based or non-profit-based, quantitative or 
qualitative, financial or non-financial)
- is any information used in performance evaluation 
not reported through the financial reporting 
system?
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.Administration of the performance standards:
determination of how a subsidiary's performance 
objective (profit or non-profit) for a given year is 
set
- is it based on the budget? who prepares the annual 
budget (subsidiary or headquarters)? to which 
extent does headquarters involve in budget 
discussion and revision?
determination of which standards of subsidiary 
performance are most used, in the assessment of 
actual results. Consider the following types of 
standards:
- subsidiary-related standards - e.g. specific 
performance targets (productivity yields, market 
share, etc.), budgeted results, historical 
standards (the past actual performance of the 
subsidiary)
- external standards - e.g. comparison against other 
subsidiaries of the company, comparison against 
similar firms in the country where the subsidiary 
operates, comparison against corporate-wide goals 
(general required rates of return, growth rates, 
etc. )
determination of the extent of environmental 
consideration in the setting of objectives and 
standards (e.g. strikes affecting productivity 
yields, locally protected competition affecting 
market share, inflation affecting production costs, 
costs of borrowing affecting profits)
- do targets (e.g. ROI) vary among foreign 
subsidiaries?
•Similarities in the formal criteria used to assess the 
operating performance of all the company's foreign 
subsidiaries:
determination of the variation in criteria used to 
control and evaluate the set of a company's foreign 
subsidiaries
determination of the factors which influence the 
variation in the control and evaluation criteria
.Differences in the performance evaluation and control 
processes used for foreign and dcHsestic operations:
determination of how the evaluation criteria employed 
for foreign subsidiaries compare to the criteria 
used for domestic divisions (main aspects only)
determination of the headquarters' control staff 
opinion: should the criteria be different? why?
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Exhibit 8.1 (continued)
.Differences in measures and standards for subsidiary 
evaluation and managerial assessment purposes:
determination of how the evaluation criteria employed 
to assess foreign subsidiaries' operations, compare 
with the criteria used to appraise foreign 
subsidiaries' managers
.Environmental factors with an impact on subsidiaries' 
activities:
determination for the different geographic areas in 
the world of which environmental factors are 
perceived to have a high influence on subsidiaries' 
operating performance
.Perceptions of the headquarters' control staff about the 
control process, as regards the capabilities of the formal 
control system to account for the environmental 
peculiarities of foreign operations :
determination of how headquarters executives perceive 
the appropriateness of the evaluation system in 
effectively reflecting environmental factors 
affecting foreign operations
determination of how headquarters executives perceive 
the need for the evaluation system to effectively 
reflect dominant environmental factors affecting 
foreign operations
IV. DEFINITION OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY INFORMAL INFORMATION IN THE 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL PROCESS
.Extent of the use of informal vs. formal information in the 
performance evaluation and control process:
determination of the degree of reliance placed by 
headquarters executives on the subsidiaries' formal 
reports, for the purpose of evaluation of operating 
performance (both for subsidiary and manager)
determination of the extent of information collected 
via informal channels, used in the evaluation and 
control of subsidiary and managerial performance. 
Determination of:
- what are the main sources of informal information 
about the peculiarities of each foreign 
subsidiary?
- how is such information used for unit performance 
evaluation, both organizational and managerial?
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.Determinants of the use of informal information:
determination of the main reasons for the collection 
of informal information by headquarters executives. 
Consider the following:
- need for a higher volume of information on vital 
issues
- need for more timely information
- need for more reliable information
- need for confidential information
- need for more understandable and useful 
information
V. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CORPORATION (BASED ON THE STUDY'S 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES)
.List of (diaracteristies:
to be collected from the questionnaire:
- percentage of company assets located outside the 
U.K. to total company assets
- number of foreign countries where the company 
maintains control over industrial facilities, and 
their distribution over the different areas of the 
world
- year in which the company established its first 
industrial facility outside the U.K.
- organizational structure
- degree of control exercised by HQ over foreign 
subsidiaries, as far as policy and strategic 
decisions are concerned
- type of strategy followed by the company in the 
organization of its international industrial 
activity
- degree of exposure of the company to host country 
and government influence in foreign operations
to be collected from company annual reports:
- dominant industry group for the international 
activities of the company
- sales revenue for the total group
- total group assets
- percentage of sales from foreign subsidiaries to 
consolidated sales revenue
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in a detailed manner.
Before the Items in the list were converted into questions, a decision 
on the most adequate sequence of topics to be presented in the 
questionnaire had to be made.
As Kidder [1981, ch.8] argues, such a sequence should adopt the best 
psychological succession of topics from the standpoint of the 
respondent, which is not necessarily the most logical sequence for the 
researcher. The questionnaire structure presented in Exhibit 8.II is 
believed to have the advantage of being logical for the respondent and 
at the same time of providing the study with a rational succession of 
topics.
In addition, the questionnaire starts by addressing a topic believed 
to be novel for many companies, and so likely to raise the immediate 
interest of the r e s p o n d e n t ^ I n  a way, the questionnaire structure 
follows a "funnel" sequence [Oppenheim, 1966, p.38], in the sense that 
the scope of topics introduced are progressively narrowed down as far 
as environmental considerations in performance evaluation are 
concerned. In order that Exhibits 8.1 and 8.II might be reconciled,
each stage in the flow chart that describes the structure of the
questionnaire (Exhibit 8. II) is directly linked to the respective 
major topic included in the list of questionnaire specifications
(Exhibit 8.1).
The writing of the questionnaire, as the final stage in the
questionnaire plan, involves formulating questions and deciding about 
the questionnaire format or presentation. Question formulation is 
mainly guided by norms of common sense. However, useful advice can be 
^Ply found in the research methodology literature in the form of
guidelines and points to be watched in the writing of questions. Two 
important references here are Kidder [1981, pp.163-178], and Payne 
[1951, oh.14], which provide a very comprehensive checklist of the 
®ust important features of question wording. Writing questions 
usually becomes a complex task which requires that decisions should be 
on question content (e.g. to cover a certain item, are several 
Questions needed or does one question cover the ground intended?), and
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on question wording (e.g. does the question contain unclear 
terminology?; is the wording biased?); decisions about form of 
response (e.g. can the question be asked in a form calling for a
c h e c k -answer?; if a checklist is used, does it cover all the possible 
alternatives?), and decisions about the place of the question in the
sequence (e.g. is the answer to the question likely to be influenced 
by the content of preceding questions?) are also needed during
question formulation.
The prime consideration in building this study's questionnaire was 
ease of response in order to elicit the highest possible return rate. 
For this reason, questions were formulated in closed form whenever 
possible [Oppenheim, 1966, pp.40-44] using open-ended or free-answer 
questions only for probing aspects of the research that are 
particularly important and difficult to comprehend. Following the 
Sudman and Bradburn [1982, p.262] suggestions, the questionnaire ends 
with an open-ended question, giving respondents an opportunity to make 
additional comments; questions asking why certain practices are used 
in companies Instead of others, and why respondents hold certain
opinions were left for the follow-up interview, since it would be
impractical to Include them in the questionnaire. In its most 
sophisticated form, closed questions require the use of scales.
Scaling methods present a number of advantages, which justified their 
widespread use in the study's questionnaire. The main feature of 
scales Is that they do not ask the respondent to write anything since 
the response consists of a tick mark in a certain score [Oppenheim,
1966, ch.4]. Besides this advantage, scales enable several variables
to be represented by a single score that reduces the complexity of the 
s^ta; they also provide quantitative measures that facilitate
statistical manipulation. For a discussion of the advantages of 
scaling techniques see also Nachmias and Nachmias [1981, ch.11]. When 
the use of scales was not advisable, rankings [Oppenheim, 1966, pp.92- 
9^1] were included in the questionnaire. As regards the determination 
of the order of questions within a topic, the questionnaire attempted 
to adopt a logic sequence in the respondent's perspective, taking 
always into account possible conditioning effects of earlier questions
[Moser and Kalton, 1971, p.346]. In order to ensure that all
contingencies were included, and also to encourage complete response.
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filter questions were used in the questionnaire, having the normal 
precautions with this type of questions been taken [Sudman and 
Bradburn, 1982, pp.223-226].
An important aspect to preserve in any questionnaire is the 
reliability and variability of the questions. To ascertain 
reliability in the case of factual questions, Oppenheim [1956, p.71] 
suggests the use of internal checks, which could involve the 
formulation of a same question in different ways. This practice 
necessarily leads to an increase in questionnaire size, and, hence, 
cannot be overused. Questions with the sole purpose of acting as 
checks on others were not included in the questionnaire. However, in 
some instances it is possible to confirm the reliability of the 
information provided, since different questions were sometimes used to 
characterize different traits of the same phenomenons^). 
Determination of the reliability of attitude questions can only be 
done by using sets of questions or attitude scales [Oppenheim, 1966, 
p.73], since internal checks as described for factual questions are 
not possible here. Overall, the questionnaire makes very little use 
of attitude questions. One of its parts, however, is more prone to 
the use of such type of question. It is the part which deals with the 
use of informal information for subsidiary performance evaluation and 
control. Sets of questions relating to attitudes towards informal 
information as regards its purpose and nature, and the reasons for its 
use were introduced in the questionnaire. As far as tests of validity 
are concerned, cross-checks against a second independent source of 
information present the best way to control for the validity of 
factual questions [Oppenheim, 1966 , p.72]. The only part of the 
Questionnaire susceptible of cross-checking is the last one on 
demographics. Information about geographic areas operated and 
percentages of assets located outside the U.K provided by respondents 
in this part was checked against company annual reports, which for 
another reason had to be consulted for every firm participating in the 
®iudy. This archival information constituted a third source of data 
used in the research.
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8.2.2. Questionnaire Pilot
The testing of the questionnaire is the logical step to follow after 
the planning process has led to the construction of a first draft. 
The pilot consists in a tryout of the questionnaire to ascertain how 
it works and whether changes are necessary before the start of the 
full-scale study. The pilot provides a means of detecting and solving 
unforeseen problems in the administration of the questionnaire, such 
as the wording and sequence of questions or the questionnaire overall 
length. It may also indicate the need for including new questions or 
deleting others [Kidder, 1981, pp.162-163].
Several versions of the questionnaire were drafted before a final 
version was ready to be tested in companies. This version was mailed 
to six multinationals included in the survey population, with a 
covering letter explaining that the questionnaire sent was being 
subject to a test, and that the researcher was looking for advice on 
the questionnaire content and presentation. The selection of the six 
companies was based on contacts previously established or on 
geographical Identity with the University where the study was being 
conducted. Four of these firms agreed to complete the questionnaire 
and to have a personal interview with the researcher. Such interviews 
were conducted with a director of each company (normally the financial 
director), and last between 90 minutes and two hours.
A substantial part of the interview was spent discussing relevant 
issues in foreign subsidiary performance evaluation and probing 
answers given in the questionnaire in order to determine whether 
Questions were correctly formulated, were not misleading, did not 
contain unclear terminology, and whether companies' practices as 
described in the interview were consistent with the answers given to 
the respective questions included in the questionnaire. Also the 
choices provided for closed questions were tested, in order to check 
their relevance and to detect any important alternative that might be 
bidden under the "other" category.
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Also of relevance during the test-interviews was the discussion of 
aspects of the questionnaire related to its appearance. Evidence 
reported in several sources [e.g. Sudman and Bradburn 1982, ch.9; 
Oppenheim, 1966, ch.3] suggests that in written questionnaires layout, 
printing, choice of paper, spacing and other features all have an 
impact on the level of response. All these aspects of questionnaire 
presentation were discussed during interviews. Another important 
aspect with strong implications for survey success is questionnaire 
length. According to Sudman and Bradburn [ 19 82, p.267], the 
acceptable size of a mailed questionnaire seems to be related to its 
level of salience for the population. On highly salient topics with 
special populations, longer questionnaires of up to sixteen pages are 
said to be possible. In the opinion of the respondents interviewed 
during the pilot, the length of the fourteen-page questionnaire tested 
was not considered to be a serious obstacle to participation in the 
study.
Finally, the test-interviews discussed the clarity and relevance for 
the respondent of the questionnaire front page, where a brief 
description of the study was given, together with general instructions 
for participation. The importance of the front and back covers of 
questionnaires is greatly emphasized by Dillman [1978] who suggests 
that the front cover should contain a study title, an illustration, 
any needed directions, and the name and address of the study sponsor 
or the researcher. The back cover should be left blank so that it may 
be used for additional comments by the respondent.
The contribution of the pilot stage for the version of the 
questionnaire used in the full-scale study is discussed next.
The Final Version
The long process of questionnaire planning and testing finally 
culminated with the construction of a definitive version to be mailed 
bo the whole of the survey population. This version differs from the 
one that was piloted in only minor aspects. Alterations introduced
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include a different question order in one of the parts of the 
questionnaire (i.e. Section I), the elimination of a question which 
eventually resulted in the reduction of the size of the questionnaire 
in one page, and the rephrasing of some questions motivated either by 
the use of more clear terminology, or by the inclusion or deletion of 
certain choice-answers.
The questionnaire in its final form is presented in Appendix A. This 
version consists of a front cover and thirteen pages of questions 
which were printed in double-sided sheets in order to reduce volume. 
Together with the questionnaire two covering letters were also mailed, 
one signed by the director of the institution where the research was 
being conducted, the other signed by the researcher (see Appendix 
B.I). These letters made a brief introduction to the research project 
and emphasized how relevant its findings could be for current company 
practice. As a means of motivating companies to cooperate it was 
promised to send to each participant a detailed summary of the 
research findings. Another aspect stressed not only in the letters of 
introduction but also in the questionnaire front and back pages, was 
confidentiality of the data. Results were said to be presented only 
in aggregate form, keeping individual respondents and company names 
anonymous in all circumstances.
8.2.4. The Study Original Variables
Eroro the questionnaire in its final version it was possible to create 
a list with all the study original variables. These are the basis of 
bhe statistical analysis to be performed later in the study, with the 
assistance of a package particularly suited to the nature of the 
investigation (SPSS - Statistical Package for the Social Sciences).
Generally each question gives rise to one variable taking on the 
values corresponding to the several available alternative answers 
provided in the questionnaire form. However, for those questions 
which enabled a multiple response, several variables had to be 
defined, all of dichotomous nature, and each corresponding to one of
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the alternative answers provided [Hull and Nie, 1981, ch.8].
Appendix C presents a list with all the original variables of the 
study, providing for each variable a meaningful label and the possible 
range of values that the variable may take on. This list is believed 
to represent a useful source of reference for the reader, in the part 
of the study which reports the results.
On the whole, the number of original variables amounts to 312. Three 
hundred and six of these resulted directly from the questionnaire, 
four (the last four variables in Appendix C) correspond to information 
collected from the annual company reports, and the remaining two (the 
first two variables in Appendix C) were introduced as means of 
identification of each case and of the request number after which the 
respective questionnaire was received.
1.3. The Administration of the Questionnaire
This section deals with all the aspects involved in making the 
questionnaire reach the survey population and in ensuring the highest 
possible response rate. It describes how companies were selected for 
the study, as well as which steps were taken in mailing the 
questionnaire and in controlling the returns. The section ends with 
bhe presentation of the survey results, where the overall response 
•'ate and the percentage of companies participating in the study are 
revealed.
8.3.1. Definition of the Survey Population
The study explores the performance evaluation practices used by 
British multinationals for their foreign subsidiaries and managers, 
^ese MNCs are defined for effects of the survey as U.K. based public
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firms with at least one foreign subsidiary (i.e. a company located 
overseas which is controlled by the group) engaged in manufacturing or 
o the r industrial activity, namely assembly, exploration and 
c o n s t r u c t io n .  The survey population [Moser and Kalton, 1971, pp.53 
and 155] is composed of all the companies meeting the above criteria 
and included in the 500 largest U.K. industrial companies list, from 
T>)P Times 1000 [19 82- 83].
The selection of companies to be circularized followed a process that 
is best described in flow-chart form (see Exhibit 8.III). From an 
initial list of 500 companies included in the source of reference 
mentioned above, those that are controlled from abroad were first 
excluded. Such companies being subsidiaries of foreign multinationals 
are obviously out of the scope of the study.
Next, private (i.e unquoted) companies were eliminated from the list. 
The basic reason for the exclusion of such companies from the study is 
that they are usually more secretive and unwilling to provide 
information to outsiders than quoted companies. In addition, annual 
reports, which are a crucial source of information for the study, are
generally difficult to obtain for these companies. After the
exclusion of foreign and unquoted firms, the list was left with 306 
corporations (Exhibit 8.Ill) which had to be checked to ascertain 
whether they were multinationals in the sense defined in the study. 
Given that no information is provided in The Times 1000 as to the 
geographical spread of the companies' industrial activities, other 
reference sources had to be consulted. Identification of those 
companies that are purely domestic was made possible by the
Who Owns [1983] directory which gives for each company a complete
list of subsidiaries with the respective country of operation. Having 
all domestic companies been eliminated from the list, the next step 
was to find out which of the remaining firms had manufacturing or 
other industrial activities (i.e. assembly, exploration and 
construction) overseas, since only these were eligible for the study. 
Two reference sources were of assistance here: KBE [1983] and KpfflPas^  
[1582], While most of the times it was possible to determine the 
oature of the companies' overseas activities, in some cases that 
Information could not be ascertained with a reasonable level of
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Exhibit 8.Ill - Process Followed in the Selection of
Companies for the Survey Population
REFERENCE SOURCE DECISION PROCESS
The Times 1000"
The Times 1000"
"Who Owns Whom"
"KBE"
"Kompass"
Place Abroad
pontrci
U.K
PrivatelyOwnwership owned
Publicly owned
Foreign
jsubsidiai
Domestic
MNC
'industrial
activity
^^roady
No
Yes or do not know
Exclude 73
Exclude 48
Exclude 146
"The Times" 500 
largest U.K. 
companies
Survey population
233 companies
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safety. In such cases, firms were Included in the list and sent a 
questionnaire with a special cover page, which asked for the 
questionnaire to be returned uncompleted if the company's operations 
outside the U.K. were not involved in manufacturing (or other 
industrial) activities.
The initial list of 500 companies was reduced to 233 after all the 
cases that did not meet the study requirements were eliminated 
(Exhibit 8.III). These 233 corporations, which constitute the study's 
survey population, were all circularized as described in the next 
section.
8.3.2. Mailing of the Questionnaire
Each company included in the survey population was sent a package 
comprising a copy of the questionnaire, two personalized covering 
letters(3) addressed normally to the company's financial director, and 
a stamped, self-addressed envelope. The covering letters included the 
name of the company directors to whom the questionnaire was being 
sent, his formal title, the complete name of the company, and the
address. Company addresses were found in The Times IPDÜ [ 19 82-83]»
and confirmed in the Who Owns Whom [1983] directory. Names of the 
relevant companies' directors were sometimes difficult to find. The 
process followed in order to determine the name and formal title of 
the director in each company's Board responsible for the financial 
function, made use of information sources, such as KBE [ 1983]» and 
Komnass [1982]. These directories provide for each company the name 
of all the respective directors, and sometimes indicate their area of 
responsibility. When it was not possible to determine who was the 
financial director of a company, all directors' names for that company 
were checked against the Directorv of Directors [1983] index, in the 
l^ope that such information could be obtained. This process proved to 
be successful in the great majority of cases. Telephone calls were 
®3de for those companies for which it was impossible to determine the 
name of the financial director from the available written sources. 
Although involving a very time consuming search, it was believed that
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the practice of addressing the questionnaire to the right person in 
each organization would result in a greater response rate for the 
study.
The first batch of questionnaires was mailed in mid July of 1983. The 
strategy pursued to follow-up responses consisted in the mailing of a 
second request (or first reminder) to all those companies which failed 
to respond after four weeks, either in the form of completing the 
questionnaire, or by sending a letter acknowledging its reception. 
One-hundred and thirty-nine companies (i.e 59.7 percent of the total) 
were in this situation. After another six weeks without hearing from 
the companies, a third request (or second reminder) was mailed. This 
time 58 companies (i.e. 41.7 percent of the cases sent the second
request) were circularized. Each of the two reminders included a new 
covering letter, specially prepared (see Appendices B.II and B.III) 
and a fresh copy of the questionnaire.
A letter of acknowledgement was sent to all the companies which 
participated in the study by completing the questionnaire. This 
letter which was another opportunity to thank the respondents for 
their participation, reaffirmed the intention previously expressed in 
the covering letters of sending in due course a summary of the study’s 
findings to each participant (see Appendix B.IV).
8.3.3. Survey Results
The f in a l results of the survey are presented in Exhibit 8 .IV. To 
sta rt with, 23 companies returned the questionnaire u n c o m p le te d  
confirming in writing that it was not applicable to them. These are 
firm s whose operations outside the U.K. are not engaged in 
manufacturing (or other industrial) activities. As discussed in 
Section 8.3.1,, these companies should not have been included in the 
survey population in the first place. However, there was no means of 
detecting them in advance. The result, is to bring down the size of 
the survey population to a total of 210 companies, instead of the 2 33 
figure initially obtained.
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E x h i b i t  8 .IV - Results of the Survey Administration
Number of companies included in the survey 233
* Number of companies which participated in the study 101
Number of questionnaires received 100
Usable questionnaires 97
Rejected questionnaires 3
Number of companies participating 
without having completed the
questionnaire 1
* Number of companies which declined to participate
in the study 67
• Number of companies which considered the questionnaire 
not applicable (i.e. firms with no manufacturing - or 
other industrial - activity outside the U.K.) 23
• Number of companies which did not answer 42
OVERALL RESPONSE RATE TO THE SURVEY (191/233) : 82.0 %
PROPORTION OF COMPANIES PARTICIPATING 
IN THE STUDY OUT OF TOTAL NUMBER OF
ELEGIBLE companies ( 101/(233-23)) : 48.1 %
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On the whole, 101 companies participated in the study, which 
corresponds to a success rate of 48.1 percent (Exhibit 8.IV). 
Questionnaires were received from 100 firms; however, only 97 of them 
are usable since three had to be rejected, either because they showed 
large parts incompleted, or because they referred to companies with 
only marketing operations outside the U.K. In one special case, a 
company did not fill the questionnaire but offered to participate in 
the study by allowing an interview with headquarters executives. This 
company considered that the questionnaire was not suited to the 
characteristics of its operations, which are rather uncommon. The 
group is organized by different lines of business, each with very high 
levels of independence from the parent, and with their own 
headquarters. Subsidiaries in this large corporation are not 
controlled by the group’s parent, but by the headquarters of the 
respective line of business.
A number of companies - 67 - wrote saying that they would not be 
participating in the survey (Exhibit 8.IV). The reasons given are 
widespread, ranging from confidentiality and company general policy to 
internal pressures on time and lack of available managerial resources. 
It is interesting to note the frequency with which companies mentioned 
the large volume of requests of this type they were receiving, making 
it impossible to respond to any of them.
The remaining companies - 42 - did not answer at all after the three 
attempts that were made (Exhibit 8.IV). This corresponds to only 18 
percent of the total number of companies circularized, which means an 
overall response rate to the survey of 82 percent.
8.3.4. Noiv-Response Bias
Tn order to determine whether the 97 companies that participated in 
4^e study are a good representation of the total survey population a 
®^st of non-response bias was conducted. This test was based on the
sales figures of corporations as indicated in the Times 1 PQ.Q. [ 1982-
from which the survey population was selected.
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A conventional way of measuring the bias due to non-response, 
suggested by authors such as Moser and Kalton [1971, ch.7], and 
Nachnias and Nachmias [1981, ch.12], consists of applying the 
following formula:
- u = R2 (U-|-U2 )
where 2^ =^2 /^ , N2 being the number of cases in the "non-response 
stratum", and N the total number of cases in the population; u^  is 
the mean (sales) of the "response stratum*; U2 the mean (sales) of 
the non-response stratum; and u is the mean (sales) of the entire 
population.
In this particular study, R2 = (210-97)/210 = 0.538, u<| = £920.9
million, and U2 = £917.8 million. Thus, the difference between the 
average sales for the cases that participated in the survey and the
average sales for all the companies included in the survey population 
is only:
- ug = £1.7 million
A more intuitive measure of non-response bias is perhaps given by the 
percentage of the difference between the mean sales of the respondents 
and the mean sales of the total survey population relatively to the 
mean sales of the total survey population. Borrowing the symbols from 
the previous formula, the computation of such a measure can, 
therefore, be written as follows:
Non-response bias = (u^  _ u)/u x 100
The application of this formula to the data in the study reveals a 
very small non-response bias of 0.18 percent. In other words, the 
deviation of the mean sales of the 97 companies that participate in 
the study to the total survey population is only 0.18 percent of the 
®®en sales of all the companies selected for the survey.
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8,4. T^ P Follow-Up Interviews
In te rv ie w s  conducted with questionnaire respondents constituted a 
supplementary source of information used in the field study. The 
purpose of the follow-up interviews was to explore in more detail 
c e rta in  aspects of interest to the research, and also to confirm the 
c a p a b i l i t y  of the questionnaire in accurately reflecting companies* 
p ra c tic e s .
The selection of firms was made on a judgemental basis, and attempted 
to cover a range of companies with different practices related to the 
following key issues:
1) Way in which foreign environmental information is collected and 
analysed in headquarters (Question 1 - Section I)
2) Inclusion or not of reports on host country economic, 
political, legal, and social conditions in the internal reporting 
systems operated between subsidiaries and headquarters (Question 1 
- Section II)
3) Degree of reliance on non-financial and non-profit financial 
indicators of performance in the control and assessment of 
subsidiaries* activities (Questions 1 and 3 - Section III)
4) Similarity of the methods used to evaluate the performance of 
subsidiary operations, and to assess the performance of subsidiary 
managers (Question 11 - Section III)
5) Level of reliance placed on informal information for 
performance evaluation (Section IV)
Personal interviews with the relevant top executivesC*) were conducted 
®®ven multinationals. The number of interviews in the study had to 
kept small for reasons of economy, since they involved considerable
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travelling. The duration of the interviews varied substantially from 
case to case, and ranged from a minimum of one and a half hours to a 
maximum of four hours. In this latter case a panel of four top 
executives was interviewed.
The method used in the interviews followed a "less structured" 
approach, of the focused type [Kidder, 1981, pp.1 87-188]. The 
"framework of topics" [ibid.] covered included probes into the way in 
which the environmental assessment function is organized in companies 
headquarters, and the importance attributed in subsidiary performance 
evaluation to economic and non-economic environmental information 
formally reported via the internal communication systems. It also 
Included questions to enable a better understanding of differences in 
methods used to evaluate the performance of foreign and domestic 
subsidiaries, as well as in criteria employed to evaluate the 
performance of operations and managers. The major elements of the 
companies’ planning process (operating budget, capital budget, long 
term plan) and respective implications in the evaluation activity were 
also topics raised. Of particular interest were questions which tried 
to determine how environmental differences among subsidiaries are 
incorporated in targets, and how headquarters executives ascertain the 
reasonableness of such targets. Other aspects discussed in the 
interviews included the importance, as perceived by executives, of 
non-profit and qualitative information, and the reliance they place on 
information reported through non-institutionalized channels in the 
evaluation of operating performance. As regards the criteria used to 
assess managerial performance, the issue of supplemental compensation 
(bonuses) and its relation to subsidiary results was raised. Finally, 
managers’ perceptions as to the actual and desired capabilities of the 
formal evaluation criteria to take important environmental factors 
into account, were explored in the interviews. An attempt was also 
®ade to find out whether evaluation practices used in headquarters had 
been modified in the recent past, and whether such modifications had 
been motivated by changes in the international environment.
The interviews had the merit of providing the researcher with many 
interesting and valuable in-depth views which greatly contributed to a 
better understanding of the main issues. In the next major part of
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the study (Part III) where results are described, views and opinions 
of executives collected during the interviews will be presented as an 
illustration and complement to companies’ practices reported on the 
basis of questionnaire information.
8 .5 .  R im m a r v
This chapter described all the steps taken in the study to create the 
means that made possible the collection of empirical information. The 
major data collection instrument was the questionnaire, whose 
preparation and administration were reported in some detail. A lot of 
effort was put into the design of the questionnaire, based on the 
premise that any empirical study can only be at least as good as its 
data. Two major phases were followed in the preparation of the 
questionnaire. In the first, the questionnaire was carefully planned 
through a sequential path which comprised the definition of the main 
parts, the breakdown of each part into precise items of information, 
the organization of such information in a natural succession, and the 
writing of the questionnaire. This latter aspect involved decisions 
not only about formulation of the questions, but also about format and 
presentation of the questionnaire. Question formulation, though 
essentially an art, may become a technical and complex task requiring 
decisions on a number of aspects, such as question content, wording, 
form of response, and place in the overall sequence. The options made 
in each of these aspects were amply discussed in the chapter. Also 
the issues of question reliability and validity were discussed.
The second major phase of questionnaire preparation involved the 
Pcrfectioning of successive drafted versions until reaching the stage 
of having a pilot version ready to be tested in companies. Four 
“nltinationals included in the survey population agreed to complete 
the questionnaire and to have a personal interview with the researcher 
to discuss aspects related to questionnaire content and appearance.
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The p re s e n t chapter also described the steps taken to administer the 
questionnaire. The survey population was selected from among the 500 
la r g e s t  companies in The Times 1000. and is composed of U.K.-based 
quoted companies with at least one foreign subsidiary - this being 
defined as a firm located overseas which is controlled by the group - 
In v o lv e d  in an industrial activity namely manufacturing, assembly, 
e x p lo r a t io n  or construction. The identification of companies 
s a t is f y in g  these requirements from the list provided bv The Times 
1000. followed a process which made use of a number of other reference 
sources. At the end, the list of 500 corporations was reduced to a 
number of 233. These are the firms which constitute the study’s 
survey population. All of them were circularized, and responses 
fo llo w e d -up. Two subsequent reminders were mailed to those companies 
w h ich  f a i l e d  to respond. The final survey results are very 
s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  with an overall response rate of 82 percent, and a 
percentage of companies participating in the study of 48 percent. A 
te s t o f  non-response bias revealed only a minute deviation between the 
group o f  respondents and the entire survey population.
The chapter concludes with the discussion of the follow-up interviews 
that were conducted with questionnaire respondents. The interviews 
were personal and of the focused type. Their purpose was essentially 
to explore in-depth aspects of interest to the research, and to 
provide another check for the accuracy of the questionnaire. Seven 
interviews were conducted, all having last for a considerable amount 
of time. A list of topics, described in the chapter, was 
systematically covered in the interviews, and from the dis eussions 
held many interesting insights which supplement questionnaires 
information were obtained.
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iQfltgetÊSî
(1) Reasons of potential attractiveness of topics to the respondents 
dictated the inclusion of the part on demographics last in the 
questionnaire. It is believed that questions on company 
characteristics such as geographical spread of the firm, 
organizational structure, and level of assets are considered 
uninteresting by respondents, and likely to reduce response rate 
if included in the beginning of a questionnaire. For a reference 
endorsing this view see, for example, Sudman and Brad burn [19 82, 
pp.218-219].
Examples of internal checks in the questionnaire are question 1 
(Section III) whose answers can be compared with those provided 
for question 1 (Section II). Question 3 (Section III) acts as a 
check on questions 2a and 2b (Section III). So does question 1 
(Section V) on question 12 (Section III). And question 2 (Section 
IV) on question 11a (Section III). A copy of the final version of 
the questionnaire is found in Appendix A.
(3) Such covering letters were discussed previously in section 8.2.3.» 
and are presented in Appendix B.I.
The personal follow-up interviews were conducted with the Group 
Finance Director in four of the companies. In the remaining 
three, the executives interviewed were the Group Vice Chairman, 
the Head of Group Finance and Accounting (plus three other 
executives), and the Group Director for Overseas Operations.
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PART III
DATA AHALBIS AMD RESULTS
CHAPTER 9 - CHARACTERIZATION OF THE RESEARCH SAMPLE
9.1. introduction
Part III of the study initiates with the present chapter which aims at 
a characterization of the research sample. Here, the 97 sample 
companies are described in terms of ten major characteristics. These 
company characteristics were derived from the literature and represent 
the independent or explanatory variables of the study. Companies' 
practices reported in the following chapters will be associated with 
such variables. The objective will be to unveil relevant 
relationships between the way in which MNCs process information and 
use that information in foreign subsidiary performance evaluation, and 
major features of the companies such as size, level of 
Internationalization, overseas experience, exposure to local 
governmental influence, and international corporate strategy. When
earlier in chapter 7 (section 7.3.) the operational model of the
research was presented, a number of corporate characteristics were 
suggested to be able to act as explanatory variables for the study. 
However, the concrete definition of such variables and the
determination of the criteria employed for their measurement were not
attempted then. This will be done now, since to achieve the 
characterization of the research sample each company characteristic 
will have to operationalized.
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9.2. n^ MBoanv Cbaracterlstlcs
This section will describe how each company characteristic selected as 
an independent variable of the study was defined, how it was measured 
and how corporations making up the research sample are distributed by 
the several categories of each characteristic.
9.2.1. Type of Industry
Companies were classified according to the dominant industrial 
activity of their overseas operations. The industrial categories were 
based on the "F.T. - Actuaries Equity Indices" classification, and
include four groups, each with the following industries:
GROUP 1. Capital Goods - CLASSES: Mechanical engineering. Electrical 
engineering. Motors. Building materials and other industrial 
materials. Construction.
GROUP 2. Consumer Goods - CLASSES: Food manufacturing, tobacco and
household products. Publishing & printing, and paper & packaging. 
Textiles and other durable consumer goods.
GROUP 3. Other Goods - CLASSES: Chemicals. Oil. Agriculture and
mining. Other industries.
GROUP 4. Miscellaneous Activities. This is a one-class group. 
Including those companies for which it is not possible to determine 
one dominant activity abroad. Generally, these are firms engaged in 
several distinct activities overseas with no single dominant industry.
distribution of the companies by the respective classes was 
undertaken on a judgemental basis from information provided in the 
companies’ annual reports. The latest report available for each of
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Table 9.1 - Industry Characteristics of Sample Firms
ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY
ADJUSTED
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
ADJ FREQ 
(PERCENT) 
FOR EACH 
GROUP
Mechanical engineering 24 24.7
CO
ê
Electrical engineering 7 7.2
oÜ
.J<
E-H
H
5
Motors
Building materials and 
other industrial materials
4
10
4.1
10.3
Construction 7 7.2 53.6
ëo
Food manufacturing, tobacco, 
and household products
11 11.3
Ü
w
Publishing & printing, and 
, paper & packaging
7 7.2
i Textiles and other durable consumer goods 5 5.2 23.7
go
on
Chemicals 7 7.2
Oil 4 4.1
K Agriculture and mining 4 4.1
O Other industries 2 2.1 17.5
Miscellaneous activities 5 5.2 5.2
TOTAL 97 100.0 100.0
N (number of valid cases) = 97
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the 97 firms (generally the 1983 report) was carefully studied, in 
order to ascertain for each case the dominant industrial activity 
outside the United Kingdom.
Table 9.1 provides the number of companies included in each class, and 
shows that 52 firms (i.e. 54 percent of the total) fall under the
capital goods group, whereas 23 firms (i.e. 24 percent) are included
in the consumer goods group. One single industry - mechanical 
engineering - accounts for one-fourth of all cases.
9.2.2. Company Size
Company size is measured in terms of two criteria: sales and assets.
Sales are defined here as the total consolidated revenue for the 
group, during the last accounting year, i.e. 1983, as per the company 
report. Sales for the companies included in the sample range from a 
minimum of £80 million(l) to a maximum of £19 663 million with a mean 
of £952.9m. Twenty-five companies (i.e. 26 percent) have sales of
under £200m (small companies), 32 firms (i.e 33 percent) have sales 
between £201m and £500m (medium companies), 27 companies (i.e. 28
percent) between £501m and £1500m (large companies), and 13
corporations (i.e. 13 percent) have sales of over £1500m (giant
companies) - see Table 9.II.
Assets, the other critérium employed to measure the size of a company, 
are defined as the total amount of consolidated net assets (i.e fixed 
assets plus current assets less current liabilities) for the group, at 
the last accounting year-end (1983), also as per the company report. 
Assets of the sample companies range from £23 million(^) to £10 454 
®illion, with a mean of £463.4m. Thirty-eight companies (i.e. 39
percent) have assets of under £100m (small firms), 23 companies (i.e
percent) between £101m and £250m (medium), 26 companies (i.e. 27
percent) between £251m and £750m (large), and 10 firms (i.e. 10
percent) of over £750m (giant companies) - see Table 9•III»
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Table 9. II - Size of Sample Firms Measured in Sales
£ MILLION
ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY
ADJUSTED
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
CUMULATIVE 
ADJ FREQ 
(PERCENT)
-200 25 25.8 25.8
201 - 500 32 33.0 58.8
501 - 1500 27 27.8 86.6
1501 + 13 13.4 100.0
TOTAL 97 100.0
N = 97
MAXIMUM 19662.80 
MEAN 952.92
MINIMUM 
STD DEV
80.00
2194.86
Table 9. Ill - Size of Sample Firms Measured in Assets
£ MILLION
ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY
ADJUSTED
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
CUMULATIVE 
ADJ FREQ 
(PERCENT)
-100 38 39.2 39.2
101 - 250 23 23.7 62.9
251 - 750 26 26.8 89.7
751 + 10 10.3 100.0
TOTAL 97 100.0
N = 97
maximum 10454.40 
MEAN 463.40
MINIMUM 23.00 
STD DEV 12 80.56
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9.2.3. Level of Companies* Commitment to Foreign Operations
This variable is also defined according to two criteria. One, is the
percentage of sales achieved in foreign markets to group consolidated 
sales revenue, during the last accounting year, i.e 1983. Included 
in this figure are both sales originated in foreign subsidiaries and 
direct exports from the U . K .  (2). The values range from a minimum of 4 
percent to a maximum of 91 percent, with an average of 43.1 percent. 
Table 9.IV shows the distribution of companies by four categories, 
indicating different levels of commitment to foreign operations: 13
companies (i.e 14 percent of the total number of firms) have overseas 
sales of less than 20 percent of their total turnover (small 
commitment); 29 companies (i.e 32 percent) generate abroad between 21 
and 40 percent of their total revenue (medium commitment); 26 firms 
(i.e 29 percent) between 41 and 60 percent (large commitment), and 22 
companies (i.e. 24 percent) have overseas sales of more than 60
percent of total turnover (very large commitment).
The other method of measuring a firm’s commitment to foreign 
operations is the percentage of assets located outside the U.K. to 
group total assets, at the last accounting year-end. Values range 
from 2 percent in the company with the lowest involvement overseas to 
90 percent in the company with the highest involvement, with an
average of 38.6 percent. According to Table 9.V, for 21 firms (i.e. 
24 percent of the relevant cases) assets abroad represent only 20
Percent or less of group total assets (small commitment); for 37
corporations (i.e. 42 percent) assets abroad are between 21 and 40
percent of total assets (medium commitment); for 19 firms (i.e. 22
percent) foreign assets are between 41 and 60 percent (large 
commitment); and for 11 companies (i.e 13 percent) assets outside the 
U.K. represent 60 percent or more of total assets (very large 
commitment). Among these latter, 3 companies have overseas assets of 
®ore than 80 percent of the total.
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Table 9.IV - Percentage of Sales Achieved by Sample Firms in 
Foreign Markets to Groiq> Consolidated Sales
ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE
ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY ADJ FREQ
FREQUENCY (PERCENT) (PERCENT)
-20$ 13 14.4 14.4
21$ - 40$ 29 32.2 46.7
41$ - 60$ 26 28.9 75.6
61$+ 22 24.4 100.0
Not determined 7 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 97 100.0
N = 90
MAXIMUM 91.00 MINIMUM 4.00
MEAN 43.08 STD DEV 20.97
Table 9.V - Percentsige of Assets Located Outside the U.K. to
Group Total Assets in Sample Firms
ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE
ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY ADJ FREQ
FREQUENCY (PERCENT) (PERCENT)
-20$ 21 23.9 23.9
21$ - 40$ 37 42.0 65.9
41$ - 60$ 19 21.6 87.5
61$+ 11 12.5 100.0
Not determined 9 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 97 100.0
N = 88
maximum 90.00 MINIMUM 2.00
MEAN 38.57 STD DEV 20.21
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9.2.4. Level of Companies* Internationalization
The level of a company’s internationalization is measured in terms of 
the number of countries where the group maintains control over 
manufacturing (or other industrial) facilities, and the distribution 
of such countries over the different geographic areas of the world.
According to Table 9.VI, 34 companies (i.e 35 percent of the relevant 
total) operate in 5 different countries or less (U.K. excluded).
These are firms with a low level of internationalization. Twenty-nine
companies (i.e. 30 percent) have industrial facilities in 6-10
countries (medium level of internationalization). Sixteen
corporations (i.e. 17 percent) operate in 11-15 different countries
(high level of internationalization), and 17 companies (i.e. 18
percent) have industrial facilities in more than 16 countries (very 
high level of internationalization).
Results concerning the number of geographic areas where companies
operate are shown in Tables 9.VII and 9.VIII. The world was divided 
into seven different geographic regions, namely Europe (U.K. not 
included). United States & Canada, Latin America, Africa, Middle East, 
Asia, and Australia & New Zealand. The criterion used to define
geographic areas sought to ensure for each area a certain homogeneity
in the characteristics of the economic, political, legal, and social 
environments.
Table 9.VII provides the total number of companies which operate in 
each geographic area. It also provides for each area the average 
number of countries where companies own industrial facilities, as well 
ss the maximum and minimum observation, and a measure of dispersion. 
Tt is noteworthy that the great majority of companies are established 
In the U.S. or Canada (81 percent of the total), and in Europe (78
percent). Also Australia & New Zealand, and Africa are areas where
®ene than half of the companies operate. In contrast, the Middle East 
n^d Latin America are regions with a very low incidence, with only 25 
3nd 34 percent of the sample companies, respectively, operating there.
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It can be established that the higher the number of geographic areas 
where a company operates, the higher is its level of 
internationalization. According to Table 9.VIII only 7 firms (i.e 7 
percent) operate in a single geographic area. Twenty-seven companies 
(i.e, 28 percent) operate in 2-3 different areas. Twenty-eight
companies (i.e 29 percent) in 4 different areas. Twenty-six (i.e 27 
percent) in 5-6 areas, and 8 companies (i.e 8 percent) operate in all 
the 7 geographic areas of the globe.
9.2.5. Companies* International Experience
The number of years companies have been established overseas provides 
a measure of their international experience. Table 9.IX shows when 
companies established their first manufacturing (or other industrial) 
operation outside the U.K. About one-third of the sample (31 
companies) set up their first subsidiary between World War II and 
i960. Thirty-seven firms (i.e. 40 percent) did it before the second
World War, and 25 corporations (i.e 27 percent) became multinational 
only during the 1960s or more recently.
9.2.6. Organizational Structure
The way in which companies are structurally organized is another 
variable thought to be of relevance for the study. Firms were 
classified according to the typology defined by Channon [1973]» which 
seems to be particularly suited to the case of the British MNC.
 ^ vast number of companies in the sample - 40 (i.e. 41 percent)
recognized to have a holding company structure, being organized by 
bheir separate subsidiaries - see Table 9.X. The second most popular 
form of structure, is the organization by product in the domestic 
®srket and by geographic area in overseas markets; 19 firms (i.e. 20
percent) have this type of structure. Next come two other forms of
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Table 9.VIII - Number of Geographic Areas in Which Sample 
Firms Maintain Control Over Industrial 
Operations
ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE
ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY ADJ FREQ
FREQUENCY (PERCENT) (PERCENT)
One geographic area 7 7.3 7.3
Two geographic areas 16 16.7 24.0
Three geographic areas 11 11.5 35.4
Four geographic areas 28 29.2 64.6
Five geographic areas 11 11.5 76.0
Six geographic areas 15 15.6 91.7
Seven geographic areas 8 8.3 100.0
Not determined 1 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 97 100.0
N = 96
MEAN 3.97 STD DEV 1.76
Table 9.1% - Date of Establishment of Sample Firms* First
Industrial Operation Outside the U.K.
ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE :
ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY ADJ FREQ
FREQUENCY (PERCENT) (PERCENT)
Before 1900 10 10.8 10.8
Between 1900 and W.W.II 27 29.0 39.8
Between W.W.II and I960 31 33.3 73.1
During the 1960s 11 11.8 84.9
During the early 1970s 5 5.4 90.3
During the late 1970s 7 7.5 97.8
In the 1980s 2 2.2 100.0
Not determined 4 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 97 100.0
N = 93
median Between W.W.II and I960
300
9 / CHARACTERIZATION OF THE RESEARCH SAMPLE
multidivisional structure, namely the company-wide organization by 
product - 11 companies (i.e. 11 percent) - and the organization by
international division for overseas operations - 10 firms (i.e. 10
percent). To be noted that 4 corporations (i.e. 4 percent) have a
matrix or grid structure, this being generally associated with more 
complex and sophisticated forms of organizational structure.
9,2.7. Exposure to Host Country and Government Influence
Seme companies whose products are of strategic importance to host 
countries are particularly exposed to local government influence in 
their overseas operations. A high degree of exposure to host country 
and government influence may also affect companies which have as their 
major international costumers national governments or state-controlled 
organizations.
A scale of 1 to 5 was used in the questionnaire to determine the level 
of exposure perceived by the respondent. Table 9.XI tabulates the 
results. For slightly more than half of the companies (50 firms) 
exposure to host country and government influence is considered to be 
lower than moderate. For 22 firms (i.e. 23 percent), exposure is
moderate, and for another 22 companies (i.e. 23 percent) exposure is
perceived as higher than moderate.
9.2.8. Degree of Strategic Control Exercised by Headquarters Over 
Subsidiaries
Another important company characteristic, thought to be of consequence 
Ton the study, is the degree of control exercised by headquarters over 
Toreign subsidiaries as far as policy and strategic decisions are 
ooncerned. These include, basically, decisions involving definition 
product markets and of key products in subsidiaries, allocation of 
resources, expansion and diversification of subsidiary operations, and 
l^oice of technology in subsidiaries.
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Table 9.1 - Organizational Structure of the Sample Firms
ADJUSTED ADJ FREQ
ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY FOR EACH GROUP
FREQUENCY (PERCENT) (PERCENT)
Holding company structure 40 41.2 41.2
Functional structure 1 1.0 1.0
Multidivisional structure :
. Company-wide by product 11 11.3
. Company-wide by geographic 9 9.3
area
. By product in the domestic 19 19 .6
market and by geographic
area in overseas markets
. By international division 10 1 0 .3
for overseas operations
. Matrix or grid 4 4.1 5 4 .6
Other 3 3.1 3.1
TOTAL 97 100.0 100.0
N = 97
Table 9.II - Degree of Exposure to Host Country and Government 
Influence in Foreign Operations of Sample Firms
...
i
ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY
ADJUSTED
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
CUMULATIVE 
ADJ FREQ 
(PERCENT)
Low 1 30 3 1 . 9 3 1 . 9
2 20 21.3 53.2
Moderate 3 22 2 3 . 4 7 6 . 6
High
4 17 18.1 9 4 . 7
5 5 5.3 100.0
Hot determined 3 MISSING 100.0 1
total 97 100.0
N r 91|
Median 2 , 35
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R e s p o n d e n t s  were asked to rate the degree of control in their 
c o m p a n i e s  using a scale of 1 (loose control) to 5 (tight control). 
Results show that only 9 firms (i.e. 9 percent) exert a relatively
loose control (ratings of 1 and 2) over foreign subsidiaries - Table 
9.XII. In contrast, 65 companies (i.e. 68 percent) exercise a
re la t iv e ly  tight control (ratings of 4 and 5) over foreign operations, 
while in 22 corporations (i.e. 23 percent) the level of control is
considered to be moderate (rated 3 in scale).
9.2.9. Corporate Strategy
For purposes of this study corporate strategy is defined according to 
the way manufacturing (or other industrial) activity is organized 
internationally in a MNC. Following an adaptation of Doz [ 1980] 
typology, firms are classified into four categories each representing 
a distinct strategy.
Table 9.XIII shows that the majority of companies - 60 (i.e. 67
percent) - have a pure segmented nation-for-nation strategy, which 
means that manufacturing is based on local plants, substantially 
independent of each other, and serving primarily the local markets. 
This strategy involves a very low volume of intersubsidiary transfers. 
On the other extreme, there are 4 companies (i.e. 4 percent) which
have a pure global integration strategy, where manufacturing is 
integrated on a worldwide or regional (e.g. EEC) basis, with a 
Substantial volume of components, semi finished, and/or finished 
products being moved between plants located in different countries. A 
global integration strategy is difficult to find in its pure form, 
since elements of a segmented nation-for-nation strategy are likely to 
hs present at least in part of a company’s organization of 
international manufacturing activités. For this reason, two mixed 
strategies have been considered in the study. One is defined as 
having a higher propensity to a segmented nation-for-nation strategy, 
he other is defined as tending to a higher propensity to a global 
integration strategy. The latter form of strategy was found in 7 
°®panies (i.e. 8 percent), while the former was encountered in 19
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Table 9.HI - Degree of Strategic Control Exercised by 
Headquarters Over Foreign Subsidiaries in Sample 
Firms
ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE
ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY ADJ FREQ
FREQUENCY (PERCENT) (PERCENT)
Loose 1 3 3.1 3.1
2 6 6.2 9.4
Moderate 3 22 22.9 32.3
4 37 38.5 70.8
Tight 5 28 29.2 100.0
Not determined 1 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 97 100.0
1
N = 96
MEDIAN 3.96
Table 9.XIII - Strategies Followed by Sample Firms in the
Organization of Their International
Manufacturing Activities
ADJUSTED CUMULATIVE
ABSOLUTE FREQUENCY ADJ FREQ
FREQUENCY (PERCENT) (PERCENT)
Segmented nation-for-nation 60 66.7 66.7
strategy
Mixed strategy with a higher 19 21.1 87.8
propensity to a segmented
nation-for-nation strategy
Mixed strategy with a higher 7 7.8 95.6
propensity to a global
integration strategy
Global integration strategy 4 4.4 100.0
Hot determined 7 MISSING 100.0
total 97 100.0
N = 90
MEDIAN: Segmented nation-for-nation strategy
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firms (i.e. 21 percent). In aggregate, there are 30 corporations
(i.e . one third of the total) which have some form of global 
in teg ra tion . Among them, in 11 cases, (i.e 12 percent of the total) 
the integration of international manufacturing activities on a global 
basis takes a dominant part in the firms* overall strategy.
9.2.10. Oorporate International Philosophy
This variable results from the aggregation of two other variables 
previously discussed: the degree of strategic control exercised by 
headquarters over foreign subsidiaries, and the form of corporate 
strategy adopted by the company. Exhibit 9.1 depicts the 
relationships between the five degrees of strategic control exercised 
by the headquarters of a MNC and the four possible forms of 
organization of its international industrial activities. The 
terminology used was introduced by Perlmutter [1969], and subsequently 
developed by Rutenberg [1982], although their definition of terms is 
somewhat different from the one adopted here.
Companies with high levels of control and a segmented nation-for- 
nation strategy, i.e. ethnocentric companies, are, by far, the largest 
group, representing 42 percent of the sample (37 cases) - see Table 
9.XIV. Firms with moderate to low levels of control and a segmented 
strategy, polvcentric companies, account for 25 percent of the total 
(22 cases). Among the 30 corporations which have some form of global 
integration strategy (either in its pure form, or mixed with a 
segmented strategy), 11 companies (i.e. 12 percent of the total
sample) are geocentric. 16 firms (i.e. 18 percent) are ethnocentric-
and only 3 corporations (i.e 3 percent) are nolvcentric- 
^ggntrln - see Exhibit 9.1, for a definition of these classes.
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Table 9.HV - Corporate International Philosophy of Sample 
Firms
ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY
ADJUSTED
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
Ethnocentric 37 41.6
Pclycentrlc 22 24.7
Ethnocentric/Geocentric 16 18.0
Pclycentrlc/Geocentrl c 3 3.4
Geocentric 11 12.4
Not determined 8 MISSING
TOTAL 97 100.0
N = 89
Bxhlbit 9.1 - Definition of a Typology for Corporate International 
Philosophy in Multinational Companies
S T R A T E G Y
Segmented 
nation-for­
nât ion
Mixed with 
propensity 
to segmented
Mixed with 
propensity 
to global
Global
integration
5 Tight
H /
3 Moderate
/
2
 ^ Loose 
_
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9.3. ‘
The 97 companies participating in the present study have just been 
described in terms of ten major characteristics, involving thirteen 
different variables.
This summary section describes the modal company and the average 
company, and attempts to provide an idea of the dispersion of 
occurences for the quantitative variables. From an analysis of the 
results reported in the chapter, it can be concluded that the modal 
company is established internationally in the mechanical engineering 
business, has consolidated sales between £ 2 0 1 million and £500 
million, and consolidated net assets of £ 1 0 0 million or less; it 
originates abroad between 21 and 40 percent of its total revenue, and 
has 21 to 40 percent of its total assets located outside the U.K. 
This hypothetical firm is established in 5 countries or less, and 
operates in 4 different regions of the world. Its first manufacturing 
subsidiary was established between the second World War and I960. The 
group is organized in the holding company structure. The level of 
exposure to host country and government influence is low, the degree 
of control exercised by headquarters over foreign subsidiaries is 
relatively tight, and the way in which international industrial 
activities are organized indicates that the company practices a 
segmented nation-f or-nation strategy. Its corporate philosophy is 
associated with the ethnocentric type.
-average f-jprn has total consolidated sales amounting to £953 
million (standard deviation (SD) = 2195), and total consolidated net 
assets of £463 million (SD = 1281). It generates abroad 43 percent 
- 21) of its total revenues, and has 39 percent (SD = 20) of its 
assets located overseas. This firm operates in 10 countries (SD = 
and its activities are spread over 4 geographic areas of the 
''orld (SD = 1,8). Its exposure to local influences approaches the 
“®diuni level (median of 2.4 in a 1 - 5 scale), and the degree of control 
Poised by headquarters over subsidiaries is higher than moderate 
'•'«ian of H.o m  a 1 . 5  scale).
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(1) This figure refers to a MNC situated beyond the 500 largest 
companies mark which was exceptionally included in the survey 
results. The firm was contacted during the pilot of the 
questionnaire and its financial director interviewed. Due to the 
fact that the questionnaire had been successfully completed, and 
that the corporation was not very far from the cut-off level 
defined for the survey population, it was decided to include the 
company in the study.
For some companies it was not possible to determine whether the 
amount of foreign sales disclosed in the annual report included 
the amount of direct exports from the U.K. In such cases, the 
value disclosed in the report as sales abroad (irrespective of 
being sales by origin or sales by destination) was accepted.
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CHiPTER 10 - THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF FOREI® ENVIRONMENTAL 
INFORMATION BY GROUP'S HEADQUARTERS
10.1. T"*^roduGtlon
This chapter examines how, and to which extent headquarters collect 
and analyse information about foreign environments characteristic to 
host countries where companies already operate or expect to operate. 
Such information relates to various different aspects, namely economic 
(e.g. inflation, labour costs), political/legal (e.g. political risk, 
taxes), and social/cultural (e.g. strikes, attitudes). The use of 
environmental information is interpreted here in broad terms, and is 
not restricted to the context of subsidiary performance evaluation.
The chapter is structured in two major sections. The first, describes 
how the process of collecting and analysing information about foreign 
environments is organized in the headquarters of multinationals, what 
the information is essentially used for, which major characteristics 
of the local environments are subject to analysis, and which sources 
of information are predominant. The second section explores 
relationships between the way in which environmental information is 
processed and companies' characteristics included as independent or 
explanatory variables in the study.
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10 2. RAnort on Companies' Practices
10.2.1. Organization of the Environmental Assessment Activity
A first major concern of the study was to identify how foreign 
environmental information is collected and analysed in companies' 
headquarters, and how such activity is organized within parent 
companies. A primary objective was to discover whether the collection 
and analysis of information on foreign environments is formally set 
up, giving rise to an institutionalized function. As described in 
chapter 3 (section 3.4.), there is a paucity of information on the 
environmental assessment practices of British MNCs. The evidence 
from the U.S. points to a growing number of multinationals which have 
Institutionalized in hedqcarters an environmental scanning activity, 
creating for that purpose a new organizational function.
The results obtained from the companies studied show that in as many 
as 80 percent of all cases (i.e. 76 firms) foreign environmental
information is usually processed (collected and analysed) in 
headquarters - see Table 10.1. Among these, only 18 percent of the 
total respondents (17 firms), however, have the activity organized on 
a formal basis, with one or more managers being assigned formal 
responsibility for processing foreign environment information. In the 
vast majority of the cases (62 percent of the total), environmental 
information is regularly collected and analysed but no one in 
headquarters has been given formal responsibility for this. Here, 
information concerning conditions faced by companies overseas is 
collected and analysed only on an informal basis. Interviews carried 
ont with company directors tend to confirm, in these cases, the non- 
existence of an institutionalized function of environmental assessment 
and suggest that, for such companies, the use of environmental 
information is motivated by the necessity to react to particular 
rather than by a deliberate choice of proactively scanning the
environments.
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Table 10.1 - How Foreign Environmental Information is Collected and 
Analysed in Canpanies* Headquarters
ABSOLUTE
FREQ.
ADJUSTED
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
CUMULATIVE 
ADJ.FREQ. 
(PERCENT)
There are one or more managers with 
formal responsibility for 
collecting & analysing f.e.i.
17 17.9 17.9
F.e.l. is usually collected & 
analysed but nobody has formal 
responsibility for this.
59 62.1 80.0
The collection & analysis of f.e.i. 
is not usually carried out either 
on a formal or informal basis.
19 20.0 100.0
Not determined. 2 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 97 100.0
N (number of valid cases) = 95 
KEY: f.e.i. = foreign environmental information
W e  10.11 - Reasons That Motivate the Collection and 
Foreign Environmental Information in 
Headquarters
Analysis o 
Cmmpanies
ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY
ADJUSTED
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
CUMULATIVE 
ADJ FREQ 
(PERCENT)
Assessment of f.e. conditions only 
when the firm is considering new 
investments.
0 0.0 0.0
Monitoring of f.e. conditions only 
for existing operations.
8 10.7 10.7
Both 65 86.7 97.3
Other purposes - (Environmental 
scanning on a worlwide basis; & 
construction tenders)
2 2.7 100.0
o^t determined 
applicable
3
19
MISSING
MISSING
100.0
100.0
TOTAL 97 100.0
foreign environmental
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The c o lle c tio n  and analysis of environmental information may be
motivated basically by two different reasons: the need to assess
conditions in countries where companies are considering to invest, 
and/or the necessity to monitor conditions in countries where firms 
already operate. Table 10.11 shows that in most firms (8? percent of 
the a p p lic a b le  cases) the collection and analysis of foreign 
environmental information is motivated by both reasons taken together, 
and that in only a minority (11 percent) the collection and analysis 
of foreign environmental information is geared exclusively to the 
monitoring of conditions in countries where companies are already 
established.
Among the 17 companies that have institutionalized the environmental 
assessment function, only four have at least one professional involved 
in the analysis and/or collection of environmental information on a 
full-time basis. In the other corporations the individuals formally
responsible for the assessment of environmental information perform
this task only as part of their responsibilities. Table 10.Ill lists 
for these companies the number of people involved in this function on 
a part- and full-time basis.
In firms with more than one person performing the function, the 
environmental assessment activity may be undertaken either on an 
individual or on a team basis. Professionals formally responsible for 
the collection and analysis of environmental information can be found 
almost anywhere in headquarters' organizational structure. Table 10.IV 
shows where these individuals are actually located. In 14 companies 
(i.e.82 percent of the relevant cases) the planning department has at 
least one person who is formally responsible for monitoring overseas 
information. An individual (or individuals) with similar 
nesponsibilities is encountered in the finance/control department in 
of the firms (i.e. 71 percent). Professionals with such
responsibilities are also found in other sub-units, although in a much 
lesser extent: for example, in 6 companies (35 percent of the cases)
the environmental assessment function can be found in product 
v^isions; in 3 corporations (18 percent) this function is directly 
linked to the board of directors, presumably as an advisory staff 
®rgan, in general, the way in which the environmental assessment
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Table 10.111 - Nimber of People Formally Involved In HQ in the 
Collection and Analysis of Foreign Environmental 
Information
Inumber of people NUMBER OF MEAN STANDARD
iINVOLVED IN :
i
COMPANIES DEVIATION
FULL-TIME:
1 0 12
i 1 1
2 2 0.63 1.36
5 1 !
Not determined 1
TOTAL 17 1
PART-TIME:
0 1
1 - 3 8
b - 6 3 3.64 3.18
7 + 2
Not determined 
___ __
3
r - - —  
TOTAL 17
Table 10.IV - Organizational Subunits in HQ Which Have One or More 
People Formally Charged With the Task of Collecting 
and/or Analysing Foreign Environmental Information
NUMBER OF PCT OF PCT OF
PEOPLE RESPONSES CASES
12 27.3 70.6
14 31.8 82.4
2 4.5 11.8
5 11.4 29.4
6 13.6 35.3
1 2.3 5.9
3 6.8 17.6
1 2.3 5.9
44 100.0
finance/Control
Planning
Legal
In ternational D iv is io n  
Product D iv is io n s  
Public A ffa ir s  
Board of D ire c to rs  
thers -  (R e g io n a l Co-Ordinations)
TOTAL RESPONSES
= 17
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function is organized and its dimension vary greatly from company to 
company. In its simplest form, the function is performed by one member 
of the planning department with part-time responsibilities for the 
co lle c tion  of country information. In its most complex forms the
function can be rather sophisticated and comprehensive. In one case
observed, one of the largest U .K . companies, there are five analysts 
permanently engaged in the collection and analysis of information on 
overseas environments. They constitute a team organized formally in a 
service which is linked to the company's planning division. In another 
case, a fairly large consumer goods manufacturer, the assessment of 
environmental information is carried out by twelve managers as part of 
the ir responsibilities. These people are spread through five different 
organ iza tio na l subunits, namely the finance/control division, the 
planning division, the legal division, the international, and the
product divisions. These managers tend to conduct their analyses
independently of one another, though on certain occasions they may 
pool resources and act as teams.
10.2.2. Nature of the Environmental Information Processed
The nature of the environmental information processed in companies' 
headquarters is rather comprehensive. It covers not only information 
of an economic nature (such as exchange rates, inflation rates, market 
size, cost of production inputs, country economic growth), but also 
non-economic information, mainly political/legal (e.g. political
stability and risk, exchange controls, restrictions on profit 
remittances, taxation, incentives offered by governments), and 
social/cultural information (e.g. labour strikes and social unrest, 
attitude towards achievement and work, attitude towards foreign
companies, language and other cultural factors).
relative importance of each of these three types of information, 
was determined by the inclusion of a five-point scale in the
Questionnaire ( 1= not important; 5= very important). From the
r^alysis of Table 10.V, it can be concluded that economic information 
political/legal information are generally considered more
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important than social/cultural information. In fact, for new 
investments economic and political/legal types of information were 
regarded as either important (rated 4 in scale) or very important 
(rated 5) In 86 percent of the cases, whereas social/cultural 
information was given that level of importance in only 69 percent of 
the cases. For existing operations the difference is even higher: more 
than 64 percent of the companies considered economic and 
p o litic a l/legal information important or very important, as compared 
to 38 percent for social/cultural information. Another conclusion 
suggested by Table 10.V is that economic and non-economic types of 
environmental information are generally regarded as more important for 
new investments than for existing operations.
In order to determine whether such differences are statistically 
significant, tests of hypotheses which compare ranks were performed 
for groups of two variables. The statistic used was the 
Wilcoxon matched pairs siened-ranks test. This statistical approach 
appears to be particularly suitable in the present case since the 
variables under scrutiny are at the ordinal-level of measurement, and 
the situation to be analysed fits the model of test of differences for 
two related samples [e.g. Siegel, 1956, pp.75-83]. Table 10.VI shows 
for each couple of variables under comparison the number of cases 
included in the test, the value of Z to which the calculation of the 
Wilcoxon test is referred [Siegel, 1956, p.79; Hull and Nie, 1981, 
p.228] and the two-tailed probability, that is the probability of 
drawing by chance from the population any two samples that differ more 
than the pair actually drawn. The statistical analysis reported here 
confirms the observations previously made when discussing Table 10.V. 
In fact, there is a statistically significant difference (at the level 
nf 0.1 percent or less) either between economic information and 
social/cultural information, or between political/legal and 
social/cultural information, both for new investments and for existing 
operations (see Table 10. VI). There is also a statistically 
significant difference between the importance attributed to each type 
of information when used for new investments and when used for 
oxisting operations (probabilities of 0.5 percent and 0.099 percent or 
according to Table 10.VI).
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Table 10.VI - Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test to Compare the 
Differences In Importance Attributed to Various Types
of Information Processed by HQ
1
i
CASES Z TWO-TAILED
PROBABILITY
Economic Information * 64 -3.450 (0.001)
1 Social/Cultural Info.; ••
Political/Legal Info.' 64 -4.235 (0.000)
Social/Cultural Info. **
Economic Information i 65 -0.673 (0.501)
! Political/Legal Info.
1
; Economic Information 72 -5.000 (0.000)
12 Social/Cultural Info. ••
|;L---------------------------------------------------
i;, Polltloal/Legal Info., 72 -4.577 (0.000)
I^Social/Cultural Info. *•
[■,: Economic Information 73 -1.342 (0.180)
 ^ Political/Legal Info.
i Economic Information :
66  - 2 . 7 8 1
-Existing Operations 1 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  _  .
**
j Political/Legal Info. : ' 
-New Investments 
j -Existing Operations |
65 -4.465 (0.000)
**
: Social/Cultural Info. : !
-New Investments 1 
; -Existing Operations i
64 -4.335 (0.000)
**
: »» Mgnificant p .< 0.01 (i.e. 1$)
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10.2.3. Sources from which Environmental Information Is Collected
Foreign environmental information is collected from a wide range of 
different sources. Sources of information that are internal to the 
flms, i.e. subsidiary managers and headquarters executives (via, for 
example, personal visits to locations), are by far the most used and 
the most highly rated in importance. In fact, an inspection of Table 
10.VII reveals that the only sources of information that are regularly 
used in virtually all the companies surveyed are subsidiary and 
headquarters executives (internal sources). These were regarded as 
either important or very important sources of information in 
respectively 79 and 75 percent of the cases. All the other sources 
(external) were attributed comparable high ratings in only a minority 
of cases. Among the external sources of information, banks and 
business periodicals & media in general are the most used and those 
generally considered of higher importance (median ratings of 2.8 in 
both cases). Next come specialized publications, including country 
reports by organizations such as "Business International", "The 
Economist Intelligence Unit", "Business Environment Risk Information" 
(BERI), and country risk indices like BERI and PSSI (Political System 
Stability Index). These specialized publications are used in 55 
companies. Other firms and British embassies & local chambers of 
commerce are sources also widely used on a regular basis. In the 
bottom of the list come the British Overseas Trade Board and 
international organizations such as the United Nations, The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the 
International Monetary Fund which are used in less than 50 firms 
see Table 10.VII.
Tbe interviews conducted with company directors tended to support the 
findings reported above, in that there seems to be a marked preference 
for internal sources of information. Environmental information may be 
reported either on a formal basis through established channels created 
between headquarters and subsidiaries, i.e. the internal reporting 
system, or on an informal basis through communication networks 
involving many people, generally using personal contacts and the 
telephone. Both aspects will be discussed and analysed in later
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Table 10.TII - Sources of Foreign Bneironaental Information
SOURCES OF FOREICaJ
environmental
information
N O T
U S E D
U S E D
T o ta l
N
R a t i n g
J
<
Subsidiary managers 0 76
1
2
v_
2
3
3
11
__ /
4
19
\
5
41
/
Median
4.57
z
K
oi 100% 21.1% 78.9%
(Ü
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chapters of the study. One particular point emerging from the
interviews is that sources of information external to the firm 
generally complement one another, constituting a pool of valuable 
information when taken as a whole. For this reason, the reading of 
the relative importance attributed individually to each external 
source of information should be made with some care.
10.2.4. Major uses for Environmental Information
The integration of the environmental assessment process into decision 
making is reflected in Table 10.VIII, which shows the major uses 
within headquarters for information on overseas environments. 
Generally, environmental information tends to support a widespread 
range of decisions made in companies' headquarters. A very large 
proportion of companies reported the use of environmental information 
in decisions regarding control and evaluation of their existing 
operations (93 percent of total respondents, i.e. 71 companies). 
Initial investments in new countries (87 percent), and expansion 
investments in countries where companies are already located ( 83 
percent). Corporate strategic planning is also a user of foreign 
environmental information in 78 percent of the companies surveyed. A 
large proportion of firms ( 75 percent) also referred to disinvestment 
decisions as users of information about foreign countries. The lowest 
Incidence of use for environmental information, among those listed in 
Table 10.VIII, are capital investment decisions involving replacement 
Investments (in only 54 percent of the cases has environmental 
Information been used for this purpose). Note, however, that even 
this is a reasonably high proportion.
^ong the 71 corporations that reported the use of environmental 
information in the control and evaluation of overseas subsidiaries, 51 
(i-e* 72 percent) said that data about foreign environments is used 
G^gularly as part of the continuous control and evaluation process of 
foreign subsidiaries' operating performance. In 19 cases (27 
poncent), environmental information is used in subsidiary performance 
evaluation only occasionally, when special circumstances either in the
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Table 10.VIII - Major Uses for Environmental Information Within 
Companies' Headquarters
COUNT
PCT OF 
RESPONSES
PCT OF 
CASES
Capital Investment decisions:
- Initial investments 66 18.4 86.8
- Expansion investments 63 17.6 82.9
- Replacement investments 41 11.5 53.9
Disinvestment decisions 57 15.9 75.0
Corporate strategic planning 59 16.5 77.6
Control and evaluation of existing 71 19.8 93.4
operations i!
Other uses - (Trading & fiscal/legal 1 0.3 1.3 :
structures) i
TOTAL RESPONSES 358 100.0
1
N = 76
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company or in the host environments emerge.
10.2.5. Discussion and Conclusions
The importance of the environmental assessment activity for the 
success and eventual survival of a corporation was extensively 
discussed in Chapter 3. It was seen there that companies operating at 
a multinational scale are likely to be subject to a wide variety of 
environmental influences, the consequences of which for the companies' 
overall strategy indicate the need for an activity of collection and 
analysis of environmental information. A number of studies, centred 
on American MNCs, suggest that environmental scanning has evolved in 
its complexity and sophistication over the years. It appears that 
from very rudimentary systematic scanning methods and a reduced use of 
environmental information in decision making [e.g. Aharoni, 1966; 
Root, 1968b; Keegan, 1974], companies' processes gradually became more 
complex and formalized [LaPalombara and Blank, 1977], reaching a level 
of refinement and sophistication that implies the institutionalization 
In most companies of a formal function of collection and analysis of 
environmental information [Kobrin et al., 1980; Kennedy, 1984].
The present study shows that while 80 percent of the firms examined 
process foreign environmental information in hedquarters, only less 
than 20 percent have the activity formally organized. The majority. 
In fact, collect and analyse environmental information only on an 
informal basis. This result suggests that the institutionalization of 
the environmental assessment activity is perhaps not so widespread 
among British MNCs as it is among American multinationals. As seen in 
Qiapter 3, the recent surveys of Kobrin et al. [1980] and Kennedy 
[1984] revealed that the majority of the U.S. MNCs studied had already 
set up in headquarters a formal function whose purpose was to collect 
and analyse information on host environments.
those British multinationals which have the environmental 
assessment function institutionalized, there are one or more 
Individuals in the headquarters with formal responsibiity for the
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collection and analysis of environmental information. This task is, 
however, usually conducted as only part of their responsibilities. 
The ascertainment of the locus of the function in headquarters' 
organizational structure revealed that in most cases the planning and 
the finance/control departments have one or more professionals charged 
with the task of assessing foreign environments. In a few cases, 
bodies such as the international division, product divisions and the 
board of directors also have people formally engaged in environmental 
assessment.
The collection and analysis of environmental information in any 
company where this activity is carried out either formally or 
informally is normally generated by the need to assess conditions in 
countries where corporations are considering to invest, and by the 
necessity to monitor conditions in countries where firms already 
operate. Despite this dual role of the assessment function, 
environmental information is generally regarded as more important for 
new investments than for existing operations. As to the nature of the 
information processed, a wide ground is covered, including data on 
economic, political/legal, and social/cultural conditions in host 
countries. In general, economic and political/legal types of 
information are considered more important than information of a 
social/cultural nature. The sources from which environmental 
information is collected are varied, complementing each other in order 
to form a pool of data. Generally, sources internal to the firms 
(their managers) are more used and considered of a higher importance 
than external sources, such as banks, the media and specialized 
publications.
Having characterized the way in which the environmental assessment 
activity is organized, and also the nature and origin of the 
information processed, the section concluded with the determination of 
the major uses given to the environmental information. In almost 
company that conducts the environmental assessment activity, 
environmental information is used in the control and evaluation of 
operations, normally as part of the continuous assessment process of 
subsidiaries' operating performance. Other activities and decisions 
Ose environmental information. Among these are capital investment
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decisions in new locations, expansion investments, corporate strategic 
planning, and disinvestment decisions.
10.3. Findings on ForelKiL Environmental Assessment Practices and
Companies' Characteristics
This section explores relationships between the different ways in 
which foreign environmental information is collected and analysed in 
headquarters and companies' characteristics, such as size, commitment 
to foreign operations, international experience, organizational 
structure, strategy, etc. (see chapter 9 for a detailed description of 
companies' characteristics).
Major hypotheses in the study are tested using a decision model that 
includes the formulation of null hypotheses for testing statistical 
significance [Lapin 1978, ch.9]. The decision model is composed of 
five elements: the null hypothesis (Ho), the alternative hypothesis
(Ha), the statistical test, the level of significance ((X), and the 
decision rule.
The first component of the decision model, the null hvpothesis. will 
he explicitly stated for every test performed in the study. Whenever 
possible, the null hypothesis will be formulated in a directional 
form (i.e. Ho: u^  > U2 or u^  < U2 , where u^  and U2 values
for a given statistic computed for two samples or populations under
analysis). However, nondirectional hypotheses (i.e. Ho: ui = U2 ) 
will be common in the study due to either difficulties encountered in 
anticipating the direction of the tests' outcomes, or the 
impossibility to test directional hypotheses when using certain
statistical techniques, such as chi-square [Downie and Starry, 1977,
ch.6].
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■nie second component of the decision model, the a l t e r n a t i v e  
j^ P^ thesis, is simply the logical opposite of the null hypothesis. 
Hence, the presentation of a formal statement with the former is not 
considered necessary in the study.
The choice of the statistical test for testing Ho, the third aspect in 
the decision model, will take into account for each case the 
specific ity  of the situation being analysed (e.g. independence between 
variables, comparison of sample means), the level of measurement (i.e. 
nominal, ordinal, interval, or ratio) at which the variables under 
scrutiny are situated, and the power and efficiency of the alternative 
statistics under consideration [Siegel, 1956, ch.3].
An essential component of the decision model is the cut-off level 
of significance (cK ) established for the test, which provides the 
probability of incurring in a Type I error. The most commonly used 
level of C/ is 0.05 [Emory, 1980, p.412], although any values less 
than 0.50 are permissible [Downie and Starry, 1977, p.70]. A common 
standard, very conservative in nature, is 0.01; studies sometimes 
adopt more generous significance levels in the region of 0.20 [e.g.
Yunker, 1982]. In the present study, and unless otherwise stated, a 
statistical test will be regarded as significant when its significance 
level falls to the mark of 5 percent or less (i.e. p ^ 0.05).
Considering that null hypotheses will be stated in such a way as to 
make Type I errors the crucial error, the cut-off significance level 
adopted here is regarded as a fairly safe one (confidence level of 95 
percent). As regards Type II errors, which are not under the direct 
control of the researcher, the relatively large sample sizes present 
in the study will hopefully guarantee an acceptably low probability of 
their incurrence.
last component of the decision model, the decision rule, is 
intimately linked to the cut-off significance level that is set. 
e^jection or acceptance of a null hypothesis are a consequence of the 
position (higher or lower) of the significance level (p) computed for 
h^e statistic being utilized in relation to the cut-off significance 
Isvel (o() previously adopted.
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Major statistical tests exploring relationships between 
c o m p a n i e s ' practices and corporate characteristics will be presented in 
this and the next chapters. Each test will follow the decision model 
just described. In particular, a statement with the null hypothesis 
vill be included in each case together with a discussion of the 
specific statistical techniques adopted.
TestJL
This test explores the relationships between the way in which the 
environmental assessment activity is organized in headquarters (i.e. 
whether or not the activity exists in the companies' headquarters and, 
if so, whether it is formally institutionalized), and the corporate 
characteristics of the respective companies. It is hypothesized, as a 
major relationship to be tested (see chapter 7), that corporations 
where collection and analysis of foreign environmental information has 
been institutionalized as a formal function, tend to be those which 
have adopted a corporate strategy which favours a global integration 
of manufacturing activity. It is also hypothesized that the way in 
which environmental assessment activity is organized is associated 
with the other company features selected for the study. For example, 
it is anticipated that multinationals with higher levels of commitment 
to foreign operations, or higher levels of internationalization tend 
to attach greater importance to environmental assessment, this being 
reflected in the existence of a formal function which collects and 
analyses information on overseas environments.
The null hypothesis states that:
Hoi: there is no association between the way in whicdi the
activity of collecting and analysing foreign environmental
information is organized in headquarters and:
• the dominant industrial activity of the international
operations of a company;
• the size of a company;
• the level of a cwmpany's commitment to foreign operations;
• the level of a company's internationalization;
• the international experience of a company;
• the organizational structure of a company;
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. the level of a company's exposure to host country and
government influence;
, the degree of strategic control exercised in a company by
headquarters over foreign subsidiaries; and 
. the strategy adopted by a company.
In order to test independence between variables, chi-SQuare (\2) was 
the statistical technique adopted because there is always at least 
one variable under scrutiny that is at the nominal-level of 
measurement. Chi-square belongs to the class of nonparametric, or 
distribution-free statistical tests and, therefore, it is free from 
the assumption of normally distributed populations [Lapin, 1978, 
ch.15].
One assumption generally specified for chi-square is that each 
expected cell frequency should be at least 5 when degrees of freedom 
(d.f.) are greater than 1, i.e. when contingency tables on which chi- 
square is based are larger than 2x2 [Lapin, 1978, p.507; Downie and 
Starry, 1977, pp.90-92]. Frequently, this is difficult to achieve and 
avast literature recognizes that when d.f.> 1 "the \  ^  test may be 
used if fewer than 20 percent of the cells have an expected frequency 
of less than 5 and if no cell has an expected frequency of less than 
1" [Siegel, 1956, p. 110]. This recommendation is based on an 
Investigation conducted by Cochran [1954], and can also be found, for 
example, in Emory [1980, p.416], and Keeping [1962, p.316].
If these requirements are not met by the data as they were originally 
collected, adjacent categories in either rows or columns may be 
combined in order to increase the expected frequencies in the critical 
cells [e.g. Siegel, 1956 , p. 110]. Combination of categories will be 
used in this study whenever necessary. For operational reasons, the 
Ghi-square statistic will be accepted when 22.2 percent of the 
expected frequencies are smaller than 5, provided that in these 
Extreme cases the minimum expected cell frequency be substantially 
higher than 1 (i.e. in the region of 3 or 4).
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As tests of independence, like chi-square, merely indicate the 
presence of association, not its magnitude, "post hoc" procedures to 
obtain a numerical estimate of the strength of the relationship become 
necessary [Downie and Starry, 1977, p.90 and ch. 14]. As was mentioned 
before, in Test 1 there is always at least one variable under scrutiny 
that is at the nominal-level of measurement. The measures of 
association adopted here were Cramer's V, and the uncertainty 
coefficient (asymmetric). Cramer's V is a statistic based on chi- 
square which can be used when both variables are at the nominal-level. 
Cramer's V was selected for this study instead of the contingency 
coefficient, which is another statistic of the same type very often 
utilized in social research, because it has 1 as an upper limit. On 
the contrary, the contingency coefficient does not have a fixed upper 
limit, since this is determined in each case by the number of columns 
and rows [Downie and Starry, 1977, ch. 14]. The 
uncertain tv coefficient (asymmetric) is also used when both variables 
are at the nominal-level but, unlike Cramer's V, is based on the 
concept of proportional reduction in error, being therefore a 
probability statistic [Nie et al., 1975, ch. 16]. The asymmetric value 
of the uncertainty coefficient may be understood as the proportion by 
which "uncertainty" in one of the variables (termed dependent for 
purposes of the test) is reduced by knowledge of the other variable 
(termed independent). The concept of uncertainty has been imported 
from information theory and relates to the ambiguity of data 
distributions.
Contingency tables relating the variables implied in the null
hypothesis defined above were constructed, and summary statistics 
(notably chi-square) were computed. Table 10. IX presents in a 
condensed form the chi-square statistic and the respective level of 
significance computed for these variables. For reasons of clarity,
the following account of the statistical results achieved will 
concentrate on those relationships proven to be statistically
significant.
most significant result was obtained between the organization of 
the environmental assessment activity and the strategy followed by 
companies in their international industrial activities. The chi-square
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statistic for the two variables produced, according to the SPSS
software, an extremely high significance level of 0.0000, which means 
that the probability of incurring in a Type I error (reject Ho when Ho 
is true), is less than 1 in 10,000. The strength of the association 
between the two variables is also substantial, with a Cramer's V of 
0,l|97 and an uncertainty coefficient (asymmetric) of 0.132. An 
analysis of Table I in Appendix D which crosstabulates the two
variables, shows that 81 percent of the companies where the 
environmental assessment function is institutionalized in headquarters 
are firms with some form of global integration of their manufacturing 
activities, i.e. are companies where the whole or part of their
industrial activity is integrated on a worldwide or regional (e.g. 
EEC) basis, with substantial volume of components, semi-finished, 
and/or finished products moving between plants located in different 
countries. In contrast, 88 percent of the corporations where the
collection and analysis of foreign environmental information is not 
usually carried out in headquarters either on a formal or informal 
basis, are firms with a segmented nation-for-nation strategy, i.e. are 
firms where manufacturing is based on local plants substantially 
independent of each other with a very low volume of intersubsidiary 
transfers. Companies whose organization of the environmental 
assessment activity fits in-between these two cases - firms where 
environmental information is collected and analysed in headquarters 
but only on an informal basis - tend to have a segmented nation-for- 
nation strategy (74 percent of the cases).
Another very significant result was obtained between the way in which 
the environmental assessment activity is organized and the level of a 
company's internationalization, measured by both the number of foreign 
countries and the number of major geographic areas in the world where 
companies maintain control over industrial operations, (see Table 
Analysis of the respective contingency tabulations (see 
Tables II and III in Appendix D) reveal that corporations with 
formally institutionalized functions tend very markedly to have high 
levels internationalization. In fact, 94 percent of the total number 
eY firms which have in headquarters one or more managers with formal 
■'esponsibility for collecting and analysing foreign environmental 
Reformation, operate in six or more countries, spread over four or
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more geographic areas in the world. On the other hand, companies 
where the environmental assessment activity is non-existent in 
headquarters either on a formal or informal basis, tend to have a 
limited international involvement. In effect, 68 percent of the firms 
where environmental assessment activity is absent, are established in 
five or less countries, and in three or less geographic areas. Among 
those corporations where the environmental assessment activity exists 
in headquarters only on an informal basis, 65 percent operate in six 
or more countries and in four or more geographic areas.
Also associated with particular ways in which the environmental 
assessment activity is organized in headquarters is the degree of a 
company's exposure to host country and government influence in foreign 
operations (Table 10.IX). Multinationals in which the environmental 
assessment function has been formally set up in headquarters tend to 
have higher levels of exposure. Table IV in Appendix D shows that 71 
percent of such firms perceive exposure to host country influence as 
medium (rated 3 in scale of 1 to 5) to high (rated 5 in scale). In 
contrast, 78 percent of those companies where environmental 
information is not collected or analysed in headquarters either 
formally or informally, perceive environmental exposure as low (rated 
1 or 2 in scale). For those corporations where foreign environmental 
information is processed in headquarters only in an informal way, the 
degree of exposure is evenly distributed between the two categories 
(low, and medium to high).
Finally, the organization of the environmental assessment activity was 
3lso found to be associated with the degree of control exercised by 
headquarters over foreign subsidiaries, as far as policy and strategic 
decisions are concerned - e.g. decisions involving definition of key 
products in subsidiaries, allocation of resources, expansion and 
diversification of subsidiary operations. As Table V in Appendix D 
demonstrates, firms with formal environmental assessment functions 
tend to exert ti^t control over subsidiaries, whereas firms with no 
environmental assessment activity at all tend to have loose control 
foreign operations. The great majority of firms where 
environmental information is collected and analysed (either on a 
formal or informal basis) exercise tight strategic control over
331
10 / the collection and analysis of FOREIOI ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION
subsidiaries (rated 4 or 5 in a 1 to 5 scale). In contrast, among 
companies where environmental assessment is absent, the majority (53 
percent) apply to subsidiaries loose to moderate levels of control 
(ra tings of 1 to 3 in scale).
Tests of independence conducted between the organization of the 
environmental assessment activity and corporate characteristics that 
produced chi-square statistics with levels of significance situated 
above the cut-off point of 5 percent (Table 10.IX) cannot be used to 
reject the respective null hypothesis. In these cases, association 
between the relevant variables is not accepted.
Smwarv; Test 1 has shown that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the way in which the environmental assessment 
activity is organized in companies' headquarters and: 1) the strategy
followed by companies in the organization of their international
industrial activities; 2) the degree of companies' 
internationalization; 3) the level of companies' exposure to host
country and government influence in foreign operations; and 4) the 
degree of control exercised by parents over overseas subsidiaries as 
far as policy and strategic decisions are concerned. The very great 
majority of corporations where the environmental assessment function 
has been formally institutionalized in headquarters have some form of 
global integration of their international industrial activities, have 
high levels of internationalization (they operate in six or more
countries, located in four or more world geographic areas), have
higher levels of exposure to local conditions (they perceive exposure 
as medium to high), and practise a tighter strategic control over 
foreign subsidiaries (they exercise more than moderate control over
their operations abroad). In contrast, those firms from which the 
environmental assessment activity is absent, even informally, tend 
e^ry markedly to have a pure segmented nation-for-nation strategy, 
''tth international industrial activities based on local plants mainly 
Independent of each other. They also tend to have lower levels of 
internationalization, lower degrees of exposure to local conditions, 
snd closer strategic control over foreign subsidiaries.
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These results show that it is those MNCs that are more likely to be 
afffeoted by variations in the host environments (i.e. companies with 
global strategies, high levels of environmental exposure, and tight 
s tra teg ic  control over subsidiaries), and that are subject to a higher 
environmental variation (i.e. companies operating in a larger number 
of countries and geographic areas) that the collection and analysis of 
foreign environmental information tends to be more sophisticated and 
form alized.
10.4. Snmmarv and Oonclosions
This first chapter of results introduced the organizational context of 
the environmental assessment activity in British MNCs. It was seen 
earlier in the discussion of the theoretical foundation of the study 
(Chapter 3)» that environmental scanning, by helping to detect present 
and future threats and opportunities, is indispensable to the 
determination of the strategic direction of a corporation. In the 
particular case of MNCs, the diversity of environmental influences to 
which operations are subject, and the correspondence of this to the 
overall success of the companies, suggest an increased need for an 
activity of environmental assessment.
Scanning or assessment of the environment implies the collection and 
analysis of intelligence using methods that may vary greatly in their 
degree of formality and sophistication. The evidence from U.S.-based 
multinationals indicates that the environmental assessment activity 
has gradually grown in complexity and importance, reaching the stage 
where most large MNCs have already created in headquarters a formal 
environmental function. The results from the present study show 
that in only 18 percent of the companies the environmental assessment 
activity has been formally institutionalized. In the rest, the 
activity is either exercised on an informal basis (62 percent), or not 
axercised at all (20 percent). Although these findings are not 
directly comparable with those obtained in the American surveys, it
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appears that a smaller proportion of British multinationals practice 
the environmental assessment activity on a formal basis than the MNCs 
originating from the U.S.
In the limited number of companies that have the activity formally 
organized, there are one or more headquarters' professionals with 
formal responsibility for the collection and analysis of environmental 
conditions encountered in countries where new investments are planned, 
or in  territories already operated. Most of the times these people, 
who tend to be located in headquarters subunits such as the planning 
d iv is ion  and the finance/control department, process environmental 
in form ation only as part of their responsibilities.
The American survey conducted by Kobrin et al. [1980] indicated that 
the institutionalization of the environmental assessment function 
occurred mainly in larger and more international companies, and also 
in firms operating in industries that were more susceptible of being 
affected by environmental influences. A statistical test conducted in 
the chapter (Test 1) attempted the definition of the profile of the 
companies which possess more elaborate and formalized activities of 
collection and analysis of environmental information. The results 
showed that firms in whose headquarters the environmental assessment 
function had been formally institutionalized tend to practise global 
integration strategies, have high levels of exposure to host country 
and government influence, exercise a tight strategic control over 
subsidiaries, and have high levels of internationalization (measured 
hy the number of countries and world geograpic areas operated). 
This indicates that high levels of sophistication present in the 
organization of the environmental assessment activity are linked to 
the vulnerability of the multinationals to the impact of foreign
environments (for example are present mainly in companies with
globally integrated industrial activities, and in firms highly exposed 
to local governments). The way in which the environmental activity is 
organized is also linked to the level of variation in the
oharacteristics of the environments to which multinationals are
o^bject (it is assumed that companies operating in a large number of 
countries spread over different geographic regions experience higher 
of environmental variation).
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As to the nature of the information processed, the empirical studies 
reviewed in chapter 3 suggested that the collection and analysis of 
economic data usually preceded the use of information of a non­
economic nature. The study revealed that among the companies that 
process environmental information, either formally or informally, non­
economic data is widely used. Certain types of non-economic 
information, related to political and legal issues, were even 
generally considered as important as economic information. On the 
other hand, non-economic data regarding social and cultural issues 
were viewed as less important.
Environmental information is collected from a very wide range of 
sources, from which those internal to the companies are predominant. 
In effect, the study agrees in this respect with the findings of the 
American surveys, and in particular, with Kobrin et al. [1980], in the 
sense that interpersonnel communication among executives both in 
subsidiaries and headquarters is the preferred source of information 
on host environments. In addition to these, other sources external to 
the companies are also used. Among the most common are banks, the 
media in general, and specialized publications such as B.I., E.I.Ü., 
B.E.R.I., and P.S.S.I.
One aspect that did not emerge very clearly from the surveys reviewed 
in Chapter 3, was how the environmental information is integrated in 
the decision making process and, particularly, in the evaluation and 
control of foreign subsidiaries. The present study attempted to 
determine which major uses are given to the information retrieved in 
the environmental assessment activity. A widespread range of 
decisions were found to be supported by environmental information. 
The most common were major capital investment decisions, and control 
and evaluation of operations. This latter use is of particular 
Interest to the study, and it is noteworthy that almost all the 
multinationals that centrally process foreign environmental 
information use it in subsidiary performance evaluation, either in a 
formal or informal way. In the majority of these cases, environmental 
information is used regularly as part of the continuous process of 
Gvaluation and control of overseas operations.
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CHiPTER 11 - INTERNAL REPORTING SYSTEMS OPERATED BETWEEN FOREIGN 
SUBSIDIARIES AND GROUP'S HEADQUARTERS
11.1. Tntroductlon
This chapter is primarily concerned with the flow of information 
reported internally by foreign subsidiaries to headquarters, through 
formal (i.e. institutionalized) channels. Such channels constitute 
the internal reporting system, whose contents include formal and
standardized reports containing information of both quantitative and
qualitative nature. As seen in chapter 4 (section 4.3.1.) the internal 
reporting system is normally based on the FIS in whose core lies 
accounting information. However, in most cases the internal reporting 
system is not circumscribed to information of a financial nature for
non-financial information is also included in the system.
The design of a reporting system can be characterized as to the 
content, frequency and magnitude of reporting, and the degree of 
system standardization (chapter 4). In the present chapter the
internal reporting systems operated between foreign affiliates and 
parents are described in terms of the above criteria. In particular, 
the report on companies' practices that follows will describe which 
items are included in the reporting systems, what the time interval 
between consecutive submission of these items is, how uniform 
reporting requirements for all foreign subsidiaries in a company are, 
end how reporting systems operated between foreign subsidiaries and 
headquarters differ from those operated between domestic divisions and 
headquarters.
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^^ 2. Rfnort on Companies* Practices
11,2.1. Content and Reporting Frequency of Internal Systems
The content of the internal reporting systems operated between foreign 
subsidiaries and headquarters for the companies participating in the 
study is presented in Table 11.1, which also includes information 
about the reporting frequency of each item. The table lists all the 
Items specified in the questionnaire, classified according to their 
nature as financial and non-financial. It also includes under the 
category "others" those items not mentioned in the questionnaire but 
which were most frequently added to the list by respondents.
The incidence of financial items in the internal reporting systems is 
substantially higher than the incidence of non-financial items. All 
the reports of a financial nature that are listed in Table 11.1 are 
included in almost every company surveyed. Balance sheets, profit and 
loss accounts, and reports on borrowings in subsidiaries from local 
sources are included in the reporting systems of virtually all the 
companies; up-dates of the year-end profit forecasts, and cash-flow 
statements are included in 99 percent of the cases; reports on sales 
per product or business, and up-dates of the budgeted year-end balance 
sheets are included in 96 and 89 percent of the cases respectively. 
On the other hand, the presence of non-financial reports in the 
reporting systems varies widely from item to item, ranging from a high 
of 87 percent for reports on economic conditions in host countries, to 
alow of 55 percent for reports on product quality - see Table 11.1.
The items Included in the internal reporting systems operated between 
foreign subsidiaries and headquarters are subject to a great variation 
reporting frequency. In general, financial items tend to be 
Submitted by subsidiaries rather frequently. Reports on borrowings in 
subsidiaries from local sources are the item most often reported by 
foreign subsidiaries: in 87 companies (i.e. 90 percent of the cases
which include this item in their reporting system) these reports are
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forwarded by subsidiaries once every month or week (Table 1 1 . 1 ) .  Next 
in frequency come profit and loss accounts, sales per product or 
business, and cash-flows generated in subsidiaries. The financial item 
that is reported less frequently relates to up-dates of the budgeted 
year-end balance sheets: in most cases such up-dates are submitted
once every quarter or less often. (Table 1 1 . 1 )
The reporting frequency of non-financial items included in companies’ 
internal reporting systems varies widely from item to item. Inventory 
levels (in quantity) and production output are the reports submitted 
most frequently by foreign subsidiaries: the majority of companies
have these items reported monthly - Table 11.1. In contrast, there 
are a number of items whose reporting frequency is very low. Market 
shares in host countries are forwarded once every year or only 
occasionally in 70 percent of all cases (i.e. 47 companies)
Similarly, reports on labour relations, product quality, and 
political, legal and social conditions in host countries are, in the 
majority of cases, only reported annually or occasionally.
Of particular interest to this study are the incidence and reporting
frequency of reports on economic and non-economic environmental
conditions faced in host countries, forwarded by foreign subsidiaries 
to companies’ headquarters. Reports on economic conditions are 
included In the internal reporting systems of the overwhelming 
majority of the companies (87 percent). Most often the item is 
reported regularly, for in only 18 percent of the cases is the item 
submitted on an occasional basis. As to the frequency with which
reports on local economic conditions are forwarded, in nearly half of
the cases (45 percent) the item is reported either every quarter or
every month (Table 1 1 .1 ) .
The Incidence and frequency of reports on political, legal and social 
conditions In host countries are lower than those found for reports on 
economic conditions. However, considering that these reports on non­
economic conditions are of a specialized nature, it is noteworthy that 
^^e great majority of companies (80 percent of the total) include
them formally in their internal reporting system. Among these firms, 
early one third request the item simply on an occasional basis, and
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Bore than another third have it reported only every year. Therefore, 
and in contrast with the reports on economic environmental conditions, 
only a relatively small minority of companies have political, legal 
and social reports frequently submitted by foreign subsidiaries (Table 
1 1 . 1 ).
Interviews with company executives carried out as a follow-up to the 
questionna ire  tended to discover an increasing awareness on the part 
of headquarters executives towards the importance of reporting 
economic and non-economic environmental issues related to operating 
abroad. In one particular case, reports on economic conditions had 
just been introduced formally in the company's internal reporting 
system, and included the provision of a number of economic indicators 
as well as of more "soft" information. In another case, a company 
with extensive interests in plantations mainly in Africa and Asia, 
economic reports on local conditions have been a part of the reporting 
system for many years, however, only recently has the company started 
to request from the general managers of selected subsidiaries written 
information about the political, legal and social "climate" in the 
respective countries. The general impression collected from the 
interviews is that the request for economic information from 
subsidiaries tends to be long established in companies, whereas the 
request for political, legal and social information is a much more 
novel feature of companies' internal reporting systems. It has been 
observed in the interviews that the degree of detail and 
sophistication of the reports on economic and non-economic 
environments varies widely from company to company, and even within 
bhe same company it varies substantially from subsidiary to 
subsidiary. In most cases these reports are not standardized, and 
bhelr level of detail is left to the discretion of subsidiary 
managers.
1^*2.2. Standardization of the Internal Reporting Systems
The content and reporting frequency of the internal reporting systems 
operated between foreign subsidiaries and headquarters were
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characterized for the typical (i.e. most common) case in each 
companyd). However, in some companies the characteristics of the 
Internal reporting systems are likely to differ among foreign 
subsidiaries. Table 11.11 attempts to portray the level of 
standardization of the companies' reporting requirements for overseas 
subsidiaries. Four different types of reporting requirements are
considered: the number of formal reports required from subsidiaries,
the content of such reports, the format (i.e. the way in which
information is presented) of the reports, and the frequency (i.e. the
time interval between consecutive submission of a same form) of the 
reports. The great majority of companies apply the same reporting 
requirements to all foreign subsidiaries. Only a small minority seems 
trying to adapt requirements to the specificity of subsidiaries (see 
Table 11.11).
Differences in format, despite being the most common change found in 
reporting requirements, were not considered in general particularly 
important, provided that the reports were able to supply all the
requisite and necessary information. According to some managers: 
"format is not critical and we accept that most suited to local 
management needs"; "HQ is happy to extract the key data it needs from 
a format which suits the business and needs of each division"; 
"accounting format is a local management requirement for managing the 
local business and as long as certain minimum information is provided 
the precise format is not dictated". As to differences in number, 
frequency, and above all content of formal reports, company executives 
said that changes among subsidiaries were due primarily to the size of 
operations and the nature of subsidiaries' activity. Many companies 
specifically mentioned that small subsidiaries do not have the means 
to provide the level of information that is requested to major 
operations, and, therefore, they are assigned reduced reporting 
requirements. Another aspect frequently mentioned was that of 
roeterlallty: smaller subsidiaries are relieved of some detail just
because certain information is considered immaterial for the company 
ss a whole. The nature of subsidiaries' activities was also said to 
influence the variability of reporting requirements: a number of firms 
operate simultaneously in several different businesses, and in these 
Oases there is an evident necessity to adapt reporting requirements to
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Table 11.11 - Standardization of Reporting Requirements for 
Companies* Foreign Subsidiaries
reporting requirements UNIFORM DIFFERENT N
Number of formal reports 84 13 97
8 6.6% 13.4%
Content of the formal reports 79 18 97
81.4% 1 8.6%
Format of the formal reports 72 25 97
74.2% 25.8%
Frequency of formal reports 86 10 96
8 9.6% 10.4%
NOTES: A bso lu te  f re q u e n c ie s  and a d ju s te d  r e la t iv e  fre q u e n c ie s  in  
percentage are p ro v id e d  f o r  each c e l l .
N rep resen ts  th e  number o f  v a l id  cases fo r  each re p o r t in g  
requirem ent.
Table 11,111 - Differences Between the Reporting Systems for 
Foreign Subsidiaries and for Domestic Divisions
ABSOLUTE
FREQ.
ADJUSTED
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
CUMULATIVE 
ADJ.FREQ. 
(PERCENT)
No difference (the same system 38 39.6 39.6
is used)
Little difference (basically the 53 55.2 94.8
same syst.with minor modifications 
Substantial difference (systs. 5 5.2 1 0 0 .0
differ in major aspects)
Not determined 1 MISSING 1 0 0 .0
TOTAL 97 1 0 0 .0
___________
= 96
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each line of business. In general, the approach taken by companies 
range from very rigid positions where content, number, frequency and 
format of the formal reports are exactly the same for all 
subsidiaries, to more flexible practices where there is an attempt to 
tailor reporting requirements to the particular needs of different 
local operations. To give a few examples of cases encountered in 
practice, in one company quarterly reports were requested from 
subsidiaries mainly for group consolidation purposes, whereas reports 
submitted monthly were used for monitoring and controlling 
subsidiaries’ activities. While quarterly reports were standardized 
in terms of content and format, monthly reports were much influenced 
by subsidiaries’ internal management accounts, their format being left 
to local management style. In another company, financial information 
included in the reporting system was standard while "technical", non- 
financial, information varied according to particular conditions. In 
a very flexible arrangement encountered in a company, the content and 
format of formal reports was left to the discretion of subsidiaries 
within the guidelines given by headquarters. Here, subsidiary managers 
were said to be "encouraged to express themselves as they see 
necessary in illustrating their position".
Another aspect explored in the study was the extent to which the 
reporting systems operating internally between foreign subsidiaries 
and headquarters differ from those operating between domestic 
divisions (or subsidiaries) and headquarters. Results are shown in 
Table 11.Ill, The majority of firms (55 percent, i.e, 53 companies) 
recognized that the reporting system applied for foreign subsidiaries 
and that used for domestic divisions were different only to a small 
extent: the reporting systems used for both foreign and domestic
operations were basically the same, being differentiated in minor 
aspects only. Differences in these cases are generally restricted to 
variations in timing of certain reports, and in content of the 
reporting system insofar as reports on economic, political, legal and 
social conditions are only applied to foreign operations. In a large 
proportion of cases (40 percent of the total), there was no difference 
between the reporting requirements for foreign and domestic 
operations. In contrast, only a tiny minority of respondents (5 
percent) admitted to make a substantial distinction in the reporting
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requirements from different subsidiaries. In these cases there is 
reason to say that two different internal reporting systems exist, one 
for foreign subsidiaries, the other for domestic affiliates.
11.2.3. Discussion and Conclusions
The present section described the major characteristics of the 
internal reporting systems in operation in the MNCs studied. 
Reporting systems operated between foreign subsidiaries and 
headquarters were analysed in terms of content, reporting frequency of 
their components, and degree of standardization across operations of a 
same company.
The considerable variety and volume of information reported through 
institutionalized communication channels, illustrated in studies such 
as Mclnnes [1971], Watt, Hammer and Burge [1977], Persen and Van 
Lessig [1979], and Leksell [19 81], was again suggested in this survey. 
Internal reporting systems were found to include a wide range of 
information of both financial and non-financial nature. However, the 
incidence and reporting frequency of financial items is by far higher. 
Balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, reports on borrowing in 
subsidiaries, cash-flow statements, and detailed segmental sales 
analysis were all found in nearly every company. Their reporting 
frequency is extremely high with the great majority of the cases 
requesting the items once a month or even more often. In contrast, 
non-financial reports such as production output, manufacturing 
capacity utilization, market share, labour relations, among others, 
sre not included in every information system, and their reporting 
frequency tends to be lower, often only once or twice a year.
Among the non-financial items included in the internal systems of 
communication, formal reports on local environmental conditions are of 
Particular relevance to the study. As discussed in chapter 4, Leksell 
[1981] drew attention to the fact that in some of the Swedish MNCs 
studied economic and political environmental information was regularly 
submitted by foreign subsidiaries to headquarters via the internal
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reporting system. No comparable evidence is available for 
multinationals originated in the U.S., U.K. and elsewhere. The 
present study revealed that in British MNCs reports on both economic 
and non-economic conditions faced in host countries are included in 
the formal information systems of the great majority of corporations. 
Reports on environmental economic conditions are in a sizeable number 
of companies forwarded rather frequently (once every quarter, or even 
monthly). As to reports on political, legal and social conditons, 
although they can be found in most companies, in a large proportion of 
cases they are either submitted on an occasional or infrequent (once a 
year) basis. The general impression collected from interviews is that 
the request for environmental economic information normally precedes 
the introduction of formal reports on political, legal and social 
environmental conditions. This latter type of information is usually 
of a more specialized and sensitive nature than economic reports. The 
presence of environmental information in the formal communication 
channels of MNCs is perhaps an indication of the importance of the 
environment for the monitoring of subsidiaries operating overseas.
This point will be explored in the next chapter.
As regards the standardization of the information systems, the study 
concluded that in most cases the reporting requirements do not change 
across the foreign subsidiaries of a same MNC. In effect, requirements 
such as number of formal reports requested from subsidiaries, content, 
format, and frequency of the reports were all considerably uniform 
across subsidiaries in the overwhelming majority of the companies
studied. Similarly, international reporting between overseas
operations and headquarters was found to be basically the same as 
domestic reporting between home operations and headquarters. These 
findings agree with those of Leksell [1981], adding evidence to the 
high degree of standardization of the formal reporting requirements in 
companies’ internal information systems.
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11.3. Findings on Internal Reporting Practices and Companies* 
Characteristics
The internal reporting systems that are in operation between foreign 
subsidiaries and companies’ headquarters have just been described in 
terms of their content, reporting frequency, and standardization. The 
present section now attempts to explore relationships between 
characteristics of the reporting systems and companies’ features, such 
as size, commitment to foreign operations, strategy, etc. Also 
relationships between internal reporting characteristics and other 
companies’ practices are explored here. As in the previous chapter 
the analysis follows a sequence of major tests. Each of these is 
motivated by an hypothesis established a priori, which is 
statistically tested using a decision model that includes the 
formulation of a null hypothesis. This decision model was described 
in section 10.2 . of the previous chapter.
Test 1
This test investigates the relationships between the magnitude of the 
flow of information reported in a company by foreign subsidiaries 
and m a j o r  characteristics of the respective companies. It is 
hypothesized, following the discussion in chapter 7 , that corporations 
with, f o r  example, higher commitment to foreign operations, more 
international experience, and tighter control exercised by 
headquarters will request from their foreign subsidiaries a higher 
volume o f  information.
The null hypothesis states that:
Hoi: there is no association between the magnitude of the flow of 
information reported in a company by each foreign subsidiary 
and:
. the dominant industrial activity of the international 
operations of the ccmpany;
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, the size of the company;
. the level of the company's commitment to foreign 
operations;
. the level of the cxmipany's internationalization;
, the International experience of the company;
. the organizational structure of the ccnapany;
. the level ' of the cMipany’s exposure to host country and 
government influence;
. the degree of strategic control exercised in the company 
by headquarters over foreign subsidiaries; and 
. the strategy adopted by the company.
Magnitude of the flow of information reported by each subsidiary^) in 
a company was defined according to the following equation:
TR = + 2X3 + 4 X4 + 1 2X5 + 52X6
where: TR is  the  t o t a l  number o f  re p o r ts  su b m itte d  in  a company by
each subsid ia ry d u r in g  one v e a r (2 )  ;
X"] is the number of reports submitted by each subsidiary
"only occasionally"(3);
^2 is the number of reports submitted by each subsidiary
"annually";
X3 is the number of reports submitted by each subsidiary
"half yearly";
X4 is the number of reports submitted by each subsidiary
"quarterly";
X5 is the number of reports submitted by each subsidiary
"monthly"; and
Xg is the number of reports submitted by each subsidiary
"weekly".
Variable TR measures, therefore, the number of formal reports that in 
a corporation are forwarded by each subsidiary to headquarters during 
a one year period. It reflects not only the reporting frequency of 
each item included in the internal reporting system operated in a 
company, but also the actual incidence of each item which is related 
to the content of the reporting system.
The tests of independence that were conducted between TR and the
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variables measuring com panies’ c h a r a c te r is t ic s ,  were based on two 
different s t a t i s t i c a l  m ethods: Pearson product-m om ent c o r r e la t io n
Goefficient ( r ) ,  and c h i-s o u a re  .
The Pearson’s r is a very powerful and efficient statistic when used 
as a measure of the strength of the relationship between two 
variables. Besides indicating the goodness of fit of a linear 
regression line to the data, the strength of relationship also 
indicates, when r is squared, the proportion of variance in one 
variable explained by the other [Lapin, 1978, sec. 10-5]. As a 
parametric statistic the Pearson’s r should only be applied to
variables measured at an interval-level or higher. The variable TR
just created complies with this requirement, since it is situated at 
the ratio-level of measurement. On the other hand, some variables 
used to measure companies’ characteristics are also at the interval­
or ratio-level (i.e. variables SIZSALE, SIZASSET, SALEOUT, ASSETOUT, 
NCOUNTRY, and NAREA). Tests of association between TR and such 
variables were conducted using Pearson correlation coefficient. 
Another condition necessary for the use of the Pearson’s r is that the 
relationship between the variables be linear [Koutsoyiannis, 1973,
pp,#346]. As Downie and Starry [1977, p.193] suggest, a scatter 
diagram relating the two relevant variables helps in visualising the 
overall pattern of relationship and in checking for linearity. 
Scatter diagrams were, therefore, analysed before Pearson ’ s
correlation coefficients were applied.
Other va ria b les  used to  measure com panies’ c h a r a c te r is t ic s  a re  a t  the  
nominal- or in t e r v a l - le v e l  ( i . e .  INDUSTRY, FIRSTOUT, STRUCT, EXPOSURE, 
CONTROL and STRATEGY). For th e s e , te s ts  o f  a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  TR were 
conducted using c h i-s q u a re  w h ich  is  a method f i r s t l y  used in  s e c t io n  
10.3., where a d e ta i le d  comment on th e  s t a t i s t i c  can be found .
The variable TR c re a te d  f o r  purposes o f  t h i s  t e s t ,  has a mean o f  98.27 
which ind ica tes  th a t  in  th e  companies su rveyed  s u b s id ia r ie s  subm it to  
headquarters an average o f  98 re p o r ts  d u r in g  one y e a r . The s tandard  
deviation is  39.50 and the  range  i s  181, w ith  a minimum o f  32 re p o r ts  
per year and a maximum o f  213. Skewness and k u r to s is  o f  TR are 
respectively 0.547 and 0.083.
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Table 11. IV presents the results of the tests of independence 
conducted between variable TR and the variables used to measure 
companies’ characteristics. A statistically significant relationship 
was found between the magnitude of the internal flow of information 
reported by foreign subsidiaries and the level of companies’ 
commitment to overseas activities. The direction of the relationship 
is direct (the value of r is positive), which means that the higher 
the commitment of a company to its foreign operations (measured in 
terms of the percentage of assets abroad to total assets), the higher 
in the company is likely to be the flow of information required by 
headquarters from subsidiaries (measured in terms of the number of 
reports submitted by each subsidiary per year). In spite of a high 
level of significance which tends to prove the existence of a 
relationship between the two variables in the population, the strength 
of such a relationship in the sample is modest, as revealed by an r of
0.272.
The other variable utilized to measure the level of a firm’s 
commitment to foreign operations - which reflects the proportion of 
sales achieved in foreign markets to group consolidated sales 
revenue - produced a result above the cut-off level (Table 11.IV) 
Therefore, its relationship with TR cannot be considered 
statistically significant. Behind this finding could lie the fact 
that foreign assets are probably a better indicator of a firm’s 
committment to overseas operations than foreign sales. In the 
particular case under appreciation here, the existence of a high 
proportion of assets invested abroad most likely means that the 
facilities owned by a company outside the U.K. are involved in 
manufacturing and capable of responding to the demands of headquarters 
in terms of provision of information. In contrast, a high proportion 
of sales abroad, which may mean that a company is simply exporting 
from the U.K. a large percentage ot its output, does not necessarily 
imply the existence overseas of complex operations. Foreign 
subsidiaries may have marketing responsibilities only, and in this 
case it is understandable that the flow of information requested by 
headquarters to subsidiaries is somewhat limited.
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Tests of independence between TR and the other explanatory variables 
included in the null hypothesis produced non-significant results 
(Table 11,1V). For this reason association between such variables 
cannot be accepted.
Summary I Test 1 explored the relationships between the magnitude of 
the flow of information reported by subsidiaries to headquarters via 
the internal reporting system and major company characteristics 
previously selected as the study’s explanatory variables. The object 
of the test was to discover which main corporate features, if any, 
were associated with the variation across companies in the volume of 
information contained in the internal reporting systems. The results 
revealed a statistically significant association between the total 
number of reports submitted in a company by a foreign subsidiary 
during one year, and the company’s degree of commitment to foreign 
operations (measured in terms of the percentage of assets located 
abroad to total company assets). This association was proved to be 
positive, showing that higher levels of commitment are associated to 
higher flows of information. Therefore, variations among companies in 
the volume of information reported internally from subsidiaries may be 
explained by the varying level of commitment to operating abroad, as 
measured by the relative amount of assets invested overseas.
Test 2
Reporting systems operated internally between foreign subsidiaries and 
headquarters include reports of both financial and non-financial 
nature. The relative weight of non-financial reports in the total 
reporting system may vary from company to company and be associated 
with certain corporate characteristics. In chapter 7 an hypothesis 
was formulated according to which the nature of the information 
reported in the internal information systems would be associated with 
the size, internationalization, experience, and organizational and 
managerial complexity of the MNCs. For purposes of the present test, 
information is classified in two groups of different nature, namely 
financial and non-financial. The test explores the relationships 
between the share of non-financial reports included in companies’
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internal reporting systems and major features of these companies. It 
is anticipated that corporations with, for example, higher levels of 
commitment to foreign operations, a higher degree of 
international ization, tighter strategic control exercised by 
headquarters over subsidiaries, and corporate strategies favouring a 
global integration of manufacturing activities, will request from 
their foreign subsidiaries a relatively higher volume of information 
of a non-financial nature (e.g. market shares, production output,
product quality, reports on economic, political and legal conditions 
in host countries). On the other hand, companies with a low 
commitment to foreign activity, low internationalization, loose
control exercised by headquarters, and segmented nation-for-nation
strategies will tend to overlook non-financial information, and 
emphasize more traditional reports of a financial nature (e.g. balance 
sheets, profit and loss accouts, cash-flows).
The null hypothesis states that:
Ho2: there is no association between the relative weight of non- 
financial reports in a company’s total reporting system, 
and:
. the dominant industrial activity of the international 
operations of the company;
. the size of the company;
. the level of the company's commitment to foreign 
operations ;
. the level of the company's internationalization;
. the international experience of the company;
. the organizational structure of the (xxmpany;
. the level of the company's exposure to host country and 
government influence;
. the degree of strategic control exercised in the company 
by HQ over foreign subsidiaries; and 
. the strategy adopted by the company.
Relative weight of the non-financial reports included in a company’s 
internal reporting system is defined as the percentage of the number 
of non-financial reports submitted by a subsidiary during one year, 
relative to the total number of reports (financial and non-financial) 
submitted by the subsidiary during the same period. This percentage 
provides a measure of the magnitude of the flow of non-financial
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I n f o r m a t io n  that is reported by subsidiaries compared to the total 
flow of information. Its computation was based on the following
equations:
PERCNFR = NFR/TR x 100
with
TR as calculated in Test 1 , and
NFR = Yi + Ï2 + 2 Y3 + 4 Y4 + 1 2Y5 + 52Y6
where: PERCNFR is the percentage of non-financial reports submitted
in a company by each subsidiary during one year in 
relation to the total number of reports submitted in 
the same period(2 );
TR is the total number of reports (both financial and
non-financial) submitted by each subsidiary during one 
year;
NFR is the total number of non-financial reports submitted
by each subsidiary during one year;
X-| is the number of non-financial reports submitted
by each subsidiary "only occasionally"(3);
^2 is the number of non-financial reports submitted by
each subsidiary "annually";
Yg is the number of non-financial reports submitted by
each subsidiary "half yearly";
Xi| is the number of non-financial reports submitted by
each subsidiary "quarterly";
^5 is the number of non-financial reports submitted by
each subsidiary "monthly"; and
^6 is the number of non-financial reports submitted by
each subsidiary "weekly".
Tests of independence between PERCNFR and the variables used to 
measure companies’ characteristics were conducted following an 
approach similar to that adopted in Test 1. Pearson nroduct- 
moroent correlation coefficient and chi-souare were applied to the 
variables under analysis according to their respective level of 
measurement.
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Variable PERCNFR is at the ratio-level of measurement. Its mean of 
26,88 indicates that for the 97 companies participating in the study 
the number of non-financial reports submitted by each subsidiary 
during one year is on average around 27 percent of the total number of 
reports submitted by the subsidiaries during the same period. The 
standard deviation of PERCNFR is 14.42 and the range is 60, with a 
minimum of zero percent and a maximum of 60 percent of non-financial 
reports. Skewness and kurtosis are respectively 0.078 and -0.718.
The results of the tests of independence conducted between PERCNFR and 
the variables measuring companies’ characteristics are presented in 
Table 11.V. Statistically significant relationships were found for 
the level of a company’s committment to foreign operations, and the 
degree of a company’s internationalization.
The degree of a company’s commitment to foreign operations can be 
measured either by the proportion of total assets located outside the 
U.K. to total company assets or by the proportion of sales achieved in 
foreign markets to group consolidated sales revenue. Both these 
variables are correlated with the relative weight of non-financial 
information relative to the total information reported in the internal 
systems. Because the correlation is positive in both cases, it may be 
concluded that the higher the commitment of a company to overseas 
activities (measured in terras of both sales and assets abroad), the 
higher in the company’s internal reporting system is likely to be the 
percentage of non-financial reports in relation to the total number of 
reports. The strength of the association in the sample for these 
variables is fair (see Table 11.V).
Statistically significant relationships were also encountered for the 
level of internationalization of a company either measured by the 
total number of countries - U.K. excluded - where a company maintains 
control over industrial operations, and the number of different 
geographic areas in the world where a company maintains control over 
industrial operations. Here the correlation for both variables with 
PERCNFR was also found to be positive in direction, though the 
magnitude is smaller than the one encountered for the variables
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measuring commitment to foreign operations (Table 11.V). It can be 
concluded, therefore, that the higher the level of a company’s 
internationalization (measured in terms of number of countries, and 
number of geographic areas operated by the company) the higher is 
likely to be the percentage of non-financial reports in relation to 
the total number of reports included in the company’s internal 
reporting system.
Tests of independence between PERCNFR and the two other ratio-level 
variables which measure company size, have not produced statistically 
significant results. Neither have tests conducted between PERCNFR and 
the nominal and ordinal-level variables in Table 11.V.
Summary; Test 2 revealed that companies with more international 
involvement tend to request from their foreign subsidiaries a higher 
proportion of non-financial information out of the total volume of 
information required. In fact, corporations with higher levels of 
commitment to foreign operations (i.e. firms with large percentages of 
sales generated and assets located abroad), as well as corporations 
with higher degrees of internationalization (i.e. firms operating in a 
large number of countries spread over a number of different world 
geographic areas) are likely to include in their internal reporting 
systems a higher percentage of reports of a non-financial nature. In 
contrast, companies with low commitment to overseas operations and low 
levels of internationalization tend to request from their foreign 
subsidiaries a higher proportion of financial reports, not including 
in their reporting systems much of the non-financial information that 
is found in companies more involved internationally. It was seen 
earlier in chapter 5 that the use of non-financial information in 
decision making besides helping in promoting the long term view in 
companies, facilitates in a multinational context the consideration of 
the specificity of each subsidiary. The results of this test suggest 
that companies with higher levels of international involvement tend to 
show higher percentages of non-financial information in their 
reporting systems. It can be argued that such companies, which in 
principle are subject to higher levels of variation in the operating 
characteristics of their subsidiaries, are better equipped to take the 
specificity of each subsidiary into account in their decisions.
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Test 1
Among the items generally included in the internal financial reporting 
systems operated between foreign subsidiaries and headquarters, there 
are two which are of special interest to this study: reports on
economic conditions in host countries, and reports on political, 
legal and social conditions in host countries. The incidence and 
reporting frequency of such items have been described in the previous 
section on companies' practices. Test 3 aims at determining which 
corporate characteristics tend to be associated with higher reporting 
frequencies of the environmental reports. It is expected that 
corporations with, for example, high commitment to foreign operations, 
high exposure to host country and government influence, and strategies 
favouring a global integration of international industrial activities, 
will tend to request from foreign subsidiaries more frequent reports 
on the particular economic and non-economic conditions experienced by 
subsidiaries locally. On the other hand, it is expected that firms 
with low levels of commitment to foreign operations, little exposure 
to host country influence and segmented nation-for-nation strategies 
will tend not even to include in their internal reporting sytems 
reports on local economic and non-economic conditions faced by foreign 
subsidiaries.
The null hypo thesis s ta te s  th a t :
Ho3: (1) there is no association between the inclusion or non­
inclusion, and the reporting frequency of reports on 
economic conditions in host countries in a ccMopany's 
internal reporting system, and :
. the dominant industrial activity of the international 
operations of the company;
. the size of the company;
. the level of the (XMnpany's ccmnnitment to foreign 
operations;
. the level of the company's internationalization;
. the International experience of the company;
• the organizational structure of the company;
. the level of the company's exposure to host country and
government influence;
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. the degree of strategic control exercised in the company 
by headquarters over foreign subsidiaries; and 
, the strategy adopted by the company.
(2) there is no association between the inclusion or non­
inclusion, and the reporting frequency of reports on 
political, legal and social conditions in host countries in 
a company's internal reporting system, and :
. the dominant industrial activity of the international 
operations of the c(xnpany ;
. the size of the company;
. the level of the company's commitment to foreign 
operations;
. the level of the company's internationalization;
. the international experience of the company;
. the organizational structure of the company;
. the level of the company's exposure to host country and 
government influence;
. the degree of strategic control exercised in the campany 
by headquarters over foreign subsidiaries; and 
. the strategy adopted by the ccnpany.
The dependent variables measuring inclusion and reporting frequency of 
reports on environmental conditions (i.e. variables ECOND and PLSCOND) 
are at the ordinal-level of measurement, and as such they were subject 
to tests of independence, together with the explanatory variables, 
using the ohi-souare statistic.
Table 11.VI shows the results of these tests, emphasizing the 
relationships proved to be statistically significant. 
Reports on economic conditions in host countries were found to be 
significantly associated with the level of a company's commitment to 
foreign operations, as measured by the proportion of total assets 
located outside the U.K. to total company assets, and with the nature 
of a company's international industrial strategy.
Analysis of Table VI in Appendix D reveals that 69 percent of the
companies that do not include reports on local economic conditions in
their Internal reporting systems have 25 percent or less of their
assets located outside the U.K. In contrast, 77 percent of all
corporations which request the submission of such reports from 
subsidiaries (either occasionally or on a regular basis) have m o r e
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than 25 percent of their assets overseas. On the other hand, and as 
far as international strategy is concerned, Table VII in Appendix D 
reveals that 92 percent of the companies that do not include reports 
on economic conditions in their reporting systems follow a segmented 
nation-for-nation strategy in the organization of their international 
Industrial operations. Among the MNCs with some form of global 
integration strategy, only 3 percent do not include reports on 
economic environmental conditions in their reporting systems. All the 
others do: 7 percent request such reports from subsidiaries only
occasionally; 37 percent ask them once a year; and 53 percent request 
them once every six months or more frequently.
Reports on political, legal and social conditions in host countries 
were found to be associated with a large number of company 
characteristics. Table 11.VI shows a statistically significant 
relationship between the incidence and reporting frequency of such
non-economic environmental reports and 1) the level of a company’s
internationalization, as measured by either the total number of 
countries, or the number of different geographic areas in the world 
where the company maintains control over industrial operations; 2) the 
strategy followed by a company in the organization of its
international industrial activity; 3) the degree of a company’s
exposure to host country and government influence in its foreign 
operations; 4) the size of a company, as measured by the amount of 
total assets for the group ; and 5) the degree of a company’s 
commitment to foreign operations, as measured by the proportion of 
total assets located outside the U.K. to total company assets.
Level of internationalization is the company characteristic with the 
highest level of significance, and some of the strongest association 
with a Cramer’s V higher than 0.30, and an uncertainty coefficient 
(asymmetric) slightly higher than 0.07, (see Tables VIII and IX in 
Appendix D) The absolute majority of corporations which do not include 
reports on local political, legal and social conditions in their 
reporting systems have a comparatively low level of 
internationalization, since they are established in less than five 
countries and in less than three different geographic areas. On the 
other hand, more than two thirds of the corporations which request
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such reports from subsidiaries on a regular basis (annually or more 
often) have medium or high levels of internationalization (they 
operate in six or more countries, spread over four or more different 
geographic areas). As to corporate strategy, the cross tabulation in 
Table X of Appendix D, shows that 94 percent of the corporations 
which do not request from subsidiaries reports on political, legal 
and social conditions practice segmented nation-for-nation strategies. 
Among all companies with some form of global integration strategy only 
one does not include such reports in its internal reporting system. 
All the others do, either occasionally (20 percent) or regularly (77 
percent). Level of company exposure to host country influence, level 
of commitment to foreign operations (measured in assets located 
overseas), and company size (measured in group consolidated assets), 
are all associated with the reporting of non-economic environmental 
conditions though in a more modest way. Tables XI • to XIII in 
Appendix D present cross tabulations with these independent variables. 
Results show that companies which do not request from subsidiaries 
environmental information of political, legal and social nature tend 
to be those (the absolute majority) which experience low levels of
exposure to host country influence (ratings of 1 in a scale of 1 to
5), have less than 25 percent of their total assets outside the U.K., 
and have total consolidated assets of less than £100 million. In 
contrast, companies with higher levels of exposure to local 
conditions, higher proportion of their assets located overseas, and 
larger in asset size tend not only to include reports on political, 
legal and social conditions in their internal reporting systems but 
also to request them more frequently from subsidiaries
Summary: Test 3 concentrates on two items generally included in
firms' internal reporting systems, which are of special interest to
the study. These items, both of non-financial nature, are namely 
reports on economic conditions in host countries, and reports on 
political, legal and social conditions in host countries. The 
incidence and reporting frequency of such reports were related to
major company characteristics. Results of the tests of independence 
conducted showed a statistically significant relationship between the 
incidence and reporting frequency of reports on economic conditions 
and the commitment of companies to foreign operations, as well as the
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11 / INTERNAL REPORTING SISTHCS OPERATED BETWEEN SUBSIDIARIES AND HQ
strategies followed by companies in the organization of their 
international industrial activities. Statistically significant 
relationships were also found between the incidence and reporting 
frequency of reports on political, legal and social conditions and 
the companies' level of internationalization, the strategies followed 
by companies in their international industrial activities, the 
companies' commitment to foreign operations, the companies' level of 
exposure to host country influence, and the companies' asset size. 
All these relationships are positive. Therefore, the companies where 
reports on local economic conditions are more frequently requested by 
headquarters tend to be those with higher levels of commitment to 
foreign operations (i.e. large proportion of assets located abroad), 
and more sophisticated strategies, namely strategies involving forms 
of global integration of international industrial activities. Also, 
those companies where reports on political, legal and social 
conditions in host countries are more frequently requested by 
headquarters, tend to have high levels of internationalization (i.e. 
they operate in a large number of countries, spread over different 
world geographic areas), industrial activities organized on a supra­
national global basis, high levels of exposure to host country and 
government influence, high commitment to foreign operations, and large 
asset size. Comparing the results obtained for reports on economic 
conditions and for reports on political, legal and social conditions, 
a larger number of company features were found to be associated with 
the latter than with the former. As seen in the previous section 
(section 11.2.), reports on environmental economic conditions are more 
common than reports on non-economic conditions, and usually their 
introduction in companies long precedes that of non-economic 
environmental reports. Items on local economic conditions are, 
therefore, likely to be found in a wide spectrum of corporations, 
whereas reports on political, legal and social conditions tend only 
to be found in a group of companies with very special characteristics, 
such as high exposure levels to local host country influences, or high 
levels of geographic diversification.
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Test 4
This test attempts to discover whether internal reporting practices 
are associated with the way in which the environmental assessment 
activity is organized in companies' headquarters. The reporting 
practices considered here are those introduced in the three tests 
above, A description of the different ways in which the environmental 
assessment activity is organized was presented in the previous 
chapter (chapter 10). Three major groups were identified there: one
includes those companies where foreign environmental information is 
processed as part of a formal institutionalized headquarters function,
i.e. companies where there are one or more managers with formal 
responsibility for collecting and analysing foreign environmental 
information; the second group includes those corporations in whose 
headquarters foreign environmental information is collected and 
analysed but only on an informal basis; the third group of companies 
includes those where the collection and analysis of foreign 
environmental information is not regularly carried out in 
headquarters, either formally or informally.
At a first level of analysis, it is hypothesized that companies which 
have formally set up in headquarters the environmental assessment 
function will tend to request from foreign subsidiaries a greater 
volume of information (measured in terms of total number of reports 
submitted by each subsidiary). At a second level of analysis, the 
nature of the information requested by headquarters is taken into 
consideration, and is associated with the way in which the 
environmental assessment activity is organized. At this level, it is 
hypothesized that corporations with formal collection and analysis of 
foreign environmental information will tend to request from foreign 
subsidiaries a higher percentage of non-financial reports vis-a-vis 
the total number of reports. It is also hypothesized that these 
companies will tend to request more frequently from foreign 
subsidiaries reports on economic and non-economic (i.e. political, 
legal and social) conditions encountered in host countries. If these 
relationships are proved significant, they will indicate that the 
sophistication of the internal reporting system, particularly in terms
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of the relative weight of non-financial information and the frequency 
of reporting of environmental conditions found in host countries, is 
related to an organizational issue consisting of the existence of an 
environmental assessment activity in headquarters.
The null hypothesis states that:
Ho#: there is no association between:
, the total number of reports submitted by each subsidiary 
in a company during one year;
, the percentage of non-financial reports in relation to the 
total number of reports submitted by each subsidiary in a 
company during one year;
. the incidence and frequency in a company's reporting
system of reports on econcmic conditions in host 
countries;
. the incidence and frequency in a ccanpany's reporting
system of reports on political, legal and social 
conditions in host countries; 
and the way in whicdi the environmental assessment activity is 
organized in the company's headquarters.
The tests of independence conducted used the chi-scuare statistic, 
since for every pair of variables under analysis there is always at
least one variable at the ordinal-level of measurement. Results of
the tests are shown in Table 11.VII.
The first relationship explored was found not to be significant. The 
organization of the environmental assessment activity in companies’ 
headquarters is, therefore, not significantly associated with the 
volume of information requested by companies from their foreign 
subsidiaries . The other relationships explored consider the nature 
of the information that is reported by subsidiaries. Statistically 
significant relationships were found between the organization of the 
environmental assessment activity in companies' headquarters and 1) 
the relative share of reports of a non-financial nature requested from 
subsidiaries; 2) the incidence and frequency of reports on local 
economic conditions requested from subsidiaries; and 3) the incidence 
and frequency of reports on local political, legal and social 
conditions requested from subsidiaries - see Table 11.VII.
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Table 11.VII - Chi-Square Tests of Independence Between Selected 
Characteristics of the Internal Reporting Systems and 
the Way in Which the Environmental Assessment Activity 
is Organized in HQ
Organization of the environmental 
assessment activity in HQ - ENFCN
P d.f. N
Total number of reports 
submitted during one year 
-TR
4.42 (0.352) 4 95
Percentage of non-financial 
reports in relation to the 
total no.of reports submitted 
during one year - PERCNFR
10.78 (0.029)
1
4 92
Incidence and frequency of 
reports on economic conditions 
in host countries - ECOND
20.96 (0.0003)
**
4 95
Incidence and frequency of 
reports on political, legal, 
and social conditions in 
host countries - PLSCOND
12.84
(a)
(0.0003)
•«
1 93
NOTES: •» significant p ^ 0.01
• significant 0.01 < p ^ 0.05
(a) Chi-square subject to Yate's correction for continuity. 
Key to symbols: - chi-square statistic
p = level of significance 
d.f. = degrees of freedom 
N = number of valid cases
365
11 / INTERNAL REPORTING SYSTEMS OPERATED BETWEEN SUBSIDIARIES AND HQ
A contingent tabulation for the percentage of non-financial reports 
is presented in Table XIV in Appendix D, Companies with no 
environmental assessment activity in headquarters tend to have very 
low levels of non-financial information reported by subsidiaries. In 
fact, 61 percent of the companies where the collection and analysis of 
foreign environmental information is not carried out, either formally 
or informally, include in their internal reporting systems less than 
20 percent of information of a non-financial nature. In contrast, 
companies which have implemented in headquarters formal functions of 
environmental collection and analysis, tend to present in their 
internal reporting systems higher proportions of non-financial 
reports. In 88 percent of the companies in these conditions, more 
than 20 percent of the information that is requested from subsidiaries 
is non-financial.
As regards the incidence and frequency of reports on environmental 
economic conditions, an analysis of the respective frequency 
tabulation (Table XV in Appendix D) reveals that companies with formal 
collection and analysis of environmental information tend to request 
reports on economic conditions from foreign subsidiaries more
frequently than the other companies. The absolute majority of the 
firms with institutionalized environmental assessment activity (59 
percent), have such reports forwarded by subsidiaries at least once 
every six months. On the other hand, corporations where environmental 
information is not usually collected or analysed, not even informally, 
tend either not to include reports on economic conditions in their
internal reporting systems (42 percent of cases), or to include them 
very infrequently (4? percent of the cases have environmental 
economic reports sent by subsidiaries only occasionally, or annually).
Finally, as to the incidence and frequency of reports on local
political, legal and social conditions, the respective contingent 
tabulation had to be narrowed down to one degree of freedom because 
any other way of arranging the data produces an unacceptable number of 
expected cell frequencies smaller than 5. In 2x2 tables with N higher 
than #0, the constraint of having expected cell frequencies higher 
than 5 can be released, provided that the chi-square statistic is 
corrected for continuity [Siegel, 1956, pp. 109-110, and p.64]. Such
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correction for continuity, which was first suggested by Yates [1934], 
has been applied here to the computation of chi-square [Nie et al., 
1975, p.243]. The tabulation of the joint frequency distributions 
(Table XVI in Appendix D), reveals that companies with some form of 
collection and analysis of foreign environmental information (formal 
or informal) tend to include in their internal reporting systems 
reports on political, legal and social conditions in host countries. 
Companies in whose headquarters environmental information is not 
processed tend, on the contrary, not to include such reports in their 
internal systems. It can be noted in the cross tabulation under 
analysis that among all companies which request from foreign 
subsidiaries information on local political, legal and social 
conditions, the overwhelming majority (88 percent) collect and
analyse in headquarters information on foreign environments, whereas 
only 12 percent do not have any environmental assessment activity.
Summary: Test 4 explores the relationship between some important
internal reporting practices and the way in which environmental
assessment activities are organized in companies' headquarters. 
Results of the tests conducted failed to demonstrate that companies 
where the environmental assessment function had been formally set up, 
tend to request from their foreign subsidiaries a significantly higher 
volume of information. What the test shows, however, is that although 
the magnitude of the total flow of information reported by 
subsidiaries does not vary across companies in line with different 
forms of environmental assessment activities, the nature of the 
information that is requested from subsidiaries does, in a very
significant way. In effect, companies with formal environmental
assessment functions, and to a lesser extent, companies where 
environmental information is processed on an informal basis, were 
found to be much more selective in the type of information requested 
from subsidiaries abroad. It was demonstrated that such corporations 
tend to include in their internal reporting systems a significantly 
higher proportion of reports of a non-financial nature. They also 
tend to request from foreign subsidiaries significantly more frequent 
reports on economic conditions encountered in host countries, as well 
as reports on political, legal and social conditions. . In contrast, 
companies in whose headquarters information on foreign environments is
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not processed, either formally or informally, tend not only to include 
very little non-financial information in their internal reporting 
systems, but also not to request from foreign subsidiaries reports on 
the economic , political, legal and social environmental conditions 
faced locally. This suggests that MNCs in whose headquarters an
environmental assessment activity can be found, tend to request
through the internal reporting system a higher proportion of
information that in principle is more capable of reflecting the
particular environmental conditions experienced by subsidiaries.
11,#. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter characterized the channels of communication formally set 
up between foreign subsidiaries and headquarters in a MNC, which are 
used as a support of the internal decision making process. As 
discussed in chapter 4, the information supplied by such communication 
channels plays a vital role in the formal process of subsidiary 
performance evaluation and control.
The nature of the information reported through the formal 
communication channels may be described both in terms of the incidence 
and reporting frequency of the items that constitute the internal 
reporting system. Reports of a financial nature such as balance 
sheets, profit and loss accounts, borrowings in subsidiaries from 
local sources, cash flow statements, and segmental sales analyses were 
found in nearly every company studied. These items tend to be 
submitted by subsidiaries rather frequently, in many cases every 
month. On the other hand, non-financial reports such as market shares, 
production output, physical inventories, manufacturing capacity 
utilization, labour relations, and environmental reports, although 
widespread, were generally found in a smaller percentage of companies. 
This reporting frequency is also lower than that of financial items, 
and only in selected companies are non-financial reports regularly 
submitted by subsidiaries on a frequent (e.g. quarterly, or monthly)
368
11 / INTERNAL REPORTING SYSTEMS OPERATED BETWEEN SUBSIDIARIES AND HQ
basis.
Incidence and reporting frequency of items in the formal communication 
channels may be combined in a measure of the magnitude of the 
reporting. The volume of information flowing from subsidiaries to 
headquarters varies greatly from MNC to MNC. A test conducted in the 
chapter (Test 1) attempted to determine which company characteristics 
are associated with higher volumes of internal reporting. Results 
showed that corporations with higher levels of commitment to foreign 
operations, i.e. firms with a higher proportion of assets located 
abroad, tend to request over the year more information from each 
subsidiary.
Taking a step further the attempt to explain the differences 
encountered in the reporting practices of companies, another test 
(Test 2) explored the profile of those MNCs in whose internal 
reporting systems the weight of non-financial information is 
comparatively higher. In general, companies with more international 
involvement request from subsidiaries a higher proportion of non- 
financial information. In fact, results revealed that corporations 
with a higher commitment to foreign operations (this measured by both 
foreign sales and foreign assets), and companies with a greater 
internationalization level (measured by the number of countries and 
world geographic areas operated) tend to include in their reporting 
systems a higher percentage of non-financial reports. The nature of 
non-financial information is such that the consideration of the 
operational specificity of each subsidiary in decision making is
facilitated when this type of information is used (see chapter 5).
Therefore, the results of the test suggest that those companies with 
higher levels of international involvement, and particularly with a 
larger number of overseas subsidiaries, are in principle more able to 
consider the individuality of each subsidiary when using information 
reported via the formal channels.
An important aspect to be taken into account when considering the 
specificity of a subsidiary is the environmental influences to which
the subsidiary is subject in the host country where it operates. The
study found that in most companies, reports on the local environmental
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conditions were normally included in the information reported through 
the internal system. Such reports are of different nature, and cover 
economic, political, legal and social issues. Despite the very high 
incidence of all kinds of environmental reports in companies' 
communication systems, the reporting frequency of economic information 
is much higher than that of political, legal and social information. 
In this latter case, only a relatively small minority of companies 
have non-economic environmental reports forwarded with frequency. As 
explained in the chapter, there is reason to believe that reports on 
political, legal and social conditions in host countries are normally 
introduced in companies' systems at a later stage, and only after 
economic environmental information being routinely submitted. These 
results concerning the incidence and frequency of environmental 
reports may be compared with the pioneering study of Leksell [1981], 
suggesting that in many British MNCs, as in Swedish multinationals, 
the formal reporting of host country environmental information is 
already a well established practice.
Variations in the incidence and frequency of environmental reports 
across companies were explored in the study in order to ascertain 
which major corporate characteristics are normally associated with 
environmental reporting. A statistical test conducted (test 3)» 
revealed that companies with higher levels of commitment to foreign 
operations (i.e. longer proportion of assets abrpad), and some form of 
global integration of their international industrial activities tend 
to have reports on local economic conditions more frequently submitted 
by subsidiaries. As regards the incidence and reporting frequency of 
political, legal and social environmental information a larger 
number of significant corporate characteristics was encountered. 
Reporting systems where non-economic environmental information is 
frequently reported by subsidiaries tend to be also operated in 
companies with high levels of commitment to foreign activities, and 
global strategies. Besides these characteristics, also the degree of a 
company's internationalization (measured by the number of countries 
and geographic areas operated), level of exposure to host country 
influence, and asset size were found to be associated with higher 
levels of reporting of non-economic environmental information. 
Considering that reports on political, legal and social conditions
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are of a very specialized nature and are only frequent in a handful of 
companies, it is worth noting that it is in those multinationals which 
are particularly sensitive to the environment (i.e. companies with 
wide international involvement, global integration strategies, and 
high exposure to local political imperatives) that such reports are 
requested more frequently. This fact points to a certain adequacy of 
the information systems in operation as far as the level of 
environmental consideration is concerned. Such an adequacy will be 
further explored in the next chapter in the context of the performance 
evaluation and control of foreign subsidiaries.
Internal reporting practices were also explored in face of a 
particular organizational issue, which is of special relevance to the 
study. Such an issue was the object of the previous chapter and 
regards the way in which the environmental assessment activity is 
organized in the MNCs' headquarters. The results from Test 4 were not 
able to demonstrate that the magnitude of reporting is associated with 
the existence of a formalized environmental function. However, the 
test showed that the nature of the information reported is 
significantly associated with the organization of the environmental 
assessment function. In effect, companies where the environmental 
assessment function had been formally set up, and to a lesser extent, 
companies where environmental information was processed on an informal 
basis, were found to include in their internal reporting systems a 
higher proportion of non-financial information. Also, these companies 
were found to request more frequently from foreign subsidiaries 
reports on local economic and non-economic environmental conditions. 
These findings show that the way in which the environmental assessment 
activity is organized in companies, although probably not affecting 
the quantity of information formally reported by subsidiaries, has a 
marked influence on the quality of that information. Besides, the 
findings suggest that companies for which the assessment of the 
foreign environments is important enough to justify the creation of a 
formal function in headquarters, are those that request from 
subsidiaries the kind of information that in principle is more 
susceptible of reflecting local environmental conditions.
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The characterization of the internal reporting system of a company 
would not be complete without the ascertainment of its degree of 
standardization. The study results are similar to the findings of 
Leksell [1981], insofar as the formal reporting requirements were 
generally found to be highly standardized across the subsidiaries of a 
same company. The great majority of firms consider to apply the same 
reporting requirements, namely number, content, format and frequency 
of reports to all overseas subsidiaries. In those cases where 
requirements differ, the changes appear to be primarily due to the 
size of operations, and the nature of the subsidiaries' activity. 
Also, internal reporting systems operating between foreign 
subsidiaries and headquarters were in most cases similar to the 
systems operating between domestic divisions (or subsidiaries) and 
headquarters. For both situations, reporting systems were basically 
the same, being normally differentiated in only minor aspects. The 
information collected here on the level of system standardization is 
only tentative. However, it seems that differences among subsidiaries 
of a same MNC do not generally find a correspondence on the different 
type of information formally requested from the subsidiaries.
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fggtBSÊês:
(1)In the questionnaire instructions for participation, respondents 
were asked to answer questions having in mind the typical case in 
their companies whenever diffesent psactices were usef for
(2) Reports for which questionnaire respondents ticked "other periods" 
- please specify" as the appropriate reporting frequency, were 
recoded before computing this variable. Recoding of each item was 
done into the time interval immediately below the period specified 
by the respondent. For example, items said to be reported three 
times per year (a period not contemplated in the questionnaire), 
were recoded as if they were reported every six months.
For purposes of this test it was established that reports which 
are submitted to headquarters on an occasional basis - i.e. 
reports for which questionnaire respondents ticked "only 
occasionally" - have a reporting frequency of one per year.
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CHAPTER 12 - THE USE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY INTERNAL REPORTING 
SYSTEMS FOR FOREIOf SUBSIDIARY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND 
CONTROL
12.1. Introduction
Having described the characteristics of the formal channels of 
communication used to report information between foreign subsidiaries 
and headquarters, the study now turns attention to the way in which 
such information is employed in subsidiary performance evaluation and 
control. The present chapter analyses the formal criteria used by 
companies’ headquarters in the evaluation and short term control of 
foreign subsidiaries’ operating performance. Information forwarded by
subsidiaries via the internal reporting system is regarded in the 
chapter as the major data input for the performance evaluation and 
control process.
This chapter addresses basically the issue of performance evaluation 
of subsidiary operations. In addition, it explores marginally the 
criteria used in the evaluation of subsidiary managers, and attempts 
to draw a parallel between the practices followed by companies in the 
two situations.
The chapter is organized into three major sections. The first, reports 
on companies’ practices on the basis of data collected in the 
questionnaire and information gathered in follow-up interviews. This 
section will reveal which measures are perceived to be the most 
Important and useful in monitoring foreign operations, which standards 
are normally used and how they are determined, and how uniform are 
performance evaluation criteria across a company’s foreign operations. 
The section will also describe the criteria on which the assessment 
and performance of foreign subsidiary managers is based, and how such 
criteria differ from those used in the assessment of operations.
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The second major section in the chapter will investigate the nature of 
major environmental influences on companies’ subsidiaries operating 
abroad. It will attempt to identify for each geographic area in the 
world those environmental factors which are perceived in headquarters 
to have the greatest impact on subsidiaries’ local activities. In 
addition, it will also explore the opinion of headquarters executives 
as regards the effectiveness of formal evaluation criteria in taking 
account of environmental factors, and how this compares with the 
executives’ opinion as regards the desirability of such criteria 
taking the environment into account.
In the third major section of the chapter, statistical tests will be 
conducted in order to explore relationships between performance 
evaluation practices and companies’ characteristics. Tests to 
investigate association of certain important practices will also be 
conducted in that section. The tests are directly motivated by the 
main hypotheses presented earlier in chapter 7 and will attempt to 
shed light into many of the questions raised previously in the study.
12.2. Report on Companies' Practices
12.2.1. Indicators of Performance Used for Foreign Subsidiaries
As it was discussed in chapter 4, one of the major uses in 
headquarters for the information reported by subsidiaries through the 
internal reporting system is the monitoring of subsidiaries’ operating 
Performance. In the previous chapter, the content and frequency of 
the reporting systems that are operated internally in companies were 
described without reference to the possible uses for such information 
(see, for example. Table 11.1). Here, the use of the information 
included in the reporting systems is related to the performance 
evaluation and control process.
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In order to find out which items of information included in the 
internal reporting system are considered more useful in controlling 
and evaluating foreign subsidiaries’ operating performance, 
respondents were asked to note the relative usefulness of the criteria 
available to them. Results are reported in Table 12.1. In general, 
financial items of information appear to be considered more useful 
than non-financial items. The report with the highest rating is the 
profit and loss account. Nearly 97 percent of the companies (i.e. 92 
cases) rated this item 4 or 5 in a scale of usefulness ranging from 1 
(not useful) to 5 (very useful). The median rating obtained for this 
item is as high as 4.9 (Table 12.1). Next in rating to the subsidiary 
profit and loss accounts are statements of cash flow generated in 
subsidiaries, and up-dates of the year-end profit forecasts. More 
than 90 percent of the companies rated both these items 4 or 5. 
Balance sheets, statements of borrowings in subsidiaries from local 
sources, up-dates of the budgeted year-end balance sheet and 
statements of sales per product or business, all received high 
ratings from respondents, with at least 60 percent of the cases 
considering these items more than moderately useful.
Amongst items generally included in the internal reporting systems of 
a non-financial nature, inventory levels (in quantity) were 
attributed the highest rating (median of 3.8), with 60 percent of 
respondents (i.e. 39 companies) assigning a rate of 4 or 5 - Table
12.1, Production output, market share in host country, reports on 
product quality, reports on local economic conditions, manufacturing 
capacity utilization, and reports on labour relations all follow suit 
with v e r y  similar ratings. Reports on political, legal, and social 
conditions faced in host countries are the only item of information 
whose m e d i a n  rating was below the "moderately useful" mid-point rate 
(median of 2.8). More than a third of the companies that include 
this Item in their internal reporting system regard it of very little 
usefulness in the evaluation and control of subsidiaries’ performance. 
Forty-one percent of the companies regard reports on local non­
economic environmental conditions as moderately useful, and slightly 
less than a quarter of all respondents consider such reports rather 
useful (ratings of 4 or 5 in scale). According to findings described 
in sect i o n  11.2 of the previous chapter, the incidence of reports on
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Table 12.1 - Usefulness of Items Included in Oompanies' Internal 
Reporting Systems in Controlling and Evaluating Foreign 
Subsidiaries' Operating Performance
R A T I N G s t a t is t ic s '!
......
Balance sheet
1
Not
useful
1
\
2 3 4 5 
Moderatelv Very 
useful useful
5 14 23 51 
/  \  /
N
94
Median
4.58
21.3$ 78.7$ !
Up-date of the 
budgeted year-end 
balance sheet
2
\
9 19
_!
18 36 
\  /
84 4.17
J
35.7$ 64.3$
<
P ro fit and loss 
account
0 
\ . ,
1 2 
_/
17 75
\  /
95 4.87
H 3.2$ 96.8$
O Up-date of the 
! vear-end o r o f it
1
\
2 6
_/
19 64
\  /
92 4.78
forecasts 9.8$ 90.2$
< Cash flow generated 
in the subsidiary
0
\__
0 8
/
14 72 
V /
94 4.85
z 8.5$ 91.5$
H
k
Sales per product 
or business
3
\
7 23
/
23 30 
\  /
86 3.94
38.4$ 61.6$
Borrowings in  the 
subsidiary from
3
\
5 18
__/
29 40 
\  /
95 4.24
local sources 27.4$ 72.6$
Inventory leve ls  
(in  quantity )
5
\
6 15
__f
22 17
\  /
65 3.80
40.0$ 60.0$
Market share in  
host country
6
\
13 16
/
14 11 ! 60
\  /  i
3.19
<fl 58.4$ 41.6$
H
u
Production
output
4
\
13 20 
__ /
18 13 
\  /
68 3.35
54.4$ 45.6$
_______Z
<
Manufacturing 
capacity u t i l iz a t io n
5
\
12 26 
__/
13 7 
\  /
63 3.06
68.3$ 31.7$
"
___________________
Labour re la tio n s 4 
\ __
13 20 
__ /
9 6 ^ 
\  /
52 2.95
71.2$ 28.8$
' Product q u a lity 5\__
9 19
/
9 10 
\  _/
52 3.13
63.5$ 36.5$
Report on economic 
conditions in  host
2
\
15 34
/
19 6
\  /
76 3.12
z country 67.1$ 32.9$
Report on p o l i t ic a l ,  
legal, and social
6
\__
20 29 
__ /
10 6 
\  /
71 2.83
conditions in  host 
country
77.4$ 22.6$
Others -  Capital 
expenditure, c re d it  
policy, no. of 
employees, orders 
received, e tc .
0 1 1 6 5 13
notes. -  Absolute frequencies are provided fo r  each ra tin g  in  the 1 to  5 
scale.
“ Adjusted r e la t iv e  frequencies (percentages) are provided in  
Cumulative form fo r ra tes  1-3 and 4 -5 .
N represents the to ta l number o f cases which rated the item .
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non-economic conditions In companies* Internal reporting systems was 
found to be surprisingly high. In effect, such reports were 
encountered in 80 percent of the total number of companies which 
responded to the questionnaire (see Table 11.1), although onlv
slightly more than a half of the companies (55 percent of the total)
have these reports submitted bv subsidiaries on a regular basis (once 
everv year, or more often). It is of interest to determine whether 
the companies that rated low the usefulness of reports on local 
political, legal, and social conditions, are simultaneously those that 
have the item in their reporting system submitted on an occasional, 
non-regular basis. If this is so, the usefulness of non-economic 
environmental information for those MNCs which require the item to be
reported regularly will be substantially higher. The ascertainment of
such a relationship requires a statistical test that will be conducted 
in section 12.4. of the present chapter.
Control and evaluation of foreign subsidiaries' operating performance 
is usually achieved with the assistance of a few indicators, which are 
normally calculated from raw-data submitted in the internal reporting 
system. In chapter 5 of the literature review, the most common success 
indicators were discussed and their main advantage and drawbacks 
examined.
Table 12.11 lists the most common profit-based financial indicators 
used by companies in the regular monitoring of foreign subsidiaries’ 
operations. The performance indicator most widely used is total 
income, either taken in isolation or compared with budget: more than 
95 percent of the total number of respondents said that the amount of 
profit or loss for the period reported by subsidiaries is monitored as 
a means of assessing how subsidiaries have performed during the 
period. The use of ROI is also widespread: 89 percent of the companies 
(i.e. 85 cases) employ this ratio regularly, and 78 percent said thev 
use ROI compared to budget. The investment base for the computation 
of ROI varies extensively, and may take the form of total amount of 
assets, net controllable assets, average trading assets, etc. Some 
companies mentioned the use of ROI as the basis of a detailed model of 
financial profile analysis. Return on sales is also a popular 
indicator of performance, used by more than three quarters of all
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Table 12.11 - Use of Profit-Based Measures in the Evaluation and Control
of Foreign Subsidiaries' Operating Performance
USE DO NOT USE N
Return on investment 85
88.5%
11
11.5%
96
Return on equity 30
3 1.2%
66
68.8%
96
Return on sales 74
77.1%
22
22.9%
96
Residual income 48
50.5%
47
49.5%
95
Total income 93
96.9%
3
3.1%
96
Budget compared to actual ROI 72
78.3%
20
21.7%
92
j Budget compared to actual total 
i^ncome
i 90 
g 94.7%
5
5.3%
95
Other profit measures
L.
19
19.8%
77
80.2%
96
NOTES: Absolute frequencies and adjusted relative frequencies in percentage 
are provided for each cell.
N represents the number of valid cases.
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companies. Measures that are not so widely used include RI employed by 
only half of the respondents, and return on equity, used by less than 
one third of the respondents. In the category "others" a number of 
indicators were mentioned, among which are gross margins, and ratios 
of interest coyer age.
Besides the use of profit-based indicators, companies may also employ 
non-profit-based financial indicators. The great majority of firms (8% 
percent, i.e. 81 cases) regularly employ non-profit-based measures of 
a financial nature in the monitoring of subsidiaries* operations. 
Table 12. Ill lists the indicators most frequently mentioned by 
companies. This table is constructed from an open question where 
respondents were asked to list major measures used in headquarters. 
Therefore, the adjusted relatiye frequencies proyided in the table 
represent the percentage of firms which specifically mentioned the use 
of a certain performance indicator, and not, as in the case of Table 
12.11, the total percentage of firms that use the indicator. For this 
reason, frequencies in Table 12.11 and 12.Ill are not comparable. The 
non-profit financial indicator most frequently mentioned by companies 
is cash-flow: corporations indicated that this measure is regularly
used to control and assess the operating performance of foreign 
subsidiaries. Other indicators often mentioned include orders, sales 
ratios, remittances, stock ratios, costs, debtors, working capital, 
and gearing, - see Table 12.III. A great number of other non-profit 
financial measures were indicated, among which are yalue added, 
overhead control ratios, capital expenditure, exchange exposure (yia 
balancing of foreign assets/liabilities), key operating ratios, 
material risk (defined as stocks less purchase commitments less sales 
orders). All these measures had frequencies of less than 5.
Table 12. IV shows how each performance measure discussed aboye 
compares in importance with the others- Questionnaire respondents 
were asked to list by order of importance the financial measures (both 
Profit- and non-profit-based) which in their opinion proyide better 
indicators of subsidiary operating performance. Table 12.IV presents 
the number of times (and respectiye relatiye frequencies) each 
financial measure was ranked 1st or 2nd, 3rd or 4th, and 5th or aboye. 
Given that the medians were calculated on the basis of the ranks
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Table 12.Ill - Use of Non-Profit-Based Financial Measures in the
Evaluation and Control of Foreign Subsidiaries'
Operating Performance
I USE
!
DO NOT 
USE
N
Non-Profit-Based Financial Measures 81
83.5%
16
16.5%
97
Cash-flow 74 26.3%
Orders 31 32.0% !
Sales ratios 23 23.7% ;
Remittances 19 19.6% 1
Stock ratios 17 12.5% :
Costs 14 14.4%
Debtors 12 12.4% 1
Working capital 11 11.3%
Gearing 8 8.2%
Other non-profit financial measures: 37 38.1% :
overhead control ratios, value 
added, borrowings, capital 
expenditure, exchange exposure, etc
NOTES: The table presents absolute frequencies and adjusted relative 
frequencies in percentage. Percentages are referred to an N 
(total number of cases) of 97.
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Table 12,1V - Relative Importance Attributed to Financial Measures as
Indicators of Foreign Subsidiaries* Operating Performance
R A N K I N G O F I M P 0 R T A N C E
Statistics
1st-2 nd 3rd-4th 5th + N Median
Return on Investment 46
66,7%
17
24,6%
6
8.7%
69 1.49
Return on Equity 7
43.7%
5
31.3%
4
25.0%
16 3 . 0 0
Return on Sales 16
40.0%
16
40.0%
8
2 0 ,0%
40
________
3 . 0 0
---------------------
Residual Income 9
34.6%
9
34.6%
________
8
3 0,8%
26 3.30
Total Income 30
53.5%
21
37.5%
5
9.0%
56 2.33
Budget compared to 
actual ROI
10
40.0%
7
2 8 ,0%
8  ^
3 2.0%
25 3.60
Budget compared to 
actual total income
15
48.4%
10
3 2.2%
6
19.4%
31 2.63
w
0
w
CO
<
P3
I
h r-
lè
K
&
I Other Profit Measures 7
63.6%
3
27.3%
1
9.1%
11 1.75
Cash-flow ■ 24 24 10 58 2.89 ,
41,4% 41,4% 17.2%
Orders i 3 6 4 13 3 . 2 0 ;
23.1% 46.1% 3 0.8% 1
Sales Ratios i  4 5 4 13 3.67 :
30,8% 38.4% 3 0.8%
Remittances 1 2 8 11 5 . 0 0 .
i 9.1% 1 8.2% 72.7%
Stock ratios 1 3 7 11 4.63 ;
' 9.1% 27.3% 6 3 .6%
Costs ; 2 1 2 5 4.00
i 40.0% 20.0% 40.0%
Debtors i  1 2 3 6 3.50 :
1 16.7% 33.3% 50.0%
Working Capital 1 1 2 2 5 3 . 2 5 ;
1 20,0% 40.0% 40.0% :
Gearing i 0 2 4 6 7 . 0 0 ;
1 33.3% 66.7%
Other non-profit I 4 15 5 24 3.63 :
measures I 16,7%
i
62,5% 20,8%
; (K
i i
I ^
' 0 
: W 
; CO 
. < 
; w
; I
I ^  I Hk
0
K
&
I
Z
0
z
: .Absolute frequencies and adjusted relative frequencies in 
percentage are provided for each cell.
,N represents the number of valid cases,
.Note that in this table the lower is the median, the higher is 
the importance attributed to the respective measure.
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assigned to each measure (i.e. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.). the lower the 
median the higher is the importance attributed to the respective 
performance indicator. The table reveals that more than half of the 
companies that ranked ROI and total income considered these measures 
either the most important financial indicator used, or the second most 
important. Other profit-based measures that were highly ranked are 
return on equity and return on sales. Total income compared to budget 
is regarded as considerably more important than ROI compared to 
budget. Among the reduced number of companies which ranked RI among 
the better indicators of performance, only slightly more than one 
third ranked the measure as 1st or 2nd. In what concerns the non­
profit based financial measures, cash flow is the indicator most 
highly ranked by respondents, being considered the best or the second 
best indicator by 41 percent of the companies that ranked the item. 
Orders, and working capital were also ranked reasonably high. In 
contrast, gearing, remittances and stock ratios tended to be given a 
very low priority - Table 12, IV.
So far, the present section has dealt with formal information used in 
companies’ headquarters in the evaluation and control of foreign 
subsidiaries' operating performance. Subsidiaries’ operations are 
generally controlled through the monitoring of information reported 
via the internal reporting system. Such system provides a package of 
information on local operations that managers in headquarters analyse 
in greater or lesser detail. On the other hand, subsidiaries’ 
operations mav also be controlled with the assistance of a battery of 
performance indicators, calculated on the basis of some information 
submitted in the reporting system.
Table 12.V illustrates the results of a question which attempted to 
find out how important to the continuing process of performance 
evaluation is each of these two major instruments of assessment. The 
monitoring of the information submitted in the internal reporting 
System, taken as a whole, is considered more important for the 
evaluation and control of subsidiary operating performance than the 
strict monitoring of a battery of individual financial (profit- or 
non-profit-based) measures. The internal reporting system taken as a 
global package of information was considered very important (rated 5
383
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In a scale of 1 to 5) by the absolute majority of respondents (60
percent, i.e. 56 companies); only 10 percent of all companies 
considered such an assessment instrument low to moderately important. 
In contrast, a battery of performance measures used independently of 
other information reported in the internal reporting system, was
regarded as very important (rated 5) by 44 percent of the total (i.e. 
39 corporations); as much as nearly one third of all respondents 
said that such measures were only low to moderately important when 
used without taking into account other information reported in the 
internal system. The difference in importance attributed by 
respondents to the two major assessment instruments is significant in 
statistical terms. Table 12.V reports the results obtained with the
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. As seen before, this is a
test of differences for two related samples, appropriate for variables 
measured at the ordinal-level. The level of significance obtained for 
the test is very high: 0.001, i.e. 0.1 percent.
12.2.2. The Setting of Standards of Performance
When monitoring subsidiaries’ operations, managers in headquarters 
usually compare the actual results achieved by subsidiaries against 
some yardstick or standard (see chapter 4 of the present study). 
Table 12.VI lists the performance standards most frequently used in 
practice, and the respective importance attributed by managers to 
each. There are two standards of performance which are employed by 
nearly every company (96 percent, i.e. 90 firms): targets previously 
set for subsidiaries, and the past actual results of subsidiaries 
(i.e. standards based on trends obtained from historical data). 
Performance targets were, by far, the standard most highly rated by 
companies. In a scale of importance ranging from 1 to 5. 8? percent
of all respondents which use targets rated this standard as important 
or very important (i.e. rates of 4 or 5). The median of 4,7 reflects 
this extremely high rating. Past subsidiary results, although almost 
universally used, were considered important or very important by 
slightly less than half of the respondents (46 percent). Its median 
amounts to 3.4, All the other performance standards listed in Table
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12.VI are used by a considerably number of companies J median
ratings of importance for such standards are all less than 3 (i.e.
less than moderately important).
The preparation and approval of performance targets set for 
subsidiaries may be more or less centralized in headquarters. Earlier 
in chapter 4, it was suggested that the principle of authority and 
controllability would tend, under normal circumstances, to be more 
safeguarded when subsidiary managers have an active participation in 
the setting of targets. In effect, it is assumed that headquarters 
executives of a MNC have, normally, a lesser understanding of the 
operating conditions specific to each subsidiary than the managers 
locally responsible for the operations. Table 12,VII shows the 
degree of intervention of companies’ headquarters in the preparation 
and approval of foreign subsidiaries’ targets. Total independence of 
subsidiaries from headquarters in the setting of performance targets 
was found in onlv one company. In this firm, subsidiary managers 
simply select and set their own targets without consulting 
headquarters. In 41 corporations (45 percent), the level of 
subsidiary independence is still high, since headquarters executives 
usually accept the targets selected bv subsidiaries which are 
submitted to them for approval. In 39 cases (43 percent), performance 
targets are only set after headquarters and subsidiary managers have 
collectively assessed alternatives and reached consensus. In 10 
companies (11 percent), the process of selecting and assigning 
performance targets to subsidiaries is rather centralized. Here, 
headquarters managers select the targets and submit them to the 
subsidiary managers for ideas and suggestions. Headquarters then make 
the decision. Overall, in 89 percent of the cases subsidiary managers 
have a fair degree of participation in the setting of their units’ 
targets. This suggests that certain conditions exist in most cases 
for the operating specificity of each subsidiary to be reasonably 
reflected in the performance targets.
The way in which performance targets are determined was found to be 
fundamentally linked to the budget. In fact, 89 percent of the 
companies (i.e. 83 firms) which use targets as performance standards,
calculate them either on the basis of the subsidiary budget alone (75
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Table 12.VII - Headquarters Intervention in the Preparation and 
Approval of Foreign Subsidiaries’ Targets
ABSOLUTE
FREQ.
ADJUSTED
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
CUMULATIVE 
ADJ FREQ 
(PERCENT)
Subsidiary managers select and 
set their own performance 
targets without consulting HQ
1 1.1 1.1
Subsidiary managers select the 
perform, target and submit it to 
HQ for approval; HQ usually 
accepts proposed targets
41 45.1 46.2
HQ and subsidiary managers 
collectively assess alternative 
performance targets and attempt 
to reach consensus; the target 
that has the support of both is 
the one that is set
39 42.9 89.0
HQ managers select the performance 
target and submit it to the 
subsidiary managers for ideas and 
suggestions; HQ managers then 
make the decision
10 11.0 100.0
HQ managers select and set the 
subsidiary performance targets 
without consulting subsidiary 
managers
0 0.0 0.0
Not determined 2 MISSING 100.0
Not applicable 4 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 97 100.0
= 91
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percent of the total), or on the basis of the subsidiary budget 
adapted to the company’s overall objectives (14 percent) - see Table 
12.VIII. In only 9 corporations (10 percent) are targets determined 
without reference to the budget. In such cases targets were found to 
be determined either on the basis of the company’s overaill objectives, 
or by management judgement.
Targets assigned to foreign subsidiaries in a company may simply vary 
in value from subsidiary to subsidiary or, more extensively, they may 
vary in nature. The former involves the assignment to subsidiaries of 
different target values based on the same indicators. Ihis is the 
case of companies which use the same set of performances indicators - 
e.g. ROI, profit, cash flow, market share, etc. - for all
subsidiaries, but which adapt the target values of such indicators to 
the specificity of each operation. On the other hand, changes in the 
nature of targets assigned to subsidiaries, involve the use of
different target performance indicators across foreign operations 
(e.g. company where targets set for some subsidiaries are based on ROI 
and return or sales, and where targets set for other subsidiaries are 
based on manufacturing efficiency and product quality). The
variability of subsidiary performance targets across a company’s set 
of foreign operations is explored in the study. Respondents were
asked to rate on a 1 to 5 scale the extent to which the value and the 
nature of performance targets vary among subsidiaries in their firms. 
Results are tabulated in Table 12.IX. Variation in the value of 
targets is very extensive: nearly three companies in four (73 percent
of the total) said that in their firms performance targets vary from 
moderately to very extensively across foreign operations. In
contrast, variation in the nature of the targets is rather limited: 
less than one company in four (22 percent) revealed to apply at least 
to a moderate extent different target indicators to foreign 
subsidiaries. Application of the Wilcoxon test, which produced a
significance level of 0.099 percent or less confirms that variation in
the value of the targets is, in a statistical sense, significantly
more extensive than variation in the nature of the targets - Table 
12.IX. It seems reasonable to assume that a change in the nature of 
the targets assigned to the different subsidiaries of a MNC offers a 
tetter method of accounting for the differences among the subsidiaries
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Table 12.VIII - Bases Used for Setting Dp 
Performance Targets
Foreign Subsidiaries’
ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY
adjusted
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
Subsidiary budget 70 75.3
The company’s overall objectives, with no 
explicit reference to the subsidiary budget
4 4.3
Management judgement (either at HQ or 
subsidiaries),with no explicit reference to 
company’s objectives or the subsidiary 
budget
5 5.4
Subsidiary budget adapted to the company’s 
overall objectives
13 14.0
Other - Targets are directly linked to the 
three-year plan
1 1.1
Not applicable 4 MISSING
TOTAL 97 100.0
93
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than a simple change in the value of the targets. This being so, the 
result reported here indicates that firms are generally employing less 
elaborate forms of standard setting, which may not adequately reflect 
the specificity of each subsidiary.
A number of reasons were given by company executives to justify the 
use of different performance targets. They can be grouped into two 
major categories: reasons dealing with the nature and prospects of the 
business of the subsidiary, and reasons relating to the specific 
economic and non-economic (mainly political) conditions found locally. 
The nature of the subsidiary business naturally ought to influence the 
type of target assigned. In one company, it was found that production 
and marketing oriented subsidiaries have completely different types of 
targets to achieve. In another company, the nature and value of
performance targets are adapted to the principal activity of the 
subsidiary, either this is contracting, manufacturing, or
distribution. In yet another case, only the values of targets vary; 
this company is involved in three main activities and assigns 
different ROIs (the company’s prime target) to the subsidiaries in
accordance with their dominant activity: contracting subsidiaries are
set ROIs in the region of 30 percent, subsidiaries in engineering 
services are given ROIs of 40 percent, and subsidiaries in asset 
intensive industries, ROIs of 15 percent. Market situation including 
level of competition in countries where subsidiaries operate was also 
found to be an important factor in the setting of targets. In the
words of one executive: "the questions we ask ourselves are - is the
market mature?; are we looking for rapid market growth?; is cash 
generation more important than market share?" Local economic and 
political environmental conditions generally influence both the value 
and the nature of the targets set for subsidiaries. Several companies 
explicitely mentioned local environment as a major influence in the 
determination of targets. One particular manager emphasized the fact 
that his company operates in countries whose inflation rates range 
from less than 4 percent to more than 400 percent. Political risk was 
also often mentioned as an important factor influencing the
determination of targets. According to one executive, performance 
targets are suited to local environments, with the objective of
achieving from subsidiaries the "possible best", which in many cases
392
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can only be the "minimum acceptable".
As can be seen, there are many factors that may explain why
performance targets are different either in value or in nature among a 
company’s foreign subsidiaries. A manager in a corporation where 
targets of different nature are used declared that "the reasons [for 
employing different targets] are almost endless - different subsidiary 
size, structure, history, market, national economy, growth
expectations or requirements, and so on and so forth”. In another 
company, where targets assigned to subsidiaries tend to vary 
substantially in value, and not so much in nature, the executive
contacted summarized the situation in his firm this way: "For an
international group operating worldwide there are differing
environments and changing/developing long term strategies. In
assessing the values [of targets], different rates of cash flow, 
return on investment, and dividends are assessed taking into account 
different types of business, high or low risk, and competitive rate of 
return in individual national environments".
12.2.3. Differences in Assessment Qriteria Among Subsidiaries
So far, the formal assessment criteria (i.e. items in the internal 
reporting system, performance measures and standards) used in the 
control and evaluation of foreign subsidiaries’ operating performance, 
have been described for the typical (i.e. most common) case in each 
oompanyd). However, the use headquarters executives make of the 
information reported by subsidiaries in the internal reporting system, 
as well as the nature of the performance measures and standards 
executives employ in the evaluation and control process, are likely to 
differ among a company’s set of foreign operations. Table 12.X 
reveals that the absolute majority of companies (63 percent, i.e. 61 
corporations) attempt to adjust the formal assessment criteria to 
special circumstances associated with subsidiaries. Among these, 9 
companies (9 percent of the total) use totally different assessment 
Criteria across their foreign operations. In 52 companies (54 percent 
of the total), the criteria tend to be similar for all subsidiaries
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Table 12.1 - Variability of the Formal Criteria Regularly Used by HQ 
to Control and Evaluate Operating Performance of Foreign 
Subsidiaries
ABSOLUTE
FREQUENCY
ADJUSTED
FREQUENCY
(PERCENT)
CUMULATIVE 
ADJ FREQ 
(PERCENT)
Companies use the  same fo rm a l 
assesseraent c r i t e r i a  and t h e  
same w e i g h t s  f o r  a l l  f o r e i g n  
subsidiaries
35 36.5 36.5
Companies use the  same fo rm a l 
assessment c r i t e r i a  b u t  w i t h  
d ifferent w e igh ts
52 54.2 90.6
Companies use d i f f e r e n t  fo rm a l 
assessment c r i t e r i a
9 9.4 100.0
Not determined 1 MISSING 100.0
TOTAL 97 100.0
= 96
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abroad; nevertheless, the relative weight attributed to data, 
measures, and standards varies according to the nature of the 
subsidiary. In contrast, criteria and relative weights were 
considered identical for all overseas operations in 35 companies (i.e. 
37 percent of the total).
Table 12.XI lists major factors which determine the use of different
assessment practices (weights and criteria) to control and evaluate
foreign subsidiaries’ operating performance. Respondents were 
provided with a list of factors and were asked to rate in a scale of 1 
to 5 the influence that each factor had in determining differences in 
assessment practices across their company’s foreign operations. The 
particular characteristics of the host country environments, posing 
special threats or opportunities to subsidiaries were considered the 
most influential factor (median of 3.9). Two thirds of the 
respondents said that differences in host environments had a major 
influence (rated 4 or 5) in the use of different assessment practices 
among subsidiaries. Also of substantial importance were considered 
factors such as unsatisfactory performance level of subsidiaries, 
strategic importance of subsidiaries for the company as a whole, and 
geographic location of subsidiaries. All these factors were regarded
by more than half of the respondents as havinc a major influence in
the use of different assessment practices for different overseas 
units. Size of subsidiaries, ownership share, type of responsibility, 
and dominant managerial function in subsidiaries (all with medians 
near or below the "moderate influence" point), were also considered as 
justifying the use of different assessment practices. One factor 
frequently mentioned by companies, and which is presented in the 
"other” category is the nature or type of business in subsidiaries. 
Its median rating of 4.8 is extremely high. - Table 12.XI.
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Table 12.H  - Factors Vhlofa Infloenco the Use of Different Weights or 
üriteria in the Formzd Control and Evaluation of Foreign 
Subsidiaries' Operating Performance
1 2 3 4 5 T  N 1  Median
Minor Moderate Major 1
In fluence  In fluence  In fluence j |
Particular 3 4 12 22 15 56 ! 3.91
characteristics of V \  / i
the host environ­ 33.9% 66.1%
ment. posing special
threats and/or 1
opportunities to i
subsidiary
RATING "T" STATISTICS
Unsatisfactory  
performance le v e l 
of subsidiary 43.7%
9 18 13
J  \______/
56.3%
55 i 3.69 I
Strategic importance 6 7 11 18 12 54 i 3.67
of subsidiary for , V _ / \  /
the company as a 
whole
44.5% 55.5%
Geographic location 4 5 17 14 14 54 ’ 3.57
of subsidiary (e .g . \ _ / \  /
Europe. Latin 4 8.2% 51/8%
America, A frica, e tc )
Size of subsidiary 8 11 12 18 4 53 ! 3.13
\_ / V /
58.5% 41.5%
OwnershiD share in  
subsidiary ( i . e .  
wholly owned vs. 
partly owned sub­
sidiaries or jo in t
11
61.5%
39 i 2.86 i
ventures
Type of Respons­
ib ility  assigned to 
subsidiary ( i . e .  
subsy. as a p r o f it -  
centre vs. subsy. as 
a cost centre)
3 9 6 5 5 
64.2% 35.8%
281 2.83
Dominant managerial 
function in sub­
sidiary (e .g . 
marketing-oriented 
subsy. vs. product­
ion-oriented subsy.
7 8 10 6 4 
71.5% 28.5%
35 j 2.75
1
!
Other factors -  
nature or type of 
business in subsy.
0 0 0 2 4 6 4.75
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12.2.4. Differences in Assessment Griteria Used for Subsidiaries and 
for Managers
The assessment practices described so far in this section, were 
referred to the evaluation and short term control of foreign 
subsidiaries’ operating performance. The criteria used in companies’ 
headquarters to assess the performance of the managers responsible for 
subsidiaries will now be described and compared with criteria used to 
assess subsidiaries’ operations.
In the great majority of companies (80 percent of the total, i.e. 75 
cases), managerial performance was found to be formally assessed by 
headquarters. Only in a limited number of cases (20 percent i.e. 19 
companies), the performance of subsidiary managers is not assessed on 
the basis of formal criteria - Table 12.XII. Here, the evaluation of 
subsidiary managers tends to be based on the personal judgements by 
the senior U.K. executives responsible for the ultimate success of the 
respective overseas operations. In one company, where an interview 
was conducted, the assessment of managerial performance was said to be 
"extremely formal for domestic operations (subsidiaries are much 
closer to parent, and are easier to understand)", whereas for overseas 
operations the assessment was considered more "informal and 
subjective". Among the 75 companies which formally evaluate 
managerial performance, 60 (i.e. 80 percent) use the internal
reporting system operated between subsidiaries and headquarters as the 
informational source on which the performance of managers is formally 
assessed - Table 12.XIII. In the other 15 corporations (i.e. 20
percent) managerial assessment extends beyond the analysis of 
subsidiary results presented in the reporting system into areas 
related to the personal performance of the managers. Almost all 
companies in this category referred to an appraisal system based on 
"personnel" criteria. The detailed analysis of such criteria, which 
are associated with areas of Personnel or Human Resources Management, 
is beyond the scope of this study. As an illustration, a few examples 
are provided. In one company, the personnel criteria employed was 
said to be related to a formal system of management succession and
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Table 12.HI - Formal Assessment of Foreign Subsidiary Managers
Absolute 
Frequency
Adjusted
Frequency
(percent)
Headquarters formally assess managerial 
performance
75 79.8
There is no formal assessment by HQ of 
managerial performance
19 20.2
1
Not determined 3 Missing '
TOTAL 97 100.0
Table 12.XIII - The Internal Reporting System as the Source of 
Information on Which the Assessment of Managerial 
Performance is Based
Absolute
Frequency
Adjusted ; 
Frequency j 
(percent) i
The formal assessment of managerial 
performance is based on info, provided 
by the internal reporting system
60 80.0 1
1
i
I The formal assessment of managerial 
! performance is NOT based on info.
I  provided by the internal reporting 
! system
TOTAL
15
r
.1. 75
20 . 0
100.0
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Table 12.XIV - Differences Between the Formal Assessment Criteria Used 
for Managers and for Subsidiaries
Absolute
Frequency
Adjusted
Frequency
(percent)
When the formal assessment of managerial 
performance is based on info provided by 
the internal reporting system, how do the 
formal criteria used to assess the 
performance of managers compare with 
those used to evaluate the performance of 
subsidiaries?
.The same , (managerial performance 
is totally identified with subsidiary 
performance)
22
-
36.7
.Little different 35 58.3
.Substantially different 3 5.0
.Entirely different (totally separate 
criteria are used) 0
_______________ i
TOTAL ; 60 100.0 ‘!
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development. In  a n o th e r case, m anagers’ perfo rm ance was found to  be
associated w ith  s u b s id ia r ie s ’ perfo rm ance  w ith  the  d if fe re n c e  th a t  
managers are asked an e x t r a  o b je c t iv e  re la te d  to  t r a in in g  o f  th e  lo c a l 
workforce. In  one company, h e a d q u a rte rs  e x e c u tiv e s  re ve a le d  th a t  they 
were applying to  th e  most im p o r ta n t  s u b s id ia r ie s  a f a i r l y  complex 
system based on the  p r in c ip le s  o f  MBO (management by o b je c t iv e s ) .  One 
executive in te rv ie w e d  s a id  th a t  in  h is  company "m anage ria l a p p ra is a l 
is made a g a in s t an agreed tasks/m anagem ent a c t io n  programme". 
According to  ano the r e x e c u t iv e ,  " s u b s id ia ry  perform ance is  taken  in t o  
account in  the e v a lu a t io n  o f  s u b s id ia ry  managers, b u t is  no t the  o n ly  
basis o f assessm ent; in  o th e r  w ords, th e  r e p o r t in g  system is  one 
aspect, but man management, p ro d u c t deve lopm ent, team developm ent, 
etc., are e q u a lly  im p o r ta n t " .  In  many cases, m a nage ria l perform ance
assessment was found to  be t ie d  up w ith  supp lem enta l com pensation and 
bonuses.
the 60 companies where th e  fo rm a l assessment o f  fo r e ig n  
subsidiary managers i s  based on in fo rm a t io n  p ro v id e d  by th e  in te r n a l  
reporting system, 22 c o rp o ra t io n s  ( i . e .  37 p e rc e n t)  use e x a c t ly  the
same formal assessment c r i t e r i a  to  e v a lu a te  the  perfo rm ance o f  
managers and th a t  o f  o p e ra t io n s .  For such companies, m anageria l 
performance is  t o t a l l y  id e n t i f i e d  w ith  s u b s id ia ry  perfo rm ance . In  35 
firms (58 p e rc e n t) ,  c r i t e r i a  used f o r  managers and o p e ra tio n s  are  s a id  
to be l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n t , -  and in  o n ly  3 companies (5 p e rc e n t)  they  were 
considered s u b s ta n t ia l ly  d i f f e r e n t  -  Table  1 2 .XIV. The d if fe re n c e s  in  
assessment c r i t e r i a ,  e i t h e r  l im i t e d  o r  s u b s ta n t ia l ,  stem from  the  
perception th a t r e s u l t s  o b ta in e d  by s u b s id ia r ie s  ought to  be s e n s ib ly  
interpreted when i t  comes th e  tim e  to  assess the  managers re s p o n s ib le  
for the s u b s id ia r ie s .  The concep t expressed in  th e  sentence "a  
manager may be p e r fo rm in g  w e l l  i n  a poor b u s in e s s ", r e f le c t s  the  
awareness on the  p a r t  o f  a number o f  h ea d q u a rte rs  e x e c u tiv e s  th a t  
there are good reasons to  d i f f e r e n t ia t e  between th e  two types  o f  
formal performance assessm ent. To c i t e  a coup le  o f  exam ples, in  one 
company fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  managers a re  e va lu a te d  ta k in g  in to  account 
subsidiary r e s u lts  fo rw a rd e d  v ia  the  r e p o r t in g  system , b u t, in  th e  
words of an e x e c u tiv e , " o b je c t iv e  v ie w  must be take n  on r e s i l ie n c e  and 
effort as app lie d  to  lo c a l  p ro b le m s ". In  a no the r company, a ltho u gh  
the c r ite r ia  employed in  th e  assessm ent o f  managers and o p e ra tio n s  are
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apparently s im i la r ,  th e  e x e c u t iv e  in te rv ie w e d  s a id  th a t  " [ i n  ou r 
group] the e v a lu a t io n  o f  th e  manager can be d i f f e r e n t  to  th a t  o f  the  
company in  th a t  the  m anager’ s c o n t r ib u t io n  i s  assessed ta k in g  in t o  
account the s i t u a t io n  he in h e r i t s  and th e  n a tu re  o f  the  problems he 
encounters; poor f in a n c ia l  r e s u l t s  do no t n e c e s s a r ily  mean bad 
management".
12.2.5. D iscuss ion  and C o n c lus ion s
This section  surveyed com panies’ p ra c t ic e s  in  the  fo rm a l e v a lu a t io n  
and control o f fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  and t h e i r  managers. I t  s ta r te d  
by describing w h ich  in fo r m a t io n  i s  fo rm a lly  used by headqua rte rs  
executives to  m o n ito r  th e  perfo rm ance  o f  u n i ts  o p e ra t in g  overseas. 
Such an in fo rm a tio n  i s  p ro v id e d  by th e  in te r n a l  r e p o r t in g  system 
in s titu tio n a liz e d  in  companies between s u b s id ia r ie s  and h e a d q u a rte rs , 
and in th is  sense th e  p re s e n t s e c t io n  c o n s t itu te s  an e x te n s io n  o f  th e  
previous chap ter.
The resu lts  re p o r te d  above emphasize th e  c r u c ia l  r o le  p layed  by the  
internal re p o r t in g  system  as a source  o f  in fo rm a t io n  f o r  the  
evaluation and c o n t ro l o f  fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s .  As i t  was 
demonstrated e a r l ie r  i n  c h a p te r 6 , most e m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s  on 
performance e v a lu a t io n  in  MNCs focused on a number o f  in d iv id u a l  
measures o f s u b s id ia ry  pe rfo rm ance  such as ROI, p r o f i t ,  R I, r e tu rn  on 
sales and so on, and o v e r lo o k e d  th e  use o f  th e  u s u a lly  abundant 
information th a t  i s  re p o r te d  th ro u g h  th e  in te r n a l  r e p o r t in g  system . 
This study’ s r e s u l t s  co n firm e d  th e  im p re s s io n  o b ta in e d  in  ta lk s  and 
interviews w ith  e x e c u tiv e s  conducted p r io r  to  th e  fo rm u la t io n  o f  the  
questionnaire, th a t  th e  c o n t in u in g  p rocess o f  s u b s id ia ry  perform ance 
evaluation r e l ie s  more on th e  in fo rm a t io n  s u b m itte d  in  th e  in te r n a l  
reporting system, ta k e n  as a w ho le , than  on se p a ra te  perform ance 
indicators e ith e r  d i r e c t l y  fo rw a rd ed  by s u b s id ia r ie s  o r  c a lc u la te d  in  
headquarters on th e  b a s is  o f  th e  in fo rm a t io n  co n ta in e d  in  the  
reporting system.
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The content o f th e  in t e r n a l  r e p o r t in g  system  is  w ide in  n a tu re , as 
seen in  the p re v io u s  c h a p te r ,  and in c lu d e s  both f in a n c ia l  and non- 
financial item s o f  in fo r m a t io n .  Among th e  fo rm e r, the s u b s id ia r ie s  
profit and lo s s  a cco u n t, th e  s ta te m e n t o f  cash f lo w  genera ted  in  
subsidiaries, and u p -d a te s  o f  th e  ye a r-e nd  p r o f i t  fo re c a s ts  were 
considered to  be th e  most u s e fu l in  c o n t r o l l in g  and e v a lu a t in g  fo r e ig n  
subsidiaries. Among th e  l a t t e r ,  p h y s ic a l in v e n to ry  le v e ls ,  
production o u tp u t, and m a rke t share  were regarded  as the  most u s e fu l.  
Despite the apparen t p re fe re n c e  in  g e n e ra l f o r  f in a n c ia l  ite m s  o f  
information, n o n - f in a n c ia l  in fo r m a t io n  was o fte n  a tta ch e d  h ig h  le v e ls  
of usefulness, and i t s  im p o rta n ce  f o r  th e  perfo rm ance e v a lu a t io n  
process cannot be d e n ie d . Many e m p ir ic a l s tu d ie s  (see ch ap te r 6 ) ,  by 
concentrating s o le ly  on f in a n c ia l  in fo rm a t io n  were e x c lu d in g  a v e ry  
relevant d im ension, whose s tu d y  i s  v i t a l  f o r  the  und e rs tan d in g  o f  
performance e v a lu a t io n  and c o n t ro l i n  MNCs.
As just mentioned, b e s id e s  th e  in fo rm a t io n  s u p p lie d  v ia  the  in te r n a l  
reporting system, managers in  h e a d q u a rte rs  m o n ito r  the  perform ance o f  
foreign s u b s id ia r ie s  w ith  the  h e lp  o f  a b a t te r y  o f  in d ic a to r s  w hich 
are normally used in d e p e n d e n tly  o f  th e  re p o r t in g  system . The 
performance in d ic a to r s  most w id e ly  used and s im u lta n e o u s ly  cons ide red  
the most usefu l a re  t o t a l  income and ROI, e i th e r  ta ke n  in  is o la t io n  o r 
compared w ith  budget. O ther measures f re q u e n t ly  used in c lu d e  re tu rn  
on sales and cash f lo w .  As to  R I, an in d ic a to r  w h ich  re c e iv e d  a 
substantial amount o f  a t t e n t io n  when m a jo r perfo rm ance measures were 
reviewed (ch a p te r 5 ) ,  o n ly  s l i g h t l y  more tha n  h a l f  o f  th e  companies 
surveyed were em p loy ing  th e  method. These r e s u l t s  agree w ith  the  
surveys o f American MNCs, where o p e ra t in g  budget com parisons, ROI, and 
profit were g e n e ra lly  th e  f a v o u r i t e  assessment te ch n iq ue s  (ch a p te r 
6). S im ila r ly ,  RI was found  in  such su rve ys  to  be s c a rc e ly  used. 
Although a com parison o f  r e s u l t s  between d i f f e r e n t  s tu d ie s  re q u ire s  
caution, i t  appears f a i r  to  say th a t  the  p re s e n t re se a rch  suggests 
that RI, d e s p ite  i t s  sca rce  use in  bo th  s id e s  o f  th e  A t la n t ic ,  i s ,  
nevertheless, more f r e q u e n t ly  encoun te red  in  B r i t i s h  than  in  American 
Multinationals. T h is  w ou ld  con fim  a s im i la r  f in d in g  in  Scapens and 
Sale [1981] fo r  d iv is io n a l iz e d  (d o m e s tic ) f irm s .
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The use o f in fo rm a t io n  f o r  s u b s id ia ry  perfo rm ance e v a lu a t io n  and 
control In vo lve s  com parisons o f  a c tu a l r e s u l t s  a g a in s t c e r ta in  
yardsticks o r s ta n d a rd s  (see c h a p te r 4 ) .  Two s tandards  o f  
performance were encoun te red  in  v i r t u a l l y  e ve ry  company: ta rg e ts
previously se t f o r  s u b s id ia r ie s ,  and the  p a s t a c tu a l r e s u l t s  o f  
subsidiaries. As e xp e c te d , th e  s e t t in g  o f  ta rg e ts  was found to  be 
essentiallv l in k e d  to  th e  b ud g e t. As d iscussed  in  Chapter 5, the  
budget rep resen ts  a p o w e rfu l in te g ra te d  in s tru m e n t o f  s u b u n it 
performance e v a lu a t io n ,  and i t  i s  o f te n  used as the  m a jo r y a r d s t ic k  
against which a c tu a l r e s u l t s  a re  compared. Surveys on perform ance 
evaluation p ra c t ic e s  in  MNCs (c h a p te r  6) were unanimous in  em phasiz ing  
the im portant r o le  o f  th e  b u d g e ta ry  system in  th e  e v a lu a t io n  process 
and i t s  w idespread use among c o rp o ra t io n s .  Here, the  budget was 
similarly found to  be employed by n e a r ly  e ve ry  company. M oreover, in  
nine cases o u t o f  te n  i t  was b e in g  used as a b a s is  f o r  s e t t in g  up 
foreign s u b s id ia r ie s ’ ta r g e ts .  As to  p a s t s u b s id ia ry  r e s u l t s ,  the  
other standard o f  perfo rm ance  u n iv e r s a l ly  used, the  f in d in g s  o f  t h is  
study agree w ith  those  o f  M o rs ic a to  [19 8 0 ] where h is t o r ic a l  d a ta  were 
revealed to  be th e  m ost common b a s is  o f  com parison o f  s u b s id ia ry  
results.
Subsidiary ta rg e ts  may ta k e  in t o  a cco u n t, to  a v a ry in g  degree, the  
specific ity  o f  each o p e ra t io n .  Such a q u a l i t y  o f  the  ta rg e ts  may be 
reflected in  the  e x te n t to  w h ich  th e y  change in  va lu e  and in  n a tu re  
across s u b s id ia r ie s ,  and in  th e  degree o f  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  th e  
subsidiary managers in  th e  s e t t in g  o f  th e  ta r g e ts .  The r e s u l t s  
showed th a t lo c a l management p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  ta r g e t  s e t t in g  is  
usually h igh, and th a t  th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  ta rg e ts  v a ry  e x te n s iv e ly  from 
one subsidiary to  a n o th e r i n  a same MNC. However, i n  what concerns a 
variation in  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  ta r g e ts ,  i t  was found th a t  o n lv  a 
minoritv o f companies were a p p lv in g  d i f f e r e n t  ta r g e t  in d ic a to r s  to  
different fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s .  V a r ia t io n  in  th e  n a tu re  o f  the  
targets was assumed to  o f f e r  a b e t te r  method o f  a c c o u n tin g  f o r  th e  
differences among th e  o p e ra t io n s  o f  a c o rp o ra t io n  than  a s im p le  change 
in the value o f  the  ta r g e ts .  T h e re fo re , i t  may be concluded th a t  
companies a lthough  u s in g  methods o r  s tan d a rd  s e t t in g  th a t  a llo w  a t  
least some s e n s i t i v i t y  to  th e  p a r t i c u la r  c o n d it io n s  faced  lo c a l ly  a re  
cot generally em p loying  th e  more e la b o ra te  form s a t  t h e i r  d is p o s a l.
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The assessment o f  th e  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  e v a lu a t io n  systems to  take  in t o  
account the s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  each s u b s id ia ry  was take n  one s tep  fu r th e r  
bv analysing the  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  o v e r a l l  fo rm a l perform ance
evaluation c r i t e r ia .  T h is  in v o lv e s  not o n ly  the  s tandards  u t i l i z e d ,  
but also the item s in c lu d e d  in  th e  in t e r n a l  r e p o r t in g  systems and th e  
individual in d ic a to rs  th a t  a re  employed in  th e  s u b s id ia ry  perform ance 
evaluation and c o n t ro l p ro c e s s . N e a rly  two th i r d s  o f  a l l  companies 
attempt to a d ju s t th e  fo rm a l assessm ent c r i t e r i a  to  s p e c ia l c o n d it io n s  
encountered in  fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s ,  a lth o u g h  o n ly  a v e ry  s m a ll 
minority employ t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a  across t h e i r  overseas 
operations. The m a jo r i t y  ten d  to  use s im i la r  c r i t e r i a  s im p ly  a d a p tin g  
the re la tive  w e igh t a t t r ib u t e d  to  d a ta , measures, and s tan d a rds  to  the  
nature of each s u b s id ia r y .  The c o n c lu s io n s  reached above about th e  
va ria b ility  o f  s ta n d a rd  s e t t in g  a p p ly  here in  t h is  b roader c o n te x t, 
since i t  appears th a t  most companies adapt o n ly  in  a m oderate way 
their formal perfo rm ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  to  the  s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  
each opera tion . G e n e ra lly ,  th e y  do n o t use th e  more e la b o ra te
approaches, more r a d ic a l  i n  th e  le v e l  o f  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  c r i t e r i a  
used.
A comparison o f  th e  fa c to r s  th a t  d e te rm ine  the  use o f  d i f f e r e n t  
assessment p ra c t ic e s  in  a MNC re v e a le d  th a t  lo c a l  e n v iro n m e n ta l 
conditions faced by s u b s id ia r ie s  were o f  p rim e concern . In  f a c t ,  the  
particular c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  h o s t env ironm en ts  th a t  pose s p e c ia l 
threats and o p p o r tu n it ie s  to  o p e ra t io n s  overseas were cons ide red  the  
most in f lu e n t ia l  f a c to r  i n  th e  use o f  d i f f e r e n t  e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a .  
Other im portant fa c to r s  in c lu d e  u n s a t is fa c to ry  perform ance le v e l  o f  
subsidiaries, s t r a te g ic  im p o rta n ce  o f  s u b s id ia r ie s  f o r  th e  MNC as a 
whole, and geograph ic  lo c a t io n  o f  s u b s id ia r ie s .
Earlier in  ch ap te r 4 , a d is t in c t i o n  was drawn between two o b je c ts  o f
Control: output and b e h a v io u r. W h ile  the  fo rm e r i s  concerned w ith  the
economic perform ance o f  an o rg a n iz a t io n a l s u b u n it ,  th e  l a t t e r  d e a ls
with the perform ance o f  th e  management re s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  s u b u n it.
In another p lace in  t h i s  s tu d y  (c h a p te r  6 ) ,  a c o n c lu s io n  was reached 
that despite the  u n iv e rs a l p r e s c r ip t io n  in  th e  th e o ry  o f  d i f f e r e n t
evaluation c r i t e r i a  f o r  th e  perfo rm ance o f  u n i ts  and managers.
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companies were p r a c t ic e  em p loy ing  v i r t u a l l y  tl^^ same c r i t e r i a  f o r
both purposes (e .g«  M o rs ic a to  [1 9 8 0 ];  C hoi, and B a v is h i
[1982]). The p re s e n t s tu d y ,  a lth o u g h  o b ta in in g  a s im i la r  r e s u l t ,  
revealed th a t p e rso n a l and in fo rm a l judgem ents a t  headquarte rs  le v e l 
normally are deemed to  compensate f o r  th e  s im i l a r i t y  o f  the  assessment 
criteria fo rm a lly  em ployed. In  r e a l i t y ,  a g re a t number o f  cases use 
the same o r l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n t  fo rm a l assessment c r i t e r i a  f o r  
subsidiaries and f o r  m anagers. However, th e  in te rv ie w s  showed th a t  
parent company e x e c u tiv e s  n o rm a lly  k e p t in  mind th a t  poor r e s u lts  do 
not always mean bad management, and so th e v  employ s u b je c t iv e  c r i t e r i a  
to d if fe re n t ia te  th e  perfo rm ance  o f  the  s u b u n it from  th a t  o f  th e  
manager. I t  is  n o te w o rth y  th a t  in  a m in o r i t y  o f  cases, n e v e rth e le s s , 
the formal assessment o f  m a n a g e ria l perfo rm ance i s  based on s p e c i f ic  
criteria , and uses in fo r m a t io n  th a t  i s  n o t p ro v id e d  v ia  the  in te r n a l  
reporting system. In  such cases th e  a p p ra is a l system is  based on
formal "p e rsonne l”  c r i t e r i a ,  and sometimes s o p h is t ic a te d  tech n iq ue s  
such as MBO are used.
This section has d e s c r ib e d  th e  assessment c r i t e r i a  ( i . e .  item s in  the  
internal re p o r t in g  system , pe rfo rm ance  measures and s ta n d a rd s ) used by 
companies in  th e  s h o r t  te rm  c o n t ro l and e v a lu a t io n  o f  fo re ig n  
subsidiaries’ o p e ra t in g  p e rfo rm an ce . A m a jo r o b je c t iv e  o f  the  p re se n t 
study is  to  understand how perfo rm ance  e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  employed in  
the assessment o f  fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  and managers ta ke  in to  
consideration the  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  e x te rn a l e nv iron m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  to  
which overseas o p e ra t io n s  a re  s u b je c t .  Such u nd e rs tan d in g  re q u ire s  
some knowledge o f  how h e a d q u a rte rs  e x e c u tiv e s  p e rc e iv e  the  in f lu e n c e s  
exerted by fo re ig n  e nv iro n m e n ts  on s u b s id ia r ie s ’ o p e ra t io n s ,  and how 
they perceive the  adequateness o f  th e  e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  employed in  
their companies as re g a rd s  th e  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  e nv iron m e n ta l 
influences. Th is  w i l l  be th e  o b je c t  o f  th e  nex t s e c t io n .
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12.3. Impact o f  F o re ig n  E nv ironm en ts  on S o b s ld la r le s *  O pe ra tions  and
E ffe c tiv e n e s s  o f  P erfo rm ance E va lua t io n  C r i te r i a  in  Talcing
Aceomit o f  th e  E n v iro n m e n ta l Im pact
12.3.1* P ercep tions  o f  th e  V a r i a b i l i t y  o f  F o re ig n  Environm ents
A l is t  co n ta in in g  a number o f  e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to r s  th a t  may have an 
impact (e ith e r  fa v o u ra b le  o r u n fa v o u ra b le ) upon s u b s id ia r ie s ’ 
ac tiv ities , and whose re le v a n c e  may v a ry  from  one geog raph ic  area to  
another, was in c lu d e d  in  th e  q u e s t io n n a ire .  Respondents were asked to  
rank fo r each g e o g ra p h ic  a rea  where t h e i r  companies o p e ra te , up to  
eight environm ental fa c to r s  w h ich  in  t h e i r  o p in io n  e x e r t  the  h ig h e s t 
influence on s u b s id ia r ie s ’ o p e ra t in g  pe rfo rm ance . Table  12. XV 
presents the median ra n k in g s  o b ta in e d  f o r  each e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to r .  
Items tha t were co n s id e re d  m ost i n f l u e n t i a l  f o r  a g ive n  g eog raph ic  
area, that is  item s th a t  were ranked bv re sp on d en ts , were coded 1 to  8 
according to  th e  re s p e c t iv e  p o s i t io n  in  the  ra n k in g  (1= th e  most 
in fluentia l fa c to r ;  2 = th e  second most i n f l u e n t i a l  f a c to r ;  e t c . ) .  
Items tha t were n o t co n s id e re d  among th e  most i n f lu e n t ia l  ones, th a t  
is items th a t were n o t ass ig ne d  a ra n k  by re sp on d en ts , were coded 10. 
Therefore, the  lo w e r th e  m ed ian , th e  more in f lu e n t ia l  th e  re s p e c t iv e  
environmental fa c to r  i s  co n s id e re d  to  be.
A d iffe rent se t o f  i n f l u e n t i a l  e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to r s  were p o in te d  o u t 
by respondents, f o r  each g e o g ra p h ic  a re a . T h is  su p p o rts  the  v iew  th a t  
headquarters managers p e rc e iv e  the  env ironm en ts  where s u b s id ia r ie s  
operate as d i f f e r e n t  from  one a n o th e r. The fa c to r s  th a t  were regarded 
as most in f lu e n t ia l  in  each g e o g ra p h ic  a rea  a re  p re sen ted  below by 
Order of ra n k ing . O nly ite m s  w ith  median ra n k in g s  o f  le s s  than  9 were 
selected.
SEi -  Economic g ro w th /s ta g n a t io n .  M arke t s iz e .  I n f l a t i o n  ra te s .  
Exchange ra te s .
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U.S. qnd Canada -  M arke t s iz e .  Economic g ro w th /s ta g n a tio n . I n f la t io n  
ra te s . A t t i tu d e  tow ards  achievem ent and w o rk . Exchange ra te s .
Australia and New Zealand -  Economic g ro w th /s ta g n a tio n .  M arket s iz e .  
I n f la t io n  r a te s .
Latin America -  I n f l a t i o n  r a te s .  Exchange ra te s .  P o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y .  
R e s tr ic t io n  on movements o f  c a p i ta l  across b o rd e rs . P ric e  and 
o the r governm enta l c o n t r o ls .  Economic g ro w th /s ta g n a tio n . 
General a t t i t u d e  tow ards  fo r e ig n  companies.
ifr lc ^  -  P o l i t ic a l  s t a b i l i t y .  Economic g ro w th /s ta g n a tio n . Im p o rt-  
export c o n t r o ls .  R e s t r ic t io n s  on movements o f  c a p i ta l  across 
borders. M a rke t s iz e .
Middle East -  P o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y .  M arke t s iz e .  Economic 
g ro w th /s ta g n a tio n . Language, r e l ig io n ,  and o th e r c u l t u r a l  
fa c to rs .  Lega l s t r u c tu r e s  in  term s o f  bus iness  law  and la b o u r 
law. General a t t i t u d e  tow ards fo r e ig n  companies. A v a i la b i l i t y  
o f in f r a - s t r u c tu r e s  ( e .g .  com m unica tions, t ra n s p o r ta t io n ,  
h o u s in g ).
Asia -  Economic g ro w th /s ta g n a t io n .  P o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y .  M arke t s iz e .  
Language, r e l i g io n ,  and o th e r  c u l t u r a l  fa c to r s .  P ric e  and 
o the r governm enta l c o n t r o ls .
It is in te re s t in g  to  n o te  th a t  v e ry  s im i la r  fa c to r s  were in d ic a te d  f o r  
Europe, U.S. and Canada, and A u s t r a l ia  and New Zealand. The fa c to rs  
that are common to  these  th re e  g eo g ra ph ic  areas are a l l  o f  an economic 
nature (economic g ro w th /s ta g n a t io n ,  m arke t s iz e .  i n f l a t i o n  and 
exchange ra te s ) .  Note t h a t  N o rth  Am erica was the  o n ly  geog raph ic  area 
in the world f o r  w h ich  re sp on d en ts  s a id  th a t  the  gene ra l a t t i t u d e  
towards achievement and w ork  i s  an in f l u e n t i a l  fa c to r  on bus iness 
operations. L a t in  A m erica , A f r ic a ,  th e  M id d le  E as t, and A s ia  d i f f e r  
from the group o f  c o u n tr ie s  p re v io u s ly  m entioned m a in ly  because 
together w ith  a few econom ic fa c to r s  (econom ic g ro w th /s ta g n a tio n , 
market s iz e ) , re sp o n d e n ts  s tre s s e d  a number o f  e nv iron m e n ta l
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Table 12.IV -  In flu e n c e  E xerted  by E n v iro n m e n ta l F a c to rs  on S u b s id ia rie s ' Operating Performanoe. in  
Kaofa Geographic ir e a
Europe US and 
Canada
L a t in
America
A f r i c a Middle
East
Asia A u s t ra l ia  
& N .Z e a l .
9 .6 8 9 .5 8 3 .5 0 3 .0 0 2 .6 7 %.83 9.72
N=J*9 N=59 Nr 18 Nr 39 Nr 17 Nr26 Nr%5
9 .7 5 9.8% 9 .7 7 9.86 9 .79 9 .7 8 9.5%
N=i)8 N=59 N=19 Nr%0 Nr 17 Nr26 Nr%%
9 .6 7 7 .0 0 9.91 9 .80 9 .7 3 9.63 9.82
N=4 8 N=59 N=19 Nr 39 Nr 17 Nr26 Nr%5
9 .8 0 9.81 8 .00 9 .7 0 7 .2 5 9.69 9.65
N=49 N=59 N=19 Nr%0 Nr 17 Nr26 NriJÜ
9 .9 2 9 .8 9 9.97 9.86 6 .2 5 7 .5 0 9 .89
N=l)9 N=59 N=19 Nr%0 Nr17 Nr26 Nr%5
2 .5 6 2 .8 5 6 .7 5 3 .7 5 5 .00 3 .7 5 2 .6 7
N=49 N=59 N=19 Nr 39 Nr 17 Nr26 Nr%%
9 .7 0 9 .5 5 9 .5 5 9 .80 9 .7 3 9.7% 9.75
N=l»8 N=59 N=19 Nr 39 Nr17 Nr26 Nr%5
9.96 9.91 9.9% 9 .8 8 8.00 9 .7 8 9.96
N=U8 N=59 N=19 Nr%0 Nr 17 Nr26 Nr 45
9 .7 9 9 .76 9.6% 9 .80 9 .8 5 9 .7 8 9.77
N=48 N=58 N=19 Nr 39 Nr 17 Nr26 Nr%%
9 .9 2 9 .9 2 5 .0 0 6 .3 8 9 .8 5 9 .7 8 9 .89
N=49 N=59 N=19 Nr 39 Nr17 Nr 26 Nr%5
9.9% 9 .9 0 9 .77 6 .1 7 9.93 9.7% 9.80
N=%9 N=59 N=19 Nr%0 Nr 17 Nr26 Nr%5
9.61 9.86 5 .13 9 .53 9 .79 8 .50 9.67
N=%8 N=58 N=19 Nr39 Nr17 Nr26 Nr%3
9 .8 5 9.87 9 .8 2 9 .8 5 6 .7 5 9 .7 8 9.8%
N=%8 N=59 N=19 Nr 39 Nr 17 Nr26 Nr%5
4 .8 0 6 .0 0 1.9% 9 .63 9 .93 9 .82 5.31
N=%9 N=59 Nr 19 Nr%0 N=17 N=26 Nr%5
5 .7 5 8 .30 3.%0 9 .63 9 .7 3 9.57 9 .52
N=50 N=60 Nr19 Nr%0 Nr 17 N=26 N=%5
3 .2 9 2 .6 7 9 .77 7 .5 0 %.00 6 .8 3 3.30
N=%9 K=59 N=19 N=%0 Nr 17 Nr26 Nr%0
9 .6 3 9 .72 9.91 9.87 9.93 9.7% 9.72
N=%9 N=59 Nr19 Nr 39 Nr17 Nr 26 Nr%5
9 .9 7 9 .97 10.00 9.97 9 .93 9.96 9 .99
N=%9 N=59 N=19 Nr%0 Nr 17 Nr 26 Nr 45
j P o litica l s t a b i l i t y  
Labour s tr ik e s  and s o c ia l  unrest 
' Attitude toward ach ievem ent and w ork
General a t t i tu d e  tow ard  fo r e ig n  
companies
; Language, r e l ig io n ,  and o th e r  
I cu ltu ra l fa c to rs
I Economic g ro w th /s ta g n a tio n
Taxation
A v a ila b il ity  of in f r a -s t r u c tu r e s  ( e .g .  
communications. t ra n s p o r ta t io n  .h o u s in g )
Î A v a ila b il ity  o f c a s h /c a p ita l
i R estrictions on movements o f c a p i t a l  
i across borders
; Import-export c o n tro ls  
Price and o th e r G o vern m en ta l c o n t r o ls
j Legal structures in  terms o f business  
I law and labour law
I In fla tio n  ra te s  
I Exchange ra te s  
I  Market size
'Cost of p ro d u c tio n  in p u ts
I Others -  S ta te  o f the crude m arket 
j  (Middle E a s t); com petitio n  (Europe  
i N,America, Asia & A u s tra la s ia ) ;  I
I trade c re d it  (Europe, N .A m e ric a ); |
I In te rest ra te s  (E u r o p e ,N .A m e r ic a ) , j
p o litic a l/e c o n o m ic  p re s s u re s  a p p lie d  
, ex te rna lly  on South A f r ic a n  com pan ies ;,
I  1
NOTES: Median ra n k in g ^
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influences o f  a p o l i t i c a l ,  le g a l and s o c ia l n a tu re .
Political s t a b i l i t y  was co n s id e re d  among the  th re e  most in f lu e n t ia l  
environmental fa c to r s  in  A f r ic a ,  th e  M id d le  E as t, A s ia , and L a t in  
America. The g en e ra l a t t i t u d e  tow ards fo r e ig n  companies was ranked 
among the most re le v a n t  fa c to r s  in  th e  M id d le  East and L a t in  Am erica. 
Language, r e l ig io n  and o th e r  c u l t u r a l  fa c to rs  were p o in te d  o u t as 
in fluen tia l e n v iro n m e n ta l c h a r a c te r is t ic s  in  th e  M id d le  East and A s ia . 
All these are fa c to r s  o f  p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c ia l / c u l t u r a l  n a tu re . 
Environmental fa c to r s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  lo c a l  le g a l re q u ire m e n ts  
were also mentioned f r e q u e n t lv  by re sp o n d e n ts . In  f a c t ,  r e s t r ic t io n s  
on movements o f  c a p i ta l  ac ross  b o rd e rs  are  among th e  most i n f l u e n t i a l  
characteristics o f  th e  e nv ironm en ts  o f  L a t in  Am erica, and A f r ic a .  
Import-export c o n tro ls  were co ns ide re d  an i n f lu e n t ia l  fa c to r  o n ly  in  
Africa, and p r ic e  and governm ent c o n t ro ls  were ranked among the  most 
in fluen tia l e n v iro n m e n ta l c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  L a t in  America and A s ia . 
The loca l le g a l s t r u c tu re s  in  term s o f  bus iness  law  and la b o u r law  
were selected as a re le v a n t  f a c to r  in  th e  M id d le  E as t. These f in d in g s  
stress the im po rtance  a t t r ib u t e d  by h ea d q u a rte rs  e x e c u tiv e s  to  non­
economic c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  e n v iro n m e n ts , e s p e c ia l ly  in  areas o f  
the Third W orld. N o te , how ever, th a t  f o r  L a t in  Am erica th e  two most 
highly ranked e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to r s  are  o f  an economic n a tu re  -  
in fla tion  ra te s , and exchange ra te s .  H a rd ly  s u r p r is in g  f o r  a re g io n  
shaken by th r e e - d ig i t  le v e ls  o f  i n f l a t i o n .
12.3.2. P e rcep tions  o f  th e  A c tu a l and D e s ire d  E ffe c t iv e n e s s  o f  
Assessment (W ^ te r ia  i n  T a k in g  Account o f  th e  V a r ia b i l i t y  o f  
Fore ign  E nv ironm en ts
Having id e n t i f ie d  f o r  each g e o g ra p h ic  re g io n  those  env ironm en ta l 
factors which a re  m ost i n f l u e n t i a l  on s u b s id ia r ie s ’ o p e ra t in g  
Performance, th e  s tu d y  now a tte m p ts  to  de te rm ine  how e f f e c t iv e ly ,  in  
headquarters e x e c u t iv e s ’ o p in io n ,  th e  fo rm a l assessment c r i t e r i a  
actually operated in  companies ta k e  account o f  such fa c to r s .  R e su lts  
are presented in  T ab le  1 2 .X V I. The le v e l  o f  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  the  
assessment c r i t e r i a  employed f o r  s u b s id ia ry  o p e ra t io n s , and f o r
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subsidiary managers, was co n s id e re d  s im i la r  by responden ts  (m edian
ratings o f 3.1 f o r  b o th  s i t u a t io n s ) ( 2 ) .  More than  h a l f  o f  th e
respondents b e lie v e  th a t  th e  assessm ent c r i t e r i a  th e y  use to  e va lu a te
subsidiaries and managers a re  m o d e ra te ly  e f f e c t iv e .  Only in  a 
re latively sm a ll p ro p o r t io n  o f  cases (15 and 17 p e rc e n t)  were c r i t e r i a  
considered not a t  a l l  o r  l i t t l e  e f f e c t iv e .
Table 12.XVI a lso  shows th e  o p in io n  o f  h e a d q u a rte rs  e x e c u tiv e s  as to  
the extent to  which fo rm a l assessm ent c r i t e r i a  shou ld  id e a l l y  be ab le  
to take account o f  r e le v a n t  fo r e ig n  e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to r s .  S im ila r  
results were a lso  o b ta in e d  he re  f o r  th e  e v a lu a t io n  o f  s u b s id ia r ie s  and 
managers (median r a t in g s  o f  3 .3  and 3 .4  r e s p e c t iv e ly ) ( 2 ) ,  T h is  means 
that executives in  p a re n t companies b e lie v e  th a t  th e  c r i t e r i a  employed 
in both assessment s i t u a t io n s  shou ld  be a b le  to  re c o g n iz e , to  a 
similar e x ten t, those  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  lo c a l env ironm ents which 
most a f fe c t  o p e ra tio n s . S l ig h t l y  le s s  th a n  h a l f  o f  the  responden ts  (46 
and 45 percen t) s a id  th a t  perfo rm ance  c r i t e r i a  shou ld  be ab le  to  
capture to  a moderate e x te n t  e n v iro n m e n ta l d if fe re n c e s .  A s u b s ta n t ia l 
number of e xecu tives  (40 and 43 p e rc e n t)  b e lie v e d  th a t  c r i t e r i a  should  
capture to  a g re a t e x te n t  ( r a te d  4 o r  5 in  a 5 -p o in t  s c a le )  such 
environmental d if fe re n c e s .
To compare the  judgem ents o f  h e a d q u a rte rs  managers as to  the  a c tu a l 
and desired le v e l o f  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  perfo rm ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  
in taking account o f  re le v a n t  e n v iro n m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s ,  a t e s t  o f  
differences was conduc ted . The t e s t  was based on th e  W ilcoxon  
Bitched-nairs s ig n e d -ra n k s  s t a t i s t i c , s in c e  the  v a r ia b le s  in  q u e s tio n  
are a ll at the o r d in a l - le v e l  o f  measurement. R e s u lts , p resen ted  in  
Table 1 2 .XVII, show th a t  h e a d q u a rte rs  e x e c u tiv e s  would l i k e  th e  
assessment c r i t e r i a  used in  t h e i r  f irm s  to  r e f le c t  e nv iron m e n ta l 
influences to  a g re a te r  e x te n t  th a n  th e v  a c tu a l ly  do. These f in d in g s  
apply both to  the  e v a lu a t io n  o f  s u b s id ia r ie s  ( le v e l  o f  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  
2.7 percent), and to  the  assessm ent o f  managers ( le v e l  o f  s ig n if ic a n c e  
of 0.1 p e rce n t).
As an i l l u s t r a t io n  o f  what has been d e sc r ib e d  as th e  e x e c u tiv e s ’ 
perceptions, th e  fo l lo w in g  cases a re  m en tioned . Some managers who 
fated low the e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  a c tu a l assessment c r i t e r i a ,  and a t  the
410
Table 12.XVI -  H e a d q u a r te rs  E x e c u t iv e s *  O p in io n  As t o  th e  A c tu a l and 
D e s ire d  C a p a b i l i t y  o f  Form a l Assessment C r i t e r ia  to  Take 
Account o f  R e le va n t F o re ig n  E n v iro n m e n ta l F a c to rs
R A T I N G STATISTICS
1 2 3 4 5
Not at all Moderately Very Much N Median
Actual C a p a b ility
of C r ite r ia :
In the control and 5 9 53 26 3 96 3.14
evaluation of sub­ \ V \ /
sidiary operations 14.6% 55.2% 30.2%
In the assessment 5 10 46 24 1 86 3.11
of subsidiary \. / \ J
managers 17.4% 53.5% 29 .1%
Desired C a p a b ility
of C rite r ia :
In the control and 1 12 44 27 11 95 3 .2 8
evaluation of sub­ \. / \ /
sidiary operations 13.7% 46.3% 40 .0%
In the assessment 1 9 39 28 9 86 3.35
of subsidiary \ / \ /
managers 11.6% 45.3% 43 .1%
Table 12.XVII -  W ilc o x o n  M atched P a irs  S ig n e d -R a n k s  T e s t t o  Compare 
D if fe re n c e s  i n  Judgem ent as to  th e  A c tu a l and D es ired  
C a p a b i l i t y  o f  F o rm a l A sse ssm e n t C r i t e r i a  t o  Take 
Account o f  R e le va n t F o re ig n  E n v iro n m e n ta l F a c to rs
Two-Tailed  
V aria b les  Cases Z P ro b a b ility
CONTROL AND EVALUATION 
OF SUBSIDIARY OPERATIONS:
Actual c a p a b ility  o f  
criteria
Desired c a p a b ility  o f  
criteria
AEFFSUB
94 -2 .2 1 8  (0 .0 2 7 ) 
DEFSUB »
ASSESSMENT OF SUBSIDIARY 
MANAGERS:
Actual c a p a b ility  o f 
criteria
Desired c a p a b ility  o f 
criteria
AEFFMAN
84 -3 .1 7 8  (0 .001 ) 
DEFFMAN •»
________________________________________ J
*« s ig n i f ic a n t  p <
•  s ig n i f ic a n t  0 .01
0.01 ( i.e .1 % )
< p ^  0 .05
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sane tim e ra te d  h ig h  the  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  such c r i t e r i a  ta k in g  in t o  
account the  env ironm en t, s a id  th a t  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  methods have 
not been changed in  t h e i r  f irm s  because th e y  do n o t b e lie v e  th a t  
formal c r i t e r i a  cou ld  eve r be e f fe c t iv e  in  re c o g n iz in g  e nv iron m e n ta l 
Influences. In  these  cases, th e  in fo rm a l aspects o f  assessment a re  
given a s u b s ta n t ia l amount o f  im po rtance . In  th e  words o f  some 
managers: ” We do n o t a tte m p t to  take  these  [e n v iro n m e n ta l] fa c to r s
into account in  the  FORMAL perform ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a .  However, 
performance e v a lu a t io n  i s  a lways c a r r ie d  o u t pay ing  a t te n t io n  to  
environmental fa c to r s ,  because we l i k e  to  see s u b s id ia r ie s  m in im iz in g  
exposure wherever p o s s ib le " .  "Form al c r i t e r i a  can never be e f f e c t iv e  
over a wide range o f  d i f f e r e n t  e nv iron m e n ts ". " I t  i s  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  
to be fo rm a l about such m a tte rs " .  And, " [ t o  re c o g n iz e  th e  
environment] more s u b je c t iv e ,  m u lt id im e n s io n a l judgement i s  
appropria te".
When asked w h ich  s ig n i f ic a n t  e nv ironm en ta l fa c to rs  are n o t a dequa te ly  
taken in to  account by th e  fo rm a l perform ance e v a lu a tio n  c r i t e r i a  in  
the assessment o f  s u b s id ia r ie s  and managers, e x e c u tiv e s  p ro v id e d  a 
l is t  o f fa c to r s  th a t  d i f f e r  from  case to  case. Some companies 
emphasized lo c a l governm enta l p ressu res  over bus iness , and gene ra l 
p o lit ic a l/e c o n o m ic  i n s t a b i l i t y ,  whereas o th e rs  s tre s s e d  c u l t u r a l  and 
social fe a tu re s  o f  the  lo c a l  environm ents such as language, a t t i t u d e  
to work, a t t i t u d e s  re g a rd in g  f in a n c ia l  and a cco u n tin g  in fo rm a t io n ,  
market u nd e rs tand ing , peop le  m o t iv a t io n ,  s t r ik e s ,  s o c ia l u n re s t,  and 
a b ility  to  in f lu e n c e  lo c a l  o f f i c i a l  a d m in is tra t io n .  A la rg e  number o f  
managers m entioned economic fa c to r s ,  l i k e  v o l a t i l i t y  o f  exchange 
rates, cost e f fe c t iv e n e s s ,  ta x a t io n ,  lo c a l economic g ro w th . cu rre n cy  
risk, cost o f  fun d s , perform ance o f  c o m p e tito rs , and m arke t c a p a c ity  
available a t d i f f e r e n t  p e r io d s . A ccord ing  to  one manager in te rv ie w e d  
the main problem  o f  th e  assessment c r i t e r i a  employed in  h is  f irm  is  
that "m issed o p p o r tu n it ie s  are n o t id e n t i f ie d ,  and management 
development is  n o t fo rm a lly  re c o g n iz e d " . In  ano the r case, i t  was s a id  
that shortcom ings o f  th e  e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  evo lve  a round , and a re  
“einly due to  the  t im in g ,  q u a l i t y  and fo r e s ig h t  o f  th e  data  on w hich 
c r ite r ia  are based.
412
12 / THE USE OP INFO. FOR SUBSIDIARY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION & CONTROL
12.3.3. Discussion and Conclusions
After hav ing  d iscussed  the  fe a tu re s  o f  the  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  
systems in  o p e ra t io n  i n  MNCs, i t  i s  cons ide red  im p o rta n t th a t  the  
perceptions o f  h e a d qu a rte rs  e x e c u tiv e s  r e la t iv e  to  the  e ffe c t iv e n e s s  
of the e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  in  r e f le c t in g  the  d iv e r s i t y  encounte red  in  
the fo re ig n  env ironm ents  a re  e x p lo re d . For a b e t te r  und e rs tan d in g  o f  
the managers’ p e rc e p tio n s  in  t h is  re s p e c t i t  i s  cons ide red  u s e fu l to  
discover t h e i r  o p in io n  as to  the  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  th e  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  
the fo re ig n  env ironm ents  ope ra ted  by t h e i r  companies.
The study re v e a le d  th a t  hea d qu a rte rs  managers tend to  p e rc e iv e  the  
environments where s u b s id ia r ie s  ope ra te  as d i f f e r e n t  from  one a n o th e r. 
In fa c t,  f o r  each geo g ra ph ic  area a d iv e rs e  s e t o f  e nv iron m e n ta l 
factors seen as h a v in g  the  h ig h e s t in f lu e n c e  on s u b s id ia r ie s ’ r e s u l t s  
were se lec ted  by re sp on d en ts . There was a c e r ta in  s im i la r i t y  among 
the fa c to rs  in d ic a te d  f o r  Europe, U.S. and Canada, and A u s t ra l ia  and 
New Zealand, in s o fa r  as a marked p ro p e n s ity  f o r  economic 
c h a ra c te ris tic s  o f  the  env ironm ents was c o n s is te n t ly  shown. For the  
other areas, namely L a t in  Am erica, A f r ic a ,  th e  M idd le  E as t, and A s ia  a 
greater v a r ie ty  o f  fa c to r s  was m entioned w ith  emphasis on those  o f  a 
p o l it ic a l ,  le g a l and s o c ia l n a tu re  (e .g .  p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  in  
Africa and th e  M id d le  E as t; i n f l a t i o n  ra te s  in  L a t in  Am erica; 
language, r e l ig io n ,  and o th e r  c u l t u r a l  fa c to rs  in  th e  M id d le  East and 
Asia; r e s t r ic t io n s  on movements o f  c a p i ta l  across bo rde rs  in  L a t in  
America and A f r ic a ) .
As regards the  p e rc e p tio n s  o f  managers as to  the e ffe c t iv e n e s s  o f  
formal assessment c r i t e r i a  in  ta k in g  account o f  re le v a n t  lo c a l 
environmental fa c to r s ,  i t  was found th a t ,  in  th e  g re a t m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  
eeses, e xe cu tive s  b e lie v e  th a t  th e  assessment c r i t e r i a  used f o r  
subsidiaries and managers are a t le a s t  m o d e ra te ly  e f f e c t iv e  in  ta k in g  
account o f  the  e nv iron m e n t. A d i f f e r e n t  c o n c lu s io n  was reached in  
studies on American m u lt in a t io n a ls  rev iew ed in  chap te r 6 , namely 
Morsicato [1 9 8 0 ], and ( h o i , C iechow icz and B a v is h i [1 9 8 2 ]. In  bo th  
°f these su rve ys , th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  respondents tho u gh t th a t  t h e i r
413
12 / THE OSE OF INFO. FOR SUBSIDIARY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION & CONTROL
systems in c lu d e d  e n v iro n m e n ta l d if fe re n c e s  le s s  than  m o d e ra te ly . 
Although i t  i s  n o t p o s s ib le  to  d i r e c t l y  compare the  r e s u lts  o f  t h is  
with o th e r s tu d ie s ,  i t  appears th a t ,  in  e x e c u tiv e s *  o p in io n ,  
performance e v a lu a t io n  systems in  B r i t i s h  MNCs take  to  a g re a te r
extent account o f  e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to r s  than  the  systems ope ra ted  in  
American MNCs. T h is  re in fo r c e s  a s im i la r  c o n c lu s io n  suggested in  the  
comparative s tu d y  o f  Choi, Czechowicz and B a v is h i [1982 ] (see ch a p te r 
6 ).
Despite the  fa c t  th a t  in  most cases the  fo rm a l assessment c r i t e r i a  
used is  p e rce ive d  to  be a t  le a s t  m odera te ly  e f f e c t iv e  in  ta k in g
account o f  th e  e nv ironm en t, e x e c u tiv e s  b e lie v e  th a t  the  c r i t e r i a  
should r e f le c t  e n v iro n m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  to  a g re a te r  e x te n t than  th e y
actually do. T h is  f in d in g  a p p lie s  e q u a lly  to  the  c r i t e r i a  employed
In the e v a lu a t io n  o f  s u b s id ia r ie s  and in  the  assessment o f  managers. 
This is  an im p o rta n t r e s u l t  s in c e  i t  shows th a t  the  a c tu a l c a p a b i l i t y  
of the e v a lu a tio n  system s to  ta ke  account o f  e nv iron m e n ta l d if fe re n c e s  
lags g e n e ra lly  beh ind managers* re q u ire m e n ts . In  t h is  re s p e c t,  th e  
present s tudy  agrees w ith  M o rs ica to  [1 9 8 0 ], where most managers
reported th a t  systems had been designed to  in c lu d e  e nv iron m e n ta l
d ifferences to  a s m a lle r  e x te n t than they  would p e rs o n a lly  l i k e .  In
the present s tu d y , t h i s  d isc re pa n cy  between the  a c tu a l and the  id e a l
ca oab ility  o f  the  system s, coup led w ith  the  fa c t  th a t  th e y  were 
generally b e lie v e d  to  r e f le c t  the  env ironm ent to  a r e la t i v e l y  h ig h  
extent, seems to  suggest th a t  e x e c u tiv e s ' re q u irem en ts  o f  th e  degree 
of environm ental s e n s i t i v i t y  to  be possessed by e v a lu a t io n  sys tan s  are 
extremely h ig h . T h is  may be in te r p r e te d  as a measure o f  the  
Importance o f  th e  e nv iron m e n ta l is su e  f o r  the  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  
Process.
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12.4. Findings sm Q"lterla Used to Assess Foreign Subsidiaries*
(derating Performance and Companies* Characteristics
The p rev ious  s e c tio n s  d e sc rib e d  how MNCs c o n tro l and e v a lu a te  the  
operating perfo rm ance o f  overseas s u b s id ia r ie s ,  and how th e y  assess 
the ir managers. The p e rc e p tio n s  o f  e x e c u tiv e s  who in  h e a d qu a rte rs  are  
responsible f o r  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  re g a rd in g  th e  im pact o f  fo re ig n  
environments on s u b s id ia r ie s ’ o p e ra tio n s  were a ls o  in v e s t ig a te d  above. 
The presen t s e c t io n  now a tte m p ts  to  e x p lo re  re la t io n s h ip s  between 
d ia ra o te r is t ic s  o f  th e  fo rm a l perform ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  and 
companies’ fe a tu re s  such as s iz e ,  in te r n a t io n a l  e xpe rie n ce , exposure 
to host c o u n try  in f lu e n c e ,  e tc .  A lso  re la t io n s h ip s  between 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  and p e rc e p tio n s  o f  
executives in v o lv e d  in  perform ance assessment a re  e xp lo re d  h e re . As 
In the p re v io u s  ch a p te rs , th e  a n a ly s is  fo l lo w s  a sequence o f  m a jo r 
tests, each o f  w h ich  i s  m o tiv a te d  by an h y p o th e s is  e s ta b lis h e d  a 
p r io r i.  These hypotheses are  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  te s te d  u s in g  a d e c is io n  
model which was d e s c r ib e d  in  c h a p te r 10 (s e c t io n  1 0 .2 ) .
lest 1
This f i r s t  te s t  does no t d e r iv e  from  the  main hypotheses o f  the  s tudy 
enunciated in  ch a p te r 7 , ra th e r  be ing  prompted by the  r e s u l t s  o b ta in e d  
when companies’ p ra c t ic e s  were examined. As i t  was suggested in  
section 1 2 .2 . ,  i t  i s  o f  in t e r e s t  to  de te rm ine  w hether th e  degree o f  
usefulness f o r  perfo rm ance e v a lu a t io n  a t t r ib u te d  by hea d qu a rte rs  
executives to  the  ite m s  in c lu d e d  in  com panies’ in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  
systems, are  a sso c ia te d  w ith  th e  re p o r t in g  fre qu e ncy  o f  the  same 
Items. In  o th e r  w ords, i t  i s  d e s ira b le  to  de te rm ine  w hether th e  
companies th a t  ra te d  low  the  u se fu ln ess  o f  a c e r ta in  ite m  are 
simultaneously those  th a t  have the  ite m  in  t h e i r  in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  
system subm itted  by fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  on an o c c a s io n a l, n o n -re g u la r  
basis. A l t e r n a t iv e ly ,  companies w h ich  ra te d  h i ^  a c e r ta in  ite m  would 
be those th a t  have the  ite m  su bm itte d  by fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  on a
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regular and fre q u e n t ( e .g .  m o n th ly ) b a s is .
I f  th is  r e la t io n s h ip  h o ld s , i t  w i l l  in d ic a te  th a t  the  freouency w ith  
which item s o f  in fo rm a t io n  a re  re p o r te d  by s u b s id ia r ie s  r e f le c t s  th e  
degree o f in te r e s t  showed by headqua rte rs  e x e c u tiv e s  on the  in d iv id u a l  
items. Th is  can be seen as an in d ic a to r ,  however ro u gh , o f  th e  
quality o f  th e  match between the  in te r n a l  r e p o r t in g  svstem in  
operation in  companies and the  in fo rm a tio n  re q u ire m e n ts  o f  t h e i r  
users. The te s t in g  o f  t h i s  r e la t io n s h ip  in v o lv e s  the  fo rm u la t io n  o f  
an hypo thes is  s ta t in g  th a t  th e re  is  an ana logy between the  way in  
which e xe cu tive s  v iew  th e  u se fu ln ess  o f  i ta n s  in c lu d e d  in  t h e i r  
companies’ r e p o r t in g  system s, when c o n t r o l l in g  and e v a lu a t in g  fo r e ig n  
subs id ia ries ’ o p e ra t in g  perfo rm ance , and the  frequency w ith  which 
subs id ia ries are  re q u ire d  to  r e p o r t  such ite m s .
The n u ll h yp o th e s is  s ta te s  th a t :
Hoi : there is no association between the level of usefulness 
attributed in a oonpany to each item of information 
included in the internal reporting system, and the 
reporting frequency required for the item.
The v a r ia b le s  in v o lv e d  in  t h i s  te s t  o f  independence are a l l  5 - o r 6 - 
scale v a r ia b le s  a t  the  o r d in a l - le v e l  o f  measurement. For t h is  reason , 
the phi-sQ uare s t a t i s t i c  was used. A d is c u s s io n  o f  t h is  s t a t i s t i c a l  
technique was p re sen ted  in  ch a p te r 10 (s e c t io n  1 0 .3 . ) .
Table 12 .X V I I I ,  where r e s u l t s  o f  the  te s ts  are shown, re v e a ls  th e
existence o f  a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n i f ic a n t  r e la t io n s h ip  between le v e l o f  
^©fulness and frequency  o f  r e p o r t in g ,  f o r  a l l  b u t th re e  o f  th e  item s 
more commonly found in  com panies’ in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  system s. T h is  
finding suggests th a t  the  frequency w ith  w hich the  re p o r t in g  o f  each 
item o f in fo rm a t io n  in c lu d e d  in  the  in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  system is  
Paquired from  s u b s id ia r ie s  i s  consonant w ith  the  way in  which 
headquarters e x e c u tiv e s  in v o lv e d  in  the  e v a lu a t io n  and c o n tro l o f
feneign s u b s id ia r ie s  tend to  va lu e  th e  ite m . I t  appears, th e re fo re ,
that the re  i s  a re a so n a b ly  good match between th e  in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  
®vstem and the  u se rs ’ in fo rm a t io n  re q u ire m e n ts .
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TAble 12.XVIII - Chi-Square Teats of Independence Between the 
Reporting Frequency of Items in the Internal 
Reporting System, and the Usefulness Attributed to 
the Items in Controlling and Evaluating Foreign 
Subsidiaries' Operating Performance
I p d . f . N
r  Balance sheet f o r  the  p e r io d
i
^ ______________________________________
: 6 .56 (0 .0 3 8 )
*
2 94,
! Up-date o f  the  budgeted year-end  
balance shee t
11.68 (0 .0 2 0 )
*
4 83
P ro fit  and lo s s  account i 3 .10 
(a )
(0 .0 7 8 ) 1 93
Up-date o f  the  yea r-end  p r o f i t  
I fo recas ts
10.80 (0 .0 0 5 )
* *
2 91
Cash-flow genera ted  in  th e  s u b s id ia ry 6 .57 (0 .0 1 0 )
* *
1 94
r
Sales per p ro d u c t o r  bus iness 16.74 (0 .0002 )
* *
2 84
Borrowings in  the  s u b s id ia ry  from 
1 lo ca l sources
0.84 (0 .3 6 0 ) 1 95
Inventory le v e ls  ( in  q u a n t i ty ) 11.36 (0 .0 0 3 )
* *
2 64
Market share in  h o s t co u n try 12.72 (0 .0 1 3 )
* *
4 60
Production o u tp u t 22.92 (0 .00 0 0 )
* *
2 68
M anufacturing c a p a c ity  u t i l i z a t i o n i24.01 (0 .00 0 0 )
* *
2 63
Labour r e la t io n s '13.49 (0 .0 0 1 )
* *
2 52
Product q u a l i t y h i . 72
i
(0 .0 0 3 )
* *
2 50
Report on economic c o n d it io n s  in  
host co u n try
5.05
j
(0 .0 8 0 ) 2 76
Report on p o l i t i c a l ,  le g a l and 
soc ia l c o n d it io n s  in  h o s t c o u n try
! 6 .04
i
(0 .0 4 9 )
•
2 71
NOTES: * •  s ig n i f ic a n t  p < 0.01
*  s ig n i f ic a n t  0.01 < p ^ 0 .05
(a ) C h i-square  s u b je c t to  Y ate ’ s c o r re c t io n  fo r  c o n t in u ity
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A d d itio n a lly , th e  r e s u l t s  o b ta in e d  in  t h is  t e s t  h e lp ,  in  p a r t ic u la r ,  
in e x p la in in g  th e  r e la t i v e l y  low le v e l o f  u se fu ln e ss  a t t r ib u te d  to  
reports on lo c a l p o l i t i c a l ,  le g a l and s o c ia l c o n d it io n s  (see sub­
section 1 2 .2 .1 . ) .  As p re v io u s ly  d e s c r ib e d , th e  in c id e n c e  o f  such 
reports in  com panies’ in te r n a l  r e p o r t in g  systems was found to  be v e ry  
high. However, in  n e a r ly  h a l f  o f  th e  cases these  re p o r ts  a re  not 
submitted r e g u la r lv  (once a year o r more o f te n ) ,  o n ly  b e in g  fo rw a rded  
to the p a ren t company on an o c c a s io n a l, s p o ra d ic  way. A c c o rd in g ly , 
the low gene ra l le v e l o f  u se fu ln e ss  o b ta in e d  is  g re a t lv  in f lu e n c e d  by 
this h igh pe rcen tage  o f  cases f o r  which the  item  is  no t re p o r te d  on a 
regular b a s is , s in c e , as th e  te s t  shows, in  these companies the  ite m  
is l i k e ly  to  be p e rc e iv e  as hav ing  a low u s e fu ln e ss . T h is  would 
contrast w ith  the  p e rc e p tio n s  o f  managers in  companies w hich have the  
item re p o rte d  w ith  fre q u e n cy .
SnMarv; The te s t  aimed a t  d e te rm in in g  w hether the  judgements made bv 
headquarters e x e c u tiv e s  as re g a rds  the  u se fu ln e ss  o f  ite m s  o f  
inform ation in  c o n t r o l l in g  and e v a lu a t in g  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  
performance were a s s o c ia te d  w ith  the  frequency w ith  w hich such it« n s  
were re p o rte d . R e su lts  show, w ith  ve ry  few e x c e p tio n s , th a t  le v e l o f  
usefulness and re p o r t in g  fre qu e ncy  o f  item s in c lu d e d  in  com panies’ 
in terna l re p o r t in g  systems are  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  a ssoc ia te d  in  a p o s i t iv e  
way. Th is means th a t  ite m s  p e rce ive d  as more u s e fu l in  e v a lu a t in g  
su bs id ia ries ’ perform ance tend to  be re p o r te d  by s u b s id ia r ie s  more 
frequently (e .g .  eve ry  q u a r te r ,  o r eve ry  m on th ). On the  o th e r  hand, 
items regarded as le s s  u s e fu l,  tend to  be those whose re p o r t in g  is  
requested from  s u b s id ia r ie s  o n ly  o c c a s io n a lly  o r  v e ry  seldom (e .g .  
once a y e a r ) .  T h is  a s s o c ia t io n  in d ic a te s  th a t  the  frequency  w ith  
which in d iv id u a l ite m s  are  re p o r te d  corresponds to  th e  in fo rm a t io n  
needs o f t h e i r  u se rs .
IfeSt 2
Section 12.2. above d e sc rib e d  th e  fo rm a l perform ance e v a lu a t io n  
c rite ria  employed in  com panies’ headquarte rs  in  th e  e v a lu a t io n  and 
control o f fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia ry  o p e ra tin g  perfo rm ance. The m a jo r 
components o f  the  e v a lu a t io n  p ro cess , namely item s in c lu d e d  in  the
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in terna l re p o r t in g  system th a t  a re  employed in  perform ance e v a lu a t io n ,  
ratios and o th e r  measures th a t  a re  used in  th e  m o n ito r in g  o f  
subs id ia ries , and perform ance s tanda rds  and ta rg e ts  assigned to  
operations, were a l l  rev iew ed in d iv id u a l ly  in  o rd e r th a t  a c le a r  
picture o f  com panies’ p ra c t ic e s  cou ld  emerge.
I t  was a ls o  seen e a r l ie r  (c h a p te r 3) th a t  f irm s  w hich have t h e i r  
operations s c a tte re d  ove r a w idespread range o f  c o u n tr ie s  a re  l i k e l y  
to have t h e ir  s u b s id ia r ie s  s u b je c t to  ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  in f lu e n c e s  posed 
bv the lo c a l env ironm en ts  where s u b s id ia r ie s  are e s ta b lis h e d . An 
analysis o f  th e  most in f lu e n t ia l  e nv iron m e n ta l fa c to rs  by g eog raph ic  
area was conducted in  the  p re v io u s  s e c tio n  (s e c t io n  1 2 .3 . ) .  There, a 
conclusion was reached th a t  hea d qu a rte rs  managers tend to  p e rc e iv e  the  
environments where s u b s id ia r ie s  ope ra te  as d i f f e r e n t  frcxn one a n o th e r.
An im portan t o b je c t iv e  o f  t h is  s tudy  is  to  de te rm ine  how th e
s e n s it iv ity  o f  perfo rm ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  to  the  im pact e x e rte d  
by lo ca l env ironm ents upon fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s ’ a c t i v i t i e s  change in  
accordance to  com panies’ c a r a c te r is t ic s  (see c h a p te r 7 ) .  "Die p re se n t 
test w i l l  a tte m p t to  measure such a s e n s i t i v i t y  and to  de te rm ine  which 
company c h a r a c te r is t ic s  tend  to  be a sso c ia te d  w ith  perfo rm ance
c r ite r ia  th a t  a re  more l i k e l y  to  r e f le c t  env ironm en ta l d if fe re n c e s .  
I t  is  expected th a t  companies w ith ,  f o r  in s ta n c e , h ig h e r le v e ls  o f  
In te rn a t io n a liz a t io n ,  h ig h e r exposure to  hos t co u n try  in f lu e n c e ,  
higher in te r n a t io n a l e xp e rie n ce , and h ig h e r commitment to  fo r e ig n
operations w i l l  employ fo rm a l perform ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  th a t  a re  
capable o f  re c o g n iz in g  to  a g re a te r  e x te n t re le v a n t  e nv iron m e n ta l 
influences th a t  d i f f e r  from  one geog raph ic  area to  a n o th e r.
Established in its directional form, the null hypothesis tries to
demonstrate that:
Ro2: there is either no association or a negative association
between the degree of sensitivity of a company's formal 
performance evaluation criteria to the impact of local 
environments cg>on foreign subsidiaries, and:
• the dominant industrial activity of the international
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operations of the company;
. the size of the company;
. the level of the company's commitment to foreign 
operations;
. the level of the company's internationalization;
. the international experience of the company;
. the organizational structure of the company;
. the level of the company's exposure to host country and 
government influence;
. the degree of strategic control exercised in the company 
by headquarters over foreign subsidiaries; and 
• the strategy adopted by the company.
The d e te rm in a tio n  o f  th e  degree o f  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  fo rm a l perfo rm ance 
evaluation c r i t e r i a  to  the  Im pact o f  lo c a l env ironm ents upon 
s u b s id ia rie s ' o p e ra t io n s , re q u ire s  the  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  a model w hich
can l in k  the  n a tu re  o f  the  e lem ents o f  th e  e v a lu a t io n  process to  the
presumed c a o a b i l i t y  o f  the  fo rm a l e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  to  take  account
of re levan t e n v iron m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s .  Such a model was c re a te d  in  a
way th a t th e  m a jo r c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  the  fo rm a l perform ance
evaluation c r i t e r i a  ( i . e .  ite m s  in  the  in te r n a l  r e p o r t in g  system , 
performance measures and s ta n d a rd s ) ope ra ted  in  a company a re
aggregated in to  a s o le  measure.
Exhibit 12,1 d e s c r ib e s  in  a d e ta ile d  manner how t h is  model is  
constructed, as w e ll as th e  assum ptions beh ind i t .  B a s ic a l ly ,  the
iodel c o n s is ts  o f  s ix  components, each re p re s e n tin g  a m a jo r
c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  th e  fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia ry  e v a lu a t io n  p rocess in  
operation in  a company, as desc ribe d  in  s e c tio n  1 2 .2 . Four o f  these 
components are  re la te d  to  s p e c i f ic  fe a tu re s  o f  the  perform ance 
evaluation c r i t e r i a  a p p lie d  in  each company to  the  ty p ic a l  fo re ig n  
s u b s id ia ry ( l) :  1) p re fe re n c e  f o r  n o n - f in a n c ia l vs f in a n c ia l
inform ation In c lu d e d  in  th e  in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  system ; 2) p re fe re n ce  
Tor n o n -p ro f it -b a s e d  vs p ro f i t - b a s e d  f in a n c ia l  measures o f  
performance; 3) Im portance  a t t r ib u te d  to  the  in te r n a l  r e p o r t in g  svstem 
^ed as a g lo b a l package o f  In fo rm a tio n  on s u b s id ia r ie s  vs a b a t te ry
in d iv id u a l perform ance measures o f  f in a n c ia l  n a tu re  used
independently o f  th e  in te r n a l  r e p o r t in g  system ; and 4 ) number o f
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Exhibit 12.1 - Model to Determine the Degree of Sensitivity of 
Formal Performance Evaluation Criteria to Foreign 
Environmental Influences
fifftPOWENT 1 - Preference for Non-Financial vs Financial
Information
D escription: T h is  component o f  the  model compares the  use fu ln ess  
a t t r ib u te d  by HQ e x e c u tiv e s  to  n o n - f in a n c ia l 
in fo rm a t io n  w ith  th a t  a t t r ib u te d  to  f in a n c ia l  
in fo rm a t io n ,  in c lu d e d  in  th e  in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  
system , when c o n t r o l l in g  and e v a lu a t in g  fo re ig n  
s u b s id ia r ie s ' o p e ra t in g  perfo rm ance.
Formula: For each case, compute
Mean o f EINV,EMARKT to  EPLSCOND,EEMPLOY (N o n -F in a n c ia l Item s)
C1=--------------------------------------------------------------
Mean o f EBS to  ECF,ESALES, EBORROW, EKEXP (F in a n c ia l Item s)
C h a ra c te r is t ic s : Maximum 1.680 Mean 0.750
Minimum 0.304 S tandard  d e v ia t io n  0.194
Assimption: I t  i s  assumed th a t  the  h ig h e r the  im po rtance
a t t r ib u te d  in  a company to  n o n - f in a n c ia l in fo rm a tio n  
(e .g .  m arket sha res , la b o u r r e la t io n s ,  re p o r ts  on 
econom ic, p o l i t i c a l ,  le g a l ,  and s o c ia l c o n d it io n s  in  
h os t c o u n tr ie s )  re p o r te d  by s u b s id ia r ie s  in  the  
in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  system , r e la t i v e ly  to  f in a n c ia l  
in fo rm a tio n  (e .g .  b a la n c e -s h e e t, P & L accoun t, cash 
f lo w ) ,  th e  more s e n s i t iv e  to  e nv iron m e n ta l 
in f lu e n c e s  the  fo rm a l perform ance e v a lu a t io n  process 
is  l i k e l y  to  be.
Note: Means were employed in  Cl in s te a d  o f  medians, f o r  reasons
o f convenience o f  co m pu ta tion .
■SOMPOWRWt g _ Preference for Non-Profit-Based vs Profit-Based 
Financial Measures of Performance
Description: T h is  component o f  the  model compares th e  p re fe re n ce  
g ive n  by HQ e xe cu tive s  to  f in a n c ia l  measures th a t  
are n o t based on p r o f i t  (e .g .  cash f lo w , sa le s  
r a t io s ,  c o s ts , o rd e rs , d e b to rs , re m it ta n c e s ) ,  w ith  
th a t  g ive n  to  f in a n c ia l  measures based on p r o f i t  
( e .g .  ROI, t o t a l  incom e, re tu rn  on s a le s , R I ) , when 
c o n t r o l l in g  and e v a lu a t in g  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s ' 
o p e ra t in g  perfo rm ance .
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Exhibit 12.1 (continued)
Formula: For each case, compute
C2=
Number o f  N o n -P ro fit-B a s e d  F in a n c ia l Measures Used
(c o u n t ICF to  INPMOTH)
Number o f  P ro fit-B a s e d  Measures Used (co u n t IROI to  IPMOTH)
C h a ra c te r is t ic s : Maximum 3 .0
Minimum 0 .0
Mean 0.527
Standard d e v ia t io n  0.467
Assumption: I t  i s  assumed th a t  the  h ig h e r the  p re fe re n c e  g ive n
in  a company to  n o n -p ro f it -b a s e d  f in a n c ia l  measures, 
r e la t i v e l y  to  p ro f i t - b a s e d  measures, th e  more
s e n s i t iv e  to  e nv ironm en ta l in f lu e n c e s  the  fo rm a l 
perform ance e v a lu a t io n  p rocess is  l i k e l y  to  be.
COMPONENT 1 - Importance of the Internal Reporting System Taken 
as a Global Package of Information vs a Battery of 
Individual Performance Measures
Descrip tion: T h is  component o f  the  model r e la te s  the  im po rtance  
a t t r ib u te d  by HQ e x e c u tiv e s  to  two m a jo r in s tru m e n ts  
o f  fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia ry  assessm ent, namely th e  
in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  system used as a g lo b a l package 
o f  in fo rm a tio n  on s u b s id ia r ie s ’ o p e ra tio n s  ( v a r ia b le  
PACKAGE) and a b a t te ry  o f  perform ance measures o f  
f in a n c ia l  n a tu re  used in d e p e n d e n tly  o f  the  in te r n a l  
r e p o r t in g  system (v a r ia b le  PURMEAS). The fo rm u la  
used in  t h i s  component r e f le c ts  not o n ly  the  
com para tive  im portance  g ive n  to  the  two v a r ia b le s  in  
q u e s t io n , b u t a lso  the  degree o f  im portance  
a t t r ib u te d  to  one o f  them (PACKAGE) in  is o la t io n .
Formula: For each case, compute
C3 = PACKAGE X 2 -  PURMEAS
d ia r a c te r is t ic s :  Maximum 8.0 
Minimum 1.0
Mean 4 .920
S tandard d e v ia t io n  1.594
Assimption: I t  i s  assumed th a t  the  more the  c o n tro l and
e v a lu a t io n  o f  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s ’ o p e ra tio n s  
r e l ie s  upon the  package o f  in fo rm a tio n  in c lu d e d  in  
th e  in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  system , and le s s  upon a 
b a t te ry  o f  in d iv id u a l f in a n c ia l  measures o f  
perform ance is o la te d  from  th a t  package o f  
in fo rm a t io n ,  th e  more s e n s it iv e  to  env ironm en ta l 
in f lu e n c e s  the  fo rm a l e v a lu a t io n  p rocess is  l i k e l y  
to  be.
[
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Exhibit 12.1 (continued)
n^fiNENT 4 - Number of Performance Standards Used
D escrip tion: T h is  component o f  th e  model de te rm ines  how many 
s tan d a rds  o f  perform ance f o r  each s u b s id ia ry  are 
used in  a company to  e v a lu a te  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  
o p e ra t in g  perfo rm ance.
Formula: For each case, compute
C4 = Number o f  S tandards Used (co u n t STARGET to  STBUK)
C h a ra c te r is t ic s : Maximum 6 .0  
Minimum 1.0
Mean 4.437
S tandard d e v ia t io n  1.597
issunption: I t  i s  assumed th a t  the  more perform ance s tandards
are  used in  a company to  assess each s u b s id ia r y ’ s 
o p e ra t in g  perfo rm ance, th e  more s e n s it iv e  to  
e nv iron m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  the  fo rm a l e v a lu a t io n  
p rocess i s  l i k e l y  to  be.
■SOMPCTfEWT 5 - Extent of Variability of Performance Targets Among 
Subsidiaries
Description: T h is  component o f  the  model de te rm ines the  e x te n t to  
w h ich  s u b s id ia ry  perform ance ta rg e ts  v a ry  bo th  in  
n a tu re  and in  va lue  across a company’ s s e t o f  
fo r e ig n  o p e ra t io n s . The fo rm u la  used computes a 
w e igh ted  average, where the  v a r ia t io n  in  the  n a tu re  
o f  ta rg e ts  ( v a r ia b le  TARGVARN) is  g ive n  a h ig h e r 
w e ig h t than  the  v a r ia t io n  in  the  va lue  o f  ta rg e ts  
( v a r ia b le  TARGVARN).
Formula: For each case, compute
TARGVARN x 2 + TARGVARN 
3
C5 =
C h a ra c te r is t ic s : Maximum 5 .0  
Minimum 1.0
Mean 2 .337
S tandard d e v ia t io n  0.939
Assimption: I t  is  assumed th a t  th e  h ig h e r the  v a r ia t io n  in  the
n a tu re  and in  the  va lu e  o f  perform ance ta rg e ts  
across fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  in  a company, th e  more 
t a i lo r e d  to  each s u b s id ia ry  the  perform ance ta rg e ts  
a re , and, co nse q ue n tly , the  more s e n s it iv e  to  
e n v iro n m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  the  fo rm a l e v a lu a t io n  
process is  l i k e l y  to  be.
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Exhibit 12.1 (continued)
(TMPOifEWT 6 - Variability of Formal Performance 
Criteria Among Subsidiaries
Evaluation
D escrip tion: T h is  component o f  the  model r e f le c t s  the  le v e l in  
w hich fo rm a l c r i t e r i a  ( i . e .  item s in  the  in te r n a l  
re p o r t in g  system , perform ance measures and 
s ta n d a rd s ) used to  c o n tro l and e va lu a te  s u b s id ia ry  
o p e ra t in g  perform ance v a ry  across a company’ s se t o f  
fo r e ig n  o p e ra t io n s .
Formula: For each case, de te rm ine
C6 = V a r ia b i l i t y  o f  Formal Perform ance E v a lu a tio n  C r i t e r ia  ( v a r ia b le  SAME)
C h a ra c te r is t ic s  : Maximum 3 ( Cos.use co m p le te ly  d i f f e r e n t  fo rm a l 
c r i t e r i a  across fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s )
Minimum 1 (C os.use e x a c t ly  the  same fo rm a l 
c r i t e r i a  across fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s )
Assmption: I t  i s  assumed th a t  the  more the  fo rm a l perfo rm ance
e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  va ry  across fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  
in  a company, th e  more ta i lo r e d  to  each s u b s id ia ry  
th e  e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  a re , and, co nse q ue n tly , the  
more s e n s i t iv e  to  e n v iron m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  the  
fo rm a l e v a lu a t io n  process is  l i k e l y  to  be.
SYNTHESIS: Variable to Measure the Degree of Sensitivity of the
Formal Performance Evaluation Criteria to Foreign 
Environmental Influences
D escription: The model cu lm in a te s  w ith  the  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  a 
v a r ia b le  th a t  i s  expected to  g ive  an in d ic a t io n  o f  
the  degree o f  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  the  fo rm a l perform ance 
e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  ope ra ted  in  a company ( i . e .  
item s in  the  in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  system , perform ance 
measures and s ta n d a rd s ) to  the  in f lu e n c e s  e xe rte d  by 
fo re ig n  environm ents upon s u b s id ia r ie s ’ o p e ra tio n s . 
T h is  v a r ia b le  re s u lts  from  the  a g g re g a tio n  o f  th e  
v a r ia b le s  c rea ted  in  components 1 to  6 above. In  
o rd e r th a t  each component g ive s  a c o n t r ib u t io n  w ith  
a s im i la r  w e ig h t to  the  f in a l  measure, the  re s u lts  
o f  Cl to  06 were tra ns fo rm e d  in  a way th a t  th e y  a l l  
range from  a p p ro x im a te ly  1 (o r  ze ro ) to  10. For 
d e ta i ls  o f  t h is  tra n s fo rm a tio n  see Appendix E.
Formula: For each case, compute
CHIT = 01 + 02 + 03 + 0 4 + 0 5  + 06
C h a ra c te r is t ic s : Maximum 43.875 Mean 32.005
Minimum 19.04 8 S tandard d e v ia t io n  5.523
I
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performance s tan d a rds  used. The re m a in in g  two components o f  th e  model 
are r e la te d  to  th e  d e g re e  o f  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  t a r g e t s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
and o f e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a ,  i n  g e n e r a l,  a c ro s s  a com pany’ s s e t  o f  
foreign o p e ra tio n s . The s ix  components are aggregated in to  a v a r ia b le  
(CRIT) whose sco res  a re  assumed to  g ive  an in d ic a t io n  o f  the  degree o f  
s e n s it iv ity  o f  a company's fo rm a l perfo rm ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  to  
the in f lu e n c e s  e x e r te d  by l o c a l  e n v i r o n m e n ts  upon  f o r e i g n  
su bs id ia ries ’ o p e ra tio n s . Appendix E p re se n ts  the  com puter programme 
that was used to  c re a te  v a r ia b le  CRIT.
The te s ts  o f  independence conducted between th is  new v a r ia b le  and the  
variables used to  measure companies’ c h a r a c te r is t ic s  were based on th e  
fa m ilia r  c h i-s o u a re  and on a s t a t i s t i c  employed in  th e  s tudy  f o r  the
f i r s t  tim e : th e  ^ jg a rm a n  rank c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t  ( r g ) ,  som etim es
also ca lle d  Spearman’ s rho.
The v a r ia b le  c re a te d  f o r  p u rp o s e s  o f  t h i s  t e s t  ( v a r ia b le  CRIT) i s  
measured a t th e  o r d in a l - le v e l .  I t s  d is t in c t i v e  c h a r a c te r is t ic  l i e s  in  
that i t  has a v e ry  la r g e  num ber o f  c a te g o r ie s .  As seen in  E x h ib i t  
12.1, v a r ia b le  CRIT ra n g e s  fro m  a m in im um  o f  19.048 to  a maximum o f  
^3.875. Among th e  73 v a l i d  ca se s , o n ly  2 have th e  same v a lu e ,  w h a t 
makes CRIT a v a r ia b le  w ith  72 d i f f e r e n t  c a te g o r ie s .
The Spearman ra n k  c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f ic ie n t  seems to  be an a p p ro p r ia te  
s t a t is t ic  to  m easure  th e  a s s o c ia t io n  b e tw e e n  CRIT and c o m p a n ie s ’ 
c h a r a c te r is t ic s .  T h is  s t a t i s t i c  r e q u ir e s  b o th  v a r ia b le s  a t  th e  
o r d in a l- le v e l o f  m e a su rem e n t ( o r  h ig h e r ) ,  and a la r g e  num ber o f  
ca tegories  o r  ra n k s  on each o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  [N ie  e t  a l . ,  1975, 
P*227]. I t s  p o w e r - e f f ic ie n c y  i s  h ig h ,  re a c h in g  91 p e rc e n t  o f  th e  
e ffic iency  a t ta in e d  w ith  the  most p o w e rfu l p a ra m e tr ic  c o r r e la t io n ,  th e  
Pearson r  [S ie g e l ,  1956, p .2 1 3 ].  Due to  th e  im p o s i t io n  o f  a la r g e  
cumber o f c a te g o r ie s  on each o f  th e  v a r ia b le s  be ing  te s te d , Spearman’ s 
cho was used o n ly  in  th e  te s ts  o f  independence between CRIT and those  
exp lana to ry  v a r ia b le s  w h ic h  s a t i s f y  t h i s  r e q u i r e m e n t ^ )  ( i . e .  
variables SIZSALE, SIZASSET, SALEOUT, ASSET OUT, and N COUNTRY, a l l  o f  
'’hlch a re  r a t i o - l e v e l  - v a r ia b le s  w i t h  many c a te g o r ie s ) .  T e s ts  o f  
Independence b e tw e e n  CRIT and th e  o th e r  e x p la n a to ry  v a r ia b le s  
(nom ina l-leve l, o r  o r d in a l- le v e l  o r  h ig h e r w ith  few c a te g o r ie s )  were
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based on the  c h i-s q u a re  s t a t i s t i c .
Table 12.XIX p re s e n ts  the  outcome o f  the  te s ts  conducted in  r e la t io n  
with the n u l l  h y p o th e s is  d e fin e d  above. R e su lts  show th a t  th e  degree 
of s e n s i t iv i t y  o f  a company’ s fo rm a l perfo rm ance  e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  
to the  in f lu e n c e s  e x e r te d  by lo c a l  e n v iro n m e n ts  upon f o r e ig n  
s u b s id ia r ie s ’ o p e r a t io n s ,  i s  a s s o c ia te d  w i t h  th r e e  m a jo r  company 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s : th e  com m itm ent o f  a company to  fo r e ig n  o p e ra tio n s , 
the le v e l o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  o f  a com pany, and th e  d e g re e  o f  a 
company’ s e x p o s u re  to  h o s t  c o u n t ry  and g o v e rn m e n t in f lu e n c e  in  i t s  
fo re ign  o p e ra tio n s .
The f i r s t  o f  these c h a r a c te r is t ic s  -  th e  com m itm ent o f  a company to  
foreign o p e ra tio n s  -  i s  measured in  the  s tu d y  in  te rm s o f  p ro p o r t io n  
of sa le s  a c h ie v e d  in  f o r e ig n  m a rk e ts  to  g ro up  c o n s o l id a te d  s a le s  
revenue, and a ls o  i n  te rm s  o f  p r o p o r t io n  o f  t o t a l  a s s e ts  lo c a te d  
outside th e  U.K. t o  t o t a l  company a s s e ts .  The r e s u l t s  p ro d u ce d  
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e la t io n s h ip s ,  a t  th e  5 p e rc e n t  l e v e l ,  
between v a r ia b le  CRIT and b o th  th e s e  v a r ia b le s  (T a b le  1 2 .X IX ). The 
r e la t io n s h ip  h a s  p ro v e d  t o  be d i r e c t ,  s in c e  th e  c o r r e l a t i o n  
c o e f f ic ie n ts  a re  p o s i t i v e .  T h is  in d ic a t e s  t h a t  th e  h ig h e r  th e  
commitment o f  a company to  fo r e ig n  a c t i v i t i e s  ( i .e .  the  more a company 
depends on o v e rs e a s  s a le s ,  and th e  m ore i t  has in v e s te d  a b ro a d ) , th e  
more the fo rm a l pe rfo rm ance  e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  used to  assess fo r e ig n  
S u b s id ia r ie s ’ o p e r a t io n s  a re  c a p a b le  o f  t a k in g  a c c o u n t o f  r e le v a n t  
e nv iron m e n ta l d i f f e r e n c e s  t h a t  d i f f e r  fro m  one g e o g ra p h ic  a re a  to  
another.
The second company c h a r a c te r is t ic  a sso c ia te d  w ith  CRIT -  th e  le v e l o f  
a firm ’ s in t e r n a t io n a l iz a t io n  -  i s  a ls o  measured in  the  s tu d y  in  te rm s 
of two c r i t e r ia :  t o t a l  number o f  c o u n tr ie s , and number o f  g eog raph ic  
areas in  the  w o r ld  where a company m a in ta in s  c o n tro l ove r in d u s t r ia l  
ope ra tions . The t e s t s  o f  a s s o c ia t io n  p ro d u ce d  a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s ig n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t  o n l y  f o r  t h e  v a r i a b l e  t h a t  m e a s u r e s  
in t e r n a t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  a company in  te rm s  o f  num ber o f  c o u n t r ie s  
operated. The s ig n if ic a n c e ,  a t  th e  1 p e rce n t le v e l ,  i s  v e ry  h ig h , and 
the p o s i t iv e  c o r r e la t io n  in d ic a t e s  t h a t  th e  v a r ia b le s  a re  d i r e c t l y  
associa ted. I t  can be c o n c lu d e d , t h e r e fo r e ,  t h a t  th e  g r e a te r  th e
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12 / THE USE OF INFO. FOR SUBSIDIARY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION & CONTROL
number o f  c o u n tr ie s  where a company owns in d u s t r ia l  f a c i l i t i e s ,  the  
more s e n s i t i v e  to  f o r e ig n  e n v iro n m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  th e  fo r m a l 
performance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  used in  the  company a re  l i k e l y  to  be.
The th ird  company fe a tu re  a sso c ia te d  w ith  CRIT, measures the  le v e l o f  
exposure o f  a c o r p o r a t io n  to  h o s t  c o u n try  and g o v e rn m e n t in f lu e n c e .  
Chi-square used to  t e s t  th e  le v e l  o f  a s s o c ia t io n  b e tw e e n  th e s e  tw o  
v a r ia b le s , p ro d u c e d  a le v e l  o f  s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  5 p e r c e n t  (T a b le  
12.XIX). The s tre n g th  o f  th e  a s s o c ia t io n  in  the  sample is  re a son a b le , 
w ith  a C ra m e r ’ s V o f  0 .2 9 0 ,  and  an u n c e r t a i n t y  c o e f f i c i e n t  
(asymmetric) o f  0.066. An a n a ly s is  o f  th e  c ro s s ta b u la t io n  between the  
two v a r ia b le s  r e v e a ls  t h a t  th e y  a re  d i r e c t l y  a s s o c ia te d ( ^ ) .  The 
conclusion, th e re fo re ,  i s  th a t  the  h ig h e r the  exposure o f  a company to  
host coun try and governm ent in f lu e n c e  in  i t s  in te r n a t io n a l  a c t i v i t y ,  
the more l i k e l y  a re  th e  fo r m a l p e r fo rm a n c e  e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  
employed in  the  company to  r e f le c t  re le v a n t  e n v iro n m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  
exerted upon fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s ’ o p e ra tio n s .
Tests o f independence between CRIT and the  o th e r e x p la n a to ry  v a r ia b le s  
included in  th e  n u l l  h y p o th e s is  d id  n o t p ro d u ce  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s ig n i f ic a n t  r e s u l t s  (T a b le  12 .X IX ). Fo r t h i s  re a s o n , a s s o c ia t io n  
between such v a r ia b le s  cannot be accepted.
I jm m a r v ; The a im  o f  t e s t  2 w as t o  d e te r m in e  w h ic h  co m p an y  
c h a r a c te r is t ic s ,  i f  any, a re  r e la t e d  to  th e  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  fo r m a l 
perform ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  t o  ta k e  a c c o u n t  o f  r e l e v a n t  
e n v iron m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  on s u b s id ia r ie s ’ o p e ra tio n s . D e te rm in in g  
such c a p a b il i ty  re q u ire d  th e  c o n s tru c t io n  o f  a v a r ia b le  w h ich  measures 
the degree o f  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  to  th e  im p a c t  o f  
local e nv iron m e n ta l fa c to r s  upon s u b s id ia r ie s ’ a c t i v i t i e s .  Such a 
variable was based on a model l in k in g  th e  n a tu re  o f  m a jo r e lem ents o f  
the e va lu a tio n  p rocess to  th e  assumed a b i l i t y  o f  th e  fo rm a l assessm ent 
C r ite r ia  to  re c o g n iz e  r e le v a n t  e n v iro n m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  s p e c i f ic  to  
o p e ra t io n s .  The s t a t i s t i c a l  t e s t s  c o n d u c te d  r e v e a le d  th e  
association between the  degree o f  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  fo rm a l perfo rm ance 
e va lua tio n  c r i t e r i a  t o  f o r e ig n  e n v iro n m e n ts ,  and th r e e  company 
o h a r a c t e r i  s t i e s :  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  f o r e i g n  o p e r a t i o n s ,
I n t e r n a t io n a l iz a t io n ,  and e xp o su re  to  h o s t  c o u n t ry  and g o v e rn m e n t
428
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in f lu e n c e . The p o s i t i v e  a s s o c i a t i o n  o b t a in e d  f o r  a l l  t h r e e  
re la tio n sh ip s  in d ic a te s  th a t  the  h ig h e r the  com m itm ent o f  a company to  
foreign o p e ra tio n s  ( i .e .  th e  h ig h e r th e  percen tage  o f  sa le s  and a sse ts  
abroad to  t o t a l  g ro u p  s a le s  and a s s e ts ) ,  th e  h ig h e r  th e  le v e l  o f  
I n t e r n a t io n a l iz a t io n  o f  a company ( i . e .  th e  g r e a te r  th e  num ber o f  
countries where a company owns in d u s t r ia l  f a c i l i t i e s ) ,  and the  h ig h e r 
the degree o f  e x p o s u re  o f  a company to  lo c a l  h o s t  c o u n try  and 
government in f lu e n c e ,  th e  more s e n s it iv e  to  the  e n v iro n m e n ta l im p a c t 
on each o p e ra tio n  th e  fo rm a l perfo rm ance  e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  used in  
the company are  l i k e l y  to  be.
Following the  d is c u s s io n  in  ch ap te r 7 (s e c t io n  7 .4 .), th e  aim o f  t h is  
tes t is  to  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  th e  deg re e  o f  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  fo r m a l 
performance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  to  fo re ig n  e n v iro n m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  is  
associated w ith  th e  way in  w h ich  th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l assessment a c t i v i t y  
is organized in  com panies’ h ea d qu a rte rs . The le v e l o f  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  
evaluation c r i t e r i a  to  e n v iro n m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  has been d e f in e d  in  
the p re v io u s  t e s t  (T e s t  2 ) .  T h e re , a v a r ia b le  was c re a te d  ( v a r ia b le  
CRIT) w h ic h  m easures  th e  c a p a c ity  o f  fo r m a l p e r fo rm a n c e  e v a lu a t io n  
c r i t e r ia  to  ta k e  a c c o u n t o f  r e le v a n t  e n v iro n m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  th a t  
d i f fe r  fro m  one g e o g ra p h ic  a re a  to  a n o th e r .  As re g a rd s  th e  way i n  
which the e n v iro n m e n ta l assessm ent a c t i v i t y  is  o rgan ized  in  companies’ 
headquarters, ch a p te r 10 re p o r te d  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  th re e  m a jo r groups 
of companies ( v a r ia b le  ENFCN): one in c lu d e s  those f i r m s  where fo r e ig n  
environmental in fo rm a t io n  is  processed as p a r t  o f  a fo rm a l fu n c t io n  
in s t i t u t io n a l i z e d  in  h e a d q u a r te r s ;  such f i r m s  have one o r  m ore 
managers w i t h  fo r m a l r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  c o l l e c t i n g  and a n a ly s in g  
Foreign e n v iro n m e n ta l in f o r m a t io n .  The second group in c lu d e s  those 
companies in  whose hea d qu a rte rs  fo re ig n  e n v iro n m e n ta l in fo rm a t io n  is  
c o lle c te d  and a n a ly s e d  o n ly  on an in fo r m a l  b a s is ;  a lth o u g h  in  such 
companies in fo rm a t io n  on lo c a l env ironm en ts  is  u s u a lly  c o lle c te d  and 
analysed, no one in  hea d qu a rte rs  has been g ive n  fo rm a l r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  
For th is .  The t h i r d  group in c lu d e s  those c o rp o ra tio n s  where fo r e ig n  
e nv iron m e n ta l in f o r m a t io n  i s  n o t r e g u la r l y  c o l le c t e d  o r  a n a ly s e d , 
either fo r m a lly  o r  in fo r m a l ly .
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The test anticipates that companies which have formally set up in 
headquarters the environmental assessment function will tend to employ 
formal performance evaluation criteria that are more sensitive to the 
impact exerted by local environments upon foreign subsidiaries’ 
activities.
The null hypothesis states that:
Ho3 : there is no association between the degree of sensitivity 
of a company's formal performance evaluation criteria to 
the impact of local environments upon foreign subsidiaries, 
and the way in which environmental assessment activity is 
organized in the company's headquarters.
Chi-sQuare was used to test this association. Both variables are 
measured at the ordinal-level, however, Spearman's rho could not be 
employed here, since the variable which was correlated against GRIT, 
has a very small number of classes.
The results show a statistically significant association between the 
two variables under test (Table 12.XX). The level of significance in 
the population is very high, amounting to 0.34 percent, and the two 
variables are related in the sample in a fairly strong manner (e.g. 
Cramer's V of 0.40). The direction of the association tells that 
companies where the environmental assessment function was 
institutionalized tend to operate performance evaluation criteria 
which take widely into account relevant environmental influences. In 
contrast, companies with no environmental assessment activity (either 
formally or informally) in headquarters tend to control and evaluate 
the performance of their foreign subsidiaries using formal assessment 
criteria that take very little into account influences exerted by 
local environments over subsidiaries' activities.
SfllNâCI.: Test 3 attempted to discover a relationship between the 
degree of sensitivity to foreign environmental influences on the part 
of formal criteria used in the evaluation and control of overseas 
Subsidiaries, and the way in which the environmental assessment 
activity is organized in companies' headquarters. Results have shown
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Table 12.%% - Qii-Square Test of Independence Between the Sensitivity 
to the Environment of Performance Evaluation Criteria 
and the Way in Which the Environmental Assessment 
Activity is Organized in HQ
ENFGN - Organization of 
the environmental 
assessment activity in a 
company's headquarters
Sensitivity of a company’s X2 11.39
formal performance evaluation P (0.0034)
criteria to the influences **
exerted by local environments d.f. 2
upon foreign subsidiaries' N 71
operations (GRIT) Gramer's V 0.401
Une.coeff. 0.122
NOTES: •• significant
Key to symbols;
v< 0.01
X. 2 =
P =
d.f. =
N =
Une.Coeff.=
chi-square statistic 
level of significance 
degree of freedom 
number of valid cases 
uncertainty coefficient 
(asymmetric) with GRIT 
dependent
I
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that companies with formal environmental assessment functions, and to 
a lesser extent, companies where environmental information is 
collected and analysed on an informal basis, tend to use formal 
performance evaluation criteria that are significantly more sensitive 
to local environmental influences, than those used by companies with 
no environmental assessment activity at all.
Test i
Test 4 is intended to compare for each company the degree of 
sensitivity of formal performance evaluation criteria to foreign 
environmental influences, and the opinion of headquarters executives 
as to the effectiveness of such evaluation criteria in taking account 
of environmental influences. Earlier (Test 2, in the present 
section), a variable was defined (variable GRIT) which was accepted as 
a measurement of the capability of a performance evaluation system to 
take into account relevant environmental factors that influence the 
activities of subsidiaries operating abroad. This variable provided 
the study with an independent means of assessing the effectiveness of 
a company's performance evaluation system in recognizing environmental 
influences.
The judgement of headquarters executives involved in performance 
evaluation as regards such effectiveness of the evaluation criteria 
was sought in the questionnaire, and the results were reported in 
section 12.3. above.
This test attempts to determine how judgements of headquarters 
executives compare with the sensitivity to the environment as measured 
variable GRIT. It is hypothesized that performance evaluation 
criteria used for subsidiaries and for m a n a g e r s ( 5 )  that are more 
Sensitive to the impact exerted by local environments upon foreign 
subsidiaries' activities, will tend to be regarded by executives as 
“ore effective in taking account of significant foreign environmental 
influences.
The null hypothesis states that:
432
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Bo4 : there Is no association between the degree of sensitivity 
of a company's formal performance evaluation criteria to 
the impact of local environments upon foreign subsidiaries, 
and the level of effectiveness, in headquarters executives' 
opinion, of the formal assessment criteria in taking such 
environmental impact into account.
The null hypothesis has been tested for two relationships. One, 
relates variable CRIT with executives' judgements on the capability of 
the evaluation criteria to take into account relevant environmental 
influences when controlling and evaluating subsidiaries' activities 
(this measured by variable AEFFSÜB). The other relationship tested, 
associates variable CRIT with executives' judgements on the same 
capability of the evaluation criteria, when assessing subsidiary 
managers(5) (measured by variable AEFFMAN).
Chl-sQuare was the statistical technique chosen here, for reasons 
similar to those given in Test 3. Results reported in Table 12.XXI 
reveal that CRIT is statistically associated at a significant level 
(less than 5 percent) with both the variables that measure executives' 
opinions on the evaluation criteria used in the assessment of the 
performance of subsidiaries and of managers.
The direction of the two relationships has proved to be as predicted: 
formal performance evaluation criteria that are more sensitive to 
environmental influences tend to be perceived as more effective in 
taking account of such influences, both when they are used to control 
and evaluate subsidiaries' activities and when they are employed to 
assess subsidiary managers. The inverse also holds: evaluation 
criteria whose scores from variable CRIT indicate low levels of 
sensitivity to local environments, tend to be perceived as little 
effective, both in the control and evaluation of subsidiaries and in 
the assessment of managers. This indicates that the headquarters 
executives can make a fair judgement on the environmental capability 
of the systems they use, since their opinions are associated with the 
Intrinsic sensitivity to the environment of the evaluation criteria, 
independently ascertained in the study.
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Table 12.XXI - Chi-Square Tests of Independence Between the 
Sensitivity to the Environment of Performance 
Evaluation Criteria and HQ Executives' Opinion About 
the Effectiveness of the Criteria to Take Account of 
the Environment
AEFFSUB AEFFMAN
Sensitivity of a company's %2 5.42 4.09
formal performance evaluation P (0.020) (0.043)
criteria to the influences * *
exerted by local environments d.f. 1 1
upon foreign subsidiaries' N 72 47
operations (CRIT) Phi 0.313 0.359
Une.Coeff. 0.083 0.129
NOTES: • significant
Key to symbols:
Key to acronyms:
0 . 0 1 < 
> 2
p ^ 0.05
chi-square statistic subject 
to Yate's correction for 
continuity
leyel of significance 
degrees of freedom 
number of valid cases 
uncertainty coefficient 
(asymmetric) with CRIT 
dependent
executives' opinion as to 
capability of formal 
assessment criteria to take account of 
relevant foreign environmental factors in 
the control and evaluation of subsidiary 
operations.
AEFFMAN = HQ executives' opinion as to 
the actual capability of formal 
assessment criteria to take account of 
relevant foreign environmental factors in 
the assessment of subsidiary managers.
P =
d.f. =
N =
Une.Coeff. =
AEFFSUB = HQ 
the actual
i
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gygaarv; The aim of Test 4 was to compare the degree of sensitivity of 
formal performance evaluation criteria to foreign environmental 
influences, and the perception of headquarters executives as regards 
the effectiveness of the evaluation criteria in taking into account 
such influences from the environments. Results demonstrate that high 
levels of sensitivity to the environment as estimated by the 
Independent measure created in the study, are statistically associated 
with high ratings of effectiveness from the headquarters executives 
who are involved in the evaluation process of subsidiaries and their 
managers. In other words, in companies which operate performance 
evaluation criteria that are highly sensitive to the environment 
headquarters managers tend to regard the criteria as highly effective 
in recognizing relevant environmental influences, both when evaluating 
subsidiaries' operations, and when assessing subsidiaries' managers. 
The inverse applies for companies with evaluation criteria that are 
little sensitive to the environment. Such an association suggests 
that managers' perception of the effectiveness of the performance 
evaluation criteria coincide with the real environmental capabilities 
of the criteria, as measured in the study using an independent method.
lest 5
This test attempts to explore whether the perceptions of headquarters 
managers involved in the performance evaluation process regarding the 
extent of variability in the characteristics of the foreign host 
environments are associated with the same managers' views of the 
extent to which formal assessment criteria should ideally be able to 
take account of relevant foreign environmental factors. The testing 
of such a relationship was suggested in chaper 7 (section 7.4.), as a 
preliminary stage in the process to determine whether the 
environmental attributes of evaluation systems are in agreement with 
the requirements of their users as far as environmental recognition is 
eoneerned. Here, it is expected to confirm that the way in which the 
environment is perceived by headquarters executives to differ across 
foreign subsidiaries is associated with the executives' requirements 
of the extent to which the environment should be taken into account by
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the performance evaluation systems. Next, in Test 6, the perception 
of executives as to the variability of the environments will be tested 
against the intrinsic environmental capabilities of the systems 
actually in operation.
The determination of the extent of variability of foreign 
environmental influences across different host locations, according to 
headquarters executives’ perceptions, required the creation of a new 
variable which reflects for each company how differently environmental 
factors listed in the questionnaire were ranked for the several 
geographic areas where the company operates.
Major influences exerted by local environments on companies' 
subsidiaries operating abroad were analysed earlier in the chapter 
(section 12.3.). There, the most influential environmental factors 
for each geographic area in the world were identified, using a 
comprehensive list of factors which respondents ranked by order of 
importance. It was concluded that, on an aggregate basis, 
headquarters managers tend to perceive the environment where 
subsidiaries operate as different from one another. However, if each 
company is taken separately, the respective headquarters executives' 
perceptions on the variability of foreign environments are likely to 
vary substantially. Such variation may be due not only to the 
different intrinsic individual perceptions of headquarters executives, 
but also to the different nature of countries and geographic regions 
where their companies operate. For example, an executive of a MNC 
which operates only in Europe and North America is likely to perceive 
less variability in the foreign environments than the executive of 
another MNC which operates in Europe and Africa, or in Europe and the 
Middle East.
TheXendall nn^ffioient of concordance (W) was considered to be an 
ideal measure for the perception of variability of foreign 
environments in each company. Kendall's W is a non-parametric measure 
of correlation which indicates the relation among several rankings of 
N objects [Siegel, 1956, pp.229-238]. It expresses the degree of 
concordance among k variables measured in ranks. Considering two 
opposite and extreme situations, one where there is no agreement among
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the several sets of rankings, and the other where there is perfect 
agreement among these several sets, the Kendall coefficient of 
concordance provides an "index of the divergence of the actual 
agreement shown in the data from the maximum possible (perfect) 
agreement [Siegel, 1956, p.230].
The computation of Kendal's W for each case in the study(&) required 
letting N ("the number of entities to be ranked"), and k ("the number 
of judges assigned ranks") to be respectively the seventeen 
environmental factors provided in a list in the questionnaire, and the 
seven geographic areas for which the environmental factors were 
ranked. The values of W computed for each case in the sample range 
from 0.653 to 0.073» with a mean of 0.314. A high value of W, which 
reflects a high level of concordance in the rankings attributed to 
each environmental factor for every geographic region operated by a 
company, may be interpreted as meaning that headquarters executives 
view the influences of environmental factors on subsidiaries' 
operations as similar from one geographic area to another. In 
contrast, a low value of W indicates a substantial level of 
discordance in rankings, which means that headquarters executives view 
environmental influences on subsidiaries' operations as fundamentally 
different across geographic regions.
As to the views of executives regarding the desired capability of 
foreign performance evaluation criteria to take into account relevant 
environemntal influences that vary from one geographic area to 
another, they were obtained in the questionnaire for situations 
involving both the evaluation of subsidiaries, and the assessment of 
managers. Detailed results describing such views were presented 
earlier in the chapter (section 12.3.).
it is anticipated that managers who perceive the influences of local 
environments on subsidiaries' activities as varying substantially from 
one geographic area to another will tend simultaneously to think that 
formal performance evaluation criteria used for subsidiaries and for 
Managers should be able to take extensive account of significant 
foreign environmental factors.
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In its null hypothesis, the test states that:
Ho5 : there Is no association between how a headquarters 
executive perceives the extent of variability of foreign 
environmental influences across the geographic areas where 
his company operates, and how he views the extent to which 
formal performance evaluation criteria should be able to 
take into account relevant foreign environmental 
influences.
The null hypothesis was tested for two relationships. One, relates 
variable W with executives' preferences regarding the capability of 
formal assessment criteria to take account of environmental influences 
on subsidiaries when controlling the units (variable DEFFSUB). The 
other relationship tested, associates variable W with executives' 
preferences regarding the same capability of the evaluation criteria 
when assessing the units' managers (variable DEFFMAN).
Since the variables which are to be correlated against W have a small 
number of categories, chi-sauare was selected as the appropriate 
technique.
Table 12.XXII shows that variable W is associated at a statistically 
significant level (less than 5 percent) with the variables used to 
measure managers' preferences regarding the capability of the 
assessment criteria to recognize relevant environmental factors both 
when evaluating operations and managers. The direction of the two 
relationships is such that hi^i scores in the variables which measure 
such preferences tend to be related with low scores in variable W. In 
other words, managers who perceive higher variability in the 
Influences exerted by foreign environments upon their companies' 
subsidiaries operating in different geographic areas tend to believe 
that formal assessment criteria should to a greater extent be able to 
take account of relevant foreign environmental influences in the 
evaluation of subsidiaries and in the assessment of managers. In 
contrast, managers who view the influences of environmental factors on 
subsidiaries' operations as similar from one geographic area to 
another tend to think that assessment criteria should not at all, or
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Table 12.XXII - Chi-Square Tests of Independence Between the 
Perceptions of HQ Executives on the Extent of 
Environmental Variability and Their Opinion on the 
Extent to Which Performance Evaluation Criteria 
Should Take Account of the Environment
DEFFSUB DEFFMAN
Extent of variability in 4.92(a) 7.91
the foreign environments 
perceived by HQ executives
P (0.027)
«
(0.019)
#
Involved in a company in d.f. 1 2
the evaluation and control N 71 65
of overseas subsidiaries Phi 0.292 -
(W) Cramer's V — 0.349
Une.Coeff. 0.064 0.058
NOTES: * significant 0.01
(a) Chi-square subject 
Key to symbols: '/
< p ^ 0.05
to Yate's correction for continuity
Key to acronyms
P =
d.f. =
N =
Une.Coeff. =
chi-square statistic subject 
to Yate's correction for 
continuity
level of significance 
degrees of freedom 
number of valid cases 
uncertainty coefficient 
(asymmetric) with CRIT 
dependent
DEFFSUB = HQ executives' opinion as to 
the desired capability of formal 
assessment criteria to take account of 
relevant foreign environmental factors in 
the control and evaluation of subsidiary 
operations.
DEFFMAN = HQ executives' opinion as to 
the desired capability of formal 
assessment criteria to take account of 
relevant foreign environmental factors in 
the assessment of subsidiary managers.
I
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should only to a limited extent, recognize foreign environmental 
factors when evaluating subsidiaries or managers.
Summary: Test 5 finds its justification in chapter 7 where the main 
hypotheses of the study were formulated. The test attempts to 
demonstrate a certain relationship which should precede the 
exploration of an important association in Test 6. The present test 
confirmed that the way in which the environment is seen to differ 
among host nations is related to the requirements of the extent to 
which the environment should be taken into account by performance 
evaluation systems. Results show that headquarters executives 
involved in foreign subsidiary performance evaluation and control who 
perceive the influence of the environment on operations as varying 
substantially across the geographic areas where companies are 
established tend to express the desire of their companies' evaluation 
criteria to take, ideally, extensive account of foreign environmental 
factors. The opposite applies for managers who do not perceive the 
environmental influences on subsidiaries to differ across host 
locations.
After establishing in Test 5 that managers' perceptions of 
environmental variability are associated with their views of the 
extent to which formal assessment criteria should ideally be able to 
take the environment into account. Test 6 will now attempt to 
determine whether there is a relationship between the perceptions of 
environmental variability and the intrinsic sensitivity to local 
environmental influences of formal performance evaluation criteria 
used in companies' headquarters. It is hypothesized that there is a 
direct association between these two factors (see chapter 7). Hence, 
It is expected that companies whose headquarters executives perceive 
high levels of variation in the characteristics of the environments 
will tend to have formal performance evaluation criteria that are 
widely sensitive to local environmental influences. This, 
complemented with the findings of Test 5, will suggest that the extent 
ic which formal criteria of subsidiary performance evaluation and
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control are actually capable of recognizing environmental influences 
responds to the requirements of the managers who are responsible for 
the evaluation process.
In its directional form, the null hypothesis states that:
Ho6 : there is either no association or a negative association 
between headquarters executives' opinion as to the extent 
of variability of foreign environmental influences across 
the geographic areas where a company operates, and the 
level of sensitivity of the company's formal performance 
evaluation criteria to the impact of local environments 
iq>on foreign subsidiaries.
The perceptions of the variability in the characteristics of foreign 
environments by headquarters executives are measured by a variable 
(variable W) created in the previous test which quantifies the extent 
to which respondents perceive foreign environmental influences varying 
across different geographic areas.
The test of association conducted between variable W and the variable 
used to measure the level of sensitivity to local environmental 
influences of formal performance evaluation criteria (i.e. variable 
CRIT, created in Test 2 earlier in this section), was based on the 
^earman rank correlation coefficient (rg). As seen above (Test 2 in 
the present section), Spearman's rho should only be applied to cases 
where both variables are at least at the ordinal-level, and both 
having a large number of categories. This criterion is met for the 
two variables under analysis here (variable W has 63 different 
categories for 72 valid cases).
Table 12.XXIII presents the result of the test of association 
conducted. The level of significance obtained, above the cut-off 
level of 5 percent, does not demonstrate an association between the 
perception of variability of foreign environments from headquarters 
executives and the sensitivity to foreign environments of the formal 
performance evaluation criteria used by these executives. Note, 
however, that Spearman's rho is negative, which means that, as
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Table 12.XXIII - Spearman's Rho Test of Independence Between the 
Perceptions of HQ Executives on the Extent of 
Environmental Variability and the Sensitivity to the 
Environment of the Performance Evaluation Criteria 
Employed
CRIT - Sensitivity of a 
company’s formal performance 
evaluation criteria to the 
influences exerted by local 
environments upon foreign 
subsidiaries' operations
Extent of variability 
in the foreign environments 
perceived by HQ executives 
involved in the evaluation 
and control of overseas 
subsidiaries (W)
-0.103
(0.230)
54
NOTES: Significance level of rg is a one-tailed probability
e^y to svmbols: r = Spearman rank correlation 
(or Spearman's rho)
p = level of significance
N = number of valid cases
coefficient
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expected, low values of W (i.e. perceptions of high variability in 
foreign environments) tend to be related to high values of CRIT (i.e. 
performance evaluation criteria taking extensive account of foreign 
environmental influences on subsidiaries).
Due to the inconclusive nature of the result, it is not possible to 
say that the requirements of headquarters executives as to 
environmental recognition in the subsidiary performance evaluation 
process finds a correspondence in the attributes of the evaluation 
systems. It may, therefore, be suggested that perhaps the level of 
environmental sensitivity of the performance evaluation systems in 
operation does not adequately satisfy their users' needs.
Summary: Test 6 sought to determine whether the perception of 
variability of foreign environments was associated with the capability 
of the formal performance evaluation criteria actually used in 
companies to take into account relevant environmental differences that 
differ from one geographic area to another. This test, which should 
be seen in conjunction with Test 5, represented an attempt to find 
out how the environmental attributes of the evaluation systems in 
operation in companies correspond to the requirements of their users. 
The results of the test did not reveal a statistically significant 
relationship between the two variables under scrutiny. This suggests 
the possibility that the extent to which performance evaluation 
systems are actually capable of taking environmental influences into 
account is not adequately responding to the needs of the people 
Involved in the evaluation process.
12.5 gqmmarv and eonclnsioiu
Capter 12 investigated how headquarters executives in MNCs control 
and evaluate the operating performance of overseas subsidiaries. The 
chapter dealt with assessment practices that result from the use of 
information reported by operations through formal channels of
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communication set up between subsidiaries and headquarters. Although 
the main focus of attention was the assessment of foreign 
subsidiaries' operations, in addition the chapter also explored the 
assessment practices used for the managers responsible for those 
subsidiaries.
The analysis started by describing, in the opinion of those who in 
headquarters are involved in performance assessment, how useful items 
included in the internal reporting system are for controlling and 
evaluating foreign subsidiaries' operating performance. Generally, 
items of a financial nature such as profit and loss, cash flow, up­
dates of profit forecasts, and borrowings are all considered highly 
useful by the overwhelming majority of respondents. On the other 
hand, items of a non-financial nature like production output, market 
shares, labour relations, and reports on local economic and non­
economic environmental conditions, are regarded as highly useful only 
by a minority of respondents. This reflects a preference in general 
for financial items of information, which is perhaps deceptive in the 
sense that it may conceal the fact that non-financial information 
plays an important role in performance evaluation as a supplier of 
information that supplements financial data. Many of the studies 
reviewed in chapter 6 concentrated solely on assessment criteria of a 
financial nature, and doing so they overlooked a vital component in 
the subsidiary performance evaluation and control process.
In order to find how adequate is the match between the reporting 
frequency of items included in companies' internal system and the 
information requirements of their users, a test was conducted which 
shows that the level of usefulness attributed to items in reporting 
systems tend to be directly associated with the frequency with which 
such items are reported by subsidiaries (Test 1). This means that 
items perceived as more useful in evaluating subsidiaries' performance 
tend to be requested more frequently from subsidiaries. Also, 
companies where certain items are regarded of little usefulness tend 
to request these items very infrequently. This association appears to 
Indicate that the frequency with which individual items are reported 
Meets the information needs of users. Earlier (chapter 11), it was 
found that despite the fact that items of a non-financial nature were
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amply included in companies' internal reporting systems, many of these 
companies require such items from subsidiaries only occasionally or 
very seldom (e.g. once a year). This is in particular, the case of 
reports on political, legal and social conditions in host countries. 
Only a relatively small number of corporations have non-financial 
items reported regularly on a frequent basis (e.g. monthly). It can 
be concluded, therefore, that the minority of companies that regard 
non-financial items as highly useful tend to be those relatively few 
where the reporting of non-financial items is requested from 
subsidiaries on a highly frequent basis.
Along with the information provided in the internal reporting system, 
managers in headquarters also employ performance indicators or 
measures. These, many of them ratios, are either calculated in 
headquarters from raw-data included in the internal reporting system 
or directly forwarded by subsidiaries. The financial indicators most 
commonly found in practice are described in the chapter, together with 
the relative importance attributed by managers to each indicator for 
subsidiary evaluation. Return on investment and total income (either 
absolute or compared to budget) fare among the most popular and highly 
regarded profit-based measures of performance. Cash flows, orders, 
and sales ratios are included among the most frequently used and 
highly ranked non-profit-based financial indicators. These results 
are similar to those obtained in the surveys of U.S. multinationals 
(chapter 6), insofar as operating budget comparisons, ROI, profit and 
cash flows were there also considered the favourite assessment 
techniques. Of particular interest is the reduced use and modest 
ranking of measures so frequently mentioned in the literature, such as 
and return on equity. As regards RI, if a direct comparison 
between this and otner studies was allowed, it would be noted that 
despite its reduced use amongst U.K. multinationals, RI was, however, 
employed more frequently in Britain than in North America. In effect, 
all studies surveyed in chapter 6 were unanimous in attributing to the 
HI method, the very lowest incidence of use. Such a wider diffusion 
of this measure in U.K. than in U.S. MNCs would confirm a simple 
finding reached by Scapens and Sale [1981] for domestic firms 
operating in both sides of the Atlantic.
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When asked to compare the importance for foreign subsidiary evaluation 
and control of the internal reporting system used as a global package 
of information, and of a battery of performance measures used 
Independently of the reporting system, headquarters managers 
demonstrated a very clear preference for the former. In other words, 
when the usefulness of these two instruments of analysis are compared, 
the monitoring of the information package submitted in the internal 
reporting system is considered more important for the evaluation and 
control of subsidiary operating performance than the strict monitoring 
of a battery of individual profit- and non-profit-based measures. 
This finding calls attention to a very important component of the 
subsidiary evaluation process - the internal reporting system - which 
was ignored by most empirical surveys (chapter 6) when reviewing the 
major criteria of performance assessment.
Having determined the type and nature of the information used by 
managers in headquarters, the study then turned to the yardsticks or 
standards against which actual results achieved by subsidiaries are 
compared. This is a major element of the formal evaluation process, 
which was studied in the chapter in considerable detail. Among the 
several different standards of performance that are found in practice, 
two of them are encountered in nearly every company: targets
previously set for subsidiaries, and the past actual results of 
subsidiaries (i.e. standards based on trends from historical data). 
The way performance targets are determined was found to be usually 
linked to the budget. In almost every company, performance targets 
are calculated either on the basis of the subsidiary budget alone, or 
on the basis of the subsidiary budget adapted to the company's overall 
objectives. Such a predominance of the budget as a basis for the 
setting of targets, together with the generalized use of past 
subsidiary results were also encountered in the American studies 
reviewed in chapter 6.
The preparation and approval of performance targets to be set for 
operations may tend either to be centralized in headquarters or to be 
left to subsidiaries' decision. In only a reduced minority of cases. 
Is the process of selecting and assigning performance targets to 
subsidiaries centralized. The high levels of participation of local
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management in the setting of subsidiary targets suggests that, in 
principle, the specificity of each subsidiary should be reflected to 
some extent in the targets assigned. This is based on the assumption 
that subsidiary managers have a better understanding of the particular 
conditions faced by their subsidiaries than headquarters executives. 
Besides, local managers have normally a vested interest in the results 
produced by their operations, and naturally they will try to safeguard 
the specificity of each subsidiary when negotiating the setting of 
targets.
Targets assigned to foreign subsidiaries are likely to vary from 
operation to operation according to the different nature of the 
subsidiaries' businesses, and to the varying local economic and non­
economic conditions. Variation in targets may occur simply in value, 
or, more extensively, in nature. It is assumed that a variation in 
nature offers a better method of accounting for the differences among 
subsidiaries than a simple variation in value.
Variation in the value of targets across a company's foreign 
operations was found to be much more extensive than variation in the 
nature of targets. Only a handful of companies employ targets that 
vary widely in nature among subsidiaries. This indicates that most 
companies although making some effort to adapt targets to the 
particular conditions faced by subsidiaries are not employing more 
sophisticated techniques of target setting that would achieve a better 
reflection of each subsidiary specificity. Targets are not the only 
component of the evaluation process likely to differ in a company from 
subsidiary to subsidiary. The whole performance evaluation criteria, 
which involve the use of items in the internal reporting system, as 
well as the use of performance measures and standards, are likely to 
be adapted to the specificity of each foreign operation. Results show 
that nearly two thirds of all companies attempt to adjust the formal 
assessment criteria to special circumstances associated with 
Subsidiaries. However, only a very small minority employ completely 
different criteria across foreign operations. Most firms tend to use 
Similar criteria only varying relative weights according to the 
specific nature of each subsidiary. It appears, therefore, that the 
conclusions made above about the extent of the adaptability of subunit
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targets to the specificity of subsidiaries also apply here in this 
broader context. In effect, most companies adopt only to a reduced 
degree their formal evaluation criteria to the particular nature and 
conditions of foreign operations. Here, again, more elaborate 
techniques do not appear to be generally used.
A number of factors were found to have determined the use of different 
assessment practices for foreign subsidiaries of a same company. The 
most influential factor considered by headquarters executives is the 
differing nature of the host environments. Also considered of 
substantial importance are factors such as unsatisfactory performance 
level of subsidiaries, strategic importance of subsidiaries for the 
overall strategy of a company, and geographic location of 
subsidiaries.
It is generally recognized that MNCs which have their operations 
scattered over a number of countries are likely to have their 
operations subject to different influences posed by the varying host 
environments. As it was just mentioned, companies cope differently 
with such a variability, employing methods of evaluation and control 
whose sophistication ranges widely. A major objective of this study 
is to determine which factors are associated with the degree of 
sensitivity of performance evaluation criteria to the impact exerted 
by local environments upon subsidiaries' activities. The 
determination of such a degree of sensitivity required the 
construction of a model which was able to link the nature of major 
elements of the evaluation process to the capability of the formal 
evaluation criteria to take relevant environmental influences into 
account. Basically, the model consists of six components 
representing the major characteristics of the evaluation process in 
cse in each company, which have already been described in this 
summary. In brief, the model establishes a number of assumptions (see 
Exhibit 12.1), based namely on 1) the preference demonstrated by 
Performance evaluation criteria for non-financial vs financial 
Information; 2) the preference for non-profit based vs profit based 
Indicators; 3) the preference for the internal reporting system as a 
global package of information vs a battery of individual measures of 
Performance; 4) the number of performance standards used; 5) the
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variability of the targets; and, finally, 6) the variability of the 
overall evaluation criteria.
A test conducted in the chapter (Test 2), revealed that the degree of 
sensitivity of a company's formal performance evaluation criteria to 
environmental influences is associated with three company 
characteristics: c o m m i t m e n t  to f o r e i g n  o p erations.
Internationalization, and exposure to host country and government 
influence. It was found that the higher the percentage of a company's 
sales and assets abroad to total group sales and assets (this being a 
surrogate for commitment to foreign operations), the greater the 
number of countries where a company owns industrial facilities (this 
measuring internationalization), and the higher the degree of exposure 
of a company to local influences, the more the formal performance 
evaluation criteria used to assess foreign subsidiaries' operations 
take into account relevant environmental differences that differ from 
one geographic area to another. As it would be expected, MNCs whose 
business is subject to high degrees of exposure to host country and 
government influence, tend to employ evaluation criteria that are more 
sensitive to the environment. In fact, it may be argued that it is 
only natural that companies whose operations can be seriously affected 
by changes in the situation of the host environments, employ 
subsidiary evaluation and control methods that take extensively the 
environment into account. Likewise, the magnitude of the involvement 
of a MNC overseas as expressed by its commitment to foreign operations 
and its level of internationalization, appears as a natural 
Justification for the extensive degree to which evaluation criteria 
are sensitive to the environment.
Another test demonstrated that the degree of sensitivity of a 
company's formal performance evaluation criteria to environmental 
influences is associated with the way in which the environmental 
assessment activity is organized in the company's headquarters (Test 
3). Firms where the environmental assessment function was 
Institutionalized tend to use performance evaluation criteria that 
take widely into account relevant environmental influences. On the 
other hand, companies with no environmental assessment activity in 
headquarters (either formally or informally) tend to assess their
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foreign subsidiaries' performance using criteria that take very little 
account of influences exerted by local environments over subsidiaries' 
activities. This confirms an hypothesis previously formulated 
(chapter 7), in the sense that the degree of sophistication of the 
evaluation criteria as regards their sensitivity to the environment, 
finds a parallel in the level of complexity of the environmental 
assessment activity conducted in headquarters. It appears, therefore, 
that those MNCs to which the monitoring of local environments is 
relevant enou^ to warrant the support of an environmental assessment 
activity in headquarters, also consider important that their 
performance evaluation criteria are sensitive to the host 
environments.
So far, the analysis has focused on the criteria employed in 
headquarters to control and evaluate the operations of foreign 
subsidiaries. In addition, the study also offers some evidence on the 
assessment practices used in headquarters in appraising the 
performance of the managers responsible for overseas subsidiaries. It 
was found that the great majority of companies formally assess 
managerial performance, and that most of these companies use the 
internal reporting system operated between subsidiaries and 
headquarters as the informational source on which the assessment of 
managers is formally based. In a few cases, managerial assessment 
extends beyond the analysis of results reported by subsidiaries in the 
internal reporting system into areas related to the personal specific 
acting of the managers. In such cases, managerial performance was 
found to be linked to "personnel appraisal criteria", which are not 
within the scope of this study. Among those companies where the 
formal assessment of managers is based on information provided by the 
internal reporting system, the overwhelming majority use the same or 
similar criteria to evaluate managers and operations. The result is 
In agreement with the findings of the American surveys reviewed in 
chapter 6. The result appears to be in contravention to the 
Prescription in the theory of a separation between the methods used to 
evaluate the two objects of control. However, most executives in 
headquarters emphasized that results obtained by subsidiaries ought to 
^ carefully and sensibly interpreted when making judgements on the 
Way in which managers responsible for those subsidiaries acted. It is
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in this context that informal appraisal takes place, as a complement 
of the formal evaluation process. Informal aspects of performance 
evaluation will be studied in the next chapter.
By describing and analysing the features of the performance evaluation 
systems in operation in MNCs, and by aggregating these features into a 
model of environmental sensitivity, the study created an independent 
means of assessing the effectiveness of a company's system in 
recognizing environmental influences. In addition, the study 
collected the opinion of headquarters executives as to the 
effectiveness of formal evaluation criteria in taking account of 
relevant environmental influences. The very large majority of 
respondents believe that the assessment criteria they use to evaluate 
subsidiaries and managers are at least moderately effective. Only in 
a small proportion of cases are criteria considered not at all or 
little effective. Studies on American MNCs, in particular Morsicato 
[1980], and Choi, Czechowicz and Bavishi [1982], reached a different 
conclusion in that the majority of the respondents believed that their 
systems were not adequately taking into account environmental 
differences. A comparison of these with the present study, based on 
executives' opinion, suggests that perhaps the systems utilized in 
British MNCs are more sensitive to the environment than those in U.S. 
multinationals. This tentative conclusion reinforces a similar 
suggestion made by Oioi, C&echowicz and Bavishi [ibid.], who studied 
companies in the U.S. and Europe.
Furthermore, this conclusion is also supported by the findings of a 
test carried out in the chapter (Test 4), which revealed that the 
perceptions of headquarters executives relative to the effectiveness 
of the evaluation systems to take the environment into account 
generally coincide with the environmental sensitivity of thé systems, 
as measured in the study by using an independent criterion. Companies 
which use formal assessment criteria that are more sensitive to the 
environmental impact tend to be those whose headquarters executives 
think that the criteria are more effective in recognizing important 
environmental influences. The inverse also applies, i.e. in MNCs 
Whose systems are relatively unsensitive to the environment, 
executives tend to perceive the systems as little effective. Such a
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finding brings support to the conclusion above, since it lends 
credibility to the executives' perceptions insofar as their opinions 
about the effectiveness of the systems to take the environment into 
account correspond to the intrinsic capability of the systems, as 
judged by an autonomous instrument.
The study also collected the opinion of headquarters executives on the 
extent to which formal assessment criteria should ideally be able to 
take relevant environmental factors into account. A large proportion 
of managers in parent companies said they would like the criteria they 
employ in the assessment of subsidiaries and managers to be capable of 
extensively recognizing important environmental influences on local 
operations. A comparison that was made for the judgement of 
respondents relatively to the actual and to the desired level of 
effectiveness of evaluation criteria in recognizing environmental 
influences, show that executives would generally like the assessment 
criteria used in their firms to reflect environmental influences to a 
greater extent than they actually do. This gap is frequently filled 
by the introduction of subjective, informal judgement in the 
evaluation process. A gap such as this was also found in Morsicato 
[1980].
Finally, the chapter studied in considerable detail the nature of 
major influences exerted by local environments on companies' 
subsidiaries. Using a list of factors which respondents were asked to 
rank by order of importance, it was possible to identify the most 
influential environmental factors for each area in the world. 
Economic factors such as economic growth and market size were found to 
be of prime concern in certain areas, namely Europe, North America, 
and Oceania. On the other hand, factors of political, legal and 
social nature, such as political stability, government controls, and 
attitudes towards foreign companies are considered of paramount 
importance specially in areas of the Third World. The perceptions of 
headquarters managers regarding the variability of foreign 
environments differ substantially from company to company. This is 
measured by a variable created in the chapter which provides an 
indication of how different foreign environments operated by a company 
are perceived to be.
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As explained in chapter 7, it is possible that the perceptions of 
environmental variability on the part of the executives involved in 
subsidiary performance evaluation may influence the design of the 
evaluation and control systems that are in operation in 
multinationals. Empirical surveys (chapter 6), namely Persen and Van 
Les sig [1979], Morsicato [1980], Choi, Czechowicz and Bavishi [1981], 
and Yunker [1982] detected that managers normally viewed the 
influences of external environments on subsidiaries to be different 
across host locations, and suggested that such views would probably 
play an important role in the selection of criteria used in the 
control and evaluation of foreign subsidiaries.
This study attempted to determine whether the actual capability of 
evaluation systems to reflect the environment is associated with the 
perceptions of environmental variability of the executives who use the 
systems. Preliminary to the examination of such a relationship, the 
study explored the way in which managers' perceptions of environmental 
variability were related to their views of the extent to which formal 
performance evaluation criteria should be able to take the environment 
into account. A test (Test 5) showed that executives who perceive a 
higher variability in the impact of foreign environments on 
subsidiaries operating in different locations tend simultaneously to 
believe that assessment criteria should to a greater extent be capable 
of taking into account relevant environmental influences in the 
evaluation of subsidiaries and in the assessment of managers. This 
suggests that the requirements sou^t for evaluation criteria as far 
as environmental recognition is concerned are linked to the way in 
which the environment is seen to differ among different overseas 
operations.
In another test (Test 6), then, the association between the 
perceptions of variability of foreign environments and the actual 
Capability of formal evaluation criteria to take environmental 
differences into account was explored. Here, inconclusive results 
were obtained. Hence, it is not possible to say that the 
requirements of headquarters executives as to the level of 
environmental recognition ideally to be achieved by the performance 
evaluation systems finds a correspondence in the actual attributes of
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the systems. It appears, therefore, to be likely that the extent to 
which evaluation systems in operation in MNCs are capable of taking 
environmental differences into account does not adequately respond to 
the needs of the executives involved in performance evaluation. This 
conclusion is furthermore reinforced by the fact already reported that 
managers in headquarters generally would wish the assessment criteria 
used in their companies to reflect environmental influences to a 
greater extent than they actually do.
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fftotnotes;
In the questionnaire administered to companies, respondents were 
explicitly asked to answer questions having in mind the typical 
(most common) case in their companies, whenever different 
practices differed among foreign subsidiaries.
This finding has been confirmed by the application of the Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test to the relevant variables. Given 
that the level of significance obtained was much above the cut-off 
level of 5 percent, no statistically significant difference 
between the two variables was found.
(3) It was considered that explanatory variables with less than 10 
categories do not meet the requirement of a large number of 
categories. This excludes the possibility of using Spearman’s rho 
to test independence between CRIT and explanatory variables based 
on scales (5 categories), as well as between CRIT and variable 
NAREA (7 categories).
(4)
(5)
(6)
Contrary to what has been the norm in the study, this 
crosstabulation is not presented here. Variable CRIT results from 
the application of a theoretical formula, that renders the 
individual scores of the variable meaningless. For this reason, a 
contingent tabulation involving variable CRIT is of difficult 
interpretation, and its inclusion in the study was not considered 
necessary.
Judgements of executives on the evaluation criteria used in the 
assessment of subsidiary managers, were considered, for purposes 
of Test 4, only for those companies which base the formal 
assessment of foreign subsidiary managers on information provided 
by the internal reporting system. Only in this way can the scores 
from variable CRIT be compared with the headquarters executives’ 
judgements on the evaluation criteria used to assess subsidiary 
managers.
The computation of Kendal’s W could not be directly carried out 
using SPSS since the package available to the researcher did not 
provide the facility to compute such a statistic in the way it was 
required in the study. Appendix F presents the computer programme 
developed to calculate this statistic.
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CHAPTER 13 - THE OSE OF INFORMAL INFORMATION FOR FOREIGN
SUBSIDIARY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL
13.1.
The different dimensions of foreign subsidiary performance evaluation 
explored so far in the study have all been addressed in the context of 
the formal assessment procedures institutionalized in companies. 
Informal aspects of performance evaluation will now be studied in the 
present chapter. Such informal evaluation of performance was equated 
in the study (chapter 4) with the use of information collected through 
informal (i.e. non-official, non-institutionalized) channels of 
communication. There are reasons for believing that a substantial 
amount of information on subsidiaries' operations and their managers 
is usually gathered by headquarters executives from sources other than 
the official internal reporting system.
This chapter attempts to  determine the s ig n ifica n ce  fo r  subs id ia ry  
performance eva lua tion  o f in fo rm a tion  gathered through in fo rm a l 
channels, and how th is  compares in  importance w ith  the in fo rm a tion  
collected v ia  the o f f i c ia l  in te rn a l rep o rtin g  system. The in fo rm a l 
communication channels most o ften  used in  companies w i l l  also be 
Iden tified . In  order to comprehend reasonably the ro le  o f in fo rm a l 
information in  the performance eva luation  and con tro l process, the 
chapter seeks to  characterize  the nature o f th is  in fo rm a tion , and also 
to discover why i t  is  used to  assess su bs id ia rie s  and th e ir  managers. 
Later in  the chapter, re la tio n s h ip s  in vo lv in g  c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f the 
Informal in fo rm a tion  co lle c te d , as w e ll as opin ions regard ing 
Importance and purpose o f such in fo rm ation  w i l l  be s ta t is t ic a l ly  
tested against a number o f companies' p ra c tices .
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13.2. Report on Oompanles' Practices
13.2.1. Informal Communication Channels Used in Performance 
Evaluation
Executives in headquarters responsible for performance evaluation 
gather information about subsidiaries' operations and their managers 
using simultaneously a number of informal channels of communication. 
Companies were asked to list in the questionnaire those informal 
communication channels most frequently used in headquarters. Two 
channels were found to be very popular: personal visits to
subsidiaries by parent company executives, mentioned by nearly every 
company, and contacts with subsidiary personnel by such means as the 
telephone, telex, letter, and electronic mail, mentioned by 89 percent 
of respondents (see Table 13.1). Also frequently mentioned were 
personal visits to the U.K. by subsidiary managers, and social 
meetings. A widespread number of other communication channels were 
also listed. For reasons of simplicity of presentation these are 
reported in Table 13.1 as "other channels internal to the company", 
and "other channels external to the company". The former, includes 
comments by non-executive directors, conclusions achieved by team 
studies, ad-hoc reports stimulated by headquarters enquiries, etc. 
The latter, includes business and bank contacts, other parent 
companies, government contacts, C.B.I. and trade associations, 
contacts with independent advisers (normally people of recognized 
reputation in host countries), and a channel in which some companies 
placed particular emphasis: auditors.
Interviews with senior executives helped in consolidating the belief 
that informal information plays a vital role in performance 
^valuation. In the words of a company director interviewed: "[informal 
information about subsidiaries' operations] is regarded [in our 
company] as essential to accomplish a reasonably equitable and 
comprehensive evaluation". It appears that informal information is
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Table 13.1 - Major Informal Communication Channels Used to Collect 
Information About Foreign Subsidiaries and Their Managers
COUNT
POT OF 
RESPONSES
POT OF 
CASES
Personal visits to subsidiaries 90 31.2 97.8
Contacts with subsidiary personnel 
(by telephone, telex, letter, electronic 
mail)
82 28.5 89.1
Personal visits to the U.K.(by subsidiary 
managers)
57 19.8 62.0 ;
1
Social meetings 28 9.7 30.4
Other communication channels internal 
to the company
15 5.2 16.3 !
!
Other communication channels external 
to the company
16 5.6 17.4 1
TOTAL RESPONSES 288 100.0 313.0 1
N (number of valid cases) = 92
458
13 / THE OSE OF INFORMAL INFO. FOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION & CONTROL
onni-present in the minds of those who are involved in the subsidiary 
evaluation process, supplementing and shaping-up information reported 
through the official channels. It also appears that after acquiring 
Information through informal channels, managers tend to forget the 
respective sources. References to "hearing through the grape vine", 
so common among executives, seem to indicate that information is 
acquired, and indeed judgements made, from many pieces of information 
that are put together in the executives' minds, leaving behind a 
blurred image of the respective sources.
13.2.2. Motives for the Use of Informal Information
There are many reasons why executives in headquarters feel the need to 
use information collected through informal channels of communication 
in the performance evaluation process. In chapter 4 (see section 
.^4,1.) the use of informal information was generally attributed to 
the limitations of the formal information systems, as suggested in the 
literature. Table 13.II lists the main reasons for the use of 
informal information indicated by questionnaire respondents. The 
largest proportion of executives (83 percent of the total) said that 
they use informal information as a means of covering exceptional and 
unpredicted situations. Two other reasons were also frequently 
pointed out: 56 percent of the respondents admitted that informal
information was used because it provides a higher volume of 
information on vital issues, and 52 percent said that informal 
information satisfies the need for confidentiality. The remaining 
reasons suggested to respondents in the questionnaire, were ticked 
only in a minority of cases: 41 percent of the executives declared
that they use informal information for better timing, whereas 35 
percent said that informal information was considered more 
understandable and useful than formal information. It is noteworthy 
that reasons dealing with the need for higher accuracy and reliability 
In information, one of the main points raised by Mintzberg [1975], 
Were indicated by a very small number of respondents (10 and 5 
percent, respectively). In the category others in Table 13.11 one 
Particular reason for the use of informal information is predominant:
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Table 13.II - Main Reasons for the Use of Informal Information
in Performance Evaluation
! Count
Percent 
of Cases
Informal information is used to satisfy 
the need for:
•information covering exceptional and 
unpredicted situations
1
j 80 83.3
; .a higher volume of information on 
j vital issues 5^ 56.2
.confidential information 1 50 52.1 j
; .more timely information 39 40.6 I
.more understandable and useful 
information | , 35.4
.more accurate (i.e. precise 
information) 10 10.4
.more reliable information 5 5.2
.other reasons
N = 96
NOTES: Count indicates the number of respondents who ticked
the respective reason.
N represents the number of valid cases.
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in several cases informal information was said to be collected when 
there is a need for information less easily quantified. In these 
companies, information reported through the official internal system 
is exclusively of a quantitative nature.
The study attempts to discover some of the purposes and nature of the 
information collected through informal channels for performance 
evaluation. Respondents to the questionnaire were asked to indicate 
whether they agreed or disagreed with each of the statements that were 
provided in a list. This was an attempt to probe into aspects related 
to the use of informal information that are generally difficult to
characterize in an explicit manner. Results achieved are, therefore,
necessarily impressionistic, but hopefully they will shed some light 
Into the role of informal information in performance evaluation. 
Table 13.Ill reports the number of respondents who agreed with each of 
the statements. Results reflect opinions about the use of informal 
information both for the evaluation of foreign subsidiaries, and for 
the assessment of managers. To start with, the great majority of the 
respondents agreed that the frequency of informal information between 
subsidiaries and headquarters is generally high respectively for the 
monitoring of subsidiaries and their managers. Further, slightly more 
than half of the respondents said that informal information is mainly 
concerned with non-routine matters, when monitoring both subsidiaries 
and managers. A very noteworthy finding is that almost every
executive questionned agreed that informal information tends to
supplement information reported via the formal channels, whereas only
s small group said that there is a tendency in their companies for
informal information to replace formal information.
As to the purposes sought for information collected through informal 
channels, nearly three quarters of the respondents admitted that an 
important purpose of informal information when used for controlling
and evaluating subsidiaries is to anticipate information that is 
subsequently reported via the formal channels. Such purpose was
considered important by a smaller number of respondents (59 percent of 
the total) when informal information is used for assessing subsidiary 
managers - Table 13.III. Confirmation of information reported via 
formal channels was another important purpose of informal information
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Table 13.H I  - Nature and Purposes of Informal Information Used in the 
Evaluation of Subsidiaries and Their Managers
Evaluation and 
control of foreign 
subsidiaries
Assessment of  ^
foreign subsidiary' 
managers
1
Count 1
Percent 
of Cases Count
Percent 
of cases
The frequency of informal 
communication between 
subsidiaries and HQ is 
generally high
i
i
68 : 71.6 60.9
Informal information is 
mainly concerned with 
non-routine matters 49 51.6 47 54.0
1 Informal information tends 
j to supplement information 
; reported via the formal 
! channels
j Informal information tends 
1 to replace information 
1 reported via the formal 
1 channels
94
5
98.9
5.3
84
15
96.6
17.2
j An important purpose of j 
1 informal information is: I 1
' .to anticipate information 
! that is subsequently reported 
via the formal channels
f
68 : 71.6 51 58.6 1
.to confirm information , 
reported via the formal , 
channels ; 54 ' 56.8 ' 52 59.8 :
1
.to compensate for the | 
rigidity and insufficiencies , 
of the information reported 1 
via the formal channels 47
!
1
i
49.5 1
i
45 '
L
51.7
j N=95 j N=87
NOTES: Count indicates the number of respondents who agreed with
respective statement.
N represents the number of valid cases.
the
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for the majority of companies both when evaluating subsidiaries and 
when assessing managers. Finally, about half of the respondents were 
in favour of a statement which suggested that an important purpose of 
informal information is to compensate for the rigidity and 
Insufficiences of the information reported via the formal channels 
(Table 13.HI).
13.2.3. Importance of Informal Relatively to Formal Information
In order to place in perspective the relevance of informal relatively 
to formal information, headquarters executives were asked to compare 
in terms of importance both types of information when evaluating 
foreign subsidiaries and when assessing their managers. Results are 
reported in Table 13.IV. Information collected via formal channels 
was considered important or very important (rated 4 or 5 in a 1 to 5 
scale) for the evaluation and control of subsidiaries in the 
overwhelming majority of companies. On the other hand, information 
collected via informal channels used for the same purposes was only 
attributed that level of importance in slightly less than half of the 
companies. This difference is significant in statistical terms, as
confirmed by the results obtained with the Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test (Table 13.V). As seen earlier, this is a test of 
differences for two related samples, appropriate for variables
measured at the ordinal-level. The very high level of significance
obtained for the test (higher than 0.1 percent), shows that when
controlling and evaluating foreign subsidiaries headquarters
executives rely significantly more on formal than on informal
information.
As regards the assessment of managers responsible for foreign
subsidiaries. Table 13.IV reports that information collected via 
formal channels was considered important or very important (rated 4 or 
5 in scale) by slightly more than half of the respondents. A similar
result was obtained for information collected via informal channels. 
The test of differences conducted (Table 13.V), confirms the non­
existence of a statistically significant difference in the importance
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Table 13.IV - Relative Importance Attributed to Formal and Informal 
Information for the Assessment of Foreign Subsidiaries 
and Their Managers
r
!
Variables R a t i n g Statistics
I ; 1 2 3 4 
. Very
1 low Moderate
5
Very
high N Median
EVALUATION AND CONTROL : 
OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES
i
.Information collected 
via formal channels
FLSUB 1
!' \
1 11
_/
38
\
44
f
95 4.41
1
13.7% 86.3%
.Information collected ' 
via informal channels
INFLSUB 4
\
7 37 
/
29
\
17
_ J
94 3.47
51.1% 48.9%
ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN | 
SUBSIDIARY MANAGERS
.Information collected 
via formal channels
FLMAN ; ^  
\
9 28 
/
27
\
25
_J
93 3.70
44.1% 55.9%
.Information collected 
via informal channels
INFLMAN 2
\
8 33 
/
32
\
18
_y
93 3.61
46.2% 53.8%
N represents the number of valid cases
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Table 13«V - Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranke Test to Compare 
Differences in Importance Attributed to Formal and 
Informal Information
Variables Cases Z
Two-Tailed
Probability
Evaluation and Control of 
Foreign Subsidiaries:
•Information collected 
via formal channels
•Information collected 
via informal channels
FLSUB
INFLSUB
94 -5.322 (0.000)
**
Assessment of Foreign 
Subsidiary Managers:
i .Information collected via I 
I formal channels j FLMAN
•Information collected via 
informal channels ! INFLMAN
93 -0.468 (0.639)
Information Collected Via 
Formal Channels:
.Evaluation and control of 
subsidiaries
.Assessment of subsidiary
FLSUB
93 -5.135 (0.000)
**
, managers FLMAN !
Information Collected Via 
Informal Channels:
•Evaluation and control of 
subsidiaries
j
INFLSUB
i
.Assessment of subsidiary
! 92 -1.146 (0.252)
! managers INFLMAN j i1
NOTE: »» Significant o^O.OI (i.e. %^)
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attributed to formal and informal information, in the assessment of 
subsidiaries* managers. This means that, contrary to the findings 
for the evaluation of subsidiaries* operations, executives in 
headquarters seem to rely equally on formal and informal Information 
when assessing managers responsible for subsidiaries. As it would be 
expected from the conclusions just reached, information collected via 
formal channels was found to be significantly more important for the 
evaluation of subsidiaries than for the assessment of managers (level 
of significance of the Wilcoxon test is higher than 0.1 percent) 
Table 13.V. On the other hand, information collected via informal 
channels was found to be equally important to evaluate subsidiaries 
and to assess their managers (Table 13.V).
13.2.4. Extent of Collection of Environmental Information Through 
Informal Channels
Information about foreign operations obtained through informal 
channels of communication, may be concerned not only with the internal 
activities of subsidiaries, but also with the surrounding local 
conditions external to the subsidiaries and likely to influence their 
operations. This latter aspect was explored in the questionnaire
where respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which foreign
environmental information used in performance evaluation is usually 
collected via informal channels. According to Table 13.VI only a
minority of companies consider that information on foreign
environments is extensively gathered through informal channels. In 
fact, only 17 firms (i.e. 18 percent of the total), said that informal 
environmental information is collected extensively or very extensively 
for the evaluation and control of foreign subsidiaries. All the other 
firms, said that informal environmental information used for this 
Purpose is not collected at all (7 percent of the total), or is 
collected to a little or moderate extent (75 percent).
As regards the extent of collection of informal environmental 
information for the assessment of subsidiaries' managers, results are 
similar^^) to those just reported: only 21 companies (i.e. 22 percent)
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Table 13.VI - Extent of Collection of Foreign Environmental 
Information Throng Informal Channels of Communication
R a t i n g  | Statistics
1 2 3 4 5 ;
To a
Not at moderate Very * 
all extent extensively | N Median
! !
Environmental informationj 
collected informally for:'
.The evaluation and 
control of foreign 
subsidiaries
.The assessment of 
foreign subsidiaries' 
managers
34 37
_/
13
V_
12
\_
82.1%
35
17.9%
26
/
16
\_
77.7% 22.3%
95 2.68
94 2.50
N represents the number of valid cases
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considered to gather extensively or very extensively this type of 
information; the rest, said either that the information is not 
collected at all (13 percent), or that it is collected to a limited or 
moderate extent (65 percent) - Table 13.VI. Later, this chapter will 
explore whether companies where foreign environmental information is 
extensively collected through informal channels tend to be those where 
environmental information is absent from the internal reporting 
system, and/or those which use performance evaluation criteria with 
low levels of sensitivity to the impact of local environments.
13.2.5. Discussion and Conclusions
Throughout the previous chapters where the results of the study have 
been examined, it was prevalent the impression that apparent 
weaknesses of the formal criteria of subsidiary performance evaluation 
were compensated by the use of informal information. The role of such 
an information in the evaluation and control process is addresed here. 
However, due to the elusive nature of informal practices in 
organizations, which renders their study difficult, only tentative 
conclusions are hoped to be reached.
The present survey adds to the evidence accumulated over the years by 
authors such as Davis [1953], Aguilar [1967], Mintzberg [1973], and 
Clancy and Collins [1979] (see chapter 4), who found that decision 
makers frequently rely on data retrieved and reported outside the 
formal communication network. In effect, the great majority of 
respondents to the questionnaire admitted that in their companies the 
frequency of informal communication between foreign subsidiaries and 
headquarters is high. In addition, in-depth interviews with 
executives revealed that informal information plays a vital role in 
performance evaluation. Moreover, such high levels of informal 
communication appear to confirm the suggestions of Lombard [1969] and 
Egelhoff [1984] that in European multinationals informal information 
exchanged between foreign subsidiaries and headquarters is abundant. 
This conclusion apparently contrasts with the situation found in 
American MNCs, as explained earlier in chapter 4.
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A large number of different communication channels of an informal 
nature are used to collect information about overseas operations. 
Among the most widely employed are personal visits to subsidiaries by 
parent company executives, as well as visits to the U.K. by subsidiary 
managers, and contacts by such means as the telephone, telex, letter, 
and electronic mail.
The main reasons indicated for the use of informal information are 
related to the headquarters executives' needs for data on exceptional 
and unpredicted situations, and to the necessity of being provided 
with a higher volume of information on special issues. Another 
important reason is related to the timeliness of the data required. 
These reasons can be reconciled with those enunciated by Mintzberg 
[1975] who attributed the use of informal information to certain 
weaknesses of the MISs, namely the systems being too limited in scope, 
and too aggregate in nature, as well as providing information too 
late. Another weakness emphasized by Mintzberg, the unreliability of 
the formal system, was not considered a relevant issue by the
respondents. One particular motive for the use of informal 
information, is the need for confidentiality which, in the opinion of 
the respondents, the formal channels cannot provide. When asked about 
the main purposes of informal information, more managers considered 
that the anticipation of information subsequently reported via the 
formal channels is important for the evaluation of subsidiaries than 
for the assessment of managers. In contrast, confirmation of formal 
data, and compensation for the rigidity and inefficiencies of the
formal information were regarded as important more often in the
assessment of managers than in the control of subsidiaries.
As regards the role of informal vis-a-vis formal information, the 
study appears to confirm the suggestions made by Clancy and Collins
[1979] that, contrary to what had been generally perceived in the
literature, informal information acts as a useful and necessary 
adjunct to the formal system. In effect, whereas the near totality of 
respondents believes that informal information supplements the formal 
channels, only a tiny minority thinks that informal information 
replaces the information reported via the institutionalized systems. 
This point will be explored further in the next section.
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The r e l a t i v e  d e g r e e  o f  r e l i a n c e  p l a c e d  o n  b o t h  t y p e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  
was s t u d i e d  s e p a r a t e l y  f o r  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  s u b s i d i a r i e s  a n d  t h e  
a s s e s s m e n t  o f  m a n a g e r s .  R e s u l t s  s h o w  t h a t  w h e n  c o n t r o l l i n g  a n d  
e v a l u a t i n g  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  h e a d q u a r t e r s  e x e c u t i v e s  r e l y  m o r e  o n  
formal t h a n  o n  i n f o r m a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  w h e n  
a s s e s s i n g  m a n a g e r s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  t o p  e x e c u t i v e s  r e l y  
equally o n  b o t h  t y p e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i n  t h i s  
latter c a s e ,  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o l l e c t e d  v i a  i n f o r m a l  c h a n n e l s  i s  a t  
least as i m p o r t a n t  a s  t h a t  r e p o r t e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  o f f i c i a l  M I S .
Of p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y  is t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  
fo r e i g n  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e l e v a n t  t o  s u b s i d i a r i e s ’ o p e r a t i o n s  
is c o l l e c t e d  t h r o u g h  i n f o r m a l  c h a n n e l s .  I n  o n l y  a m i n o r i t y  o f  
c o m p a n i e s  i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  o v e r s e a s  e n v i r o n m e n t s  e x t e n s i v e l y  g a t h e r e d  
in a n  i n f o r m a l  w a y  f o r  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  s u b s i d i a r i e s  a n d  m a n a g e r s .  
In t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n ,  a n  a t t e m p t  w i l l  b e  m a d e  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  
those c o m p a n i e s  w h o s e  p e r f o r m a n c e  e v a l u a t i o n  c r i t e r i a  d o  n o t  t a k e  t h e  
e n v i r o n m e n t  i n t o  a c c o u n t ,  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  t h a t  f a c t  b y  m a k i n g  e x t e n s i v e  
use o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o l l e c t e d  t h r o u g h  i n f o r m a l  c h a n n e l s .
13.3. Findings on the Reliance Placed on Informai Information ffiXl
Performance Evaluation and Characteristics of tbfi Internal
Reporting Systems
The r o l e  p l a y e d  b y  i n f o r m a t i o n  c o l l e c t e d  t h r o u g h  i n f o r m a l  c h a n n e l s  o f  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  i n  p e r f o r m a n c e  e v a l u a t i o n  h a s  j u s t  b e e n  e x p l o r e d  a b o v e .  
The p r e s e n t  s e c t i o n  w i l l  n o w  t r y  t o  d i s c o v e r  w h e t h e r  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  
which h e a d q u a r t e r s  e x e c u t i v e s  r e l y  u p o n  i n f o r m a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
M o n i t o r i n g  o f  s u b s i d i a r i e s  a n d  t h e i r  m a n a g e r s ,  i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
certain c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a l  r e p o r t i n g  s y s t e m s .  
C o n s i d e r i n g  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  r e p o r t i n g  s y s t e m  i s  t h e  m a j o r  f o r m a l  
channel o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  i n  a  c o m p a n y ,  i t  s e e m s  n a t u r a l  t o  b e l i e v e  
that a g r e a t e r  u s e  o f  i n f o r m a l  c h a n n e l s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  i s  m o t i v a t e d  
hy s h o r t c o m i n g s  o f  t h e  f o r m a l  r e p o r t i n g  s y s t e m .  I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y
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anticipated (see chapter 7) that companies which use more informal 
information in the evaluation of performance, have less sophisticated 
reporting systems operating between foreign subsidiaries and 
headquarters. Due to the difficulty in characterizing objectively a 
phenomenon whose nature is essentially subjective, the results from 
the statistical tests that will be conducted should be interpreted 
carefully, keeping always in mind that the findings in this section 
are only tentative.
Test 1
The purpose of this first test is to discover how the importance
attributed to informal information used in subsidiary performance
evaluation relates to the volume and nature of the information
reported through formal communication channels. In chapter 7 (section
7.4.) an hypothesis was formulated according to which the role of 
informal information is seen mainly as a means of overcoming the 
déficiences of formal information. In this sense, performance 
evaluation systems that are elaborate and comprehensive would require 
less informal information than narrow and unsophisticated systems. 
This being so, an indirect relationship is anticipated between the 
magnitude of the flow of information reported in companies between 
subsidiaries and headquarters and the importance for performance
evaluation attributed in headquarters to information collected through 
informal channels of communication. A similar indirect relationship 
is also anticipated between the relative weight of non-financial 
information in the companies’ formal reporting systems, and the 
importance attributed to informal information.
Two variables were created in chapter 11 (section 11.3») which measure 
the volume and nature of the information included in firms’ internal 
reporting systems. One of these variables (variable TR) measures the 
magnitude of the flow of information reported by the typical 
subsidiary in each company ; its scores represent the number of formal 
reports forwarded by a subsidiary to headquarters during one year. 
The other variable (variable PERCNFR) is concerned with the nature of 
the information reported, and measures the relative weight of non-
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financial reports (e.g. market shares, production output, labour 
relations, product quality, environmental conditions encountered 
locally, etc.) in a company’s total reporting system; the scores of 
this variable reflect the percentage of non-financial reports 
submitted by a subsidiary during one year in relation to the total 
number of reports submitted by the subsidiary in the same period.
The null hypothesis states that:
Hoi : there is no association between the importance attributed 
in a company to information collected informally for the 
purpose of evaluation and control of foreign subsidiaries 
and either:
the magnitude of the flow of information reported in the 
company by each foreign subsidiary; or 
the relative weight of non-financial information in the 
company's total reporting system.
Importance attributed to informal information was measured using a
five-point scale. Due to the low number of categories of this
variable, Spearman’s rho cannot be utilized, despite the independent 
variables being both at the ratio-level. Chi-scuare was, therefore, 
the statistical technique employed.
The tests of association conducted show that the importance with which 
Informal information is perceived by executives when evaluating 
performance is related at a significant level with both the volume and 
the nature of formal information reported by subsidiaries (2 and 3 
percent, respectively) - Table 13.VII. A close look at the contingent 
tabulations for the two pairs of variables, reveals, however, that the 
direction of the relationship is in both cases opposite to the one
hypothesized.
The crosstabulation between the variables which measure the importance 
attributed to informal information and the number of formal reports 
submitted during one year by the typical subsidiary in each company 
shows that firms with low volumes of formal reporting tend to give
less importance to informal information for performance evaluation
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Table 13.VII — Chi-Square Tests of Independence Between the 
Importance Attributed to Informal Information and the 
Volume and Nature of the Information Reported Formally
TR PERCNFR
rLevel of importance given by 
I HQ management to information 
collected informally for the 
purpose of evaluation and 
control of foreign subsidiaries 
(INFLSUB)
'X
P
d.f.
N
j Phi 
! Unc.Coeff.
85
(0 . 020) 
*
2
94
Cramer’s V 0.289
0.062
4.48 (a)
(0.034)
*
1
94
0.240
0.042
NOTES: » Significant 0.01 < p < 0.05
(a) Chi-square subject to Yate’s 
Key to symbols: "x/ =
P =
d.f. =
N =
Une.Coeff.=
Key to acronims: TR
PERCNFR
Correction £qn continuity 
chi-square statistic 
level of significance 
degrees of freedom 
number of valid cases 
uncertainty coefficient 
(asymmetric) with INFLSUB 
dependent.
Total number of formal 
reports submitted by each 
subsidiary in a company 
during one year 
Percentage of formal non- 
financial reports in 
relation to the total 
number of formal reports 
submitted in a company by 
each foreign subsidiary 
during one year.
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than firms with high levels of formal reporting (see Table XVII in 
Appendix D). In fact, nearly two thirds of the companies (63 percent) 
which have a low flow of information between subsidiaries and 
headquarters (71 or less formal reports submitted by each subsidiary 
during one year), said that information collected outside the formal 
reporting system had only little to moderate importance (rates of 1 to 
3 in a 5-point scale). The same level of importance was attributed to 
informal information by slightly over half of the companies (57 
percent) which have a moderate flow of formal information (72 to 122 
reports submitted by subsidiaries over a year). Finally, nearly three 
quarters of the firms (74 percent) with high formal reporting 
frequency (firms whose subsidiaries forward more than 123 reports to 
headquarters in one year), said that informal information was highly 
or very highly important for subsidiary performance evaluation.
A similar result was found for the crosstabulation between the 
importance of informal information for performance evaluation and the 
percentage of non-financial reports submitted by subsidiaries during 
one year in relation to the total number of reports. Companies with a 
high proportion of non-financial information in their internal 
reporting systems were found to perceive informal information as more 
important than companies whose systems include a low proportion of 
formal reports of a non-financial nature (Table XVIII in Appendix D).
i: Test 1 sought to demonstrate that the level of importance for 
performance evaluation attributed by headquarters executives to 
information collected through informal channels was associated with 
the volume and nature of the information reported by subsidiaries via 
the internal formal channels. It was expected to find a situation 
where low volumes of formal information included in the internal 
reporting systems would be associated with a high reliance on informal 
information. It was also expected that formal systems composed 
predominantly of financial information would be associated with high 
levels of reliance on information collected outside the formal 
reporting system. Results of the statistical tests conducted reveal 
that variables are significantly associated, however, behaving in a 
direction opposite to what was expected. In fact, the tests show that 
the higher the volume of formal information reported between
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subsidiaries and headquarters, and the higher the weight of non- 
financial information reported formally, the more important the 
Information collected through informal channels is likely to be 
perceived by executives involved in the evaluation of subsidiary 
operating performance. This suggests that perhaps the volume and 
nature of formal information stimulates the search of information 
through informal channels, and appears to reinforce the idea presented 
above (section 13.2.5.) that informal information acts as a complement 
to the data submitted formally.
The two tests that follow are concerned with foreign environmental 
information collected in headquarters through informal channels of 
communication. The extent to which such information is collected for
the purpose of evaluation and control of foreign subsidiaries and of
assessment of managers has been reviewed in section 13.2. There, it 
was suggested that the extent of use of informal environmental 
information in performance evaluation might be related to both the 
sensitivity of the performance evaluation criteria to the impact of 
local environments upon subsidiaries’ operations, and the way in which 
environmental information is reported in the internal formal 
communication channels. The purpose of the following tests is to
explore such relationships using the appropriate statistical
techniques.
ISSLZ
This test aims at determining whether the extent to which information 
on foreign environments obtained through informal channels is 
associated with the degree of sensitivity of formal performance 
evaluation criteria to foreign environmental influences. Earlier in 
chapter 12 (section 12.4.), a variable was created (variable CRIT) 
which measures the capacity of a performance evaluation system to take 
account of relevant environmental factors that influence the 
activities of subsidiaries operating in different geographic areas. 
This variable was constructed on the basis of the responses provided 
by companies as to their practices regarding six major components of 
the foreign subsidiary evaluation process. It provides a means of
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assessing the effectiveness of a company’s performance evaluation 
system in recognizing environmental influences.
It is anticipated, following an hypothesis in chapter 7, that 
companies with formal performance evaluation criteria relatively 
insensitive to environmental influences will collect more 
environmental information through informal channels, than companies 
with evaluation criteria that are particularly sensitive to the 
environment. In other words, it is expected that companies where the 
Influences exerted by local environments are not taken formally into 
account in the performance evaluation process, will compensate for 
this by using informal environmental information more extensively.
The null hypothesis states that:
Ho2: there is no association between the extent to which foreign
environmental information is obtained throng informal 
channels in a company, and the degree of sensitivity of the 
company’s formal performance evaluation criteria to the 
impact of local environments upon foreign subsidiaries.
Given that the extent of collection of informal environmental 
information is measured by an ordinal variable with only five
categories, Spearman’s rho could not be used here. The statistical
technique employed was, therefore, based on chi-scuare.
The null hypothesis has been tested for two relationships. One, 
associates variable CRIT with the extent to which informal
environmental information is collected for the purpose of evaluation 
and control of foreign subsidiaries. The other relationship, 
associates variable CRIT with the extent of collection of this type of 
Information for the purpose of assessment of the managers responsible
for subsidiaries^^).
Results of the tests conducted for the two relationships tested, were 
found both to be non-significant - Table 13.VIII. This means that the 
associations suggested in Test 2 cannot be accepted^3). The extent 
of use of informal environmental information in performance
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Table 13.VIII — Chi Square Tests of Independence Between the 
Extent of Collection of Informal Environmental 
Information and the Sensitivity to the 
Environment of Performance Evaluation Criteria
CRIT
Extent of collection through 
informal channels of foreign 
environmental information for 
the evaluation and control of 
foreign subsidiaries 
(INFLESUB)
r ? --------- -
p
d.f.
N
Cramer's V 
Unc.Coeff.
0.75
(0.687)
2
72
0.102
0.008
Extent of collection 1.92
through informal channels of P (0.383)
foreign environmental d.f. 2
information for the N (a) 48
assessment of foreign Cramer's V 0.200
subsidiaries' managers 
(INFLEMAN)
Unc.Coeff. 0.030
NOTES: (a) Only those cases which base the formal assessment of
managers on information provided by the internal formal 
reporting system, were included here.
= chi-square statisticKey to symbols:
P
d.f.
N
Kev to acronyms: CRIT =
= level of significance 
= degrees of freedom 
= number of valid cases 
Unc,Coeff.= uncertainty coefficient 
(asymmetric) with INFLESUB 
and INFLEMAN dependent. 
Sensitivity of a company's 
formal performance evaluation 
criteria to the influences 
exerted by local environments 
upon foreign subsidiaries' 
operations.
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evaluation, cannot be shown, therefore, to be influenced by the degree 
with which the formal evaluation criteria are capable of taking into 
account relevant environmental factors that vary from one geographic 
area to another.
Snmmarv: Test 2 attempted to demonstrate that companies in whose
headquarters foreign environmental information is extensively 
collected through informal channels with the purpose of aiding in the 
evaluation of subsidiaries and managers, tended to be companies which 
operate formal performance evaluation criteria with low levels of 
sensitivity to environmental influences. It was expected to conclude 
that executives in headquarters tended to use informal environmental 
Information as a means of compensating for the relative insensitivity 
to the environment of the formal criteria employed in the evaluation 
of foreign operations. Results of the statistical tests performed do 
not permit, however, such a conclusion to be drawn.
IssU l
This test tries to ascertain whether the extent to which information 
on foreign environments obtained through informal channels is 
associated with the frequency of environmental information reported 
In the formal internal communication systems operated between foreign 
subsidiaries and companies' headquarters. Chapter 11 (section 11.2.) 
described the incidence and reporting frequency of reports on economic 
and non-economic environmental conditions faced in host countries, 
forwarded by subsidiaries operating abroad. It was found there that 
the great majority of companies include in their internal reporting 
systems reports on economic, and on political, legal and social 
conditions. In some companies such reports are submitted to 
headquarters only occasionally; in others, reports are submitted on a 
regular basis. Among the companies where reports on environmental 
conditions are regularly forwarded by subsidiaries, the frequency with 
which such reports are submitted was found to vary greatly, from once 
a year to once a month.
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The test anticipates (see chapter 7) that firms where reports on local 
environmental conditions are frequent will tend to depend less on 
environmental information gathered through informal channels. 
Alternatively, it is anticipated that companies in whose reporting 
systems environmental information is either absent or reported 
infrequently will tend to use informal environmental information 
extensively. This hypothesis is motivated by the belief that more 
informal environmental information is used in the performance 
evaluation process when companies' formal channels of communication 
fall short in their provision of information on local environments.
The null hypothesis states that:
Ho3: 1) There is no association between the extent to wfaidi
foreign environmental information is obtained through 
informal (Aannels, and the frequency with iAi(A reports on 
economic conditions in host countries are included in the 
internal reporting system.
2) There is no association between the extent to which 
foreign environmental information is obtained throu^ 
informal (Aannels, and the frequency with whi(A reports on 
political, legal and social conditions in host countries 
are included in the internal reporting system.
As in the previous test, here the null hypothesis also includes the 
extent to which informal environmental information is gathered for the 
purposes both of evaluation of foreign subsidiaries, and of assessment 
of managers. Chi-square was again deemed to be the appropriate test.
According to Table 13.IX, results of the tests of association between 
the extent of collection of informal environmental information and the 
reporting frequency of reports on local economic conditions are 
significant at the 1 percent level, both when environmental 
information is used in the evaluation of subsidiaries, and in the 
Assessment of managers. Contingency tables for the two pairs of 
variables tested indicate that the direction of the association is not 
AS Straightforward as it has been previously hypothesized. The 
Analysis of these contingency tables (presented in Appendix D) reveals
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Table 13.%% — Chi-Square Test of Independence Between the 
Extent of Collection of Informal Environmental 
Information and the Frequency With Which 
Environmental Reports are Included in the Formal 
System
ECOND PLSCOND
Extent of collection through x"- 13.97 8.91
informal channels of foreign 
environmental Information for
p (0.0009)**
(0.012)
*
the evaluation and control of d.f. 2 2
foreign subsidiaries N 95 93
(INFLESUB) Cramer*s V 0.384 0.310
_____________________________
Unc.Coeff. 0.110 0.090
Extent of collection through X" ' 9.50 5.77
informal channels of foreign P 1 (0.009) (0.056) i
environmental Information for 1 •• **
the assessment of foreign d.f. 1 2 2
subsidiaries* managers N (a) 1 60 59 1
(INFLEMAN) I Cramer*s V i 0.399 0.313 1
: Unc.Coeff i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ L
0.118 0.074 j
NOTES: •• significant p X 0.01
• significant 0.01 < p < 0.05
(a) Only those cases which base the formal assessment of 
managers on Information provided by the Internal 
formal reporting system were Included here.
Key to symbols:
Key to acronyms:
X  = chi-square statistic
p = level of significance
d.f. = degrees of freedom
N = number of valid cases
Unc.Coeff. = uncertainty coefficient
(asymmetric) with INFLESUB 
and INLEMAN dependent. 
ECOND = Reports on e c o n o m i c  
conditions In host countries 
Included In the formal 
reporting system operated In 
a company between foreign 
subsidiaries and HQ.
PLSCOND = Reports on political, legal 
and social conditions In host 
countries Included In the 
formal reporting system 
operated In a company between 
foreign subsidiaries and HQ.
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a very interesting pattern of association. The table which 
crosstabulates the extent of collection of Informal environmental 
information for the purpose of evaluation of subsidiaries, and the 
reporting frequency of reports on local economic conditions (Table XIX 
in Appendix D) presents the following picture: flrsty, three quarters
of the companies which do not Include reports on economic conditions 
in their Internal systems, or which Include them only occasionally, 
were found to collect Informal environmental Information from a 
moderate to a very high extent (rated 3 to 5 In a 5-polnt scale). 
Secondly, nearly three quarters of the companies which have reports on 
economic conditions forwarded once a year by subsidiaries either do 
not collect Informal environmental Information at all, or collect It 
to a reduced extent (rated 1 or 2 In scale). Thirdly, nearly two 
thirds of the companies which request more than twice a year (e.g. 
every quarter, or every month) reports on economic conditions from 
subsidiaries, collect moderate to high volumes of Informal 
environmental Information. A similar pattern of association Is 
encountered In the table which crosstabulates the extent of collection 
of Informal environmental Information for the purpose of assessment of 
subsidiary managers, and the reporting frequency of reports on local 
economic conditions (Table XX In Appendix D).
The association described above suggests that when firms do not have 
reports on environmental economic conditions Included regularly In 
their Internal formal channels of communication, they tend to collect 
extensively such an Information through Informal channels. It seems, 
therefore, that In these cases Informal Information plays a part In 
performance evaluation that has been overlooked by formal 
information. On the other hand, among companies which Include on a 
regular basis economic environmental reports In their formal 
communication systems, some collect such Information from Informal 
channels to a very low extent, others collect It very extensively. 
The former are companies where reports on economic conditions are 
forwarded by subsidiaries only once a year. The latter are companies 
where such reports are forwarded frequently (e.g. once a month, or a 
quarter). It seems In these cases that Informal Information Instead 
of compensating for shortcomings of the formal Information, acts as a 
supplement to formal Information, already extensively provided. It may
#81
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be that companies where economic environmental information Is 
frequently reported via formal channels regard such Information as so 
vital that a vast amount of Information Is also collected through 
informal channels.
As regards the tests of association between the extent of collection 
of Informal environmental Information and the reporting frequency of
reports _gn -local political, legal and social conditions. the
statistical tests conducted show the existence of a significant 
relationship at the 5 percent level (1.2 percent), when environmental 
information Is used In the evaluation of subsidiaries - Table 13.IX. 
The association obtained for the two variables when environmental 
information Is used for the assessment of subsidiary managers did not 
prove to be statistically significant. The level of significance 
obtained (5.6 percent). Is, however, just above the 5 percent cut-off 
- Table 13.IX. The direction of the association, as revealed by the 
contingency table which relates the extent of collection of Informal 
environmental Information for the evaluation of subsidiaries and the 
reporting frequency of non-economlc Information (political, legal and 
social). Is opposite to the direction Initially hypothesized. The 
respective crosstabulation (Table XXI In Appendix D) shows that 
companies which have reports on local non-economlc conditions 
forwarded frequently by subsidiaries tend to collect environmental 
information very extensively from Informal channels, for evaluating 
subsidiary performance.
Alternatively, companies which do not Include reports on non-economlc 
conditions In their Internal reporting systems, or companies which 
include them but only occasionally or on a Infrequent basis (I.e. once 
a year) tend either to omit Informal environmental Information from 
the evaluation process, or to use such Information to a limited 
extent. In fact, while the great majority of companies (82 percent of 
the total) which gather little environmental Information from Informal 
channels (rates of 1 to 3 In a 5-polnt scale) have reports on local 
Political, legal and social conditions submitted by subsidiaries very 
infrequently. If at all, the majority of companies (53 percent) which 
gather Informal environmental Information very extensively (rates of 4 
and 5) have such reports submitted by subsidiaries on a frequent basis
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(e.g. monthly, quarterly) - Table XXI in Appendix D.
This conclusion differs from the one drawn from the association 
previously reported, only to the extent that firms which do not 
include (or only occasionally include) reports on non-economlc 
conditions In their formal reporting channels, tend to collect small 
volumes of environmental Information through Informal channels.
Previously, It was seen that firms which do not Include (or only
occasionally Include) reports on economic conditions In their formal 
reporting channels, tend to compensate for this by collecting high 
amounts of environmental Information through Informal channels. A 
possible explanation for this difference Is suggested by findings 
reported earlier In chapter 11 (section 11.2., and Test 3 In section
11.3.). There, It was found that reports on environmental economic 
conditions are more common than reports on non-economlc conditions, 
and that their Introduction In companies* formal reporting systems 
usually precedes the Introduction of non-economlc environmental 
reports. This suggests that more companies perceive economic 
environmental Information as Important for the evaluation process than 
non-economlc environmental lnformatlon(*). %ls being so. It Is 
possible that headquarters executives In companies whose formal 
systems fall to collect environmental Information both of an economic 
and non-economlc nature, while realizing the Importance of economic 
information for performance evaluation, tend to overlook the 
importance of non-economlc Information. The consequence of this 
difference In opinion towards the two types of environmental 
information, may lead to one type being extensively collected via 
informal channels, and the other being Informally collected only to a 
reduced extent.
i: The purpose of Test 3 was to explore the relationship between 
the extent to which Information on foreign environments Is collected 
through Informal channels, and the frequency with which such an 
information Is reported In the companies* formal communication 
systems. An Inverse relationship was expected between the two 
variables, both when environmental Information assists In the 
evaluation of subsidiaries, and when It helps In the assessment of 
managers. Such a hypothesis was based on the belief that the amount
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of environmental information gathered through informal channels was 
substantially motivated by an insufficient amount of Information 
provided by the normal formal sources. The tests of Independence 
conducted demonstrate that the extent of collection of Informal 
environmental Information In companies* headquarters Is associated at 
a significant level with the reporting frequency of formal Information 
on economic conditions faced by subsidiaries In host countries, and 
also with the reporting frequency of formal Information on political, 
legal and social conditions. However, the direction of the 
association was found to be opposite to what had been hypothesized. 
In general, firms where reports on local environmental conditions 
(economic, and non-economlc) are frequently Included In the Internal 
reporting system were found to collect Informal environmental
information more extensively than corporations where formal 
environmental reports are forwarded by subsidiaries only once a year. 
It seems that Informal environmental Information used In performance 
evaluation acts In conjunction with the formal Information, both 
closely complementing each other, and being as little or as much 
extensively collected as formal environmental Information Is provided 
with a low or a high frequency. Another Interesting finding of Test 3 
is that companies which do not Include reports on economic conditions 
in their formal reporting systems, or which Include them only on an 
occasional basis, tend to gather extensive Informal environmental
information. On the other hand, companies whose formal reporting 
systems do not Include reports on political, legal and social 
conditions, or Include them only occasionally, tend to collect low 
levels of Informal environmental Information. A possible reason for 
this difference may lie In the fact that economic Information on 
foreign environments Is generally considered more Important for 
evaluating subsidiary performance than non-economlc Information. This 
being so, when economic environmental Information Is not reported
formally, executives Involved In the evaluation process would make 
sure that Information Is collected through Informal channels. The 
same would not happen for political, legal and social Information 
since most managers consider this Information of only reduced 
importance for the evaluation process.
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13.#. SqmarY and Conclusions
This final chapter of results was concerned with an important aspect 
of the performance evaluation process, often overlooked in research in 
the area. The chapter explored some informal aspects of performance 
evaluation, concentrating on the use made by headquarters executives 
of information that is collected through informal -i.e. non-official, 
non-institutionalized - channels of communication. Due to * the 
essentially subjective nature of the phenomena studied here, any 
attempt to characterize them In an objective manner will necessarily 
encounter serious difficulties. The study tried to collect evidence 
on the use of Informal Information In a way which could enable 
comparisons among companies, and the use of Inferential statistical 
techniques. A word of caution In the Interpretation of results Is, 
however, necessary since these findings should only be regarded as 
exploratory.
The study generally revealed that Informal Information plays an 
Important role In performance evaluation. The existence of high 
levels of communication through Informal channels between foreign 
subsidiaries and headquarters appears to confirm suggestions made by 
authors (see chapter 4) that European MNCs are more prone to use 
Informal Information In their decision making processes than American 
multinationals. Informal Information used In performance evaluation 
is gathered from a number of channels of communication outside the 
official reporting system operated Internally between foreign 
subsidiaries and headquarters. Some of the popular Informal channels 
include personal visits to subsidiaries by parent company executives, 
contacts with subsidiary personnel by means of the telephone, visits 
to the U.K. by subsidiary managers, social meetings, and a host of 
other sources such as ad-hoc reports stimulated by headquarters 
enquiries, bank and government contacts. Independent advisers, and 
auditors.
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Many reasons for the use of informal information in the evaluation 
process were given by executives in headquarters. In general, they 
were related to the need for a kind of information that is not 
normally reported through the formal channels. Among the most common 
reasons are the provision of information covering exceptional and
unpredicted situations, a higher volume of Information on vital 
issues, the need for confidentiality, and the necessity for prompt 
information. These reasons are not far from those pointed out by
Mintzberg [1975] when he attributed the use of Informal Information In 
decision making to a number of major weaknesses of the formal 
Information systems.
An attempt to characterize further the Informal Information used 
both for the evaluation of subsidiaries, and the assessment of
managers revealed that the majority of respondents consider that 
Important purposes of Informal Information when evaluating 
subsidiaries are to anticipate Information that Is subsequently
reported via the formal channels, and to confirm formal Information. 
When Information collected Informally Is used In the assessment of 
managers, the main purposes. Indicated by the majority of respondents 
are, besides these two, to compensate for the rigidity and
insufficiencies of the Information reported formally.
The study was able to determine how executives In parent companies 
perceive the Importance of Informal and formal Information both when 
evaluating foreign subsidiaries and when assessing their managers. A 
comparison of such perceptions Indicated that when controlling and
evaluating foreign subsidiaries headquarters executives rely 
significantly more on formal than on Informal Information. On the 
other hand, executives rely equally on both types of Information when 
assessing managers responsible for subsidiaries.
Attention was centered In the level of Importance attributed to
informal Information used for foreign subsidiary performance 
evaluation. A test conducted In the chapter (Test 1) revealed that 
the Importance with which Information collected Informally Is 
Perceived by executives Is associated with certain characteristics of 
the Internal reporting systems. Such characteristics, are related to
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the volume and nature of the information reported via the formal 
communication channels. The test shows that the higher the volume of 
formal information reported between subsidiaries and headquarters, and 
the higher the weight of non-financial Information reported formally, 
the more Important the Information collected through Informal channels 
Is likely to be regarded. This reflects a direction between the 
variables that Is opposite to the one anticipated. In effect, as 
revealed In chapter 4, the literature generally suggests that the use 
of Informal Information Is motivated by the defflclences of the 
formal communication system. This being so. It would be expected that 
managers Involved In the performance evaluation process assigned 
higher Importance to Informal Information when formal Information was 
insufficient and unsophisticated. The test results, by pointing In 
the opposite direction, show that the degree of Importance with which 
informal Information Is perceived Is directly linked to the 
comprehensiveness and sophistication of the formal system. It 
appears, therefore, that the volume and nature of Information 
generated through the Institutionalized channels stimulates the search 
for Informal Information. This perhaps suggests a conclusion similar 
to the Clancy and Collins [1979] findings. In the sense that Informal 
information would act as a useful and necessary complement to the data 
submitted formally, rather than a substitute that would Imply an 
unnecessary dissipation of resources. Besides, respondents when 
directly asked this question were unanimous In considering that 
informal Information supplements Instead of replaces formal 
information In the performance evaluation process.
One aspect of particular Interest to the study Is the extent to which 
information about local environmental conditions experienced by 
subsidiaries abroad Is collected Informally by executives Involved In 
performance evaluation. A test was conducted with the objective of 
determining whether the extent of collection of Informal environmental 
information Is associated with the capability of the formal 
performance evaluation criteria to take account of relevant 
environmental factors that Influence the activities of foreign
subsidiaries operating In different geographic areas (Test 2).
Results of this test did not prove to be significant, and no
conclusion can, therefore, be reached.
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Another test (Test 3) explored the relationship between the extent to 
which information on foreign environments is collected through 
Informal channels, and the frequency with which such information is 
reported in the companies* formal systems. Results were significant 
both for reports on economic conditions, and for reports on political, 
legal, and social conditions. In general. It was found that companies 
where reports on local economic and non-economlc conditions are 
frequently submitted by subsidiaries collect Informal environmental 
information more extensively than companies where formal environmental 
reports are submitted less frequently. The relative variation In the 
magnitude of the variables Is opposite to the one that had been 
anticipated. This suggests, once again, that the volume of Informal 
and formal Information behave In conjunction In a similar direction.
The findings of test 3 are generally In agreement with those of test 
1, both Indicating that the use of Informal and formal Information In 
performance evaluation tends to be positively associated. This seems 
to Imply that Information collected via Informal channels Is used as 
an adjunct which closely complements Information reported through the 
official channels. Indeed, the main reasons and purposes for the use 
of Informal Information pointed out by executives are consistent with 
this conclusion. Despite the difficulties encountered arising from 
the very nature of the subject studied, the chapter has, hopefully, 
demonstrated how Important for the evaluation process Informal 
information can be In U.K. MNCs.
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footnotes:
This has been confirmed by the application of the Wllcoxon 
matched-palrs signed-ranks test to the relevant variables. Given 
that the level of significance obtained was above the cut-off 
level of 5 percent, no statistically significant difference 
between the two situations was found.
(2) The relationship between variable CRIT and the variable that 
measures the extent of collection of Informal environmental 
Information for the purpose of assessment of subsidiary managers, 
was only tested for those cases which base the formal assessment 
of managers on Information provided by the Internal reporting 
system. Only In this way can the scores of the two variables be 
meaningfully compared.
In statistical terms It means that the probability of Incurring In 
a Type I error (I.e. reject Ho when Ho Is true) Is unacceptably 
high.
This conclusion Is confirmed by results shown In Table 12.1 
(chapter 12).
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CHAPTER 1# - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
14.1. Brief RgYlfiK-of the Background. Purpose and Methodology of the 
Stodv
The p re s e n t s tud y  s e t o u t to  examine the  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  
performance e v a lu a t io n  and c o n tro l systems in  o p e ra tio n  in  MNCs w ith  a 
view to  d e te rm in in g  the  e x te n t and ways in  which the  in f lu e n c e s  o f  
host c o u n try  env ironm ents are taken  in to  account in  th e  e v a lu a t io n  
process. In  a d d it io n ,  the  s tudy  in tended  to  d is c o v e r the p r o f i l e  o f  
the m u lt in a t io n a ls  w hich employ systems th a t  are more s e n s it iv e  to  the  
environm ent.
The im portance  o f  th e  env ironm en ta l issu e  in  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  
stems from  a number o f  reasons hav ing  to  do f i r s t  w ith  the  a p p lic a t io n  
of the  c o n d it io n s  necessary to  the  achievement o f  an e q u ita b le  and 
e ffe c t iv e  assessment p ro cess , and second w ith  th e  In te r n a l 
o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  m u lt in a t io n a ls  and the  n a tu re  o f  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  
which may re n d e r them p a r t i c u la r ly  v u ln e ra b le  to  e nv iron m e n ta l 
In flu e n c e s , As to  the  f i r s t  se t o f  reasons. I f  the  p r in c ip le  o f  
a u th o r ity  and c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y  Is  to  be p ro p e r ly  a p p lie d  In  m anageria l 
assessment a v a s t number o f  h os t co u n try  env ironm en ta l c o n d it io n s  o f  
an econom ic, p o l i t i c a l ,  le g a l ,  s o c ia l and c u l t u r a l  n a tu re  must be 
taken In to  account s in c e  the y  In f lu e n c e  perform ance and o n ly  to  a v e ry  
lim ite d  e x te n t can be a lte re d  by the  lo c a l management. F u rthe rm ore , 
the c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  s p e c i f ic  env ironm en ta l In f lu e n c e s  on th e  
ope ra tions o f  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  c o n tr ib u te s  to  a more com plete 
understanding o f  the  re a l p o te n t ia l  o f  each s u b u n it ,  t h is  be ing  
in va lu a b le  f o r  c e n tra l management a c t io n  and s tra te g y  fo rm u la t io n .
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As rega rds  the  second s e t o f  reasons, economic and p o l i t i c a l  fo rc e s  
which come In to  p la y  in  the  business macro c o n ju n c tu re  may le a d  
ce rta in  MNCs to  adopt s t ra te g ie s  o f  g lo b a l in te g r a t io n  c h a ra c te r iz e d  
by h ig h ly  c e n t ra liz e d  d e c is io n  making and a c lo s e ly  in te g ra te d  netw ork 
of mutual r e la t io n s h ip s  among s u b s id ia r ie s .  Such s t ra te g ie s  mean th a t  
a c lose  m o n ito r in g  o f  env ironm en ta l in f lu e n c e s  on fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  
is  e s s e n t ia l s in c e  the  f a i lu r e  o f  any o f  the  s u b s id ia r ie s  may p u t in  
serious je o pa rd y  the  whole o f  the  c o rp o ra t io n . On the  o th e r hand, the  
very n a tu re  o f  the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  MNCs may be such th a t  th e y  become 
p o te n t ia l ly  exposed to  lo c a l h o s t co u n try  in f lu e n c e s  and p re ssu re s . 
This is  th e  case o f  companies whose p roduc ts  a re  o f  s t r a te g ic  
importance to  host c o u n tr ie s  o r where m a jo r in te r n a t io n a l  custom ers 
are n a t io n a l governments o r  s ta te  owned e n te rp r is e s .  In  such 
circum stances the  e v a lu a t io n  o f  s u b s id ia r ie s  a ls o  re q u ire  th a t  the  
s p e c if ic  e nv iron m e n ta l c o n d it io n s  are understood and m o n ito re d .
The l i t e r a t u r e  rev iew ed In  the  s tudy has g e n e ra lly  f a i le d  to  make 
e x p l ic i t  the  Im portance  o f  the  env ironm ent f o r  the  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  
e v a lu a tio n  and c o n tro l p ro cess . M oreover, the  e m p ir ic a l ev idence  
a v a ila b le  on the  c r i t e r i a  used by MNCs to  assess the  perform ance o f  
fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  does not address th is  Issue  In  a s a t is fa c to r y  
way, A number o f  s tu d ie s ,  a l l  based on U,S, m u lt in a t io n a ls ,  have 
examined the  methods employed In  the  e v a lu a tio n  o f  s u b s id ia r ie s .  
However, none o f  them was p u rp o se ly  designed to  address th e  
environm enta l Is s u e ,
The s tra te g y  fo llo w e d  In  t h is  s tudy  encompassed the  fo rm u la tio n  o f  an 
o p e ra tio n a l model a r t ic u la t in g  the  main p o in ts  to  be the  o b je c t  o f  
exam ination. Such a model equates the  Issues  ra is e d  In  th e  re v ie w  o f  
the re se a rch  th e o r e t ic a l  background In to  an In te g ra te d  and e m in e n tly  
pragm atic fram ew ork. The model can be seen In  I t s  two broad le v e ls  o f  
a n a ly s is . One, d e fin e d  as th e  le v e l o f  d e s c r ip t io n  covers no t o n ly  
the fo rm a l e v a lu a t io n  and c o n tro l c r i t e r i a  a c tu a l ly  used In  MNCs, b u t 
also o th e r  aspects  b e lie v e d  to  be Im p o rta n t to  the  und e rs tan d in g  o f  
the perform ance e v a lu a t io n  p rocess. T h is  In c lu d e s  f i r s t  the  
o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  th e  e nv ironm en ta l assessment a c t i v i t y  In  the  
Performance e v a lu a t io n .  B esides, the  e nv iron m e n ta l assessment 
a c t iv i t y  I s ,  p e r s e , an Issue  v i t a l  to  any MNC s in c e , by h e lp in g  to
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detect p re s e n t and fu tu re  th re a ts  and o p p o r tu n it ie s ,  I t  Is  
Ind ispensab le  to  th e  d e te rm in a tio n  o f  the  s t r a te g ic  d ir e c t io n  o f  a 
c o rp o ra tio n . O ther areas covered In  the  d e s c r ip t iv e  le v e l o f  th e  
model a re  the  In te r n a l re p o r t in g  system fo rm a lly  s e t up between 
s u b s id ia r ie s  and h e a d q u a rte rs , and th e  In fo rm a l d im ension  o f  
performance e v a lu a t io n .  Both these to p ic s  are regarded as e s s e n t ia l 
to an adequate comprehension o f  the  e v a lu a t io n  process In  MNCs,
The o th e r le v e l o f  a n a ly s is  contem pla ted In  the  o p e ra t io n a l model Is  
the le v e l o f  e x p la n a tio n . T h is  a ttem p ts  to  e x p lo re  reasons th a t  may 
ju s t i f y  the  use In  companies o f  c e r ta in  p ra c t ic e s  and techn iques  
Instead o f  o th e rs .  I t  a ls o  a tte m p ts , u l t im a te ly ,  to  de te rm ine  the  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  companies w ith  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  systems th a t  
take more e x te n s iv e  account o f  the  fo re ig n  env ironm ents .
From th e  l i t e r a t u r e  rev iew ed In  the  s tudy  and the  a r t ic u la t io n  o f  the  
major re se a rch  Issues  In  the  o p e ra t io n a l m odel, a s e t o f  hypotheses 
were fo rm u la te d . To c o l le c t  the  necessary da ta  to  te s t  such 
hypotheses and a ls o  to  p ro v id e  th e  ev idence re q u ire d  fo r  the  
d e s c r ip t iv e  s id e  o f  th e  s tu d y , a q u e s tio n n a ire  was developed.
This q u e s t io n n a ire  was m a iled  to  each o f  th e  233 c o rp o ra tio n s  th a t  
c o n s titu te d  the  s tu d y 's  I n i t i a l  su rvey p o p u la t io n , which was s e le c te d  
from among th e  500 la rg e s t  f irm s  In  The Times 1000. The c r i t e r io n  
fo r s e le c t io n  s p e c if ie d  U .K .-based quoted companies w ith  a t le a s t  one 
fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  -  th a t  I s  a f irm  lo c a te d  overseas c o n t ro l le d  by the  
group -  In v o lv e d  In  an In d u s t r ia l  a c t i v i t y ,  namely m a n u fa c tu r in g , 
assembly, e x p lo ra t io n  o r  c o n s tru c t io n .  As In  some cases I t  was n o t 
poss ib le  to  de te rm ine  the  n a tu re  o f  the  In te r n a t io n a l Invo lvem en t o f  a 
company, a d e c is io n  was made to  In c lu d e  such cases In  the  su rvey  
p op u la tio n  a sk in g  f o r  the  q u e s tio n n a ire  to  be re tu rn e d  uncompleted I f  
the company co n ta c ted  was n o t e l ig ib le  f o r  the  s tu d y . In  the  end, 23 
firm s con firm ed  In  w r i t in g  th a t  they  d id  no t have I n d u s t r ia l  
a c t i v i t ie s  abroad, b r in g in g  down, th e re fo re ,  th e  s iz e  o f  the  su rvey  
P opu la tion  to  210.
The overall response rate to the survey amounted to 82 percent, this 
Including companies that wrote declining to collaborate In the study.
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A to ta l  o f  101 m u lt in a t io n a ls  p a r t ic ip a te d  In  the  re s e a rc h , however, 
only 97 q u e s tio n n a ire s  were usab le . Such a degree o f  p a r t ic ip a t io n  
corresponds to  a success ra te  o f  48.1 p e rc e n t. A f te r  co n c lu d in g  th e  
a d m in is tra t io n  o f  the  q u e s t io n n a ire , fo l lo w -u p  In te rv ie w s  w ith  
respondents were conducted. Seven p e rson a l In te rv ie w s  were made w ith  
the purpose o f  check ing  once more the  accuracy o f  the  q u e s t io n n a ire , 
and o f  e x p la in in g  In -d e p th  aspects o f  In te r e s t  to  the  re se a rch .
The da ta  c o lle c te d  was su b je c te d  to  s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a ly s is ,  m a in ly  
fo llo w in g  the  d e s c r ip t iv e  o p e ra t io n a l model and th e  hypotheses 
generated a p r i o r i . A summary o f  the  most re le v a n t f in d in g s  
id e n t i f ie d  Is  p resen ted  n e x t.
14.2. M ain F in d in g s  o f  th e  S tudy
This re se a rch  genera ted  a number o f  f in d in g s  w ith  Im p o rta n t 
Im p lic a t io n s  fo r  bo th  th e o ry  and p r a c t ic e .  These f in d in g s  w i l l  be 
reviewed h e re , fo l lo w in g  a sequence o f  p re s e n ta t io n  th a t  Is  s l i g h t l y  
d if fe re n t  from  the  one adopted In  P a r t I I .  The o b je c t iv e  Is  to  
emphasize those  co n c lu s io n s  conside red  o f  g re a te r  consequence f o r  the  
purpose o f  the  s tu d y .
14.2.1. The Organizational Context of the Environmental Assessment 
Activity
A no tew orthy  f in d in g  o f  th e  s tudy Is  th a t  the  g re a t m a jo r i ty  o f  
companies p ra c t ic e  In  headqua rte rs  some form  o f  fo re ig n  e nv iron m e n ta l 
scanning. However, In  o n ly  a sm a ll m in o r ity  Is  the  a c t i v i t y  fo rm a lly
organized. In  most cases. In  f a c t ,  fo re ig n  e nv iron m e n ta l In fo rm a t io n
Is c o lle c te d  and analysed s im p ly  on an In fo rm a l b a s is . A com parison 
of these r e s u l t s  w ith  those  o f  s tu d ie s  on U.S. m u lt in a t io n a ls  re v e a ls  
that the  e x is te n c e  o f  an In s t i t u t io n a l iz e d  e nv iron m e n ta l assessment
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fu n c tio n  appears to  be more w idespread among Am erican-based MNCs than  
among B r i t i s h  m u lt in a t io n a ls .
In those cases where th e  fu n c t io n  Is  fo rm a liz e d  th e re  are one o r  more 
p ro fe s s io n a ls  In  headqua rte rs  to  whom the ta sks  o f  c o l le c t in g  and 
ana lys ing  fo r e ig n  e nv iron m e n ta l In fo rm a tio n  were fo rm a lly  ass igned . 
In most o f  the  tim es such ta sks  c o n s t i tu te  o n ly  p a r t  o f  these
in d iv id u a ls *  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s .
In g e n e ra l, e n v iro n m e n ta l In fo rm a tio n  o f  an economic, p o l i t i c a l ,  
le g a l,  s o c ia l ,  and c u l t u r a l  n a tu re  Is  c o lle c te d  from  a v e ry  w ide range 
of sources w h ich  complement each o th e r fo rm in g  a poo l o f  d a ta . 
Sources In te r n a l  to  th e  f irm s ,  e s p e c ia lly  company e x e c u tiv e s , bo th  In  
s u b s id ia r ie s  and headqua rte rs  are p ro m in en t. In  a d d it io n ,  o th e r
p re fe rre d  sources o f  In fo rm a tio n  on a c tu a l o r  p o te n t ia l  h o s t 
environments In c lu d e  banks, th e  media In  g e n e ra l, and s p e c ia liz e d
p u b lic a t io n s .
The In te l l ig e n c e  re t r ie v e d  In  th e  env ironm en ta l assessment a c t i v i t y  Is  
used as s u p p o rt to  a number o f  d e c is io n s  and a c t i v i t i e s .  C orpora te  
s t ra te g ic  p la n n in g , m a jo r c a p i ta l  In ve s tm e n ts , and d is in v e s tm e n t 
dec is ions a l l  use e nv iron m e n ta l In fo rm a t io n .  A d d it io n a l ly ,  
environm enta l In fo rm a t io n  was found In  many cases to  be r e g u la r ly  
employed In  th e  c o n tro l and e v a lu a t io n  o f  fo re ig n  o p e ra t io n s , as p a r t  
o f the  co n tin u ou s  assessment process o f  s u b s id ia r ie s *  o p e ra t in g  
perform ance.
The s tudy  re ve a le d  th a t  h ig h e r le v e ls  o f  s o p h ls t lc a lo n  In  the  
o rg a n iz a tio n  o f  the  e nv iron m e n ta l assessment a c t i v i t y  a re  n o rm a lly  
associated w ith  a h ig h e r v u ln e r a b i l i t y  o f  th e  MNCs to  the  Im pact o f  
fo re ig n  env ironm ents  and w ith  la rg e r  degrees o f  v a r ia t io n  In  the  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  the  environm ent to  which th e  companies are s u b je c t .  
In r e a l i t y ,  m u lt in a t io n a ls  where the  c o l le c t io n  and a n a ly s is  o f
fo re ig n  e nv iron m e n ta l In fo rm a t io n  Is  fo rm a lly  I n s t i t u t io n a l iz e d ,  and 
to a s m a lle r  e x te n t ,  companies where th e  e nv iron m e n ta l assessment 
a c t iv i t y  Is  conducted In  an In fo rm a l way, tend  to  be h ig h ly  exposed to  
host co u n try  and government In f lu e n c e s , p ra c t is e  g lo b a l In te g r a t io n  
s tra te g ie s ,  e x e rc is e  a t ig h t  s t r a te g ic  c o n tro l ove r s u b s id ia r ie s ,  and
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have h ig h  le v e ls  o f  in te r n a t io n a l iz a t io n  ( i . e .  companies o pe ra te  in  a 
large number o f  c o u n tr ie s  and geograph ic  a re a s ).
A fte r t h is  in t r o d u c to r y  ev idence which p laces  the  c e n tra l p ro ce ss in g  
of e nv iron m e n ta l in fo rm a tio n  in  i t s  o rg a n iz a t io n a l c o n te x t, th e  
f in d in g s  w i l l  now tu rn  to  the  q u a l i t ie s  o f  the  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  
systems used f o r  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s .
14.2.2. Environmental Capability of Performance Evaluation and 
Control Systems
G enera lly , th e  s tud y  p o in ts  to  the  fa c t  th a t  in  the  g re a t m a jo r i ty  o f  
companies th e  fo rm a l assessment c r i t e r i a  used f o r  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  
and t h e i r  managers are a t le a s t  m ode ra te ly  capable o f  ta k in g  h o s t 
country e n v iro n m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  in to  accoun t. In  o n ly  a sm a ll 
m in o r ity  o f  cases do the  c r i t e r i a  used seem to  be no t a t a l l  o r  l i t t l e  
e ffe c t iv e  in  th a t  re s p e c t.  I f  t h is  r e s u l t  i s  compared w ith  the  sca rce  
evidence a v a ila b le  from  Am erican s tu d ie s , a te n ta t iv e  c o n c lu s io n  may 
be drawn s u g g e s tin g  th a t  th e  perform ance e v a lu a tio n  systems used in  
B r it is h  m u lt in a t io n a ls  are perhaps more s e n s it iv e  to  the env ironm ent 
than those in  o p e ra t io n  in  U.S. MNCs.
Despite t h is  o b s e rv a tio n , the  s tudy  found th a t  in  h eadqua rte rs  
execu tives* o p in io n  fo rm a l e v a lu a tio n  c r i t e r i a  shou ld  r e f le c t  
environm ental in f lu e n c e s  to  a g re a te r  e x te n t than  they  a c tu a l ly  do. 
There i s ,  th e re fo re ,  a gap between the  p e rce ive d  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  the  
e va lu a tio n  system to  reco gn ize  im p o rta n t env ironm en ta l d if fe re n c e s  
among hos t env ironm ents and managers* re q u ire m e n ts . Such a gap, seen 
in  c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  the  fa c t  th a t  headqua rte rs  e x e c u tiv e s  g e n e ra lly  
view t h e i r  system s as r e f le c t in g  the  env ironm ent in  a r e la t i v e l y  
extensive  way, in d ic a te s  th a t  managers* re q u irem en ts  o f  th e  degree to  
which perform ance e v a lu a t io n  systems shou ld  be capable o f  ta k in g  the  
environment in to  account a re  e x trem e ly  h ig h . T h is  may be in te r p r e te d  
as an in d ic a t io n  o f  the  im portance  o f  th e  e nv ironm en ta l is s u e  f o r  
those who in  p ra c t ic e  are in v o lv e d  in  th e  e v a lu a t io n  and c o n tro l o f  
fo re ig n  o p e ra t io n s .
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Managers* b e l ie f s  o f  th e  e x te n t to  which assessment c r i t e r i a  shou ld  be 
capable o f  re c o g n iz in g  re le v a n t  env ironm en ta l in f lu e n c e s , were found 
to be re la te d  to  th e  degree o f  env ironm en ta l v a r i a b i l i t y  across h o s t 
nations th a t  is  p e rce ive d  by them. In  e f f e c t ,  those  h eadqua rte rs  
executives who wanted perform ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  used f o r  
s u b s id ia r ie s  and f o r  managers to  take e x te n s iv e  account o f  the  
environment tended to  v iew  the  im pact o f  lo c a l env ironm ents on 
s u b s id ia r ie s  as v a ry in g  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  from  one geog raph ic  area to  
another. % is  in d ic a te s  th a t  the  env ironm en ta l re q u irem en ts  sought 
fo r the e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  are in f lu e n c e d  by managers* p e rc e p tio n s  o f  
the way in  w h ich  the  environm ent d i f f e r s  across overseas o p e ra t io n s . 
And e nv iron m e n ta l v a r ia t io n  is  pe rce ive d  to  be p a r t i c u la r ly  h ig h  in  
companies w h ich  a re  e s ta b lis h e d  in  a wide range o f  lo c a t io n s  spread 
s im u ltaneous ly  th rough  in d u s t r ia l iz e d  re g io n s  and areas o f  th e  T h ird  
World.
The d isc re pa n cy  between what is  o ffe re d  by perform ance e v a lu a t io n  
systems and what i s  d e s ire d  from  them, was, fu r th e rm o re , suggested by 
the r e s u lts  o f  a t e s t  w hich used an independent in s tru m e n t th a t  
determined th e  a c tu a l c a p a b i l i t y  o f  fo rm a l e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  to  
recognize e n v iro n m e n ta l d if fe re n c e s .  In  r e a l i t y ,  the  needs o f  
headquarters e x e c u tiv e s  as to  the  e x te n t to  w hich perform ance
e va lu a tio n  systems shou ld  id e a l ly  be ab le  to  take  the  env ironm ent in to  
account d id  no t f in d  a correspondence in  the  a t t r ib u te s  a c tu a l ly  
possessed by the  system s.
The c a p a b i l i t y  o f  fo rm a l perform ance e v a lu a tio n  c r i t e r i a  to  take  h os t 
country e n v iro n m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  in to  account as mesured by th e  
independent in s tru m e n t c rea ted  in  the  s tudy was found to  v a ry  g r e a t ly  
according to  c e r ta in  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  MNCs. Companies w ith  a 
h igher commitment to  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  ( i . e .  f irm s  w ith  la rg e r  
p ro p o rtio n s  o f  overseas asse ts  and s a le s ) ,  a h ig h e r
in te r n a t io n a l iz a t io n  le v e l ( i . e .  f irm s  o p e ra tin g  in  a la r g e r  number o f
c o u n tr ie s ) , and a h ig h e r  le v e l o f  exposure to  h o s t co u n try  and
government in f lu e n c e s ,  employ perform ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  th a t  
tend to  be more s e n s it iv e  to  the  env ironm en t. I t  i s  no tew o rthy  th a t  
C orporations p a r t i c u la r l y  in v o lv e d  in  o p e ra tin g  overseas, and whose 
a c t iv i t ie s  can be s e r io u s ly  a ffe c te d  by changes in  the  c o n d it io n s  o f
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the in te r n a t io n a l  h o s t environm ents are us ing  methods o f  s u b s id ia ry  
performance e v a lu a t io n  and c o n tro l th a t  take  more e x te n s iv e  account o f  
the env ironem ent.
Moreover, th e  e nv iron m e n ta l s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  
c r i t e r ia  was a ls o  d isco ve re d  to  be a sso c ia te d  w ith  th e  way in  w h ich  
in fo rm a tio n  about fo re ig n  environm ents i s  c o lle c te d  and ana lysed  in  
the m u lt in a t io n a ls *  h ea d qu a rte rs . Companies w ith  more o rg an ize d  
environm ental assessment a c t i v i t i e s  show a p ro p e n s ity  to  employ 
e va lu a tio n  system s th a t  a re  more s e n s it iv e  to  the  env ironm en t. T h is  
suggests th a t  those  MNCs to  which the  m o n ito r in g  o f  lo c a l env ironm ents 
is  s u f f i c i e n t l y  im p o rta n t to  j u s t i f y  the  e x is te n c e  o f  a c e n t ra l 
environm enta l assessment a c t i v i t y ,  a ls o  co ns ide r i t  im p o rta n t th a t  
th e ir  e v a lu a t io n  and c o n tro l c r i t e r i a  are  s e n s it iv e  to  the  
environm ent.
A complete u nde rs tand ing  o f  th e  ways in  which a perform ance e v a lu a t io n  
system is  capable  o f  ta k in g  hos t e nv ironm en ta l c o n d it io n s  in to  account 
can o n ly  be ach ieved w ith  a d e ta ile d  exam ina tion  o f  the  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  the  assessment c r i t e r i a  employed. T h is  i s  th e  
o b je c t iv e  o f  the  nex t s e c tio n .
14.2.3. Characteristics of the Formal Evaluation and Control Process
The perform ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  whose fe a tu re s  w i l l  be ana lysed  
here r e fe r  to  the  methods and techn iques employed in  the  headqua rte rs  
of MNCs to  assess fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s *  o p e ra tin g  perfo rm ance . 
N eve rthe less , th e  s tudy d isco ve re d  th a t  in  the  la rg e  m a jo r ity  o f  cases 
the assessment o f  the  managers re s p o n s ib le  f o r  the  s u b s id ia r ie s *  
ope ra tions i s  based on the  same o r v e ry  s im i la r  c r i t e r i a  th a t  are used 
fo r the  s u b s id ia r ie s  them se lves. T h e re fo re , the  d is c u s s io n  th a t  
fo llo w s  w i l l  a ls o  be a p p lic a b le  in  most cases to  the  assessment o f  
m anagerial perfo rm ance . T h is  id e n t i f i c a t io n  o f  methods used f o r  th e  
two o b je c ts  o f  c o n t r o l ,  a lth o u g h  a g a in s t what i s  p re s c r ib e d  in  th e o ry , 
is  in  agreement w ith  f in d in g s  from  o th e r su rveys on perform ance 
e va lu a tio n  p ra c t ic e s .
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An im p o rta n t outcome o f  the  s tudy re g a rd in g  the  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f  the  
performance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  a c tu a l ly  in  use is  the  c o n f irm a tio n  o f  
the v i t a l  r o le  p layed  by th e  in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  system ope ra ted  
between fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  and headqua rte rs  in  the  e v a lu a t io n  and 
co n tro l p ro ce ss . The in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  system produces a co n s ta n t 
flow  o f  in fo rm a t io n  w hich in  the  o p in io n  o f  headqua rte rs  e x e c u tiv e s  is  
more im p o r ta n t f o r  th e  e v a lu a t io n  o f  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  and t h e i r  
managers than  b a t te r ie s  o f  in d iv id u a l perform ance measures and 
standards n o rm a lly  regarded  in  the  l i t e r a t u r e  as th e  b a s ic  in s tru m e n ts  
o f perform ance e v a lu a t io n .
The in fo rm a tio n  in c lu d e d  in  a company's fo rm a l com m unication channels 
is  composed o f  d i f f e r e n t  item s o r re p o r ts  which are su bm itte d  by 
s u b s id ia r ie s  a t  v a ry in g  tim e  in te r v a ls .  The s tudy suggests th a t  the  
frequency w ith  w hich item s o f  in fo rm a tio n  a re  fo rw a rded  to  
headquarters meets the  needs o f  the  users o f  the  in fo rm a tio n .  I t  was 
found, in  f a c t ,  th a t  th e  re p o r t in g  frequency  o f  item s in c lu d e d  in  the  
in te rn a l com m unication system is  a sso c ia te d  w ith  the  degree o f  
usefu lness f o r  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  a t t r ib u te d  by h ea d qu a rte rs  
execu tives  to  the  item s re p o r te d .
The n a tu re  o f  th e  in fo rm a tio n  re p o rte d  v ia  the fo rm a l channels i s  
wide ra n g in g  and in c lu d e s  item s o f  both a f in a n c ia l  and n o n - f in a n c ia l 
ch a ra c te r. The in c id e n c e  and re p o r t in g  frequency  o f  f in a n c ia l  item s 
such as ba lance sh e e ts , p r o f i t  and lo s s  accoun ts , re p o r ts  on 
borrow ings in  s u b s id ia r ie s ,  c a s h -flo w  s ta te m e n ts , and segm ental sa le s  
analyses, a re  g e n e ra lly  much h ig h e r than  those o f  n o n - f in a n c ia l 
re p o rts  ( e .g .  p ro d u c t io n  o u tp u t, m a n u fa c tu ring  c a p a c ity  u t i l i z a t i o n ,  
market sh a re , la b o u r r e la t io n s ) .  However, in  c e r ta in  MNCs th e  w e ig h t 
of n o n - f in a n c ia l in fo rm a tio n  r e la t iv e  to  the  t o t a l  volume o f  
in fo rm a tio n  re p o r te d  by s u b s id ia r ie s  is  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  h ig h e r  than in  
o the rs . Companies w ith  an e x te n s ive  in te r n a t io n a l  in vo lve m e n t, th a t  
is  f irm s  w ith  a la rg e  percen tage  o f  sa le s  genera ted and a sse ts  lo c a te d  
abroad, and f irm s  o p e ra t in g  in  a v a s t number o f  c o u n tr ie s  in  d i f f e r e n t  
world geog raph ic  a re as , tend to  in c lu d e  in  t h e i r  r e p o r t in g  systems a 
h igher pe rcen tage  o f  n o n - f in a n c ia l ite m s . C o ns ide ring  th a t  in  a 
m u lt in a t io n a l c o n te x t,  the  use o f  n o n - f in a n c ia l in fo rm a tio n  as opposed 
to p u re ly  f in a n c ia l  d a ta  f a c i l i t a t e s  the  c o n s id e ra tio n  o f  the
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s p e c i f ic i t y  o f  each s u b s id ia ry ,  i t  i s  apparen t th a t  c o rp o ra tio n s  w hich 
in  p r in c ip le  are  s u b je c t to  h ig h e r le v e ls  o f  v a r ia t io n  in  th e  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  t h e i r  o p e ra tin g  env ironm ents are b e t te r  equipped to  
consider the in d iv id u a l i t y  o f  each s u b s id ia ry  in  t h e i r  d e c is io n s .
A f in d in g  o f  n o te w o rthy  re le va n ce  is  the  e x is te n c e  among the  non- 
f in a n c ia l ite m s  r e g u la r ly  re p o rte d  v ia  the  fo rm a l commmunication 
channels o f  re p o r ts  on lo c a l env ironm en ta l c o n d it io n s  faced by 
s u b s id ia r ie s .  In  the  g re a t m a jo r ity  o f  companies re p o r ts  on the  
economic c o n d it io n s  encounte red  in  the  h os t environm ent are f re q u e n t ly  
forwarded by s u b s id ia r ie s  to  hea d qu a rte rs . On th e  o th e r hand, fo rm a l 
re p o rts  on p o l i t i c a l ,  le g a l and s o c ia l e nv ironm en ta l c o n d it io n s  a re  
fre q u e n tly  fo rw arded  in  o n ly  a m in o r ity  o f  cases. The c o rp o ra tio n s  
which have such non-econom ic e nv iron m e n ta l re p o r ts  su bm itte d  r e g u la r ly  
and a t  s h o r t  tim e  in te r v a ls  tend to  be la r g e r  in  asse t s iz e ,  more 
committed to  fo r e ig n  o p e ra tio n  ( i . e .  showing a la rg e r  p ro p o r t io n  o f  
assets a b ro a d ), more in te r n a t io n a l iz e d  ( i . e .  o p e ra tin g  in  a la r g e r  
number o f  c o u n tr ie s  and geograph ic  a re a s ) , tend to  p ra c t ic e  some form  
o f g lo b a l in te g r a t io n  o f  t h e i r  in te r n a t io n a l in d u s t r ia l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
and, f i n a l l y ,  tend  to  have a h ig h e r  le v e l o f  exposure to  h o s t c o u n try  
and government in f lu e n c e s . In  o th e r words, i t  i s  in  those 
m u lt in a t io n a ls  w h ich  are s u b je c t to  a w id e r v a r ia t io n  in  env ironm ents 
tha t e n v iro n m e n ta l re p o r ts  a rg ua b ly  o f  a more s p e c ia liz e d  and 
s e n s it iv e  n a tu re  a re  requested  more o f te n .  Th is  c o n c lu s io n  is  
consonant w ith  the  one reached p re v io u s ly  about the  the  w e ig h t o f  non- 
f in a n c ia l in fo rm a tio n  in  the  t o t a l  in te r n a l  r e p o r t in g  system . 
Companies th a t  are  in  co n ta c t w ith  a w id e r e nv ironm en ta l d iv e r s i t y  
seem to  be more te c h n ic a l ly  p repared to  comprehend the  s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  
each s u b s id ia ry  as f a r  as the  lo c a l in f lu e n c e s  o f  the  environm ent are 
concerned.
Furthermore, the sophistication of the internal reporting systems, 
particularly in terms of the relative weight of non-financial 
information and the reporting frequency of host country environmental 
conditions, is related to an organizational issue regarding the 
environmental assessment activity in the multinationals* headquarters. 
Companies where environmental information is formally collected and 
analysed, and to a lesser extent, companies where environmental
499
14 / SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
in fo rm a tio n  i s  processed on an in fo rm a l b a s is  tend  to  be more 
s e le c tiv e  in  th e  type  o f  in fo rm a tio n  requested  from  overseas 
s u b s id ia r ie s  s in c e  the y  show a p re fe re n c e  f o r  n o n - f in a n c ia l 
in fo rm a tio n  in  g en e ra l and f o r  env ironm en ta l re p o r ts  in  p a r t ic u la r .  
This suggests  th a t  MNCs to  which the  m o n ito r in g  o f  the  env ironm ent i s  
im po rtan t enough to  j u s t i f y  the  s e t t in g  up o f  a fo rm a l e nv iron m e n ta l 
assessment fu n c t io n  do ope ra te  re p o r t in g  systems th a t  in  p r in c ip le  
tend to  r e f le c t  b e t te r  h os t co un try  env ironm en ta l c o n d it io n s .
Besides th e  in fo rm a tio n  r e g u la r ly  in c lu d e d  in  th e  in te r n a l  r e p o r t in g  
channels o f  companies th a t  was ju s t  d e s c r ib e d , managers in  
headquarters a ls o  employ perform ance measures and s tanda rds  in  the  
e v a lu a tio n  p rocess . Among the  most w id e ly  used perform ance in d ic a to r s  
are t o t a l  incom e, ROI, re tu rn  on s a le s , and cash f lo w .  I n t e r e s t in g ly ,  
re s id u a l income does no t re c e iv e  in  p ra c t ic e  th e  a t te n t io n  th a t  i t  
has deserved from  the  p e rs p e c tiv e  o f  th e  academic l i t e r a t u r e .  In  as 
many as h a l f  o f  th e  companies surveyed, RI i s  n o t used.
As to  the  s tanda rds  o f  perform ance most f re q u e n t ly  employed, ta rg e ts  
p re v io u s ly  s e t f o r  o p e ra tio n s , and the  s u b s id ia r ie s *  p a s t a c tu a l 
re s u lts  ( i . e .  s tanda rds  based on tre n d s  from  h is t o r ic a l  d a ta ) were 
encountered in  n e a r ly  every  company. As expected, the  s e t t in g  o f  
ta rg e ts  was found to  be e s s e n t ia l ly  l in k e d  to  the  budget. The s tu d y  
revealed the  e x is te n c e  o f  a h ig h  degree o f  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  s u b s id ia ry  
management in  the  s e t t in g  o f  t h e i r  u n its *  ta rg e ts ,  which in d ic a te s  
tha t th e  o p e ra tin g  s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  each s u b s id ia ry  sh o u ld , in  
p r in c ip le ,  be re a son a b ly  safeguarded in  the  ta rg e ts  ass igned .
However, and in  c o n tra s t  w ith  th is  c o n c lu s io n , an a n a ly s is  o f  the  
v a r ia b i l i t y  across s u b s id ia r ie s  o f  perform ance ta rg e ts  and fo rm a l 
e v a lu a tio n  c r i t e r i a  in  g e n e ra l, suggests th a t  companies are n o t making 
use o f  th e  most a p p ro p r ia te  methods f o r  the  s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  each 
s u b s id ia ry  to  be ta ke n  in to  account in  the  e v a lu a tio n  p rocess . In  
e f fe c t ,  the  ta rg e ts  assigned to  s u b s id ia r ie s  are in  th e  g re a t m a jo r i ty  
of cases id e n t ic a l  in  n a tu re  f o r  a l l  the  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  o f  a 
company, o n ly  v a ry in g  e x te n s iv e ly  in  v a lu e . C o ns ide ring  th a t  a 
v a r ia t io n  in  ta r g e t  n a tu re  o f fe r s  a b e t te r  method o f  apprehending the  
s in g u la r i t ie s  o f  s u b s id ia r ie s  than a s im p le  change in  ta r g e t  v a lu e , i t
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may be concluded th a t  companies a ltho u gh  s e t t in g  s tandards  th a t  a llo w  
at le a s t  some s e n s i t i v i t y  to  the  p a r t ic u la r  lo c a l c o n d it io n s  a re  no t 
g e n e ra lly  em ploy ing  the  more e la b o ra te  tech n iq ue s  a t  t h e i r  d is p o s a l.  
A s im i la r  c o n c lu s io n  is  drawn from  the  o v e r a l l  fo rm a l perform ance 
e va lu a tio n  c r i t e r i a  in  o p e ra t io n . W h ile  the  m a jo r ity  o f  companies 
attem pt to  a d ju s t the  c r i t e r i a  to  the  s p e c ia l c o n d it io n s  encountered 
in  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s ,  th e y  do so by s im p ly  a d a p tin g  the  r e la t iv e  
weight a t t r ib u te d  to  d a ta , measures and s tandards  to  the  s p e c i f ic
nature o f  s u b s id ia r ie s  and no t by em ploying d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a ,  
p u rp o s e -b u ilt  f o r  each o p e ra t io n . C on firm ing  such a r e la t iv e  
s ta n d a rd iz a tio n  o f  the  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  employed is  th e  
fa c t th a t  in te r n a l  re p o r t in g  systems ope ra ted  between fo re ig n  
s u b s id ia r ie s  and h e a d q u a rte rs , seen as the  backbone o f  th e  in fo rm a tio n  
used f o r  perfo rm ance e v a lu a t io n ,  a re  u s u a lly  u n ifo rm  across fo re ig n  
o p e ra tio n s . In  th e  overw helm ing m a jo r i ty  o f  cases, re p o r t in g  
requ irem ents , namely number, c o n te n t, fo rm a t, and frequency  o f  fo rm a l 
re p o rts , do n o t change among s u b s id ia r ie s .  S im i la r ly ,  the
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  re p o r t in g  systems used fo r  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  
were found to  be b a s ic a l ly  the  same as those used fo r  dom estic
d iv is io n s  o r s u b s id ia r ie s .
Changes o f  w ha tever e x te n t in  the  assessment p ra c t ic e s  used f o r  
d i f fe re n t  s u b s id ia r ie s  o f  a m u lt in a t io n a l a re  in f lu e n c e d  by a number 
of fa c to rs  re la te d  to  the  s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  th e  s u b s id ia r ie s .  The most 
in f lu e n t ia l  fa c to r  appears to  be o f  an e nv iron m e n ta l n a tu re  s in c e  th e  
p a r t ic u la r  fe a tu re s  o f  the  hos t co un try  environm ents pos ing  th re a ts  
and o p p o r tu n it ie s  to  a company's fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s  were cons ide red  by 
headquarters e x e c u tiv e s  as th e  m a jo r reason why v a r ia t io n s  in  
performance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  were in tro d u c e d  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
s u b s id ia r ie s .  O ther im p o rta n t fa c to r s ,  re la te d  to  the  in te r n a l
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  the  s u b u n its ,  in c lu d e  u n s a t is fa c to ry  perfo rm ance 
le v e ls  o f  s u b s id ia r ie s ,  t h e i r  s t r a te g ic  im portance  f o r  the  whole o f  
the m u lt in a t io n a l o p e ra t io n s , and th e  s iz e  o f  the  s u b s id ia r ie s .
A fte r a n a ly s in g  th e  fo rm a l c r i t e r i a  used by MNCs to  assess the  
performance o f  t h e i r  fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s , th e  r o le  o f  in fo rm a l 
In fo rm a tio n  in  th e  perform ance e v a lu a tio n  process w i l l  now be b r ie f l y  
d iscussed.
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14.2.4. The Role of Informal Information in Performance Evaluation and 
Control
The s tud y  con firm ed  the  s u b s ta n t ia l re le van ce  th a t  in fo rm a tio n  
re tr ie v e d  o u ts id e  the  fo rm a l com m unication netw ork has f o r  the  fo re ig n  
s u b s id ia ry  e v a lu a t io n  p rocess . High le v e ls  o f  com m unication th rough  
In fo rm a l channels were encountered between s u b s id ia r ie s  and 
headquarte rs , w h ich  appears to  co rro b o ra te  sugges tions  made in  th e  
l i t e r a t u r e  th a t  in  European MNCs, in  c o n tra s t to  the  s i t u a t io n  found 
in  U.S. m u lt in a t io n a ls ,  in fo rm a l in fo rm a tio n  used in  d e c is io n  making 
is  abundant.
In fo rm a l in fo rm a tio n  i s  ga thered  from  d iv e rs e  channels o f  
communication ra n g in g  from  pe rsona l v i s i t s  by managers, to  c o n ta c ts  
through the  te lephone  and s o c ia l m ee tings. The reasons f o r  the  use o f  
in fo rm a l in fo rm a tio n  a re  w idespread and in c lu d e  the  p ro v is io n  o f  
in fo rm a tio n  c o v e r in g  e x c e p tio n a l and u n p re d ic te d  s i tu a t io n s ,  th e  need 
fo r  more d a ta  on c e r ta in  v i t a l  is s u e s , and the  n e c e s s ity  f o r  prom pt 
in fo rm a tio n  and c o n f id e n t ia l i t y .
A com parison o f  the  p e rc e p tio n s  o f  e xe c u tiv e s  tow ards fo rm a l and 
in fo rm a l in fo rm a tio n  in d ic a te d  th a t  managers r e ly  more on fo rm a l than  
on in fo rm a l in fo rm a t io n  when e v a lu a t in g  fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s .  On the  
o ther hand, the y  r e ly  e q u a lly  on both types o f  in fo rm a tio n  when 
assessing managers. I t  would appear th a t  the  fo rm a l assessment 
c r i t e r ia  a re  n o t so t ru s te d  when m anageria l perform ance comes to  be 
assessed, w hich is  th e  reason why fo rm a l in fo rm a tio n  does n o t take  
primacy ove r in fo rm a l in fo rm a tio n .
F in a l ly ,  a v e ry  no te w o rthy  f in d in g  is  th a t  in fo rm a l in fo rm a tio n  used 
in  perfo rm ance e v a lu a t io n  g e n e ra lly  complements ra th e r  than  
s u b s t itu te s  fo rm a l assessment c r i t e r i a .  In  e f f e c t ,  the  more 
comprehensive and e la b o ra te  the  fo rm a l e v a lu a t io n  system th e  more 
im p o rta n t in fo rm a l in fo rm a tio n  is  pe rce ive d  to  be. T h is  be ing  so, i t  
does n o t seem th a t  in fo rm a tio n  is  c o lle c te d  th rough  in fo rm a l channels 
m ain ly to  overcome the  d e f ic ie n c ie s  o f  the  fo rm a l systems b u t to
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enhance t h e i r  c a p a b i l i t ie s  and s tre n g th s . The im p l ic a t io n  o f  t h is  
f in d in g  f o r  th e o ry  fo rm u la tio n  i s  th a t  in fo rm a l in fo rm a tio n  shou ld  
perhaps be regarded  as a welcom ing o rg a n iz a t io n a l fe a tu re  in s te a d  o f  
an unavo idab le  waste o f  re so u rces .
14.3. Limitations of the Study
Any survey s tu d y , such as t h is ,  i s  o n ly  as good as the  da ta  c o l le c t io n
ins trum ents  used in  the  f i e l d  re s e a rc h . Many are th e  p i t f a l l s  in
q u e s tio n n a ire  des ign  and a d m in is tra t io n  which can d e tra c t  from  the  
q u a lity  o f  a w ork . The most common p i t f a l l s  have been rev iew ed  in
chapter 8 in  o rd e r th a t  the  p re sen t s tudy cou ld  avo id  them. In
r e a l i t y ,  u tm ost care  was taken  w ith  the  p re p a ra t io n  o f  the  
q u e s tio n n a ire  and i t s  a d m in is tra t io n .  Formal p la n n in g  and te s t in g  o f  
the q u e s t io n n a ire  p r io r  to  the  m a ilin g  o f  the  f i n a l  v e rs io n  
represen ted  an im p o rta n t p a r t  o f  t h is  research  p r o je c t ,  which c la im ed 
a ve ry  s u b s ta n t ia l amount o f  e f f o r t  and t im e . L ik e w is e , the  
a d m in is tra t io n  o f  th e  q u e s tio n n a ire  in v o lv e d  a v e ry  tim e  consuming 
stage s in c e  a l l  s teps  were taken  in  o rd e r to  d e fin e  c o r r e c t ly  the  
survey p o p u la t io n  and to  address p e rs o n a lly  the q u e s tio n n a ire  to  the  
r i ^ t  s e n io r  e x e c u tiv e  in  each o rg a n iz a t io n .  D esp ite  t h is  c a re fu l 
approach to  th e  des ign  and a d m in is tra t io n  o f  the  s tu d y 's  main data  
c o l le c t io n  in s tru m e n t,  re m a in in g  weaknesses, a lways in e v i t a b le ,  are  
l i k e ly  to  be found . I t  is  hoped, however, th a t  these weaknesses are 
only m inor and in  no way compromise the  th r u s t  o f  the f in d in g s .
Throughout the  te s t in g  o f  hypotheses some v a r ia b le s  i n i t i a l l y  s e le c te d  
as e x p la n a to ry  never produced s ig n i f ic a n t  r e s u lts  w ith  com panies' 
p ra c t ic e s . T h is  re q u ire s  some a tte m p t a t  an e x p la n a tio n , in  o rd e r to  
know w hether the  la c k  o f  a s s o c ia t io n  r e f le c t s  the  t ru e  n a tu re  o f  th e  
phenomena be ing  in v e s t ig a te d  o r ,  in s te a d , w hether they  are due to  
p a r t ic u la r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  d e f in in g  the  v a r ia b le s  in  th e  most adequate 
way. The v a r ia b le s  in  q u e s tio n  here are the  type  o f  in d u s try  and the  
o rg a n iz a t io n a l s t r u c tu re  o f  a MNC. In d u s try  was d e fin e d  as the
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dominant a c t i v i t y  o f  a company's fo re ig n  o p e ra tio n s . T h is  in fo rm a tio n
is  no t r e a d i ly  a v a i la b le ,  and as e x p la in e d  in  chap te r 9 , th e
companies' annual re p o r ts  were used as a source . In  f a c t ,  the  la t e s t  
re p o rt a v a i la b le  f o r  each f irm  in c lu d e d  in  th e  s tudy was c a r e fu l ly  
analysed so th a t  the  dom inant in d u s t r ia l  a c t i v i t y  o u ts id e  the  U n ite d  
Kingdom cou ld  be a s c e r ta in e d . T h is  method p resen ted  problem s s in c e  in  
a number o f  cases i t  was d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  a t  a l l  p o s s ib le ,  to  e x tr a c t  th e  
In fo rm a tio n  re q u ire d .  Such problems d e r ive d  m a in ly  e i th e r  from  the  
lack o f  d is c lo s u re  o f  da ta  o r from  the  v e ry  n a tu re  o f  the  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f companies ( f o r  example, in  conglom erates the  in te r n a t io n a l  
a c t i v i t ie s  o f  a MNC are t y p ic a l ly  spread t h r o u ^  an even range o f  
d i f fe r e n t  in d u s t r ie s ) .  T h is  suggests th a t  the  poor r e s u lts  o b ta in e d
fo r the  te s ts  o f  a s s o c ia t io n  in v o lv in g  the  v a r ia b le  in d u s t r y  cou ld  be
due to  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered in  c la s s i fy in g  companies.
A s im i la r  c o n c lu s io n  may be reached fo r  the  v a r ia b le  th a t  measures 
o rg a n iz a tio n a l s t r u c tu r e .  In  e f f e c t ,  a lthough  u t i l i z i n g  a ty p o lo g y  
suggested by Channon [1973] w hich is  b e lie v e d  to  be p a r t i c u la r ly  
su ite d  to  to  the  B r i t i s h  MNC, th e  c la s s i f ic a t io n  o f  companies 
accord ing  to  t h e i r  s t ru c tu re  p re sen ts  prob lem s. T h is  i s  n o t 
s u rp r is in g  know ing th a t  th e re  have been s ig n s  in  th e  l i t e r a t u r e  
In d ic a t in g  th a t  s t r u c tu re  i s  g e n e ra lly  a poor e x p la n a to ry  v a r ia b le .  A 
p oss ib le  e x p la n a tio n  fo r  th is  l ie s  p re c is e ly  in  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ith  
the c o r re c t  c la s s i f ic a t io n  o f  f irm s  by the  d i f f e r e n t  c a te g o r ie s  o f  th e  
v a r ia b le  s t r u c tu r e .  As D a n ie ls , P i t t s  and T r e t te r  [1984 , p .295] 
observe: "althou^ structural types may be fairly easily defined,
classifying companies according to them is difficult.”
In g e n e ra l, the s tu d y  was designed w ith  the  purpose o f  a c h ie v in g  an 
understand ing  o f  the  ways in  which the  in f lu e n c e  o f  h o s t co u n try  
environm ents on s u b s id ia ry  perform ance are taken  in to  account in  the  
e v a lu a tio n  and c o n tro l p rocess . T h e re fo re , th e  e xam ina tion  o f  th e  
performance e v a lu a t io n  c r i t e r i a  in  o p e ra tio n  in  MNCs was made h a v in g  
the e nv iron m e n ta l is s u e  in  m ind. However, as i t  was e x p la in e d  in  th e  
o p e ra tio n a l model p resen ted  in  ch ap te r 7 , the  s u b s id ia ry  c e n tra l 
m anageria l c o n te x t in v o lv in g  d e c is io n s  imposed by headqua rte rs  on 
subun its  i s  a ls o  l i k e l y  to  shape the  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  system . 
In  e f f e c t ,  th e  cho ice  o f  e v a lu a t io n  system s' fe a tu re s  may be l in k e d  to
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such o p e ra t in g  d e c is io n s  th a t  transcend  s u b s id ia ry  management. For 
example, th e  r e la t iv e  emphasis on n o n - f in a n c ia l in d ic a to rs  may have 
been in f lu e n c e d  by th e  le v e l o f  t ra n s a c t io n s  among s u b s id ia r ie s  (and 
consequent use o f  t r a n s fe r  p r ic in g ) ,  s in c e  a h ig h e r volume o f  
tra n s a c tio n s  can be assumed to  in c re a se  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  assess ing  
s u b s id ia r ie s  on th e  bas is  o f  the  p r o f i t  concep t. The s u b s id ia ry  
c e n tra l m anage ria l co n te x t was no t in v e s t ig a te d  f o r  reasons o f  s iz e  
m a n a g e a b ility  o f  t h i s  s tu d y . M oreover, as e x p la in e d  in  ch ap te r 7 , i t  
is  b e lie v e d  th a t  a concep tua l s e p a ra tio n  o f  the  c e n tra l m anageria l and 
env ironm enta l is su e s  is  a cce p ta b le . N e ve rth e le ss , an in te r e s t in g  
development o f  the  p re se n t work would be th e  fu r th e r  e x p lo ra t io n  o f  
the s u b s id ia ry  c e n tra l m anageria l c o n te x t in  a perform ance e v a lu a t io n  
framework. S uggestions f o r  fu r th e r  resea rch  such as t h is  w i l l  be 
presented in  th e  next s e c tio n .
14.4. Contributions of the Stmtar and Implications for Further 
Research
This f i n a l  s e c t io n  d iscusses some o f  the  m ajor c o n tr ib u t io n s  o f  the  
study to  th e o ry  fo rm a tio n  and management a c t io n .  I t  a ls o  p re se n ts  
d ire c t io n s  f o r  fu r th e r  research  suggested by the  survey f in d in g s  and 
the l i t e r a t u r e  re v ie w .
The s tud y  has c a lle d  a t te n t io n  to  the  im portance  o f  e nv iron m e n ta l 
re c o g n it io n  in  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  perform ance e v a lu a t io n ,  an is s u e  
th a t is  g e n e ra lly  absent n o t o n ly  from te x tb o o ks  b u t a ls o  from le a d in g  
research in  the  a rea . From a th e o r e t ic a l s ta n d p o in t,  the  need f o r  the  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  hos t c o u n try  environm ents to  be taken  in to  account 
in  the  perfo rm ance e v a lu a t io n  process f in d s  i t s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  in  the  
requ irem ents deemed necessary to  th e  achievement o f  a f a i r  and 
competent assessment o f  s u b s id ia r ie s  and t h e i r  managers, and a lso  on 
the le v e l o f  v u ln e r a b i l i t y  o f  MNCs to  env ironm en ta l in f lu e n c e s . The 
Im portance o f  the  e nv iron m e n ta l issu e  in  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  was 
fu rth e rm o re  con firm ed  by the  e xe cu tive s  whose ta s k  is  to  e v a lu a te  and
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co n tro l fo r e ig n  o p e ra t io n s . A lth o u ^  the  m u lt in a t io n a ls  s tu d ie d  were 
found to  employ e v a lu a t io n  systems th a t  are  reasonab ly  capable o f  
ta k in g  th e  h o s t c o u n try  environm ents in to  accoun t, the  users o f  th e  
systems b e lie v e d  in  g ene ra l th a t  the  assessment c r i t e r i a  shou ld  
recogn ize  the  env ironm ent to  an even la rg e r  e x te n t.  No doubts shou ld  
thus rem ain  as to  the  re le van ce  o f  t h is  issu e  and a d d it io n a l rese a rch  
must be undertaken  in  o rd e r th a t  a w e ll e s ta b lis h e d  body o f  ev idence  
in  the  f i e l d  may be c o n s tru c te d .
In t h is  c o n te x t,  fu r th e r  research  cou ld  be conducted in  o rd e r to  
determ ine w he ther the  use o f  more s o p h is t ic a te d  e v a lu a t io n  system s, in  
p a r t ic u la r  those  th a t  are  more s e n s it iv e  to  th e  e nv ironm en t, 
c o n tr ib u te  to  h ig h e r  le v e ls  o f  e ffe c t iv e n e s s  o f  s u b s id ia r ie s  and 
indeed o f  MNCs as a w ho le . T h is  would c o n s t itu te  an u lt im a te  t e s t  o f  
the b e n e f i ts  o f  e nv iron m e n ta l re c o g n it io n  in  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  
performance e v a lu a t io n ,  which a lthough  d i f f i c u l t  to  pe rfo rm  would make 
a v a lu a b le  c o n t r ib u t io n  to  the knowledge in  the  a re a . A nother 
suggestion  th a t  would enhance the  unde rs tand ing  o f  th e  e nv ironm en ta l 
issue in  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  c o n s is ts  o f  e x p lo r in g  the  v iew s o f  the  
managers in  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s  re g a rd in g  the  assessment methods and 
c r i t e r ia  employed by h e a d q u a rte rs . In  e f f e c t ,  i f  an in s id e  v iew  from  
those who a re  a pp ra ised  is  added to  the evidence p ro v ide d  by the  
cu rre n t s tu d y  a b e t te r  a p p re c ia t io n  o f  the  e nv iron m e n ta l c a p a b i l i t y  o f  
e v a lu a tio n  systems w i l l  be l i k e l y  to  be ach ieved .
Throughout th e  re p o r t in g  o f  the  co n c lus io n s  and m a jo r f in d in g s  o f  the  
study com parisons w ith  the  evidence a v a ila b le  from  o th e r surveys were 
a ttem pted. T h is  enabled the s tudy  to  p u t the  p ra c t ic e s  o f  B r i t i s h  
MNCs in  p e rs p e c tiv e  w ith  those o f  U .S .-based  m u lt in a t io n a ls .  I t  was 
suggested, f o r  exam ple, th a t  the  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  systems in  
o p e ra tio n  in  U .K. companies could  be more s e n s it iv e  to  the environm ent 
than those  used by in te r n a t io n a l  c o rp o ra tio n s  from  the  o th e r s id e  o f  
the A t la n t ic .  However, sugges tions  such as t h is  are no t based on 
com parative re s e a rc h , and th is  be ing  so they are o n ly  o r ig in a te d  by 
c e r ta in  apparen t d ir e c t io n s  from  lo o s e ly  re la te d  s tu d ie s  and no t by 
sound s u p p o r t iv e  e v id en ce . Indeed, some background in fo rm a tio n  in  the  
l i t e r a t u r e  in d ic a te s  th a t  European m u lt in a t io n a ls  n o rm a lly  tend to  use 
management p rocesses th a t  d i f f e r  s l i g h t l y  from  those  employed by
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American MNCs. E g e lh o ff  [1 9 8 4 ], f o r  in s ta n c e , in  a s tu d y  in v o lv in g  
U .S ., U .K ., and C o n tin e n ta l European m u lt in a t io n a ls  d isco ve re d  th a t
p a tte rn s  o f  c o n tro l d i f f e r  s ig n i f ic a n t ly  in  the  th re e  n a t io n a l g roups. 
S p e c if ic  d if fe re n c e s  in  p ra c tic e s  re la te d  to  the  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  
performance e v a lu a t io n  process can o n ly  be a s c e rta in e d  in  com para tive  
s tud ies  w h ich  in c lu d e  MNCs from  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n tr ie s .  I t  i s ,  
th e re fo re , suggested th a t  the  p re sen t s tu d y  be r e p lic a te d  f o r  a c ro s s - 
s e c tio n a l sample o f  m u lt in a t io n a ls  from  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n tr ie s  o f  o r ig in .
As d iscussed  in  the  p re v io u s  s e c t io n ,  reasons to  use c e r ta in  
performance e v a lu a t io n  p ra c t ic e s  in s te a d  o f  o th e rs  may be due to  
fa c to rs  re la te d  to  d e c is io n s  imposed by headquarte rs  on s u b s id ia r ie s  
such as t r a n s fe r  p r ic e s ,  charges f o r  the  p a ren t te ch n o log y  and 
s e rv ic e s , and in te r n a l  b o rro w in g . These fa c to rs  were in c lu d e d  in  a 
broad model o f  fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia ry  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  and c o n tro l 
presented in  ch a p te r 7 . The model emerged from  the convergence o f  
sca tte re d  bod ies  o f  l i t e r a t u r e  b rough t to g e th e r and d iscussed  in  P a rt 
I  o f the  s tu d y . Such a model is  seen as an im p o rta n t c o n t r ib u t io n  o f  
th is  work s in c e  i t  p re se n ts  what is  tho u gh t to  be a comprehensive 
framework o f  r e le v a n t  issu e s  and v a r ia b le s  a t  work in  the  perform ance 
e v a lu a tio n  p rocess in  MNCs. The fa c to rs  termed in  th e  model as th e  
s u b s id ia ry  c e n tra l m anageria l c o n te x t were no t in v e s t ig a te d  f o r  th e  
reasons a lre a d y  e x p la in e d . The e x p lo ra t io n  o f  t h is  d im ension and i t s  
a r t ic u la t io n  w ith  the  e nv iron m e n ta l is s u e  in  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  is  
be lieved  to  be a f r u i t f u l  development o f  th e  p re sen t s tu d y .
At a conceptual level it was considered right from the start of the 
study that informal information could play an important role in 
foreign subsidiary performance evaluation. Hie empirical evidence 
confirmed this by demonstrating the relevance of information collected 
outside the official communication channels for the monitoring of 
foreign operations, and especially for the assessment of managers. 
Moreover, it was discovered that informal information normally 
complements the formal assessment criteria enhancing the capabilities 
of the institutionalized evaluation systems. As often mentioned 
before, these findings were obtained by applying objective techniques 
of analysis to a phenomenon that is eminently of a subjective nature. 
Therefore, it seems wise to regard the observations made here of the
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ro le  p layed  by in fo rm a l in fo rm a tio n  as sugges tions  c a l l in g  f o r  f u r t h e r  
e x p lo ra t io n . New in s ig h ts  in to  the  use o f  in fo rm a l in fo rm a tio n  in
performance e v a lu a t io n  are  h o p e fu lly  to  be achieved by s tu d y in g  the  
issue in  more d e ta i l  and by em ploying a m ethodology b e t te r  s u ite d  to  
the n a tu re  o f  th e  p rob lem . In  t h is  p a r t ic u la r  re s p e c t, the  case s tu d y  
method seems a p p ro p r ia te .
F in a l ly ,  th e  s tud y  c o n tr ib u te s  to  the  knowledge o f  th e  e nv ironm en ta l 
scanning a c t i v i t y  p ra c t is e d  in  B r i t i s h  MNCs. I t  was found th a t  th e  
c o l le c t io n  and a n a ly s is  o f  fo re ig n  env ironm en ta l in fo rm a tio n  is  
emerging as an in s t i t u t io n a l iz e d  fu n c t io n  in  companies* h e a d q u a rte rs . 
D espite the  fa c t  th a t  o n ly  a m in o r ity  o f  f irm s  have a t the  moment the  
env ironm enta l assessment a c t i v i t y  fo rm a lly  o rg a n ize d , th e  m a jo r i ty  
have re a liz e d  th e  im portance  o f  t h is  issue  and a lre a d y  p rocess 
env ironm enta l in fo rm a tio n  on an in fo rm a l b a s is . Judg ing  by the
evidence p ro v id e d  by a number o f  s tu d ie s  on the  e nv iron m e n ta l 
assessment p ra c t ic e s  o f  American MNCs, i t  appears th a t  th e  
fo rm a liz a t io n  o f  t h is  a c t i v i t y  is  no t y e t  as w idespread in  U.K. 
c o rp o ra tio n s  as i t  i s  in  U.S. m u lt in a t io n a ls .  E nv ironm enta l scann ing  
p ra c tic e s  do n o t re p re s e n t a c e n tra l issu e  o f  the  p re sen t re s e a rc h . 
In  f a c t ,  such p ra c t ic e s  are o n ly  re le v a n t  in s o fa r  as the y  gene ra te  
in fo rm a tio n  th a t  i s  la t e r  used in  th e  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  e v a lu a t io n  
process. For t h is  reason the  depth o f  th e  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  th e  
methods fo llo w e d  in  the  c o l le c t io n  and a n a ly s is  o f  fo re ig n  
env ironm enta l in fo rm a tio n  had to  be c u r ta i le d  to  those s t r i c t l y  
necessary fo r  the  purposes o f  the  s tu d y . I t  i s  b e lie v e d , however,
th a t e n v iro n m e n ta l scann ing  is  an is s u e  o f  utm ost im po rtance  to  a MNC
w ith  re le v a n t  im p lic a t io n s  f o r  company s t ra te g y  and business p o l ic y .  
D e ta ile d  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  the  e nv ironm en ta l scann ing  p ra c t ic e s  in  
B r i t is h  MNCs i s ,  th e re fo re ,  suggested as an in te r e s t in g  and v a lu a b le  
avenue f o r  re s e a rc h .
To conc lude , th e  se ve ra l issues  ra is e d  in  the  p re se n t work are  hoped 
to  have c o n tr ib u te d  to  a b e t te r  und e rs tan d in g  o f  the  n a tu re  o f  
s u b s id ia ry  perfo rm ance e v a lu a t io n  and c o n tro l in  MNCs. In  p a r t ic u la r ,  
a new d im ension  was added to  the  s tu d y  o f  m u lt in a t io n a l perform ance 
e v a lu a tio n , by add re ss in g  th e  problem o f  the  re c o g n it io n  o f  v a ry in g  
host c o u n try  e n v iro n m e n ta l in f lu e n c e s  on s u b s id ia r ie s *  o p e ra t io n s . As
508
14 / SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
shown, t h is  re p re s e n ts  a c r i t i c a l  e lem ent o f  the  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry
e v a lu a tio n  p ro cess , o f  s p e c ia l re le van ce  to  the  grow ing  number o f
companies th a t  in  o rd e r to  s u c c e s s fu lly  compete in  the  in te r n a t io n a l
markets are  fo rc e d  to  adopt o rg a n iz a t io n a l processes and s t ra te g ie s  
th a t re n d e r them p a r t i c u la r ly  v u ln e ra b le  to  un foreseen changes in  h o s t 
country env ironm en ts .
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE
QUESTIONNAIRE
ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS AND
FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Purpose of the Study
This survey explores the criteria employed Jtü groups* headquarter* to 
CYSlHats thf performanoe of their subsidiaries and managers operating 
abroad. More specifically, it seeks to understand the ways in which 
environmental .characteristics (both economic and non-economi c) of host 
countries, which affect subsidiaries operations, are taken into account in 
the foreign subsidiary performance evaluation and control process.
fisneral instructions for Participation
1. The present survey is addressed to British-based firms with at 
least one foreign subsidiary (i.e. a company located overseas which is 
controlled by the group) engaged in manufacturing, or other industrial 
activity (assembly, exploration, construction).
2. The questionnaire is to be answered by a company senior executive who 
is directly involved in the control and evaluation of foreign 
subsidiaries.
3. All efforts were made to keep the time required to complete the 
questionnaire down to a minimum. For this reason, alternative answers 
are already provided for most questions and the respondent is asked to 
simply tick the box(es) which most accurately describes his/her opinion 
or the company’s practice. Space for comments is generally provided.
4. A number of questions seek to characterize the flow of information 
reported internally by foreign subsidiaries to headquarters, as well as 
the use of that information in the control of foreign subsidiaries. If 
in your company different practices regarding the two aspects above are 
used for different foreign subsidiaries, please answer questions 
concerning the typical (i.e. the most common) case in your firm.
5. All the information provided here will be held in strict confidence, 
and will be presented in aggregate form only. In all circumstances, 
the anonymity of individual respondents and company names will be 
carefully protected.
6. Thank you very much for your support of this research project. For any 
queries concerning this study, please contact;
Mr. M A Marques M.Com.
University of Glasgow
Department of Accountancy
67 Southpark Avenue
Glasgow G12 8LE
Tel.: (041) 339 8855 Extension 501
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QUESTIONNAIRE
environmental analysis and
FOREIGN SUBSIDIARY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
fflTPPgg QÎ. lilA Study
This survey explores the criteria emoloved Jly groups' heada uarters iLfi. 
evalgate the performance of their subsidiaries and managers operating 
abroad. More specifically, it seeks to understand the ways in which 
environmental characteristics (both economic and non-economic) of host 
countries, which affect subsidiaries operations, are taken into account in 
the foreign subsidiary performance evaluation and control process.
fiengral instructions for Participation
1. The present survev is addressed to British-based firms with at 
least one foreign subsidiary (i.e. a company located overseas which is 
controlled by the group) engaged in manufacturing, or other industrial 
activity (assembly, exploration, construction). If your firm has no 
subsidiary in these conditions please answer the last question 
(Section V, question 8.) and return the questionnaire without further 
completion.
2. The questionnaire is to be answered by a company senior executive who 
is directly involved in the control and evaluation of foreign 
subsidiaries.
3. All efforts were made to keep the time required to complete the 
questionnaire down to a minimum. For this reason, alternative answers 
are already provided for most questions and the respondent is asked to 
simply tick the box(es) which most accurately describes his/her opinion 
or the company's practice. Space for comments is generally provided.
4. A number of questions seek to characterize the flow of information 
reported internally by foreign subsidiaries to headquarters, as well as 
the use of that information in the control of foreign subsidiaries. If 
in your company different practices regarding the two aspects above are 
used for different foreign subsidiaries, please answer questions 
concerning the typleal (i.e. the most common) caae in your firm.
5. All the information provided here will be held in strict CQBfi^flPCe» 
and will be presented in aggregate form onlv. In all circumstances, 
the anonymity of individual respondents and company names will be 
carefully protected.
6. Thank you very much for your support of this research project. For any 
queries concerning this study, please contact:
Mr. M A Marques M.Com.
University of Glasgow
Department of Accountancy
6? Southpark Avenue
Glasgow G12 8LE
Tel.; (041) 339 8855 Extension 501
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section I - FOREIGN ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION PROCESSED BY GROUP'S HFJlDOnARTRRS
Ibis section dea ls w ith  the  ex ten t to  which headquarters (HQ) c o lle c t  and analyse in fo rm a tio n  
ibout fo re ig n  environm ents p e c u lia r  to  host co u n trie s  where companies a lready operate , o r expect 
to operate. Such in fo rm a tio n  may re la te  to  d if fe r e n t  aspects, namely economic (e .g . in f la t io n ,  
labour cos ts ), p o l i t i c a l / le g a l  (e.g. p o l i t i c a l  r is k ,  taxes), and s o c ia l /c u l tu r a l  (e.g. s t r ik e s ,  
attitudes). Th is  s e c tio n  is  concerned w ith  the use o f environm enta l in fo rm a tio n  in  g e n e ra l, and 
not exc lus ive ly  in  the con tex t o f su b s id ia ry  performance eva lua tion .
Bov is foreign environmental information collected and analysed in your BQ?
Please t ic k  (\/)  one answer.
(a) There are one o r more managers w ith  fo rm a l re s p o n s ib i l ity  fo r  
c o lle c tin g  and a na lys in g  fo re ig n  environm enta l in fo rm a tio n .
(b) Foreign env ironm enta l in fo rm a tio n  is  u s u a lly  c o lle c te d  and 
analysed bu t nobody has fo rm a l re s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  th is .
□
□
(c) The c o lle c t io n  and a n a ly s is  o f fo re ig n  environm enta l in fo rm a tio n  p -— , 
is  not u s u a lly  c a rr ie d  o u t, e ith e r  on a fo rm a l or in fo rm a l b as is . I I
(go to  q ue s tion  2.) 
(go to  q ue s tion  A.) 
(go to  S ection  I I  )
, Please indicate below the number of people in your firm's BQ who are involved in the formal 
function of collecting and/or analysing foreign environmental information.
F u ll- t im e  P a rt- t im e  T o ta l
Number o f peop le :
,%ich of the following organisational sub-units in BQ have one or more people formally charged 
with the task of collecting and/or analysing foreign environmental information?
Please t ic k  W )  as a p p ro p ria te .
( a)  Finance/Control I 1  (d )  In te rn a tio n a l d iv is io n  I I (g ) Board o f d ire c to rs  I I
(W Planning I I (e ) Product d iv is io n s  I I (h )  O thers- please s p e c ify :
(c) Legal I I ( f )  P ub lic  a f fa ir s  I I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
la the collection and analysis of foreign environmental information in your BQ geared to :
Please t i c k  (>/) one answer.
a^) the assessment o f fo re ig n  environm enta l co n d itio n s  , ,
only when your f irm  is  co ns ide ring  new investm ents ? 1 I
the m o n ito rin g  o f fo re ig n  environm ental co n d itio n s  
only fo r  e x is t in g  o p e ra tion s  ? □
(c) both  ?
(d) o the r purposes ? (please 
s p e c ify ) ;________________
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I, Which o f the  fo l lo w in g  ch a rac te r ia t ic «  o f  the  boat c o u n tr ie a ' enviro™"«»nta a re  g e n e ra lly  c o lle c te d  
ad tnalyaed T Please ra te  these by th e ir  r e la t iv e  im portance, us ing  the  fo l lo w in g  sca le  :
Not im portan t M oderately im portant Very im portan t
0 -  the c h a ra c te r is t ic  is  not u s u a lly  c o lle c te d  and/or ana lysed. 
Please answer in  both columns i f  you answered (c )  in  the previous q u e s tio n .
(a) Economic (e.g. i n f la t io n  and exchange ra te s , market s iz e , economic
grow th, e tc . )
(b) P o lit ic a l/L e g a l (e .g .  p o l i t i c a l  r is k ,  exchange and p r o f i t  rem ittances
c o n tro ls ,  ta x a t io n , in c e n t iv e s , e tc . )
(c) S o c ia l/C u ltu ra l (e .g . la b o u r  s tr ik e s  and u n re s t,g e n e ra l a t t i tu d e s  toward
fo re ig n  inves tm en t, e tc . )
New
investm ents
E x is tin g
ope ra tions
Which o f  th e  f o l lo w in g  so u rc e s  o f  f o r e ig n  e n v iro n m e n ta l in fo rm a tio n  ( e i th e r  s t a t i s t i c a l  o r 
q u a lita t iv e  in f o r m a t io n )  have been r e g u la r ly  used i n  BQ to  c o l l e c t  d a ta  a bo u t fo r e ig n  
awironments ? Please ra te  these by th e i r  r e la t iv e  im portance, us ing  the  sca le  as fo llo w s  :
1 2 3 4 5
Not im portan t M oderately im portan t Very im portan t
0 = the  source has no t been re g u la r ly  used in  your f irm .
(a) S u bs id ia ry  managers
(b) Headquarters execu tives  (v ia , f o r  example, personal v i s i t s  to  lo c a tio n s )
(c) Banks
(d) O ther f irm s
(e) B r i t is h  embassies and lo c a l chambers o f commerce
( f )  B r i t i s h  Overseas Trade Board
(g) In te rn a t io n a l o rg a n isa tio n s  (e .g .  U .N ., O .E .C .D ., I .H .F . , e tc . )
(h) S p ec ia lize d  p u b lic a tio n s  (e .g . re p o rts  by B . I . ,  the  E . I .U . , e tc . ;  in d ic e s  such as
th e  B .E .R . I . ,  and the P .S .S . I . )
( i )  Business p e r io d ic a ls  and media in  genera l
( j )  O thers -  please sp e c ify  : _____ ______________________________________________________
^or which BQ d e c is io n s  o r  a c t iv i t ie s  has fo re ig n  environm enta l in fo rm a tio n  been used ?
Please t ic k  (>/) as a p p ro p ria te .
(a) C a p ita l investm ent d e c is io n s :
-  i n i t i a l  investm ents
-  expansion investm ents
-  replacement investm ents
~| (b) D is inves tm ent d ec is ions
If you t ic k e d  (d ) above, p lease answer ques tion  8, 
ff you d id  n o t, p lease go to  se c tion  I I .
[ I (c ) Corporate s tra te g ic  p lann ing
I | (d ) C on tro l and e va lu a tio n  o f
e x is t in g  ope ra tion s
I I (e) O thers- p lease s p e c ify :______
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j Bov has the information about foreign environments been used in fke control mnH evaluation of your 
' firm's subsidiaries? (Please t ic k  W )  one answer)
r  1(a) r e g u la r ly . fo rm ing  p a rt o f the continuous c o n tro l and e va lua tion  process o f fo re ig n  
s u b s id ia r ie s ' ope ra ting  performance.
r  1(b) on ly  o c c a s io n a lly , when spec ia l circum stances e ith e r  in  the company o r in  the host 
environments have emerged.
SECTION II - INTERNAL FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEMS
Ibis section is  concerned w ith  the flo w  o f in fo rm a tio n  reported  in te r n a l ly  by fo re ig n  s u b s id ia rie s  
Co headquarters (HQ), through fo rm a l ( Le. in s t i tu t io n a l is e d  ) channels.
1, Which of the items provided below are included in the fonsal financial reporting system operated 
is your firm between foreign subsidiaries and BQ ?
Please t ic k  (v^) columns fox the a p p rc ^ r ia te  tim e  in te r v a l between consecutive  subm ission 
subsidiaries.
by
I T E M S
I N C L U D E D NOT
INCLUDEDOnly
occas iona lly
Annually Q u a rte rly Monthly Other
periods
(s p e c ify )
Balance sheet fo r  the period
bp-date of the budgeted year-end 
balance sheet.
Profit and lo ss  account
Up-date o f the  year-end p r o f i t  
forecasts
Cash-flow generated in  the 
subsidiary
Inventory le v e ls  ( in  q u a n tity )
Uaies per product o r business
Borrowing in  the su bs id ia ry  ^rom 
local sources
Market share in  host country
Production ou tpu t
Manufacturing capac ity  u t i l i z a t io n
Psbour re la t io n s  (e .g . days lo s t  
due to in d u s t r ia l  a c tio n , 
absenteeism ra te s )
Product q u a li ty
Psport on economic cond itions  in  
host country (e .g . in f la t io n  ra te , 
cost o f money, c re d it  a v a i la b i l i t y ,  
^general s ta te  o f the Economy)
kport on p o l i t i c a l ,  le g a l,  and soc ia l 
conditions in  host country (e .g . 
p o l i t ic a l  s t a b i l i t y ,  c a p ita l tra n s fe r 
regu la tions , p r ic e  c o n tro ls , im port- 
^-export c o n tro ls )
Others -  please in d ic a te  those you 
consider o f importance (and not 
specified above) :
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Are reporting requirements UMLfORM for all the foreign subs'! Hi nr lea in your company, in terms of : 
Please tick W) each alternative.
(a) nunter o f fo rm a l re p o rts  requ ired  from s u b s id ia rie s  ?
(b) content o f the fo rm a l re p o rts  ?
(c) format o f the fo rm a l re p o rts  ?
(d) frequency ( i . e .  the time in te rv a l between consecutive
submission o f a same form ) o f form al re p o rts  ?
aH
□
Ü2.
b, I f  any o f  y o u r answ ers above is  p le ase  in d ic a te  b r i e f l y  th e  re a s o n (s )  why r e p o r t in g  
requirements d i f f e r  among fo re ig n  su b s id ia rie s  :
To what extent does the financial reporting system operating internally between foreign 
aobsidiaries and BQ differ from that operating between domestic divisions and BQ ?
Please t ic k  (vO <me answer.
(a) No d if fe re n c e  (the  same system is  used) | | (c )  S u b s ta n tia l d if fe re n c e  (systems | {
d i f f e r  in  m ajor aspects)
(b) L i t t l e  d if fe re n c e  (b a s ic a lly  the same r i (d ) There is  no fo rm a l f in a n c ia l----------- -------- -
system w ith  m inor m o d i f i c a t i o n s ) r e p o r t i n g  system o pe ra ting  between] |
domestic d iv is io n s  and HQ
h, I f  your answer is  (c ), p lease in d ic a te  the main d iffe re n c e s  in  the space below :
SECTIOH I I I  -  TŒ  USE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEMS 
FOR FOREIGN STTBSTDTABT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL
This se c tio n  dea ls w ith  the c r i t e r ia  used by HQ in  the  e va lu a tio n  and s h o rt- te rm  c o n tro l o f 
fore ign s u b s id ia r ie s ' o pe ra ting  performance. In fo rm a tio n  reported  by s u b s id ia r ie s  through fo rm a l 
channels (L e . v ia  the in te rn a l f in a n c ia l re p o rtin g  system) is  regarded here as the in p u t fo r  the 
performance e va lu a tio n  and c o n tro l process.
HOTE: Some com panies m ig h t em ploy d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a  to  assess th e  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  fo r e ig n  
subsid iary ope ra tions  and the performance o f fo re ig n  su b s id ia ry  managers. I f  th is  is  your case, 
please to te  th a t th is  SECTION is  concerned w ith  the form er (e va lu a tio n  and c o n tro l o f su b s id ia ry  
ope ra tion s), un less in d ic a te d  o therw ise .
1, How u s e fu l i s  each o f  the  ite m s inc luded  in  vour company's fo rm a l f in a n c ia l  re p o r t in g  system in  
c o n tro ll in g  and e va lu a tin g  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s ' o pe ra ting  performance ?
Please use the fo llo w in g  sca le : (use 0 i f  the item  is  not inc luded  in  your re p o r t in g  system)
Not u se fu l Moderately u se fu l Very u s e fu l
(a ) Balance sheet ( j ) P roduction  output
(b) Up-date o f the budgeted year-end 
balance sheet
(k) M anufacturing capac ity  
u t i l i z a t io n
(c ) P /L  account (1) Labour re la t io n s
(d ) Up-date o f the year-end p r o f i t  fo recas ts (m) Product q u a li ty
(e ) Cash flo w (n) Report on economic c o n d itio n s
■— ( f )
(R)
Inven to ry  le v e ls  ( in  q u a n tity )  
Sales per product o r business
(o) Report on p o l i t i c a l ,  le g a l, 
and s o c ia l co n d itio n s
(h )
( i )
Borrowings in  the su bs id ia ry  
Market share
(p) Others -  p lease sp ec ify :
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Do BQ regularly control and assess the <^ >erating performance of foreign subsidiaries on the basis 
of the follCTfing fimmrial measures ? Please t ic k  W )  each a lte rn a t iv e .
(a) Return on investment -  ROI ( i . e .  a r a t io  o f income to assets)
(b) Return on equ ity
(c) Return ot sales
(d) Residual income ( i . e .  the p r o f i t  or loss a f te r  in te re s t charges
based on s u b s id ia r ie s ' assets)
(e) T o ta l income ( i . e .  the to ta l  amount o f p r o f i t  or loss fo r  the period )
( f)  Budget :
Compared to  ac tua l ROI 
Compared to  a c tua l to ta l  income
(g) Other p ro fit-b a s e d  f in a n c ia l measures -  please s p e c ify :_______________
No
□
□n
Do BQ regularly control and assess the operating performance of foreign subsidiaries on the basis 
of any n^ggrgf^t^based financial measures (e.g. cash-flows, costs, orders, sales ratios, 
remitta^es, etcj ?
I f  Yes, please l i s t  some major measures used :
No□
Which of the f-inamrial measures (both profit- and non-profit-based) that are used by your firm in 
the evaluation and control of foreign operations are thought to provide better indicators of 
subsidiary operating performance 7
Please re fe r  to  your answers g iven in  the previous question  (a. and b.), and l i s t  by order o f 
importance ( l* th e  most im portan t; 2=the next most im portan t, e tc .)
How important is each of the following as a source of information for the evaluation and control 
of foreign subsidiary operating performance ?
Please t ic k  W )  one c e l l  in  both.
(a) The in te rn a l f in a n c ia l re p o rtin g  system taken as 
a. g lo b a l package o f in fo rm a tio n  on su bs id ia rie s  
o pe ra tions .
(b) The pure ly  f in a n c ia l measures ind ica te d  in  
question  3 . above taken independently o f the in te rn a l 
f in a n c ia l re p o rtin g  system.
1
V. Low
2 3
Moderate
4 5
V. H igh
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ji, Does BQ systematically use may information in the performance evaluation and control process 
ttfotted by subsidiaries through formal channels but HOT IHCLÜDED in the internal financial 
reporting system (e.g. reported through the marketing information system, if any, etc.) ?
Yes I I No] I Not a p p lic a b le ] |
If Yes, please g ive  some examples o f the type o f in fo rm a tio n  in  question  and the re sp e c tive  
channels through which i t  is  reported  :
Which of the following standards are used in your firm to evaluate foreign subsidiary operating 
performance 7
Please ra te  these by th e ir  r e la t iv e  importance, using the scale as fo llo w s :
1 2 3 4 5
Not im portan t Moderately im portant Very im portan t
0 ■ the standard is  not used in  your f irm
(a) A s p e c if ic  performance ta rg e t p re v io u s ly  set fo r  the su b s id ia ry  
 (b) The past a c tu a l re s u lts  o f the su bs id ia ry  (e.g. trends based on h is to r ic a l  data)
(c ) The re s u lts  o f s im i la r  f irm s  in  the host country where the s u b s id ia ry  operates
(d) The re s u lts  o f o the r s im ila r  s u b s id ia rie s  o f your f irm ,  o p e ra tin g  in  the same host 
country
(e) The re s u lts  o f o the r s im ila r  su b s id ia rie s  o f your f i rm ,  o pe ra ting  in  d if fe r e n t  host 
c o u n tr ie s
( f )  The re s u lts  o f o the r s im ila r  s u b s id ia rie s  o f your f irm ,  o p e ra tin g  in  the UJL
(g) Others -  please s p e c ify :______________________________________________________________
If performance ta rg e ts  set fo r  s u b s id ia rie s  ( (a) in  the previous ques tion  ) are not used in  your 
company, p lease go to  que s tion  8.
If perforsance targets are used in your firm, who prepares and approves the foreign subsidiaries' 
performance targets 7 (Please t ic k  (V) one answer)
(a) S u bs id ia ry  managers se le c t and set th e ir  own performance ta rg e ts  w ith o u t co n s u lt in g  HQ.
(b) S ubs id ia ry  managers s e le c t the performance ta rg e t, and subm it i t  to  HQ fo r  approval.
HQ u s u a lly  accepts proposed ta rg e ts .
(c) HQ and s u b s id ia ry  managers c o lle c t iv e ly  assess a lte rn a t iv e  performance ta rg e ts  and a ttem pt 
to  reach consensus. The ta rg e t th a t has the support o f both  is  the one th a t is  set.
(d) HQ managers s e le c t the performance ta rg e t, and subm it i t  to  the su b s id ia ry  managers fo r
ideas and suggestions. HQ managers then make the d ec is ion .
(e ) HQ m anagers s e le c t  and se t th e  s u b s id ia ry  p e rfo rm a n ce  ta rg e t  w ith o u t  c o n s u lt in g  
su b s id ia ry  managers.
^  are thy foreign subsidiaries' performance targets determined 7
(a) On the basis o f the su bs id ia ry  budget.
(b ) On the basis o f the company's o v e ra ll o b je c tiv e s , w ith  no e x p l ic i t  re fe rence  to  the 
s u b s id ia ry  budget.
(c ) By management judgement (e ith e r  a t HQ o r s u b s id ia r ie s ), w ith  no e x p l ic i t  re fe rence to 
company's o b je c t iv e s  o r the su bs id ia ry  budget.
(d) Other -  please s p e c ify :_______ ___________________________________________________________
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It, To wbat extent do subsidiary performance targets vary across foreign operations in your firm ?
Please t ic k  (v6 one c e l l  in  both sca les.
(a) The nature of the targets varies (e.g. ROI for some subsidiaries, market share for others ,
cash flow for others);
1 2 3 4 5
very l i t t l e to a moderate extent very extensively
(b) The value of the targets varies (e.g. 18% of ROI for some subsidiaries,10% of ROI for others):
1 2 3 4 5
very little to a moderate extent very extensively
If your answer to either one above is 3 or greater, please describe briefly what are the main 
reasons for such variation in:
(a) the nature of the targets:
(b) the value of the targets:
3. Do BQ regularly use the same formal criteria ( i.e. items in the financial reporting system, 
performance measures and standards) to control and evaluate the operating performance of ALL your 
compaiqr's foreign subsidiaries ? (Please tick (V) one)
(a) Yes (the same criteria with the same weights) ( |
(b) Yes (the same criteria but with different weights) | |
□(c) No
(go to question 10.) 
(go to question 9. ) 
(go to question 9. )
Please indicate how much each of the factors listed below had in determining differences
in weights or criteria formally used to control and evaluate the operating performance of foreign 
subsidiaries . Please tick (^, using the scale as follows:
1
Minor influence Moderate Major influence
0 * not applicable (if the factor does not vary across foreign operations in
your f irm ) .
0 1 2 3 4 5
Geographic lo c a tio n  o f su bs id ia ry  (e .g . Europe, L a t in  America,
Asia , e tc . )
P a rticu la r c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f the host env ironnent, posing 
special th re a ts  and/or o p p o rtu n itie s  to  subs id ia ry
Size o f su bs id ia ry -----------
S trategic importance o f subs id ia ry  fo r  the company as a whole -
U nsatis factory performance le v e l o f subs id ia ry i
~Type o f r e s p o n s ib il ity  assigned to  subs id ia ry  ( i . e .  subs id ia ry  
as a p ro f i t - c e n tre  vs . subs id ia ry  as a co s t-ce n tre ) 1
w nersh ip  share in  su bs id ia ry  ( i . e .  w ho lly  owned vs . p a r t ly  
_ owned su b s id ia rie s  or jo in t  ventures)
Dominant m anagerial fu n c tio n  in  subs id ia ry  (e .g . m arketing- 
_ -o rien ted  subs id ia ry  vs . p rodu c tion -o rie n ted  su bs id ia ry )
Others -  please sp e c ify :
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lUl^In general, to what extent do the formal criteria (Le. items in the financial reporting system, 
performance measures and standards) used to control and evaluate the operating performance of 
n^rgjgn subsidiaries differ from the criteria used for domestic subsidiaries ?
Please t ic k  (v )  one answer.
(a) No d iffe re n c e  (th e  same c r i t e r ia  are used) | |
(b) L i t t le  d if fe re n c e  (on ly  in  some minor aspects the c r i t e r ia  d i f f e r )  [ |
(c) S ubs tan tia l d if fe re n c e  (the  c r i t e r ia  d i f f e r  in  major aspects) | j
b, If your answer is  (c ), please mention the main d iffe re n ce s  in  the space below. A lso , would you 
please in d ic a te  b r ie f ly  which are the basic reasons p reven ting  the use o f id e n t ic a l e va lua tion  
c r ite r ia  :
11, This question  re fe rs  s p e c if ic a l ly  to  c r i t e r ia  used by HQ to  assess the performance o f fo re ig n  
subsidiary MANAGERS.
I, In general, is the formal assessment of foreign subsidiary sunsgers based on information provided 
the financial rqxxrting system operated between subsidiaries and BQ ?
Yes I ] No I I Not a pp lica b le  ( i . e .  there  is  no form al { )
assessment by HQ o f m anagerial performance)
I f  not a p p lic a b le , p lease go to  question  12.
k, ^  please describe briefly how the assessment of managerial performance is undertaken, and 
vfaat kind of information is basically used :
C. ^  YES, how do the formal criteria (Le. items in the financial reporting system, performance 
measures and standards) used to assess the performance of foreign subsidiary managers compare to 
the criteria used to evaluate the performance of foreign subsidiary operations ?
Please t ic k  (V )^ one answer.
(a) The same (m anageria l performance is  t o ta l ly  I ~1 (c )  S ig n if ic a n t ly  d if fe r e n t  j I
id e n t i f ie d  w ith  su bs id ia ry  perform ance)'-------
(b) L i t t l e  d if fe r e n t  { | (d ) E n t ire ly  d if fe r e n t  ( t o t a l ly  { |
separate c r i t e r ia  are used)
If  your answ er above is  (c )  o r  (d ) , p lease  d e s c r ib e  b r i e f l y  the  a sp e c ts  in  w h ich  m a n a g e ria l
evaluation is  d if fe re n t  from subs id ia ry  eva lua tion  :
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1 2 , Below a re  l i s t e d  s e v e ra l e n v iro n m e n ta l fa c to r s  th a t  may have an im p a c t upon s u b s id ia r ie s ' 
a c t iv it ie s , and whose relevance may vary from one geographic area to  another.
Please indicate for each geographic area where your company operates, up to eight environmental 
factors which in your opinion exert high influence on subsidiaries' operating performance.
Please rank by o rder ( l= th e  most in f lu e n t ia l ;  2-the next most in f lu e n t ia l ;  e tc .) down the column.
Europe US and 
Canada
L a tin
America
A fr ic a Middle
East
Asia A u s tra lia  
& N .Zeal.
P o lit ic a l s t a b i l i t y
Labour s tr ik e s  and s o c ia l unrest
Attitude tcva rd  achievement and work
General a t t i tu d e  toward fo re ig n  
companies
Language, r e l ig io n ,  and o ther 
cu ltu ra l fa c to rs
Economic g row th /s tagna tion
Taxation
A v a ila b il ity  o f  in f ra -s t ru c tu re s  (e .g . 
cosmunications, tra n spo rta tio n ,ho us in g !
A v a ila b il ity  o f c a s h /c a p ita l
R estrictions on movements o f c a p ita l 
across borders
Import-export c o n tro ls
Price and o the r Governmental c o n tro ls
Legal s tru c tu re s  in  terms o f business 
lav and labour law
In fla t io n  ra te s
Exchange ra te s
Market s ize
Cost o f p roduc tion  inpu ts
Others -  please s p e c ify :
13. In general, how EFFBCIIVE are your compai^ 's FORMAL performance evaluation criteria (Le. items in 
the financial reporting system, performance measures and standards) in taking account of 
foreign environm<»ntal factors ?
Please tick (V) one cell in both scales.
(a) in the control and evaluation of subsidiaries:
1 2 3 4 5
I I I I I I
not at a l l moderately most e f fe c t iv e
e ffe c t iv e e ffe c t iv e
(b) in  the e va lua tion  o f subs id ia ry  managers:
1
1 1 
1 1
2 3
1 1 
1 _ 1 _
4 5
1 1 
1 1
not a t a l l moderately most e f fe c t iv e
e ffe c t iv e e ffe c t iv e
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i. Please indicate below some aignificant environmental factora which in your opinion are NOT 
adequately taken into account by the FORMAL performance evaluation criteria uaed in the evaluation 
of foreign subsidiaries and managers :
15. In your personal opinion, to what exteit SHODLD formal performance evaluation criteria (Le. items 
in the financial reporting system, performance measures and standards) be able to t-nko account of 
foreign environmental factors ?
Please t ic k  (vO one c e l l  in  both sca les.
(a) in  the c o n tro l and eva lua tion  o f s u b s id ia rie s ;
1 2 3 4 5
not a t a l l to  a moderate to  a g rea t
exten t ex ten t
(b) in  the e va lua tion  o f subs id ia ry  managers:
1
1 1 
1 1
2 3 4 
1 1 
1 1
5
1
1
not a t a l l to  a moderate to  a g rea t
exten t exten t
SECTION IV - THE OSE OF INFORMAT. INFORMATION FOR FOREIGN STTBSIDIART PF.RFORMAMr.F. 
EVALUATION AND CONTROL
In fo rm ation  about fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s ' opera tions c o lle c te d  through in fo rm a l channels seems to  
play an im portan t ro le  in  the performance e va lua tion  and c o n tro l process. The fo llo w in g  questions 
seek to  explore  th is  dimension.
Would you please list in the space provided some of the informal comanmi cation rTwnnfT g most 
frequently used by BQ managers in your firm to gather information about subsidiaries' operations 
and their managers (examples : personal v i s i t s  to  s u b s id ia rie s , telephone conversations w ith  
subsidiary personnel, s o c ia l m eetings, e tc .) :
3. Please indicate below the relative importance given by BQ management to formal rqxxrts and 
information collected via informal channels, for the purpose of :
Please t ic k  (>/) the app ropria te  boxes.
(a) eva lua tion  and c o n tro l o f fo re ig n  s u b s id ia rie s :
1
Very low
2 3
Moderate
4 5
Very h igh
inform ation v ia  fo rm al channels
Inform ation v ia  in fo rm a l channels
(b) e va lua tion  o f fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s ' managers:
1
Very low
2 3
Moderate
4 5
Very high
inform ation v ia  form al channels
Inform ation v ia  in fo rm a l channels
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jg To vhat extent Is FOREIQT mVLtoOWMEIflAL information obtained through in fo rm a l channels, for the  
purpose of : (Please t ic k  (vO the appropria te  boxes)
(a) eva lua tion  and c o n tro l o f fo re ig n  s u b s id ia rie s :
1 2 3 4 5
not at a l l to  a moderate 
exten t
ve ry  e x te n s ive ly
(b) eva lua tion  o f fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s ' managers :
1 2 3
not a t a l l to  a moderate 
extent
ve ry  e x te n s ive ly
I f  any o f your answers above is  3 o r g re a te r, please g ive some examples o f the k in d  o f fo re ig n  
environmental in fo rm a tio n  HQ managers tend to c o lle c t  in fo rm a lly  :
I, Below are l is te d  severa l statements about the purpose and nature o f the in fo rm a tio n  used fo r  
performance e va lua tion  and c o n tro l purposes, c o lle c te d  through in fo rm a l channels.
Please give your opinion on each of the statements by ticking (V) the appropriate boxes. Your 
answers should refer to the situation encountered in your company's HQ as far as the use of 
informal information for performance evaluation is concerned.
E va lua tion  o f
fo re ig n  s u b s id ia rie s
E va lua tion  o f 
managers
(a) In fo rm al in fo rm a tio n  tends to  rep lace in fo rm a tion
repo rted  v ia  the form al channels.
(b) In fo rm al in fo rm a tio n  tends to  supplement in fo rm a tion
repo rted  v ia  the form al channels.
(c) The frequency o f in fo rm a l communication between
s u b s id ia rie s  and HQ is  g en e ra lly  h igh.
(d) In fo rm al in fo rm a tio n  is  m ain ly  concerned w ith
non -rou tine  m atte rs .
(e) An im portant purpose o f in fo rm a l in fo rm a tion  is  to
confirm  in fo rm a tio n  reported  v ia  the form al channels.
( f)  An im portant purpose o f in fo rm a l in fo rm a tion  is  to
a n tic ip a te  in fo rm a tio n  th a t is  subsequently reported
v ia  the fo rm a l channels.
(g) An im portant purpose o f in fo rm a l in fo rm a tion  is  to
compensate fo r  the r ig id i t y  and in s u ff ic ie n c ie s  o f 
the in fo rm a tio n  reported  v ia  the form al channels.
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
□ □ □ □
□ □ □ □
□ □ □ □
□ □ □ □
□ □ a □
□ □ □ □
□ □ □ □
3, Please tick (v^) the main reason(s) for the use by BQ of 
channels for performance evaluation and control purposes.
(a) a h ighe r volume o f in fo rm a tio n  on v i t a l  issues | |
(b) in fo rm a tio n  covering excep tiona l and unpred ic ted j I
s itu a t io n s
(c) c o n fid e n tia l in fo rm a tio n  \ |
( d )  more tim e ly  in fo rm a tio n  I I
information collected through informal 
It is to satisfy the need for :
(e) more re l ia b le  in fo rm a tio n  | |
( f )  more accurate ( i.e .p re c is e  r  i
in fo rm a tio n )------------------------*------- '
(g) more understandable and I 1
use fu l in fo rm a tion  ■'
(h ) o thers -  please s p e c ify :_______
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SECTION V - GENERAL INFORMATION
1, Please in d ic a te  below the  number o f  count r ie s  in  each geographic area where your company — in fa in c  
control over m anufacturing  (o r o th e r in d u s t r ia l)  opera tions.
(a) Europe (excl.U K )
(b) U.S. and Canada
(c) L a tin  America
Number o f Number of
coun tries co un trie s
(d ) A fr ic a
(e) M iddle East
( f )  Asia
(g ) A u s tra lia  and New Zealand
2, When did your compai^ establish its first manufacturing (or other industrial) operation outside
the UJL ? (Please tick (V) one answer)
(a) Before 1900 1 I
(b) Between 1900 and World War I I  ( |
(c) Between World War I I  and 1960 | |
(d ) During the 1960s
(e ) During the 1970s -  e a r ly
-  la te
(f) In  the 1980s
□
B
□
I. How is  your canpany s t r u c tu r a l ly  organised ? (Please t ic k  (V) one answer)
(a) Holding company s tru c tu re  (the company is  o rg a n ise d  by i t s  d i f f e r e n t  s u b s id ia r ie s , I  I 
each o pe ra ting  independently o f headquarters' po licy -m ak ing) ^
(b) Functiona l s tru c tu re  (company-wide o rg a n isa tio n  by major fu n c t io n a l areas : fin a n ce , 
m arketing, e tc . )
(c) M u lt id iv is io n a l s tru c tu re
-  Compaiy-wide o rg an isa tion  by product
-  Company-wide o rgan isa tio n  by geographic area
-  Organised by product in  the domestic market and
by geographic area in  overseas markets
-  Organised by in te rn a t io n a l d iv is io n  fo r  overseas
opera tions
-  M atrix  o r g r id  s tru c tu re  (company-wide o rg an isa tio n
by product and geography s im u ltaneous ly ; in vo lves  
shared re s p o n s ib il ity  across d iv is io n s )
(d) Other. Please describe  b r ie f ly :
□
□
□
□
□
□
How do you c la s s ify  the degree o f  c o n tro l exercised by BQ over fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s , as fa r  as 
policy and s tra te g ic  dec is ions  are concerned (e.g. dec is ions in v o lv in g  d e f in it io n  o f key products 
in su b s id ia rie s , a llo c a t io n  o f resources, expansion and d iv e rs i f ic a t io n  o f su bs id ia ry  opera tions, 
etc.) ? (Please t ic k  (V) one c e l l )
1 2 3 4 5
loose moderate t ig h t
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5, Which of the following strategies is followed by y oar company in the organisation of its 
international manufacturing (or other industrial) activity ? (Please t ic k  (v^) one answer)
(a) A g loba l in te g ra t io n  s tra teg y  -  m anufacturing is  in te g ra te d  on a worldw ide or reg io n a l . ------.
(e .g . EEC) b a s is , w ith  s u b s ta n tia l volume o f components, semi f in is h e d , and/or f in is h e d  I 1
products moving between p lan ts  located in  d if fe re n t  c o u n trie s .
(b) A segmented n a t io n - fo r-n a tio n  s tra te g y  -  m anufacturing is  based on lo c a l p la n ts , i - ■ i
s u b s ta n t ia lly  independent o f each o the r. The volume o f in te rs u b s id ia ry  tra n s fe rs  is  low. I J
(c) A m ix tu re  o f  both :_________________________________________________________________________ ____
-  w ith  a h igher p ropensity  to  a g lo b a l in te g ra tio n  s tra te g y . j |
“  w ith  a h igher p ropensity  to  a segmented n a t io n - fo r -n a t io n  s tra te g y . 1 I
6, There a re  f i r m s  whose p ro d u c ts  b e ing  o f s t r a te g ic  im p o rta n c e  to  m ost h o s t c o u n tr ie s  a re  
p a r t ic u la r ly  exposed to  lo c a l government in flu en ce  in  th e ir  fo re ig n  s u b s id ia r ie s . The same may 
happen when f irm s  have as th e ir  m ajor in te rn a tio n a l costumers n a tio n a l governments o r s ta te  owned 
enterprises.
What is, in your opinion, the degree of exposure of your company to boat country government 
influence in foreign operations ? (Please t ic k  (V) one c e l l )
low medium h igh
7. What is the proportion of total assets located outside the U.K. to total company assets ?
Please base your anw er on the fig u re s  fo r  the la te s t  f is c a l  year.
I I % o f our company's to ta l  assets are loca ted  overseas.
Please in d ic a te  your name, t i t l e ,  and company name below. A copy o f the re s u lts  o f the study w i l l  
be sent to  you.
Name:____________________________________________________________________
T i t l e : _______
Company name:_
There may be aspects o f th is  to p ic  th a t you th in k  are im portan t and the questionna ire  does not 
cover. I f  you have any fu r th e r  comments, please use the space below.
THANK Y O U  VERY MUCH FOR Y O U R  COOPERATION - IT IS M U C H  APPRECIATED.
A ga in , a l l  in f o r m a t io n  w i l l  be t r e a t e d  as S T R I C T L Y  CONFIDENTIAL.
Comment s :
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LETTERS CONCERNING THE MAILING OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
APPENDIX B
B.I - Covering Letters Sent to All Companies in the Survey Population
&NAME&
&TITLE&
&COMPANYNAME&
&ADDRES1&
&ADDRES2&
&ADDRES3/0&
&ADDRES4/0&
Dear &FINANCEDIRECTOR&
The research project which I am presently carrying out aims at gaining a 
better understanding of the relevant criteria employed by headquarters to 
control and evaluate the performance of their overseas operations and 
managers. Eventually, it is hoped to make suggestions for improvements to 
current practice.
The study includes a survey of companies’ practices and a questionnaire is 
being mailed to a large number of international firms. The cooperation of 
experienced members of the business community is, therefore, vital for the 
successful completion of this research project. Accordingly, I would 
greatly appreciate your firm’s participation in the survey.
I would be most grateful if you could spend a few minutes to complete the
enclosed questionnaire or pass it on to the most appropriate person in your
organisation for completion. A stamped and adressed envelope is enclosed.
When the research is completed, a detailed summary of its findings will be 
sent to each participant. It will hopefully be of interest to you in the 
formulation of policy decisions in this area.
All information about your firm will, of course, be treated with strict 
confidentiality. The results of the study will be presented as aggregate 
data only, not as individual responses.
Thank you in advance for your interest and cooperation. Your assistance
will be very much appreciated.
Yours sincerely.
M A Marques M.Com.
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&NAME&
&TITLE&
&COMPANYNAME&
&ADDRES1&
&ADDRES2&
&ADDRES3/0&
&ADDRES4/0&
Dear &FINANŒDIRECTOR&
I have pleasure in inviting you to participate in a research project 
concerned with the performance evaluation of foreign subsidiaries, with 
special reference to the relevance of local environmental factors, which is 
being conducted in the University of Glasgow by Mr M Marques. It is hoped 
that the results of the study will provide a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of practice in this area. In order for the results to be 
valid, however, it is extremely important that a large number of firms 
participate in the survey. Accordingly, I would be most grateful if you, or 
one of your colleagues would find time to participate in the project. If 
you have any queries please let me or Mr Marques know. A copy of the study 
will be mailed to you just as soon as the work is completed.
Many thanks for your support.
Yours sincerely.
S J Gray
Professor of Accountancy
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B.II - Second Request Letter
&NAME&
&TITLE&
&COMPANYNAME&
&ADDRES1&
&ADDRES2&
&ADDRES3/0&
&ADDRES4/0&
Dear &FINANCEDIRECTOR&
Four weeks ago P ro fe sso r Gray and I  w ro te  in v i t in g  you to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  a 
resea rch  p ro je c t  w hich is  be ing  conducted in  t h is  U n iv e rs ity  on the  s u b je c t 
o f  fo r e ig n  s u b s id ia ry  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  and c o n t ro l.  We have no t heard 
from you s in c e , so I  am w r i t in g  to  r e a f f i r m  ou r in t e r e s t  in  your 
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  the  s tu d y . The co o p e ra tio n  o f  a la rg e  number o f  
experienced  members o f  the  business community i s  a b s o lu te ly  v i t a l  f o r  the  
achievem ent o f  v a l id  and m ean ing fu l r e s u l t s .
P lease f in d  enclosed ano the r copy o f  the  q u e s tio n n a ire  sent to  you e a r l ie r .  
I  w ou ld  be most g r a te fu l  i f  you o r one o f  you r co lleagues , cou ld  spend a few 
m inu tes to  com plete i t .
I  would l i k e  to  emphasize th a t  a l l  the  in fo rm a tio n  p ro v id e d  w i l l  be ke p t 
s t r i c t l y  c o n f id e n t ia l . The r e s u lts  o f  the su rvey w i l l  be re p o r te d  in  
aggregate  o n ly .
When the  re se a rch  is  com pleted, a copy o f  i t s  f in d in g s  w i l l  be se n t to  each 
p a r t ic ip a n t .  I t  w i l l  h o p e fu lly  be o f  in te r e s t  to  you in  the  fo rm u la t io n  o f  
p o l ic y  d e c is io n s  in  t h is  a rea.
I  w i l l  be most g r a te fu l  f o r  you r in te r e s t  and s u p p o rt.
Yours s in c e re ly .
M.A. Marques
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B.III - Third Request Letter
&NAME&
&TITLE&
&COMPANYNAME&
&ADDRES1&
&ADDRES2&
&ADDRES3/0&
&ADDRES4/0&
Dear &FINANCEDIRECTOR&
T h is  is  a second rem inder o f  a l e t t e r  th a t  P ro fe sso r Gray and I  w ro te  on 
the  3 rd  August i n v i t i n g  you to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  a re se a rch  p ro je c t  on fo r e ig n  
s u b s id ia ry  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  and c o n t ro l.  As we have no t heard  from  
you y e t ,  I  am w r i t in g  to  say th a t  we are  s t i l l  v e ry  in te re s te d  in  yo u r 
p a r t ic ip a t io n .
A s u b s ta n t ia l number o f  companies have a lre a d y  com pleted and re tu rn e d  the
q u e s t io n n a ire  on w hich th is  research  is  based. F u rth e r p a r t ic ip a t io n  is
s t i l l  needed, however, in  o rd e r to  ach ieve  v a l id  and m e an ing fu l r e s u l t s .
Would you be k in d  enough as to  com plete and re tu rn  the  enc losed  
q u e s tio n n a ire ?  I  would be most g r a te fu l i f  you o r one o f  you r c o lle a g u e s  
cou ld  spend some m inu tes to  com plete i t .
Once a ga in , I  guarantee a b so lu te  c o n f id e n t ia l i t v  f o r  a l l  in fo rm a tio n  about
your company. The r e s u lts  o f  the su rvey w i l l  be re p o r te d  in  aggregate  o n ly .
When the  rese a rch  is  com pleted, a copy o f  the  f in d in g s  w i l l  be se n t to  each 
p a r t ic ip a n t .
I  w i l l  be most g ra te fu l f o r  your in te r e s t  and c o o p e ra tio n .
Yours s in c e re ly ,
M.A, Marques
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B.IV - Acknowledgement Letter
&NAME&
&TITLE&
&COMPANYNAME&
&ADDRES1&
&ADDRES2&
&ADDRES3/0&
&ADDRES4/0&
Dear &FINANCEDIRECTOR&
Thank you v e ry  much fo r  co m p le tin g  and re tu r n in g  the  
q u e s t io n n a ire  on fo re ig n  s u b s id ia ry  perform ance e v a lu a t io n  and 
c o n t ro l.  Your c o o p e ra tio n , to g e th e r w ith  th a t  o f  o th e rs ,  i s  a 
v i t a l  c o n t r ib u t io n .  W ith o u t t h is  the  resea rch  p r o je c t  I  am 
u n d e rta k in g  could  never hope to  ach ieve  v a l id  and m e a n ing fu l 
r e s u l t s .
I  t r u s t  th a t  the  f in d in g s  o f  th e  s tudy w i l l  prove to  be o f  
in te r e s t  to  you. I t  i s  hoped to  produce the  f i n a l  re p o r t  by m id - 
1984. Once a g a in , thank you v e ry  much fo r  your s u p p o rt.
Yours s in c e re ly .
M.A. Marques
552
APPENDIX C
QU E S T I O N N A I R E  V A RIABLES W I T H  RESPECTIVE LABELS AND R A NGE OF VALUES
APPENDIX C
COCODE
(Oanpany code - number of oompany in data file)
Real positive number
REQUEST
(Questionnaire request number)
1 Questionnaire received after first request 2 Quest, received after second request
3 Questionnaire received after third request 4 Quest, received during pilotastudy
SBCnGH I - POBKIW E m X M W IàL JMPOIMATICW PROORSRD GRODP’S HRAnon*BTKRS 
EN F ON
(Environmental Function - How foreign environmental information is collected and 
analysed in HQ)
1 (a) There are one or more managers with formal responsibility for
collecting and analysing foreign environmental information.
2 (b) Foreign environmental information is usually collected and
analysed but nobody has fwmal responsibility for this.
3 (c) The collection and analysis of foreign environmental information
is not usually carried out, either on a formal or informal basis.
99 Not detennined.
PFEOPLE
(Number of people in HQ who are involved in the formal function of collecting and/or 
analysing foreign environmental information on a full-time basis)
Real positive number
99 Not determined
999 Not applicable
PFEOPLE
TFEOPLE
(Number of people in HQ who are involved in the formal function of collecting and/or 
analysing foreign environmental information on a part-time basis)
— idem —
(Total number of people in HQ who are involved in the formal function of collecting and 
/or analysing foreign environmental information either on a full-time or on a part> 
time basis.)
-  id e m  -
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âPPBNDII C
Organizational subunits in HQ which have one or more people formally charged with the task of 
oollecting and/or analysing foreign envirowntal information :
EH0RGH1
(FInance/Cbntrol)
1 Yes
2 No
99 Not determined 
999 Not applicable
BN0RGN2
(Planning)
BR0RGN3
(Legal)
ER0RGM4
(International division)
ER0RGM5
(Product divisions)
ER0RGN6
(Public affairs)
ER0RGN7
(Board of directors)
- idem -
— idem —
- idem -
- idem -
— idem —
- idem -
ER0RGM8
(Other organizational subunits)
- idem -
ENOBJECT
(The collection and analysis of foreign environmental information in HQ is geared to :)
1 (a) the assessment of foreign environmental conditions 3 (c) both.
only when the firm is considering new investments.
2 (b) the monitoring of foreign environmental conditions 4 (d) other purposes
only for existing operations.
99 Not determined 
999 Not applicable
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ECRV
apphidii C
(Economie characteristics of the host countries' environments ere generadly collected 
and analysed for new
1 2
I________________I
Not important Moderately important Very important
0 = the characteristic is not usually collected and/or analysed.
99 Not determined 
999 Not applicable
ECEX
(Eoonomic (Aaracteristics of the host countries' environments ere generally collected 
and analysed for existing operations)
- idem -
POLBGRW
(Political/Legal characteristics of the host countries' enviroranents are generally 
collected and analysed for new investments)
- idem -
POLEGEZ
(Political/Legal Aaracteristics of the host countries' environments are generally 
collected and analysed for existing operations)
- idem —
SOCULHH
(Social/Cultural characteristics of the host countries' environments are generally 
collected and analysed for new investments)
— idem —
SOCÜLEZ
(Social/Cultural characteristics of the host countries' environments are generally 
collected and analysed for existing operations)
- idem -
SOURSBI
(Subsidiary managers as a source of foreign environmental information (either 
statistical or qualitative information) regularly used in HQ to collect 
data about foreign environments)
1 2  3 ^ 5
Not important Moderately important Very important
0 s the source has jjqt been regularly used in your firm.
99 Not determined 
999 Not applicable
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SOURHQ
(Headquarters executives as a source of foreign environmental information (either
statistical or qualitative information) regularly used in HQ to collect
data about foreign environments)
- idem -
SOORBNK
(Banks as a source of foreign environmental information (either statistical or 
qualitative information) regularly used in HQ to collect data about foreign 
environments )
- idem -
SOORFIRM
(Other firms as a source of foreign environmental information (either statistical or
qualitative information) regularly used in HQ to collect data about foreign
environments)
SOÜREMB
SOURBOTB
SOURORG
- idem -
(British embassies and local chambers of commerce as a source of foreign 
environmental information (either statistical or qualitative information) regularly 
used in HQ to collect data about foreign environments)
- idem -
(British Overseas Trade Board as a source of foreign environmental information (either 
statistical or qualitative information) regularly used in HQ to collect data about 
foreign environments)
- idem —
(International organizations (e.g. D.N., O.E.C.D., I.M.F., etc.) as a source of foreign 
environmental information (either statistical or qualitative information) regularly 
used in HQ to collect data about foreign environments)
- id«n -
(Specialized publications (e.g. reports by B.I., the E.I.Ü., etc. ; indices such as the 
B.E.R.I., and the P.S.S.I.) as a source of foreign environmental information (either 
statistical or qualitative information) regularly used in HQ to collect data about 
foreign environments)
- idem -
(Business periodicals and media in general as a source of foreign environmental 
information (either statistical or qualitative information) regularly used in HQ to 
collect data about foreign environments)
- idem —
SODROTH
(Other sources of foreign environmental information (either statistical or qualitative 
information) regularly used in HQ to collect data about foreign environments)
- idem -
SOPRPOBL
SOURMED
557
APPEMDII C
BQ deolsloos or activities for which foreign envlroamental Information has been used :
ERUSENI
(Foreign enviromental information has been used for caoital investment decisinns
rsgardinK Inlllal investments)
1 Yes
2 No
99 Not determined 
999 Not applicable
ERUSEM2
(Foreign environmental information has been used for capital investment decisions
regarding expansion investments)
- idem -
ERUSEM3
(Foreign environmental information has been used for capital investment decisions
regarding replacement investments)
- idem -
ERUSEM4
(Foreign environmental information has been used for disinvestment decisions)
- idem -
ERDSEM5
(Foreign environmental information has been used for corporate strategic planning)
- idem -
ERUSEM6
(Foreign environmental information has been used for control and evaluation of existing
operations)
- idem —
ERUSEN7
(Foreign environmental information has been used for other pirposes)
- idem -
ERDSECTL
(How the information about foreign environments has been used in the control and 
evaluation of the firm's subsidiaries)
1 (a) r e g u l a r l y ,  forming part of the continuous control and evaluation process of foreign
subsidiaries' operating performance.
2 (b) onlv n c f a s l o n a l l v .  when special ci rc uns tances either in the company or in the host
environments have emerged.
99 Not determined 
999 Not applicable
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SECTION II - INTERNAL flWANClAL REPORTING SYSTEMS
BS
0
NOT
INCLUDED
(Balance sheet for the period - item in the formal financial reporting system 
operated in the firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
1 2
Only Annually
occasionally
I N C L U D E D
3 4 5 6
Half Yearly Quarterly Monthly Weekly
7
Other
periods
99 Not determined 
999 Not applicable
BSOPDT
(Up-date of the budgeted year-end balance sheet - item in the formal financial 
reporting system operated in the firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
- idem -
PL
PLDPDT
CF
IHV
SALES
(Profit and loss account - item in the formal financial reporting system operated in 
the firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
- idem -
(Up-date of the year^end profit forecasts - item in the formal financial reporting 
system operated in the firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
- idem —
( Gash-flow generated in the subsidiary - item in the formal financial reporting system 
operated in the firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
- idem -
(Inventory levels (in quantity) - item in the formal financial reporting system 
operated in the firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
- idem -
(Sales per product or business - item in the formal financial reporting system operated 
in the firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
b o r r o w
m a r k t
- idem -
(Borrowing in the subsidiary fhom local sources - item in the formal financial 
reporting system operated in the firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
— idem —
(Market share in host country - item in the formal financial reporting system operated 
in the firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
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OUTPUT
- Idem -
(Production output - item in the formal financial reporting system operated in the firm 
between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
MâNüFOT
LiBREL
- idem -
(Manufacturing capacity utilization - item in the formal financial reporting system 
operated in the firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
- idem -
(Labour relations (e.g. days lost due to industrial action, absenteeism rates) - item 
in the formal financial reporting systan operated in the firm between foreign 
subsidiaries and HQ)
QUALT
ECOND
PLSCOND
- idem -
(Product quality - item in the formal financial reporting system operated in the firm 
between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
- idem -
(Report on eoonomic conditions in host country (e.g. inflation rate, cost of money, 
credit availability, general state of the Economy) - item in the formal financial 
reporting system operated in the firm between foreign sttosidiaries and HQ)
- idem -
(Report on political, legal, and social conditions in host country (e.g. political 
stability, capital transfer regulations, price controls, import^ export controls) - 
item in the fomal financial reporting system operated in the firm between foreign 
subsidiaries and HQ)
EMPLOY
ÎEXP
ORDERS
CRPOLT
RSOTH
— idem -
(Number of employees - item in the formal financial reporting system operated in the 
firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
— idem —
(Capital expenditure - itan in the formal financial reporting system operated in the 
firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
— idem —
(Orders received - item in the formal financial reporting system operated in the firm 
between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
— idem —
(Oedit policy (company debtors) - item in the formal financial reporting system 
operated in the firm between foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
—' l d 6 n i  —
(Other Items in the formal financial reporting system operated in the firm between 
foreign subsidiaries and HQ)
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— idem —
RBQNO
(Uniformity in nunber of formal reports required from foreign subsidiaries)
1 Yes
2 No
99 Not determined 
999 Not applicable
REQCONT
(Uniformity in content of the formal reports required from foreign subsidiaries)
REQFORN
REQFRBQ
PORVDOM
-  idan —
(Uniformity in format of the formal reports required from foreign subsidiaries)
- idem -
(Uniformity in frequency (i.e. the time interval between consecutive submission of a 
same form) of formal reports required from foreign subsidiaries)
- idem -
(Extent to which the financial reporting system operating internally between foreign 
subsidiaries and HQ differ from that operating between domestic divisions and HQ)
1 (a) No difference (the same system is used) 3 (c) Substantial difference (systems
differ in ma1or aspects)
2 (b) Little difference (basically the same 999 (d) There is no fwmal financial
system with minor modifications) reporting system operating between
domestic divisions and HQ
99 Not determined
SECTION III - IBS J2SE INFORMATION PROVIDED £1 FINANCIAL REPORTING SISTBiS 
FOR FOREICTf SUBSIDIARI PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND CONTROL
EBS
(Balance sheet for the period - usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating 
fweign subsidiaries’ operating perfcrmance)
1 2  3 4 5
Not useful Moderately useful Very useful
99 Not determined
999 Not applicable (Rated 0 in the questionnaire, i.e. the item is not included in the company’s 
formal financial reporting system)
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BBSOPDT
(Up-date of the budgeted year^end balance sheet - usefulness of Item In controlling and 
evaluating foreign subsidiaries* operating performance)
- idem -
EPL
(Profit and loss account - usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating foreign 
subsidiaries’ operating performance)
- idem -
EPLUPDT
(Up-date of the year-end profit forecasts - usefulness of item in controlling and 
evaluating foreign subsidiaries’ operating performance)
- idem -
ECF
(Cash-flow generated in the subsidiary - usefulness of item in controlling and 
evaluating foreign subsidiaries’ operating performance)
- idem -
EINV
(Inventory levels (in quantity) - usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating 
foreign subsidiaries’ operating performance)
- idem -
ESALES
(Sales per product or business - usefulness of item in oontrolling and evaluating 
foreign subsidiaries’ operating performance)
- idem -
EBORROH
(Borrowing in the subsidiary - usefulness of itan in controlling and evaluating foreign 
subsidiaries’ operating performance)
- idem -
EMARKT
(Market share in host country - usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating 
foreign subsidiaries’ operating performance)
- idem -
EOUTPOT
(Production output - usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating foreign 
subsidiaries’ operating performance)
- idem —
ENAMDFUT
(Manufacturing capacity utilization - usefulness of itan in controlling and evaluating 
foreign subsidiaries’ operating perfwmance)
- idem -
elabrel
(Labour relations (e.g. days lost due to industrial action, absenteeism rates) - 
usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating foreign subsidiaries’ operating 
performance)
- idem —
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EQUAL!
(Product quality - usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating foreign
subsidiaries' operating performance)
EECOND
EPLSCOND
EEMPLOT
EXEXP
EORDERS
ECRPOLT
ERSOTH
- idem -
(Report on economic conditions in host country (e.g. inflation rate, cost of money, 
credit availability, general state of the Economy) - usefulness of item in 
controlling and evaluating foreign subsidiaries' operating performance)
— idem —
(Report on political, legal, and social conditions in host country (e.g. political 
stability, capital transfer regulations, price controls, import- export controls) - 
usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating foreign subsidiaries' operating 
performance)
— idem —
(Number of employees - usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating foreign 
subsidiaries' operating performance)
- idem -
(Capital expenditure - usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating foreign 
subsidiaries' operating performance)
- idem -
(Orders received - usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating foreign 
subsidiaries' operating performance)
— idem —
(Oedit policy (company debtors) - usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating 
foreign subsidiaries' operating perfwmance)
— idem —
(Other items in the formal financial reporting system operated in the firm between 
foreign subsidiaries and HQ - usefulness of item in controlling and evaluating foreign 
subsidiaries' operating performance)
- idem -
RPMEAS
(Regular assessment and control of the operating performance of foreign subsidiaries on 
the basis of non-profit-based financial measures (e.g. cash-flows, costs, orders, 
sales ratios, renittances,etc.)
Yes
No
99 Not determined
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IROI
(Return on Investment ( I.e. a ratio of income to assets) - importance of financial
measure (profit-based) as an indicator of foreign subsidiary operating performance)
1 The most important 5 The sixth most important
2 The second most important 7 The seventh most important
3 The third most important 8 The eighth most important
4 The fourth most important 9 Item indicated as important but not
assigned an order of importance (items
5 The fifth most important ticked "Yes" in question 2a. and not
listed in question 3* + items included 
in question 2b. and not listed in 3.)
99 Not determined
999 Not applicable (items ticked "No" in question 2a. + items not indicated in question 2b.) 
IROE
(Return on equity - importance of financial measure (profit-based) as an indicator of 
foreign subsidiary operating performance)
- idem —
(Return on sales - importance of financial measure (profit-based) as an indicator of 
foreign subsidiary operating performance)
- idem -
(Residual income (i.e the profit or loss after interest charges based on subsidiaries’ 
assets) - importance of financial measure (profit-based) as an indicator of foreign 
subsidiary operating performance)
- idem -
(Total income (i.e. the total amount of profit or loss for the period) - importance of 
financial measure (profit-based) as an indicator of foreign subsidiary operating 
performance)
- idem -
IBDDGROI
(Budget compared to actual ROI - importance of financial measure (profit-based) as an 
indicator of foreign subsidiary operating performance)
- idem —
I B D D G I N C
(Budget compared to actual total income - impwtance of financial measure (profit- 
based) as an indicator of foreign subsidiary operating performance)
- idem -
IPMOTH
(Other profit measures - importance of financial measure (profit-based) as an indicator 
of foreign subsidiary operating performance)
- idem —
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ICF
(Cash-flow - Importance of financial measure (non-profit-based) as an indicator of
foreign subsidiary operating performance)
- idem -
ICOSTS
(Costs - importance of financial measure (non-profit-based) as an indicator of foreign 
subsidiary operating performance)
- idem -
lORDERS
(Orders - importance of financial measure (non-profit-based) as an indicator of foreign 
subsidiary operating performance)
— idem —
ISALES
IREMIT
(Sales - importance of financial measure (non-profit-based) as an indicator of foreign 
subsidiary operating performance)
- idem -
(Remittances - importance of financial measure (non-profit-based) as an indicator of 
foreign subsidiary operating performance)
- idem -
IWC
ISTOCK
IDEBTOR
IGEAR
INPMOTH
(Working capital - importance of financial measure (non-profit-based) as an indicator 
of foreign subsidiary operating performance)
— idem —
(Stock ratios - importance of financial measure (non-profit-based) as an indicate of 
foreign subsidiary operating performance)
- idem -
(Debtors - importance of financial measure (non-profit-based) as an indicator of 
foreign subsidiary operating performance)
— idem —
(Gearing - importance of financial measure (non-profit-based) as an indicator of 
foreign subsidiary operating performance)
— idem —
(Other non-profit-measures - importance of financial measure (non-profit-based) as an 
indicator of foreign subsidiary operating performance)
- idem -
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PACKAGE
(Importance of .ttlÊ Internai financial reporting system taken as a. global p a c k a g e  of 
Information on subsidiaries operations, as a source of i n f o r m a t i o n  for the evaluation 
and control of foreign subsidiary operating performance).
Very Low Moderate
99 Not determined
Very High
PDRMEAS
(Importance of the purely financial measures indicated in question 3» 
independently of the internal financial reporting system, as a source of 
for the evaluation and control of foreign subsidiary operating performance).
— idem —
taken
HOTPRS
(Systematic use by HQ in the performance evaluation and control process of information 
reported by subsidiaries throu^ formal channels but NOT INCLUDED in the internal 
financial reporting system (e.g. reported through the marketing information system, if 
any, etc.)).
1 Yes
2 No
99 Not
999 Not
S T A R G E T
(A specific performance target previously set for the subsidiary - standard used in the 
firm to evaluate foreign subsidiary operating performance).
1
Not important Moderately important
0 = the standard is not iiaBl in the firm
99 Not determined 
999 Not applicable
5 
- !
Very important
S T P A S T
(The past actual results of the subsidiary (e.g. trends based on historical data) - 
s t a n d a r d  used in the firm to evaluate foreign subsidiary operating performance).
— idem —
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STCOHC
STSBHC
STSBDC
STSBDK
STOTH
(The results of similar firms in the host country where the subsidiary operates -
standard used in the firm to evaluate foreign subsidiary operating performance).
- idem -
(The results of other similar subsidiaries of your firm, operating in the same host
country - standard used in the firm to evaluate foreign subsidiary operating 
performance).
- idem -
(The results of other similar subsidiaries of your firm, operating in different host 
countries - standard used in the firm to evaluate foreign subsidiary operating 
performance).
- idem -
(The results of other similar subsidiaries of your firm, operating in the U.K. -
standard used in the firm to evaluate foreign subsidiary operating performance).
- idem -
(Other s t a n d a r d s  used in the firm to evaluate foreign subsidiary operating 
performance).
- idem —
TA R G A P P
(Who prepare and approves the foreign subsidiard.es’ performance targets).
1 (a) Subsidiary managers select and set their own performance targets without consulting HQ.
2 (b) Subsidiary managers select the performance target, and submit it to HQ for apprxrval. HQ
usually accepts proposed targets.
3 (c) HQ and subsidiary managers collectively assess alternative performance targets and attempt
to r^ach consensus. The target that has the support of both is the one that is set.
4 (d) HQ managers select the performance target, and submit it to the subsidiary managers for
ideas and surest ions. HQ managers then make the decision.
5 (e) HQ managers select and set the subsidiary performance target without consulting subsidiary
managers.
99 Not determined 
999 Not applicable
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TâRGDET
(How are the foreign subsidiaries’ performance targets determined).
1 (a) On the basis of the subsidiary budget.
2 (b) On the basis of the company’s over^l objectives, with no explicit reference to the
subsidiary budget.
3 (c) By management Judgement (either at HQ or subsidiaries), with no explicit reference to
company’s objectives or the subsidiary budget.
4 —  On the basis of the company’s overell objectives, adapted to the subsidiary budget
(combination of (a) and (b) above).
5 (d) Other ways of determining targets.
99 Not determined
999 Not applicable
TARGVARH
(Extent to whidi the nature of subsidiary perfwmance targets varies across foreign 
operations in the firm (e.g. ROI for some subsidiaries, market share for others, cash 
flow for others).
1 2 3 4 5
very little to a moderate extent very extensively
99 Not determined 
999 Not applicable
T A R G V A R V
(Extent to which the value of subsidiary performance targets varies accross foreign 
operations in the firm (e.g. 18$ of ROI for some subsidiaries,10$ of ROI for others).
- idem -
SAME
(Regular use by HQ of the same formal criteria ( i.e items in the financial reporting 
system, performance measures and standards) to control arxi evaluate the operating 
performance of AUt the company’s foreign subsidiaries).
1 (a) Yes (the same criteria with the same weights)
2 (b) Yes (the same criteria but with different weights)
3 (c) No
99 Not determined
999 Not applicable (companies with onlv one foreign svbsidiary)
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INFGEO
(Geographic location of subsidiary (e.g Europe, Latin America, Asia, etc.) - influence 
the factor had in determining differences in weights or criteria formally used to
control and evaluate the operating performance of foreign subsidiaries).
1 2 3 4 5
Minor influence Moderate Major influence
0 = the factOT* does not vary across foreign operations in the firm - MISSING VALUE 
99 Not determined
999 Not applicable (For those cases which ticked (a) in question 8.)
IHFEHV
(Particular characteristics of the host environment, posing special threats and/or 
opportunities to subsidiary - influence the factor had in determining differences in 
weights or criteria formally used to control and evaluate the operating performance
of foreign subsidiaries).
— idem —
(Size of subsidiary - influence the factor had in determining differences in 
weights or criteria formally used to control and evaluate the operating perfwmance
of foreign subsidiaries).
— idem -
I N F S T R A T
(Strategic importance of subsidiary for the company as a whole - influence the factor
had in determining differences in weights or criteria formally used to control and
evaluate the operating performance of foreign subsidiaries).
- idem -
I H F P E R F
(Unsatisfactory performance level of subsidiary - influence the factor had in 
determining differences in weights or criteria formally used to control and evaluate 
the operating performance of foreign subsidiaries).
— idem “
I H F R E S P T
(Type of responsibility assigned to subsidiary (i.e. subsidiary as a profit-centre vs. 
subsidiary as a cost-centre) - influence the factor had in determining differences in 
weifÿts or criteria formally used to control and evaluate the operating performance 
of foreign subsidiaries).
IHFSIZE
INFOVN
— idem —
(Ownership *are in sibsidiary (i.e. wholly owned vs. partly owned subsidiaries or 
joint ventures) - influence the factor had in determining differences in wei^ts or 
criteria formally used to control and evaluate the operating performance of foreign 
subsidiaries).
— idem —
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INFFCN
INFNAT
INFOTH
(Dominant managerial function in subsidiary (e.g. marketing-oriented subsidiary vs. 
production-oriented subsidiary) - influenoe the factor had in determining differences 
in weights or criteria formally used to control and evaluate the operating 
performance of foreign subsidiaries).
- idem -
(Nature or type of business in subsidiary - influence the factor had in determining 
differences in wei^ts or criteria formally used to control and evaluate the 
operating performance of foreign subsidiaries).
- idem —
(Other factors - influence the factor had in determining differences in 
weights or criteria formally used to control and evaluate the operating perforaance 
of foreign suÉ>sidiaries).
- idem -
BFORVDOM
(Extent to whidi the formal criteria (i.e. items in the financial reporting system, 
performance measures and standards) used to control and evaluate the operating 
performance of foreign subsidiaries differ from the criteria used for domestic 
subsidiaries).
1 (a) No difference (the same criteria are used)
2 (b) Little difference (only in some minor aspects the criteria differ)
3 (c) Substantial difference (the criteria differ in ma1or aspects)
99 Not determined
EMAH
(Formal assessment of foreign subsidiary managers based on information provided 
by the financial reporting system operated between subsidiaries and HQ).
Yes
No
99 Not determined
999 Not applicable ( i.e. there is no formal assessment by HQ of managerial performance)
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EMANVSOB
(How the formal criteria (i.e. items in the financial reporting system, performance 
measures and standards) used to assess the performance of foreign subsidiary managers 
compare to the criteria used to evaluate the performance of foreign subsidiary
1 (a) The same (managerial performance is totally
identified with subsidiary performance)
2 (b) Little different 
99 Not determined
999 Not applicable
3 (c) Significantly different
4 (d) Entirely different (totally
separate criteria are used)
Below are listed several envirotmental factors that may have an impact upon subsidiaries'
activities, and whose relevance may vary from one geographic area to another.
The variables specified below iodioate for each géographie area where the ooe^ )aqy operates the
degree of influence exerted ty the respective enrironental fbctor on subsidiaries' operating
BBCConBBSS.
1 the most influential environmental factor
2 the second most influential
3 the third most influential
4 the fourth most influential
5 the fifth most influential
6 the sixth most influential
7 the seventh most influential
8 the ei^th most influential
9 factor ticked but not assigned an 
order of importance
99 Not determined 999 Not applicable (geographic areas where 
the company does not operate)
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Europe US and 
Canada
Latin
America
Africa Middle
East
Asia Australia 
& N.Zeal.
Political stability PCLST1 PCLST2 P0LST3 PCLSW PCLST5 P0LST6 PCLST7
Labour strikes and social unrest STOIK1 STRIKZ STRU3 STRH4 STRIX5 STRIKB STRirr
Attitude toward achievement 
and work
ATTWRK1 ATTWRK2 ATTHRK3 ATIWRK4 ATTWRR5 ATTWRK6 ATTTOE7
General attitude toward foreign 
companies
A T M K 1 kTOmt2 ATMIE3 kTom n A T M I K ATTMffiB AllMIK/
Language, religion, and other 
cultural factors
CDLTD1 CQLTU2 CDLTD3 C0LTU4 CDLTO5 CQLTQS CDLT07
Economic growth/stagnation E0GR0W1 EŒBOMZ EoaiaG BOGRGM E0GR0W5 EaaKNS Boaiarr
Taxation TAI1 TAX? TAX3 T A » TAX5 TUB TAXr
Availability of infra-structures 
(e.g. communications, 
transportation, housing)
IMFRA1 HFRI2 HFRA3 IMFRA4 HFBA5 JSFM6 HFRA7
Availability of cash/capital GISH1 CISB2 GRSH3 CAsm cksm GRSB6 GRSffr
Restrictions on movements of 
capital across borders
KHCPFE1 KM0VE2 m N F3 KMCVEA m m 5 KNGVBS KMGVE7
Import-export controls JLkCH.1 IKCT12 iBcnd lECILA IBC1L5 IBC1I6 IBCIL7
Price and other Governmental 
controls
GCfVCTLI G0VC112 GCNCFL3 G0VC1L4 G0VCIL5 Govcn^ G0VCIL7
Legal structures in terms of 
business law and labour law
LAW1 LAH2 LAf3 U M IJH5 LAW6 LAH7
Inflation rates mFLATI IHFLAT2 HFLAT3 HFLATA I1FLAT5 HFLATS MFLAT7
Exchange rates EICH1 EXOE EICE3 EXOA KX06 Ezcas EXCBT
Market size MTESIZ1 MK1SIZ2 MCESIZ3 MKTSIZ4 MKTSI25 MKTSIZ6 MKTSIZ7
Cost of production inputs ONPT1 C3HPT2 C3NPT3 OHPTA CINPT5 CDIPT6 C1NPT7
Other environmental factcrs pomi FOIS? FODB F o m F o i œ F01I6 F o m
AEFFSOB
(How EFFECTIVE are the company's FORMAL performance evaluation criteria (i.e. items in 
the financial reporting system, performance measures and standards) in taking account 
of significant foreign environnental factors In Ihs. control and. evaluation nf 
subsidiaries).
4
not at all 
effective
moderately
effective
99 Not determined
most effective
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ABFFMAN
(How EFFECTIVE are the oompary’s FORMAL performance evaluation criteria (i.e. items in 
the financial reporting system, performance measures and standards) in taking account 
of significant foreign environmental factors In the evaluation of subsidiary
managers).
1 
I-
not at all 
effective
moderately
effective
most effective
99 Not determined
999 Not applicable (companies vrtiich do not evaluate subsidiary managers on the basis of 
performance evaluation criteria")
"formal
D E F F S U B
(Extent to which formal performance evaluation criteria (i.e. items in the financial 
reporting system, performance measures and standards) SHOULD, in the personal opinion 
of the respondent, be able to take acoount of significant foreign environmental 
factors In Ihe. .sqdLcsI and evaluation nf
1
not at all to a moderate 
extent
99 Not determined
to a great 
extent
D E F F H A H
(Extent to which formal performance evaluation criteria (i.e. 
reporting system, performance measures and standards) SHOULD, 
the respondent, be able to take account of significantof
factors In the m a n a g e r s ) .
items in the financial 
in the personal opinion 
foreign environmental
not at all to a mcxlerate 
extent
to a great 
extent
99 Not determined
999 Not applicable (cxxnpanies which do not evaluate subsidiary managers on the basis of 
performance evaluation criteria")
"formal
SECTIOR IT - ^  INFORMAL INFORMATION FOREICÎH SDBSIDIART PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION H m  CONTROL
Informal cxxn uni cation channels most frequently used by BQ managers in the firm to gather 
information about subsidiaries' operations and their managers :
INFLCHM1
(Personal visits to subsidiaries)
1 Yes
2 No
99 Not determined
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IRFLCHM2
(Contacts with subsidiary personnel (by telephone, telex, letter, etc.)
— idem —
INFLCHM3
(Social meetings)
“ idem -
IHFLCHM4
(Personal visits to the UK by subsidiary managers)
— idem —
IHFLCHM5
(Other communication channels internal to the firm)
— idem -
INFLCHM6
(Communication channels external to the firm)
— idem -
FLSUB
(Importance given by HQ management to information collected via formal channels for the
purpose of evaluation and œntrol of foreign subsidiaries).
1 2 3 4 5
( 1 1 1 !
Very low Moderate Very hi^
99 Not determined 
IRPLSUB
(Importance given by HQ management to information oollected via informal channels for
the purpose of evaluation and control of foreign subsidiaries).
— idem —
FLMAN
(Importance given by HQ management to information œllected via formal channels for the 
purpose of evaluation of foreign subsidiaries’ managers).
1 2 3 4 5
I- - - - I -------- - -—I-------—— —I "I
Very low Moderate Very higi
99 Not determined
999 Not applicable (companies which do not evaluate subsidiary managers on the basis of "formal 
performance evaluation criteria")
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III FLMAN
(Importance given by HQ management to Information collected via informai channels for 
the purpose of evaluation of foreign subsidiaries’ m a n a g e r s ) .
2 3 4 5
Moderate Very highVery low
Not determined
IHFLBSUB
(Extent to which FCTEIGN ENVIROWMBITAL information is obtained through informal 
channels, for the purpose of evaluation and control of foreign subsidiaries).
1
not at all to a mcxlerate very extensively
extent
99 Not determined 
IIFLEMAI
(Extent to which FOREICW ENVIRONMENTAL information is obtained through i n f o r m a l  
channels. for the purpose of evaluation of foreign subsidiaries’ m a n a g e r s ) .
— idem —
Below are listed several statements about the purpose and nature of the information used for
performance evaluation and control purposes, collected through informal channels.
Respondents were asked to give their opinion on each of the statements. The answers refer to the
situation enciountered in the companies’s HQ as far as the use of informal information for
performance evaluation is concerned.
INFL1SÜB
(Informal information tends to replace information reported via the formal channels - 
Evaluation of foreign subsidiaries).
1 Agree
2 Disagree
99 Not determined 
INFL1MAH
(Informal information tends to replace information reported via the formal channels - 
Evaluation of managers).
1 Agree
2 Disagree
99 Not determined
999 Not applicable ( companies which do not evaluate subsidiary managers on the basis of "formal 
performance evaluation criteria")
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IHFL2S0B
(Informal Information tends to supplement Information reported via the formal diannels- 
Evaluatlon of foreign subsidiaries).
- idem -
IH F L 2 M A N
(Informal information tends to supplement information reported via the formal channels- 
Evalnation of managers).
- idem -
I H F L 3 S 0 B
(The frequency of informal oommunication between subsidiaries and HQ is generally high- 
Evaluation of foreign subsidiaries).
- idem -
I N F L 3 M A N
(The frequency of informal communication between subsidiaries and HQ is generally high- 
Evaluation of managers).
- idem -
I R F L 4 S U B
(Informal information is mainly concerned with non-routine matters - Evaluation of
forelpj] sH tg ld larles)»
- idem -
I N F L 4 M A N
(Informal information is mainly concerned with non-routine matters - Evaluation of
managers).
- idem -
I N F L 5 S Ü B
(An important purpose of inforvortres.This sting baying cal information r^xjrted via
the formal channels - Evalntion ^  foreign subsidiaraes).
- idem -
I K F L 5 M 1 H
(An impwtant purpose of informal information is to confirm information reported via 
the formal channels - Evaluation M  managers).
- idem -
I R F L 6 S U B
(An important purpose of informal ver an have writial. Esuld upe fengrvigh that is 
subsequently reported via the formal channels - Evaluation £f foreign subsidiaraes).
- idem —
inflSman
(an important purpose of informal information is to anticipate information that is 
subsequently reported via the formal channels - Evaluation af managers).
- idem -
I R F L 7 S Ü B
(An important purpose of informal information is to compensate for the rigidity and 
Insufficiencies of the information reported via the formal channels - Evaluation 
foreign subsidiaries).
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INFL7MAN
(An important purpose of informal information is to compensa te for the rigidity and 
insufficiencies of the information reported via the formal channels - Eîval uahlnn of 
managers).
- idem -
Main reaaopfg) for the use by HQ of information collected through informal channels for 
perfcxvanoe evaluation and control purposes. It is to satisfy the need for :
IHFLRM1
(a higher volume of information on vital issues)
1 Yes
2 No
99 Not determined 
INFLRM2
(information covering exceptional and unpredicted situations)
— idem —
INFLRM3
(confidential information)
— idem —
INFLRM4
(more timely information)
— idem —
INFLRM5
(more reliable information)
— idem —
INPLRM6
(more accurate - i.e. precise - information)
- idem -
INFLRM7
(more understandable and useful information)
- idem -
INFLRH8
(other reasons)
- idem -
SECTION V - GENERAL ^FORMATION 
C00NTRT1
(Number of countries in Europe (excl. UK) vhere the company maintains control over 
manufacturing (or other industrial) operations).
Real positive number
99 Not determined
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C00HTRT2
C0DNTRT3
COUNTRY#
C0UNTRY5
C0UNTRY6
COUNTRY?
(Nunber of countries in U.S. and Canada where the company maintains control over
manufacturing (or other industrial) operations).
- idem -
(Nunber of countries in Latin America where the company maintains control over
manufacturing (or other industrial) operations).
- idem -
(Nunber of countries in Africa where the company maintains control over manufacturing 
(or other industrial) operations).
- idem -
(Nunber of countries in the Middle East where the compary maintains control over
manufacturing (or other industrial) operations).
- idem -
(Nunber of countries in Asia where the company maintains control over manufacturing (or 
other industrial) operations).
- idem -
(Nunber of countries in Australia and New Zealand vrfiere the company maintains control 
over manufacturing (or other industrial) operations).
- idem —
PIRSTOUT
(When the company established its first manufacturing (or other industrial) operation 
outside the U.K.).
1 (a) Before 1900
2 (b) Between 1900 and World War II
3 (c) Between World War II and I960
99 Not determined
4 (d) During the 1960s
5 (e) During the earlv 1970s
6 During the late 1970s
7 (f) In the 1980s
578
apphidii c 
STRUCT
(How the oompary Is structurally organized).
1 (a) Holding company structure (the company is organized by its different subsidiaries,
each operating independently of headquarters’ policy-making)
2 (b) Functional structure (company-wide organization by major functional areas : finance,
marketing, etc.)
(c) Multidivisional structure :
3 - Company-wide organization by product
4 - Company-wide organization by geographic area
5 - Organized by product in the domestic market and
by geographic area in overseas markets
6 - Organized by international division for overseas
operations
7 - Matrix or grid structure (company-wide organization
by product and geography simultaneously; involves 
shared responsibility across divisions)
8 (d) Other types of organizational structure
99 Not determined
CONTROL
(Degree of control exercised by HQ over foreign subsidiaries, as far as policy and 
strategic decisions are concerned (e.g decisions involving definition of key products 
in subsidiaries, allocation of resources, expansion and diversification of subsidiary 
operations, etc).
1 2 3 4 5
Loose Moderate Tight
99 Not determined
STRATEGY
(Strategies followed by the company in the organization of its international 
manufacturing (or other industrial) activity).
4 (a) A global integration strategy - manufacturing is integrated on a worldwide or. rSFlQUal
(e.g. EEC) basis, with substantial volume of components, semi finished, and/or finished 
products moving between plants located in different countries.
1 (b) A  segmented nation-fbr^nation strategy - manufacturing is based on local plants,
substantially independent of each other. The volume of intersubsidiary transfers is low.
(c) A mixture of both :
99 Not determined
3 - with a higher propensity to a global integration strategy.
2 - with a hi^er propensity to a segmented nation-for-nation
strategy.
579
APPENDIX C
There are firms whose products being of strategic importance to most host countries are 
particularly exposed to local government influence in their foreign sufcsidiaries. The same may 
happen when firms have as their major international oostvners national goverrments or state owned 
enterprises,
EXPOSURE
(Degree of exposure of the company to host country and government influence in its 
foreign operations).
1 2  3 ^ 5
Low Mediun Higii
99 Not determined
ASSETOUT
(Proportion of total assets located outside the U.K. to total oompary assets), 
-figures for the latest fiscal year'-
Real positive number ($ of the ocmpany*s total assets that are located overseas)
99 Not determined
SIZSALE
(Size of the company measured in sales revenue for the group).
Real positive number 
99 Not determined
SIZASSET
(Size of the comparer measured in total assets for the group).
Real positive number 
99 Not determined
SALEOUT
(Proportion of sales from foreign subsidiaries to group consolidated sales revenue), 
Real positive number (J of the company's total sales that are originated overseas)
99 Not determined
INDUSTRY
(The dominant industry for the international activities of the group).
<To be defined)
580
APPniDIX c
COPHILOS
(Oompany jrfillosophy - Aggregates variables OGNTRGL and STRATEGY).
1 Ethnocentric company - Oompanies with a segnented nation-for-nation strategy and a degree of
control of 14 or 5.
2 Ethnocentrlc/Polvcentrlc company - Companies with a segnented nation-for-nation strategy and
a degree of control of 3-
3 Polvcentrlc oompany - Companies with a segnented nation-for-nation strategy and a degree of
control of 1 or 2.
•I Polvcentrlc/Geocentrlc oompany - Companies with a jgn segnented nation-for-nation strategy
(i.e. with either a global integration strategy, or a mixed- 
segnented strategy or a mixed-global strategy) and with a degree 
of control of 1 or 2 for those companies with a mixed-segnented 
strategy, or a degree of control of 1, 2 or 3 for those companies 
with a mixed-global strategy or a global strategy.
5 Geocentric company - Oompanies with a global strategy or a mixed-global strategy, and with a
degree of control of 4 or 5.
6 Ethnocentrlc/Geooentric company - Companies with a mixed-segnented strategy, and with a degree
of control of 4 or 5.
7 Other funcharacteristic) company - Oompanies with a mixed-segnented strategy, and with a degree
of control of 3.
99 Not determined (For all those cases with missing values in the variables OWTRCL and/or
STRATEGY)
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CROSSTABDLATTONS BETWEEN VARIABLES OF THE STUDY
APPENDIX D
Table I - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables ENFCN and 
STRATEGY
* * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F  * * * * * * * * *
ENFCN by strateg y
COUNT 
ROW PCT 
COL PCT 
TOT PCT
STRATEGY
I
I
I
I 1 ]
ENFCN
1 I 3 1
I 18.7 I
I 5.1 I
I 3.4 I
-I.
I 41 I
I 74.5 I
I 69.5 I
I 46.6 I
-I-
I 15 I 
I 88.2 I 
I 25.4 I 
I 17.0 I
-I-
COLUMN
TOTAL
59
67.0
13
81.2
44.8
14.8
14 
25.5 
4 8.3 
15.9
2
11.8
6.9
2.3
29
33.0
ROW
TOTAL
16
18.2
55
62.5
17
19.3
88
100.0
RAW CHI SQUARE = 21.74567 WITH 2 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000 
CRAMER'S V = 0.49710
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.13198 WITH ENFCN DEPENDENT.
= 0.19184 WITH STRATEGY DEPENDENT. 
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 9
NOTES: Key to acronyms and yalues: ENFCN = Enyironmental function - How
foreign enyironmental info, is collected and analysed in HQ. 1 = 
There are one or more managers with formal responsibility for 
collecting and analysing foreign enyironmental information 
(f.e.i.); 2 = F.e.i. is usually collected and analysed but nobody 
has formal responsibility for this; 3 = The collection and 
analysis of f.e.i. is not usually carried out either formally or 
informally.
STRATEGY = Strategies followed by 
companies in the organization of their international industrial 
actiyities. 1 = Segmented nation-for-nation strategy; 2 = Global 
integration strategy -pure or mixed- (this class aggregates yalues 
2, 3, and 4 of the code originally defined).
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Table II - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables ENFCN and
NCOUNTRY
C R 0 S S T A B U L A T I 0 1N O F
ENFCN
NCOUNTRY
COUNT I
RCW PCT I -5 6-10 11 + ROW
COL PCT I TOTAL
TOT PCT I 1 I 2 I 3 I
ENFCN ------- • I- -I— ■ I-
1 I 1 I 8 I 8 I 17
I 5.9 I 47.1 I 47.1 I 18.1
I 2.9 I 28.6 I 25.0 I
I 1.1 I 8.5 I 8.5 I
■I- -I— • I- -I
2 I 20 I 18 I 20 I 58
I 34.5 I 31.0 I 34.5 I 61.7
I 58.8 I 64.3 I 62.5 I
I 21.3 I 19.1 I 21.3 I
I- -I— •I- -I
3 I 13 I 2 I 4 I 19
I 68.4 I 10.5 I 21.1 I 20.2
I 38.2 I 7.1 I 12.5 I
I 13.8 I 2.1 I 4.3 I
I- -I— I- -I
COLUMN 34 28 32 94
TOTAL 36.2 29.8 34.0 100.0
BY NCOUNTRY
RAW CHI SQUARE = 15.71114 WITH 4 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0034 
CRAMER'S V = 0.28908
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.10012 WITH ENFCN DEPENDENT
= 0.08504 WITH NCOUNTRY DEPENDENT. 
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3
NOTES: Key to acronyms and yalues: ENFCN = Enyironmental function - How
foreign enyironmental info, is collected and analysed in HQ. 1 = 
There are one or more managers with formal responsibility for 
collecting and analysing foreign enyironmental information 
(f.e.i.); 2 = F.e.i. is usually collected and analysed but nobody 
has formal responsibility for this; 3 = The collection and 
analysis of f.e.i. is not usually carried out either formally or 
informally.
NCOUNTRY = Total number of countries 
-excl. U.K.- where each company maintains control oyer industrial 
operations.
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Table III - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables ENFCN
and NAREA
* * * * * * * * *
ENFCN
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F * * * * * * * * *
BY NAREA
NAREA
COUNT 
ROW PCT 
COL PCT 
TOT PCT
1-3
1
ENFCN
1 I 1 
I 5.9 
I 2.9 
I 1.1
I------
I 
I
I 
I
4-5 
I 2
■ I------
I 8
I 47.1 
I 21.1 
I 8.5
6-7 
I 3
■ I------
I 8
I 47.1 
I 36.4 
I 8.5
20
34.5
58.8
21.3
I 26 
I 44.8 
I 68.4 
I 27.7
I 12 
I 20.7 
I 54.5 
I 12.8
-I-
COLUMN
TOTAL
I 13 
I 68.4 
I 38.2 
I 13.8
I------
34
36.2.
I 4 
I 21.1 
I 10.5 
I 4.3
I 2 
I 10.5 
I 9.1 
I 2.1
38
40.4
22
23.4
ROW
TOTAL
17
18.1
58
61.7
19
20.2
94
100.0
2 OUT OF 9 ( 22.2%) OF THE VALID CELLS HAVE EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY LESS 
THAN 5.0. MINIMUM EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY = 3.979
RAW CHI SQUARE = 17.64113 WITH 4 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0015 
CRAMER’S V = 0.30633
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.10655 WITH ENFCN DEPENDENT.
= 0.09232 WITH NAREA DEPENDENT.
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3
NOTES: Key to acronyms and yalues: ENFCN = Enyironmental function - How
foreign enyironmental info, is collected and analysed in HQ. 1 = 
There are one or more managers with formal responsibility for 
collecting and analysing foreign enyironmental information 
(f.e.i.); 2 = F.e.i. is usually collected and analysed but nobody 
has formal responsibility for this; 3 = The collection and 
analysis of f.e.i. is not usually carried out either formally or 
informally.
N A R E A  z N u m b e r  of different 
geographic areas in the world where each company maintains control 
oyer industrial operations.
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Table IV - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables ENFCN and 
EXPOSURE
ENFCN
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F  * * * * * * * * *
BY EXPOSURE
EXPOSURE
COUNT 
ROW PCT 
COL PCT 
TOT PCT
ENFCN
1
I Low 
I
I 1-2 
I 1
-I------
I 5
I 29.4 
I 10.4 
I 5.4
I 
I 
I 
I 
I- 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I-
Medium to 
High 
3-5 
I 2
■ I-----
I 12
I 70.6 
I 27.3 
I 13.0
29
50.9
60.4
31.5
14
77.8
29.2
15.2
28
49.1
63.6
30.4
4
22.2
9.1
4.3
COLUMN
TOTAL
48
52.2
44
47.8
ROW
TOTAL
17
18.5
57
62.0
18
19.6
92
100.0
RAW CHI SQUARE = 8.29722 WITH 2 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0158 
CRAMER’S V = 0.30031
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.05095 WITH ENFCN DEPENDENT.
= 0.06829 WITH EXPOSURE DEPENDENT. 
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 5
NOTES: Key to acronyms and yalues: ENFCN = Enyironmental function - How
foreign enyironmental info, is collected and analysed in HQ. 1 = 
There are one or more managers with formal responsibility for 
collecting and analysing foreign enyironmental information 
(f.e.i.); 2 = F.e.i. is usually collected and analysed but nobody 
has formal responsibility for this; 3 = The collection and 
analysis of f.e.i. is not usually carried out either formally or 
informally.
EXPOSURE = Degree of company exposure 
to host country and goyernment influence in foreign operations.
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Table V - Contingency Tables and Summary Statistics for Variables ENFCN
and CONTROL
ENFCN
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F  * * * * * * * * *
BY CONTROL
CONTROL
ENFCN
COUNT 
ROW PCT 
COL PCT 
TOT PCT
1
COLUMN
TOTAL
Loose to 
Moderate 
1-3
1 I
Tight
ROW
TOTAL
3 I
I 6 I 8 I 3 I 17
I 35.3 I 47.1 I 17.6 I 18.1
I 19.4 I 22.2 I 11.1 I
I 6.4 I 8.5 I 3.2 I
I- -I- -I- -I
I 15 I 20 I 23 I 58
I 25.9 I 34.5 I 39.7 I 61.7
I 48.4 I 55.6 I 85.2 I
I 16.0 I 21.3 I 24.5 I
I- -I- -I-
I 10 I 8 I 1 I 19
I 52.6 I 42.1 I 5.3 I 20.2
I 32.3 I 22.2 I 3.7 I
I 10.6 I 8.5 I 1.1 I
I- -I- -I-
31 36 27 94
33.0 38.3 28.7 100.0
1 OUT OF 9 (11.1%) OF THE VALID CELLS HAVE EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY LESS 
THAN 5.0. MINIMUM EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY = 4.883
RAW CHI SQUARE = 10.55651 WITH 4 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0320 
CRAMER’S V = 0.23696
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.06863 WITH ENFCN DEPENDENT.
= 0.05849 WITH CONTROL DEPENDENT. 
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3
NOTES: Key to acronyms and yalues: ENFCN = Enyironmental function - How
foreign enyironmental info, is collected and analysed in HQ. 1 = 
There are one or more managers with formal responsibility for 
collecting and analysing foreign enyironmental information 
(f.e.i.); 2 = F.e.i. is usually collected and analysed but nobody 
has formal responsibility for this; 3 = The collection and 
analysis of f.e.i. is not usually carried out either formally or 
informally.
CONTROL = Degree of control exercised 
by HQ oyer foreign subsidiaries, as far as policy and strategic 
decisions are concerned (e.g. decisions inyolying definition of key 
products in subsidiaries, allocation of resources, expansion and 
diyersification of subsidiary operations, etc.).
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Table VI - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables ECCNfD and 
ASSETOUT
* * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F  * * * * * * * * *
ECOND by ASSETOUT
ASSETOUT
COUNT I
ROW PCT I -25% 26% + ROW
COL PCT I TOTAL
TOT PCT I 1 I 2 I
ECOND -------
1 I 9 I 4 I 13
Not included I 69.2 I 30.8 I 14.8
I 34.6 I 6.5 I
I 10.2 I 4.5 I
■I- -I- -I
2 I 8 I 28 I 36
Included only I 22.2 I 77.8 I 40.9
occasionally I 30.8 I 45.2 I
or annually I 9.1 I 31.8 I
I- -I- -I
3 I 9 I 30 I 39
Included half I 23.1 I 76.9 I 44.3
yearly or I 34.6 I 48.4 I
more often I
. T
10.2 I 34.1 I
_ j
COLUMN
► J.—
26 62 88
TOTAL 29.5 70.5 100.0
1 OUT OF 6 (16.7%) OF THE VALID CELLS HAVE EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY LESS 
THAN 5.0. MINIMUM EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY = 3.841
RAW CHI SQUARE = 11.54707 WITH 2 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0031 
CRAMER’S V = 0.36224
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.05915 WITH ECOND DEPENDENT.
= 0.09832 WITH ASSETOUT DEPENDENT. 
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 9
NOTES: Key to acronyms : ECOND = Reports on economic conditions in host
countries, as an item in the formal reporting system operated in a 
company between foreign subsidiaries and HQ.
ASSETOUT = Proportion of total assets located 
outside the U.K. to total company assets.
588
APPENDIX D
Table VII - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables ECOND 
and STRATEGY
* * * * * * * * *
ECOND
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F * * * * * * * * *
BY STRATEGY
STRATEGY
ECOND
COUNT 
ROW PCT 
COL PCT 
TOT PCT 1
Not included
Included only 
occasionally
Included
annually
Included half 
yearly or 
more often
1 I 11 
I 91.7 
I 18.3 
I 12.2 
I------
-I-
COLUMN
TOTAL
13
86.7
21.7 
14.4
I 
I 
I 
I
• I 
I 
I 
I 
I
■ I-----
I 22 
I 57.9 
I 36.7 
I 24.4
14
56.0
23.3
15.6
60
66.7
1
8.3
3.3 
1.1
2
13.3
6 . 7
2.2
11
44.0
36.7
12.2
16
42.1
53.3
17.8
30
33.3
ROW
TOTAL
12
13.3
15
16.7
25
27.8
38
42.2
90
100.0
1 OUT OF 8 (12.5%) OF THE VALID CELLS HAVE EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY LESS 
THAN 5.0. MINIMUM EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY = 4.000
RAW CHI SQUARE = 8.67078 WITH 3 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0340 
CRAMER’S V = 0.31039
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.04266 WITH ECOND DEPENDENT.
= 0.08627 WITH STRATEGY DEPENDENT. 
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 7
NOTES: Key to acronyms and yalues: ECOND = Reports on economic conditions
in host countries, as an item in the formal reporting system 
operated in a company between foreign subsidiaries and HQ.
STRATEGY = Strategies followed by 
companies in the organization of their international industrial 
actiyities. 1 = Segmented nation-for-nation strategy; 2 = Global 
integration strategy -pure or mixed- (this class aggregates yalues 
2, 3, and 4 of the code originally defined).
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Table VIII - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables PLSCOND
and NCOUNTRY
* * * * * * * * *
PLSCOND
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F * * * * * * * * *
BY NCOUNTRY
COUNT 
ROW PCT 
COL PCT 
TOT PCT
NCOUNTRY
I
I -5 
I
I 1 ]
6-10
PLSCOND
1
Not Included
I 13 1
I 68.4 I
I 39.4 I
I 13.8 I
4
21.1
13.8
4.3
-I-
Included only 
occasionally
Included
annually
Included half 
yearly or 
more often
I 10 I
I 41.7 I
I 30.3 I
I 10.6 I
8
33.3
27.6
8.5
-I-
I 7 1
I 25.0 I
I 21.2 I
I 7.4 I
8
28.6
27.6
8.5
-I-
I 3 1
I 13.0 I
I 9.1 I
I 3.2 I
9
39.1
31.0
9.6
-I-
COLUMN
TOTAL
33
35.1
29
30.9
11 +
2
10.5
6.2
2.1
6
25.0
18.7
6.4
13
46.4
40.6
13.8
11
47.8
34.4
11.7
32
34.0
ROW
TOTAL
19
20.2
24
25.5
28
29.8
23
24.5
94
100.0
RAW CHI SQUARE = 17.71046 WITH 6 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0070 
CRAMER'S V = 0.30693
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.07132 WITH PLSCOND DEPENDENT.
= 0.08951 WITH NCOUNTRY DEPENDENT. 
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3
NOTES: Key to acronyms: PLSCOND = Reports on political, legal, and social
conditions in host countries, as an item in the formal reporting 
system operated in a company between foreign subsidiaries and HQ.
NCOUNTRY = Total number of countries -excluding 
U.K.- where the company maintains control oyer industrial 
operations.
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Table IX - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables PLSCOND
and NAREA
* * * * * * * * *
PLSCOND
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F * * * * * * * * *
BY NAREA
NAREA
COUNT 
ROW PCT 
COL PCT 
TOT PCT
PLSCOND
Not included
Included only 
occasionally
Included 
annually
Included half 
yearly or 
more often
1
COLUMN
TOTAL
1-3
1
4-5
2
6-7
3
ROW
TOTAL
11 7 1 19
57.9 36.8 5.3 20.2
32.4 18.4 4.5
11.7 7.4 1.1
11 9 4 24
45.8 37.5 16.7 25.5
32.4 23.7 18.2
11.7 9.6 4.3
8 7 13 28
28.6 25.0 46.4 29.8
23.5 18.4 59.1
8.5 7.4 13.8
4 15 4 23
17.4 65.2 17.4 24.5
11.8 39.5 18.2
4.3 16.0 4.3
34 38 22 94
36.2 40.4 23.4 100.0
1 OUT OF 12 (8.3%) OF THE VALID CELLS HAVE EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY LESS
THAN 5.0. MINIMUM EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY = 4.447
RAW CHI SQUARE = 20.87898 WITH 6 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0019 
CRAMER’S V = 0.33325
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.07969 WITH PLSCOND DEPENDENT.
= 0.10218 WITH NAREA DEPENDENT.
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3
NOTES: Key to acronyms: PLSCOND = Reports on political, legal, and social
conditions in host countries, as an item in the formal reporting 
system operated in a company between foreign subsidiaries and HQ.
NAREA = Number of different geographic areas in 
the world where the company maintains control oyer industrial 
operations.
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Table X - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables PLSCOND 
and STRATEGY
* * * * * * * * *
PLSCOND
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F * * * * * * * * *
BY STRATEGY
STRATEGY
COUNT I
ROW PCT I ROW
COL PCT I TOTAL
TOT PCT I 1 I 2 I
PLSCOND --- -I- -I- -I
1 I 15 I 1 I 16
Not included I 93.7 I 6.2 I 18.2
I 25.9 I 3.3 I
I 17.0 I 1.1 I
•I- -I- -I
2 I 18 I 6 I 24
Included only I 75.0 I 25.0 I 27.3
occasionally I 31.0 I 20.0 I
I 20.5 I 6.8 I
I- -I- -I
3 I 14 I 12 I 26
Included I 53.8 I 46.2 I 29.5
annually I 24.1 I 40.0 I
I 15.9 I 13.6 I
I- -I-. -I
4 I 11 I 11 I 22
Included half I 50.0 I 50.0 I 25.0
yearly or I 19.0 I 36.7 I
more often I 12.5 I 12.5 I
I- -I- -I
COLUMN 58 30 88
TOTAL 65.9 34.1 100.0
RAW CHI SQUARE = 10.56427 WITH 3 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0143 
CRAMER’S V = 0.34648
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.05000 WITH PLSCOND DEPENDENT
= 0.106 85 WITH STRATEGY DEPENDENT 
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 9
NOTES: Key to acronyms and yal ues: PLSCOND = Reports on political, legal,
and social conditions in host countries, as an item in the formal 
reporting system operated in a company between foreign subsidiaries 
and HQ.
STRATEGY = Strategies followed by 
companies in the organization of their international industrial 
actiyities. 1 = Segmented nation-for-nation strategy; 2 = Global 
integration strategy -pure or mixed- (this class aggregates yalues 
2, 3, and 4 of the code originally defined).
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Table XI - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables PLSCOND
and EXPOSURE
* * * * * * * * *
PLSCOND
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F * * * * * * * * *
BY EXPOSURE
EXPOSURE
PLSCOND
COUNT I 
ROW PCT I 
COL PCT I 
TOT PCT I
 1.
1 I
Not included
Included only 
occasionally
Included 
annually
Included half 
yearly or 
more often
I
I
I
-I-
I
I
I
I
-I-
I
I
I
I
-I-
I
I
I
I
-I-
COLUMN
TOTAL
Low Medium High
1 2-3 4-5
1 2 3 I
10 7 2 I
52.6 36.8 10.5 I
34.5 17.1 9.1 I
10.9 7.6 2.2 I
8 7 8 I
34.8 30.4 34.8 I
27.6 17.1 36.4 I
8.7 7.6 8.7 I
9 15 4 I
32.1 53.6 14.3 I
31.0 36.6 18.2 I
9.8 16.3 4.3 I
2 12 8 I
9.1 54.5 36.4 I
6.9 29.3 36.4 I
2.2 13.0 8.7 I
29 41 22
31.5 44.6 23.9
ROW
TOTAL
19
20.7
23
25.0
28
30.4
22
23.9
92
100.0
1 OUT OF 12 (8.3%) OF THE VALID CELLS HAVE EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY LESS 
THAN 5.0. MINIMUM EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY = 4.543
RAW CHI SQUARE = 13.63640 WITH 6 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0340 
CRAMER'S V r 0.27223
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.05872 WITH PLSCOND DEPENDENT.
= 0.07580 WITH EXPOSURE DEPENDENT.
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 5
NOTES: Key to acronyms: PLSCOND = Reports on political, legal, and social
conditions in host countries, as an item in the formal reporting 
system operated in a company between foreign subsidiaries and HQ.
EXPOSURE = Degree of company exposure to host 
country and goyernment influence in foreign operations.
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Table XII - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables PLSCCNJD
and ASSETOUT
* * * * * * * * *
PLSCOND
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F * * * * * * * * *
BY ASSETOUT
COUNT 
ROW PCT 
COL PCT 
TOT PCT
ASSETOUT
I
I -25% 26%-40% 41%+
I
I I I  2 1 3
PLSCOND
1
Not included
I 11 
I 61.1 
I 42.3 
I 12.8 
I------
I 4 
I 22.2 
I 12.9 
I 4.7
Included only 
occasionally
Included
annually
Included half 
yearly or 
more often
5
21.7
19.2
5.8
I 
I 
I 
I
.1------
I 6
I 25.0 
I 23.1 
I 7.0
I------
I 4
I 19.0 
I 15.4 
I 4.7
I 11 
I 47.8 
I 35.5 
I 12.8
I 10 
I 41.7 
I 32.3 
I 11.6
I 6 
I 28.6 
I 19.4 
I 7.0
-I-
COLUMN
TOTAL
26
30.2
31
36.0
3
16.7
10.3
3.5
7
30.4
24.1
8.1
8
33.3
27.6
9.3
11
52.4
37.9
1 2 . 8
29
33.7
ROW
TOTAL
18
20.9
23
26.7
24
27.9
21
24.4
86
100.0
RAW CHI SQUARE = 13.48323 WITH 6 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0360 
CRAMER'S V = 0.27998
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.0526 8 WITH PLSCOND DEPENDENT.
= 0.06636 WITH ASSETOUT DEPENDENT. 
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 11
NOTES: Key to acronyms: PLSCOND = Reports on political, legal, and social
conditions in host countries, as an item in the formal reporting 
system operated in a company between foreign subsidiaries and HQ.
ASSETOUT z Proportion of total assets located 
outside the U.K. to total company assets.
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Table XIII - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables PLSCWD 
and SIZASSET
* * * * * * * * *
PLSCOND
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F * * * * * * * * *
BY SIZASSET
COUNT 
ROW PCT 
COL PCT 
TOT PCT
SIZASSET
I
I- g100m 
I
I 1 I
£ 101-£300  
2
PLSCOND
Not included
Included only 
occasionally
Included
annually
Included half 
yearly or 
quarterly
Included
monthly
1 I 10 I
I 52.6 I
I 27.0 I
I 10.5 I
-I-
-I-
-I-
-I-
I
I
I
I
-I-
COLUMN
TOTAL
37
38.9
4
2 1 . 1
1 3 . 8
4.2
I 14 I
I 58.3 I
I 37.8 I
I 14.7 I
6
25.0
20.7
6.3
I 8 1
I 28.6 I 
I 21.6 I 
I 8.4 I
12
42.9
41.4
12.6
I 5 1
I 29.4 I 
I 13.5 I 
I 5.3 I
3
17.6
10.3
3.2
0 I 
0.0 I 
0.0 I 
0.0 I
4
57.1
13.8
4.2
29
30.5
£301m + ROW 
TOTAL
3
5
26.3
17.2
5.3
4
16.7
13.8 
4.2
8
28.6
27.6
8.4
9
52.9
31.0
9.5
3
42.9
10.3
3.2
29
30.5
19
20.0
24
25.3
28
29.5
17
17.9
7
7.4
95
100.0
3 OUT OF 15 (20.0%) OF THE VALID CELLS HAVE EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY LESS 
THAN 5.0. MINIMUM EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY = 2.137
RAW CHI SQUARE = 16.67047 WITH 8 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0337 
CRAMER'S V = 0.29621
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.06411 WITH PLSCOND DEPENDENT.
= 0.08982 WITH SIZASSET DEPENDENT. 
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 2
NOTES: Key to acronyms: PLSCOND = Reports on political, legal, and social
conditions in host countries, as an item in the formal reporting 
system operated in a company between foreign subsidiaries and HQ.
SIZASSET = Size of the company measured in total 
assets for the group - millions of pounds.
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Table XIV - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables PEHCHFR
and ENFCN
* * * * * * * * *
PERCNFR
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F
BY ENFCN
ENFCN
PERCNFR
- 20%
21% - 40%
41%
COUNT I 
ROW PCT I 
COL PCT I 
TOT PCT I 
 1-
1 I 
I 
I 
I
-I-
2 I 
I 
I 
I
-I-
3 I 
I 
I 
I
-I-
1
2
6 . 1
12.5
2.2
8
19.5
50.0
8.7
6
33.3
37.5
6.5
COLUMN
TOTAL
16
17.4
20
60.6
34.5
21.7
27
65.9
46.6
29.3
11
61.1
19 . 0
12.0
58
63.0
11
33.3
61.1
12.0
6
14.6
33.3
6.5
1
5.6
5.6 
1 . 1
18
19.6
ROW
TOTAL
33
35.9
41
44.6
18
19.6
92
100.0
2 OUT OF 9 (22.2%) OF THE VALID CELLS HAVE EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY LESS 
THAN 5.0. MINIMUM EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY = 3.130
RAW CHI SQUARE = 10.77819 WITH 4 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0292 
CRAMER'S V = 0.24203
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.05836 WITH PERCNFR DEPENDENT.
= 0.06684 WITH ENFCN DEPENDENT. 
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 5
NOTES: Key to acronyms and yalues: PERCNFR = Percentage of non-financial
reports in relation to the total number of reports submitted in a
company by each foreign subsidiary during one year.
ENFCN = Enyironmental function - How
foreign enyironmental info, is collected and analysed in HQ. 1 =
There are one or more managers with formal responsibility for 
collecting and analysing foreign enyironmental information 
(f.e.i.); 2 = F.e.i. is usually collected and analysed but nobody 
has formal responsibility for this; 3 = The collection and 
analysis of f.e.i. is not usually carried out either formally or 
informally.
596
APPENDIX D
Table XV - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables ECWD and 
ENFCN
* * * * * * * * *
ECOND
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F
BY ENFCN
ENFCN
COUNT I
ROW PCT I ROW
COL PCT I TOTAL
TOT PCT I I I  2 1 3 1
ECOND------ 1-------- 1--------1-------- 1
I I  0 1  5 1  8 1  13
Not included I 0.0 I 38.5 I 61.5 I 13.7
I 0.0 I 8.5 I 42.1 I
I 0.0 I 5.3 I 8.4 I
-I-------- 1-------- 1------- 1
2 1  7 1  25 I 9 1  41
Included only I 17.1 I 61.0 I 22.0 I 43.2
occasionally I 41.2 I 42.4 I 47.4 I
or annually I 7.4 I 26.3 I 9.5 I
-I---------1-------- 1------- 1
3 1 10 I 29 I 2 1 41
Included half I 24.4 I 70.7 I 4.9 I 43.2
yearly or I 58.8 I 49.2 I 10.5 I
more often I 10.5 I 30.5 I 2.1 I
-I---------1-------- 1------- 1
COLUMN 17. 59 19 95
TOTAL 17.9 62.1 20.0 100.0
2 OUT OF 9 (22.2%) OF THE VALID CELLS HAVE EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY LESS 
THAN 5.0. MINIMUM EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY = 2.326
RAW CHI SQUARE = 20.95953 WITH 4 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0003 
CRAMER’S V = 0.33213
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.11283 WITH ECOND DEPENDENT.
= 0.12159 WITH ENFCN DEPENDENT.
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 2
NOTES; Key to acronyms and yalues: ECOND = Reports on economic conditions 
in host countries, as an item in the formal reporting system 
operated in a company between foreign subsidiaries and HQ.
ENFCN = Enyironmental function - How 
foreign enyironmental info, is collected and analysed in HQ. 1 = 
There are one or more managers with formal responsibility for 
collecting and analysing foreign enyironmental information 
(f.e.i.); 2 = F.e.i. is usually collected and analysed but nobody 
has formal responsibility for this; 3 = The collection and 
analysis of f.e.i. is not usually carried out either formally or 
informally.
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Table ZVI - Contingency Tabulation and Summary Statistics for Variables
PLSCOND and HIFCN
* * * * * * * * *
PLSCOND
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F * * * * * * * * *
BY ENFCN
ENFCN
PLSCOND
COUNT I 
ROW PCT I 
COL PCT I 
TOT PCT I
 1-
1 I
1
Not included
Included only 
occasionally or 
more frequenty
COLUMN
TOTAL
I
I
I
-I-
I
I
I
I
-I-
9
47.4
12.2
9.7
65
87.8
87 .8
69.9
10
52.6
52.6 
10.8
9
12 .2
47.4
9.7
I
- I
I
I
I
I
-I
I
I
I
I
-I
74
79.6
19
20.4
R O W
TOTAL
19
20.4
74
79.6
93
100 .0
CORRECTED CHI SQUARE = 12.84354 WITH 1 DEGREE OF FREEDOM (Yate’s correction 
for continuity) SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0003
PHI = 0.40469
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.13916 WITH PLSCOND DEPENDENT.
= 0.13916 WITH ENFCN DEPENDENT.
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 4
NOTES: Key to acronyms and yalues: PLSCOND = Reports on political, legal,
and social conditions in host countries, as an item in the formal 
reporting system operated in a company between foreign subsidiaries 
and HQ.
ENFCN = Enyironmental function - How 
foreign enyironmental info, is collected and analysed in HQ. 1 = 
There are one or more managers with formal responsibility for 
collecting and analysing foreign enyironmental information 
(f.e.i.); or f.e.i. is usually collected and analysed but nobody 
has formal responsibility for this (this class aggregates yalues 1, 
and 2 of the code originally defined); 2 = The collection and
analysis of f.e.i. is not usually carried out either formally or 
informally (this class corresponds to yalue 3 of the code 
originally defined).
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Table XVll - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for VariablesINFLSDB
and TR
* * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F  * * * * * * *  
INFLSUB BY TR
TR
COUNT 
ROW PCT 
COL PCT 
TOT PCT
INFLSUB -------
1
Very low to 
moderate 
1 - 3
High or very high 
4 - 5
I
I
I
I
-I-
I
I
I
I
-I-
I
I
I
I
-I-
-71
1
72-122
COLUMN
TOTAL
17
35.4
63.0
18.1
10
21.7
37.0
10.6
27
28.7
25
52.1
5 6 . 8
26.6
19
41.3
43.2
20.2
44
46.8
123 +
6
12.5
26.1
6.4
17
37.0 
73.9
18.1
23
24.5
ROW
TOTAL
48
51.1
46
48.9
94
100.0
RAW CHI SQUARE = 7.85486 WITH 2 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0197 
CRAMER’S V = 0.28907
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.06215 WITH INFLSUB DEPENDENT.
= 0.04070 WITH TR DEPENDENT.
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3
NOTES: Key to acronyms: INFLSDB = Level of importance given by HQ
management to information collected informally for the purpose of 
evaluation and control of foreign subsidiaries.
TR = Total number of reports submitted by each 
foreign subsidiary in a company during one year.
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Table XVIII - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables
INFLSDB and PERCNFR
O F  * * * * * * * * *
BY PERCNFR
* * * * * * * * * C R 0 S S 'r A B u L A T I
INFLSUB
PERCNFR
COUNT I
ROW PCT I -22.5% 22.5%+ ROW
COL PCT I TOTAL
TOT PCT I 1 I 2 I
INFLSUB ------- I- -I- .1
1 I 26 I 22 I 48
Very low to I 54.2 I 45.8 I 51.1
moderate I 65.0 I 40.7 I
1 - 3 I 27.7 I 23.4 I
I- -I- -I
2 I 14 I 32 I 46
High or very high I 30.4 I 69.6 I 48.9
4 - 5 I 35.0 I 59.3 I
I 14.9 I 34.0 I
I- -I- .1
COLUMN 40 54 94
TOTAL 42.6 57.4 100.0
CORRECTED CHI SQUARE! = 4.48447 WITH 1 DEGREE 1 = 0.0342
PHI = 0.23994
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.04204 WITH INFLSUB DEPENDENT.
= 0.04271 WITH PERCNFR DEPENDENT.
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3
NOTES: Key to acronyms: INFLSDB = Level of importance given by HQ
management to information collected informally for the purpose of 
evaluation and control of foreign subsidiaries.
PERCNFR = Percentage of non-financial reports 
in relation to the total number of reports submitted in a company 
by each foreign subsidiary during one year.
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Table XIX - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables INFLESÜB
and ECOND
* * * * * * * * *
INFLESUB
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F * * * * * * * * *
BY ECOND
ECOND
INot
lincluded 
I or 
COUNT lincluded 
ROW PCT lonly 
COL PCT loccasionally 
TOT PCT I 1 I
TMTTT P C T T P  ___  _  T  T
Included 
annually
2
Included 
half yearly 
or
more often 
3
ROW
TOTAL
1 I 7 I 19 15 41
Not at all or I 17.1 I 46.3 36.6 43.2
to a little extent I 25.0 I 73.1 36.6
1 - 2  I 
-I -
7.4 I
______ __ j_
20.0 15.8
To a moderate 2 I 21 I 7 26 54
extent to I 38.9 I 13.0 48.1 56.8
very extensively I 75.0 I 26.9 63.4
3 - 5  I
_ j
22.1 I 7.4 27.4
COLUMN 28 26 41 95
TOTAL 29.5 27.4 43.2 100.0
RAW CHI SQUARE = 13.97237 WITH 2 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0009 
CRAMER’S V = 0.38351
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.10994 WITH INFLESUB DEPENDENT.
= 0.06977 WITH ECOND DEPENDENT.
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 2
NOTES: Key to acronyms : INFLESUB % Extent of collection through informal
channels of foreign environmental information for the evaluation 
and control of foreign subsidiaries.
ECOND = Reports on economic conditions in host 
countries, as an item in the formal reporting system operated in a 
company between foreign subsidiaries and HQ.
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Table XX - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables INFLEMAN
and EOWD
* * * * * * * * *
INFLEMAN
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F * * * * * * * * *
BY ECOND
ECOND
INot
lincluded 
I or 
COUNT lincluded 
ROW PCT lonly 
COL PCT loccasionally 
TOT PCT I 1 I
TMTTT TTM AM  T  T _
Included
annually
2
Included 
half yearly 
or
more often 
3
ROW
TOTAL
1 I 5 I 13 9 27
Not at all or I 18.5 I 48.1 33.3 45.0
to a little extent I 33.3 I 76.5 32.1
1 - 2  I 8.3 I
____ ___ —  I -
21.7 15.0
To a moderate 2 I 10 I 4 19 33
extent to I 30.3 I 12.1 57.6 55.0
very extensively I 66.7 I 23.5 67.9
3 - 5  I
_ j
16.7 I 6.7 31.7
COLUMN
_________
15 17 28 60
TOTAL 25.0 28.3 46.7 100.0
RAW CHI SQUARE = 9.49777 WITH 2 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0087 
CRAMER’S V = 0.39786
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.11827 WITH INFLEMAN DEPENDENT.
= 0.076 81 WITH ECOND DEPENDENT.
NOTES: Key to acronyms: INFLEMAN = Extent of collection through informal
channels of foreign environmental information for the assessment 
of foreign subsidiaries’ managers.
ECOND = Reports on economic conditions in host 
countries, as an item in the formal reporting system operated in a 
company between foreign subsidiaries and HQ.
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Table XXI - Contingency Table and Summary Statistics for Variables INFLESUB
and PLSCOND
* * * * * * * * *
INFLESUB
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F * * * * * * * * *
BY PLSCOND
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
PLSCOND
j
INot Included Included
lincluded annually half yearly
I or or
COUNT lincluded more often
ROW PCT lonly ROW
COL PCT loccasionally TOTAL
TOT PCT I 1 2 I 3
INFI ESUB ________
1 I 37 25 I 14 76
Not at all to I 48.7 32.9 I 18.4 81.7
to a moderate I 88.1 89.3 I 60.9
extent I 39.8 26.9 I 15.1
1 - 3 I___________
2 I 5 3 I 9 17
Extensively or I 29.4 17.6 I 52.9 18.3
very extensively I 11.9 10.7 I 39.1
4 - 5 I 5.4 3.2 I 9.7
I------------
COLUMN
TOTAL
42
45.2
28
30 . 1
23
24.7
93
100.0
1 OUT OF 6 ( 16.7%) OF THE VALID CELLS HAVE EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY LESS 
THAN 5.0. MINIMUM EXPECTED CELL FREQUENCY = 4.204
RAW CHI SQUARE = 8.90926 WITH 2 DEGREES OF FREEDOM. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0116 
CRAMER’S V = 0.30951
UNCERTAINTY COEFFICIENT (ASYMMETRIC) = 0.08980 WITH INFLESUB DEPENDENT.
= 0.04007 WITH PLSCOND DEPENDENT. 
NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 4
NOTES: Key to acronyms: INFLESUB = Extent of collection through informal
channels of foreign environmental information for the evaluation 
and control of foreign subsidiaries.
PLSCOND = Reports on political, legal, and 
social conditions in host countries, as an item in the formal 
reporting system operated in a company between foreign subsidiaries 
and HQ.
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COMPUTER PROGRAMME TO CREATE VAWTART.R CRTT
APPENDIX E
RUN NAME
GET FILE 
/  RECODE 
IF  
IF  
IF  
IF  
IF  
IF  
IF  
IF
COUNT 
COMPUTE 
IF  
IF
MISSING VALUES 
COMPUTE 
Compont. I IF
1 I IF  
IF  
IF  
IF  
IF  
IF  
IF  
IF
COUNT 
COMPUTE 
IF  
IF
MISSING VALUES 
COMPUTE 
! ASSIGN MISSING 
\  PRINT FORMATS 
/  COUNT 
COUNT 
IF
Compont.! MISSING VALUES
2 I COMPUTE
ASSIGN MISSING
\  PRINT FORMATS 
/  COMPUTE 
Compont.I ASSIGN MISSING
3 \  PRINT FORMAT
/  COUNT
COMPUTE 
IF
Compont.I IF
4 I IF
MISSING VALUES
\  PRINT FORMATS
CREATION OF A NE W  SYSTEM FILE AS A PREPARATION 
FOR THE TESTS TO BE PERFORMED IN RELATION TO 
H O  2 IN CHAPTER 12 
STSPSS2
EES TO EKEXP (99=9)(999=9)
(EES LT 9) SUMzEES
(EESUPDT LT 9) SU M = S U M+EESUPDT
(EPL L T  9) SUM= SUM+EPL
(EPLUPDT LT 9) SUM=SUM+EPLUPDT
(EOF LT 9) S U M=SUM+ECF
(ESALES LT 9) SUM=SUM+ESALES
(EEORROW LT 9) SUM=SUM+EEORROW
(EKEXP LT 9) SUMzSUM+EKEXP
MISSINGzEES TO EOF,ESALES,EEORROW,EKEXP(9)
VALIDz8-MISSING
(VALID GE 1) INDIzSUM/VALID
(VALID EQ 0) IND1z9
IND1 (9)
SUMzO
(EINV LT 9) SUMzSU M + E I N V
(EMARKT LT 9) SUMzSUM+EMARKT
(EOUTPUT L T  9) SUMzSUM+EOUTPUT
(EMANUFUT LT 9) SUMzSUM+EMANUFUT
(ELAEREL LT 9) SUMzSUM+ELAEREL
(EQUALY LT 9) SUMzSUM+EQUALY
(EECOND LT 9) SUMz S U M + E E C O N D
(EPLSCOND LT 9) SUMzSUM+EPLSCOND
(EEMPLOY LT 9) S U M z S U M + E E M P L O Y
MISSINGzEINV,EMARKT TO EPLSCOND,EEMPLOY(9)
V ALIDz9-MISSING
(VALID GE 1) IND2zSUM/VALID
(VALID EQ 0) IND2z9
IND2 (9)
CRIT1zIND2/IND1
CRITK99.999)
CRIT1 (3)
IND3=IR0I TO IPMOTH (1 THRU 9)
INDMzICF TO INPMOTH (1 THRU 9)
(IND3 EQ 0) IND3=99 
IND3 (99)
CRIT2z INDM/IND3 
CRIT2 (999.999)
CRIT2 (3)
CRIT3=PACKAGE»2-PURMEAS 
CRIT3 (99.999)
CRIT3 (3)
IND5=STARGET TO STSEUK(O)
CRIT4z6-IND5
(STARGET EQ 999 OR STPAST EQ 999) CRIT4z99.999 
(STCOHC EQ 999 OR STS E H C  EQ 999) CRIT4z99.999 
(STSEDC EQ 999 OR STSEUK EQ 999) CRIT4z99.999 
CRITM (99.999)
CRIT4 (3)
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Compont.
5
\
/
Compont.!
6 I
\
/
Transfor
mation
of
values
Into
compara­
ble
ranges
\
Synthe- / 
sis I
Var.CRITX
RECODE
COMPUTE
IF
IF
COUNT
COMPUTE
IF
IF
IF
MISSING VALUES 
PRINT FORMATS 
RECODE 
COMPUTE
MISSING VALUES 
PRINT FORMATS 
COMPUTE
MISSING VALUES 
ASSIGN MISSING 
RECODE
COMPUTE
MISSING VALUES 
ASSIGN MISSING 
RECODE 
COMPUTE
ASSIGN MISSING 
PRINT FORMATS 
SAVE FILE 
FINISH
TARGVARN,TARGVARV (999=99)
SUMzO
(TARGVARN LE 5) SUM=SUM+TARGVARN*2 
(TARGVARV LE 5) SUM=SUM+TARGVARV 
MISSINGzTARGVARN,TARGVARV (99)
VALIDz2-MISSING 
(VALID EQ 2) CRIT5=SUM/3
(VALID EQ 1 AND TARGVARN LE 5) CRIT5=SUM/2 
(VALID EQ 1 AND TARGVARN EQ 99) CRIT5=99.999 
CRIT5 (99.999)
CRIT5 (3)
SAME(2z3)(3=5)(999=99.999)(99=99.999) 
CRIT6zSAME
CRIT6(99.999)
CRIT6 (3)
CRIT11zCRIT1*10
CRITK99.999)
CRIT11 (999)
CRIT2(0.000z1)(0.143 THRU 0.200z2)(0.250 THRU 
0.333=3)(0.400 THRU 0.429=4)(0.500z5)(0.600 
THRU 0.625=6)(0.667 THRU 0.714=7)(0.750 THRU 
0.833=8)(1.000z9)(1.143 THRU 3.000z10)
CRIT15=CRIT5*2 
CRIT5(99.999)
CRIT15(999)
CRIT6(1.000z6)(3.000z8)(5.000z10)
CRITzCRIT11+CRIT2+CRIT3+CRIT4+CRIT15+CRIT6
CRIT(999)
CRIT(3)
STSPSS3
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COMPUTER PROGRAMME TO CREATE VARIABLE &
APPENDIX F
RUN NAME
GET FILE 
RECODE 
DO REPEAT
COMPUTE 
END REPEAT 
COUNT 
COMPUTE 
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
ASSIGN MISSING 
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
ASSIGN MISSING 
PRINT FORMATS 
SAVE FILE 
FINISH
CREATION OF A NEW SYSTEM FILE AS A PREPARATION TO THE 
TESTS TO BE PERFORMED IN RELATION TO H06 IN CHAPTER 12 
STSPSS3
P0LST1 TO CINPT7 (9=0)(99=0)(999=0)
XzPOLST,STRIK,ATTWRK,ATTMNE,CULTU,ECGROW,TAX,INFRA,CASH,KMOVE, 
lECTL,GOV CTL,LAW,INFLAT,EXCH,MKTSIZ,CINPT/X1 = P0LST1,STRIK1, 
ATTWRK1,ATTMNE1,CULTU1,ECGR0W1,TAXI,INFRA1,CASH1,KMOVE1,IECTL1, 
G0VCTL1,LAW1,INFLAT1,EXCHI,MKTSIZ1,CINPT1/X2=P0LST2,STRIK2, 
ATTWRK2,ATTMNE2,CULTU2,ECGR0W2,TAX2,INFRA2,CASH2,KM0VE2,IECTL2, 
G0VCTL2,LAW2,INFLAT2,EXCH2,MKTSIZ2,CINPT2/X3=POLST3.STRIK3, 
ATTWRK3,ATTMNE3,CULTU3,ECGR0W3,TAX3,INFRA3,CASH3,KM0VE3,IECTL3, 
G0VCTL3,LAW3,INFLAT3,EXCH3,MKTSIZ3,CINPT3/X4=P0LST4,STRIK4, 
ATTWRK4,ATTMNE4,CULTU4,ECGR0W4,TAX4,INFRA4,CASH4,KM0VE4,IECTL4, 
G0VCTL4,LAW4,INFLAT4,EXCH4,MKTSIZ4,CINPT4/X5=POLST5,STRIK5, 
ATTWRK5,ATTMNE5,CULTU5,ECGR0W5,TAX5,INFRA5,CASH5,KM0VE5,IECTL5, 
G0VCTL5,LAW5,INFLAT5,EXCH5,MKTSIZ5,CINPT5/X6=POLST6,STRIK6, 
ATTWRK6,ATTMNE6,CULTU6,ECGR0W6,TAX6,INFRA6,CASH6,KM0VE6,IECTL6, 
G0VCTL6,LAW6,INFLAT6,EXCH6,MKTSIZ6,CINPT6/X7=POLST7,STRIK7, 
ATTWRK7,ATTMNE7,CULTU7,ECGR0W7,TAX7,INFRA7,CASH7,KM0VE7,IECTL7, 
G0VCTL7,LAW7,INFLAT7,EXCH7,MKTSIZ7,CINPT7 
X= X1+X2 +X3+X4 +X5 +X6 +X7
KIzPOLSTI,P0LST2,P0LST3,P0LST4,P0LST5,P0LST6,P0LST7(0)
Kz7-K1
RJzPOLST+STRIK+ATTWRK+ATTMNE+CULTU+ECGROW+TAX+INFRA+CASH+
KMOVE+IECTL+GOVCTL+LAW+INFLAT+EXCH+MKTSIZ+CINPT
MRJzRJ/17
RJ,MRJ(0)
Sz(POLST-MRJ)»»2+(STRIK-MRJ)**2+(ATTWRK-MRJ)»»2+(ATTMNE-MRJ)»»2- 
(CULTU-MRJ)**2+(ECGR0W-MRJ)**2+(TAX-MRJ)**2+(INFRA-MRJ)**2+ 
(CASH-MRJ)**2+(KM0VE-MRJ)**2+(IECTL-MRJ)**2+(G0VCTL-MRJ)**2+ 
(LAW-MRJ)**2+(INFLAT-MRJ)**2+(EXCH-MRJ)**2+(MKTSIZ-MRJ)**2+
(CINPT-MRJ)**2 
WzS/(K**2/12(17**3-17))
S,W(0)
W(3)
STSPSS4
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